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**A Roadmap for IPsec Policy Management**  
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Abstract

This document describes the approach that the IPSP WG will follow to resolve the challenges that IPsec compliant devices phase with respect to modeling, specifying, translating, provisioning, exchanging, negotiating, checking and enforcing IPsec policies.

**1. What is the IPSP WG trying to solve?**

The rapid growth of the Internet and the need to control access to network resources (bandwidth, routers, hosts, etc.) has quickly generated the need for representing, discovering, exchanging and managing the policies that control access to these resources in a scalable, secured and reliable fashion.

Current IP security protocols and algorithms [RFCs 2401-2412, 2085, 2104 and 2451] can exchange keying material using IKE [[RFC2409](#)] and protect data flows using the AH [[RFC2402](#)] and/or ESP protocols [[RFC2406](#)]. The scope of IKE limits the protocol to the authenticated exchange of keying material and associated policy information between the end-points of a security association.

However, along the path of a communication, there may be administrative entities that need to impose policy constraints on entities such as security gateways and router filters. There also is a need for end-points of a security association and/or, for their respective administrative entities, to securely discover and negotiate access control information for the end hosts and for the policy enforcement points (security gateways, routers, etc.) along the path of the communication.

## **2. Roadmap to a solution**

In essence the IPSP WG will produce a set of documents and working code. To accomplish this the IPSP WG will work on the items listed below. Please note, that not all items require code development. Below, you will find a complete list of all items. The IPSP WG will:

- 1) first establish the requirements for IPsec policy management. Any solution developed under the IPSP umbrella MUST meet these requirements. The requirements document will cover all aspects of IPsec policy management including:

- IPsec data model
- IPsec policy architecture
- IPsec policy specification
- IPsec policy provisioning
- IPsec security gateway discovery
- IPsec policy discovery, negotiation, conflict resolution and compliance checking

This WG item will produce a standards-track document.

- 2) define a data model for IPsec policies. This model will be compatible with the P-CIM [[PCIM](#)]. This WG item will produce a standards-track document.

- 3) develop an architecture for IPsec policy management. The document will discuss and cover the following topics:

- IPsec data model
- IPsec policy specification
- IPsec policy provisioning
- IPsec security gateway discovery
- IPsec policy discovery, negotiation, conflict

resolution and compliance checking

This WG item will produce a standards-track document.

- 4) develop a flexible, vendor-independent language to represent IPsec policies. The language MUST follow the IPsec data model which in turns follows the P-CIM.

This WG item will produce a standards-track document and parser implementations.

- 5) develop guidelines for the provisioning of IPsec policies using existing policy provisioning protocols. This includes profiles for distributing IPsec policies over protocols such as LDAP, COPS, SNMPCONF, FTP, etc.

This WG item will produce standards-track documents and implementations.

- 6) specify and develop adopt or develop an IPsec policy exchange and negotiation protocol. The protocol must be capable of:

- i) discovering security gateways
- ii) exchanging and negotiating security policies, and;
- iii) resolving policy conflicts in both intra/inter domain environments. The protocol must be independent of any security protocol suite and key management protocol.

Note that the WG MAY decide to divide the above-mentioned functionality into one or more protocols. This WG item will produce a standards-track document and implementations.

### **3. Roadmap Nutshell**

Requirements document. Standards track.

Roadmap Document. This is the roadmap document. Standards track.

Data Information Model. Standards track.

Policy Management Architecture. Standards track.

Specification Language. Standards track document and a reference implementation of the parser.

Provisioning Guidelines. Standards track document and implementations using existing provisioning protocols.

Policy Exchange and Negotiation Protocol. At least one standards track document and implementation.

#### 4. Security Considerations

The document provides a framework for applications to identify the relevant policies in place across the network. Policies must be communicated in a secure way so as not to jeopardize the ability of the application to run. It is also important to ensure that the policies that are communicated statically or dynamically to the Policy Enforcement device are done so, securely. Not doing so could compromise the security of the entire network.

#### REFERENCES

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