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JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
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Abstract

The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these identifiers.

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1. Introduction

The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [[JWS](#)], JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [[JWE](#)], and JSON Web Key (JWK) [[JWK](#)] specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these identifiers. All these specifications utilize JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [[RFC7159](#)] based data structures. This specification also describes the semantics and operations that are specific to these algorithms and key types.

Registering the algorithms and identifiers here, rather than in the JWS, JWE, and JWK specifications, is intended to allow them to remain unchanged in the face of changes in the set of Required, Recommended, Optional, and Deprecated algorithms over time. This also allows changes to the JWS, JWE, and JWK specifications without changing this document.

Names defined by this specification are short because a core goal is for the resulting representations to be compact.

1.1. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [[RFC2119](#)]. If these words are used without being spelled in uppercase then they are to be interpreted with their normal natural language meanings.

BASE64URL(OCTETS) denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS, per Section 2 of [[JWS](#)].

UTF8(String) denotes the octets of the UTF-8 [[RFC3629](#)] representation of String.

ASCII(String) denotes the octets of the ASCII [[RFC20](#)] representation of String.

The concatenation of two values A and B is denoted as A || B.

2. Terminology

These terms defined by the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [[JWS](#)] specification are incorporated into this specification: "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", "Base64url Encoding", "Header Parameter", "JOSE Header", "JWS Payload", "JWS Protected Header", "JWS Signature", "JWS

Signing Input", and "Unsecured JWS".

These terms defined by the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [[JWE](#)] specification are incorporated into this specification: "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", "Additional Authenticated Data (AAD)", "Authentication Tag", "Content Encryption Key (CEK)", "Direct Encryption", "Direct Key Agreement", "JWE Authentication Tag", "JWE Ciphertext", "JWE Encrypted Key", "JWE Initialization Vector", "JWE Protected Header", "Key Agreement with Key Wrapping", "Key Encryption", "Key Management Mode", and "Key Wrapping".

These terms defined by the JSON Web Key (JWK) [[JWK](#)] specification are incorporated into this specification: "JSON Web Key (JWK)" and "JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set)".

These terms defined by the Internet Security Glossary, Version 2 [[RFC4949](#)] are incorporated into this specification: "Ciphertext", "Digital Signature", "Message Authentication Code (MAC)", and "Plaintext".

This term is defined by this specification:

Base64urlUInt

The representation of a positive or zero integer value as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The octet sequence MUST utilize the minimum number of octets needed to represent the value. Zero is represented as BASE64URL(single zero-valued octet), which is "AA".

3. Cryptographic Algorithms for Digital Signatures and MACs

JWS uses cryptographic algorithms to digitally sign or create a Message Authentication Code (MAC) of the contents of the JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload.

[3.1.](#) "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS

The table below is the set of "alg" (algorithm) header parameter values defined by this specification for use with JWS, each of which is explained in more detail in the following sections:

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alg Param Value	Digital Signature or MAC Algorithm	Implementation Requirements
HS256	HMAC using SHA-256	Required
HS384	HMAC using SHA-384	Optional
HS512	HMAC using SHA-512	Optional
RS256	RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-256	Recommended
RS384	RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-384	Optional
RS512	RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-512	Optional
ES256	ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256	Recommended+
ES384	ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384	Optional
ES512	ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512	Optional
PS256	RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256	Optional
PS384	RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and MGF1 with SHA-384	Optional
PS512	RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and MGF1 with SHA-512	Optional
none	No digital signature or MAC performed	Optional

The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification.

See [Appendix A.1](#) for a table cross-referencing the JWS digital signature and MAC "alg" (algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.

3.2. HMAC with SHA-2 Functions

Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate a Message Authentication Code (MAC). This can be used to demonstrate that whoever generated the MAC was in possession of the MAC key. The algorithm for implementing and validating HMACs is provided in [RFC 2104](#) [[RFC2104](#)].

A key of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for "HS256") or larger MUST be used with this algorithm. (This requirement is based on [Section 5.3.4](#) (Security Effect of the HMAC Key) of NIST SP 800-117 [[NIST.800-107](#)], which states that the effective security strength is the minimum of the security strength of the key and two times the size of the internal hash value.)

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The HMAC SHA-256 MAC is generated per [RFC 2104](#), using SHA-256 as the hash algorithm "H", using the JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, and using the shared key. The HMAC output value is the JWS Signature.

The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWS Signature is an HMAC value computed using the corresponding algorithm:

alg	Param Value	MAC Algorithm
HS256		HMAC using SHA-256
HS384		HMAC using SHA-384
HS512		HMAC using SHA-512

The HMAC SHA-256 MAC for a JWS is validated by computing an HMAC value per [RFC 2104](#), using SHA-256 as the hash algorithm "H", using the received JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, and using the shared key. This computed HMAC value is then compared to the result of base64url decoding the received encoded JWS Signature value. The comparison of the computed HMAC value to the JWS Signature value MUST be done in a constant-time manner to thwart timing attacks. Alternatively, the computed HMAC value can be base64url encoded and compared to the received encoded JWS Signature value (also in a constant-time manner), as this comparison produces the same result as comparing the unencoded values. In either case, if the values match, the HMAC has been validated.

Securing content and validation with the HMAC SHA-384 and HMAC SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for HMAC SHA-256 -- just using the corresponding hash algorithms with correspondingly larger minimum key sizes and result values: 384 bits each for HMAC SHA-384 and 512 bits each for HMAC SHA-512.

An example using this algorithm is shown in [Appendix A.1](#) of [\[JWS\]](#).

3.3. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5

This section defines the use of the RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 digital signature algorithm as defined in [Section 8.2 of RFC 3447](#) [\[RFC3447\]](#) (commonly known as PKCS #1), using SHA-2 [\[SHS\]](#) hash functions.

A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms.

The RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows: Generate a digital signature of the JWS Signing Input using

RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN and the SHA-256 hash function with the desired private key. This is the JWS Signature value.

The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWS Signature is a digital signature value computed using the corresponding algorithm:

alg	Param Value	Digital Signature Algorithm
RS256		RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-256
RS384		RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-384
RS512		RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-512

The RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows: Submit the JWS Signing Input, the JWS Signature, and the public key corresponding to the private key used by the signer to the RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY algorithm using SHA-256 as the hash function.

Signing and validation with the RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 SHA-384 and RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 SHA-256 -- just using the corresponding hash algorithms instead of SHA-256.

An example using this algorithm is shown in [Appendix A.2](#) of [\[JWS\]](#).

3.4. Digital Signature with ECDSA

The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [\[DSS\]](#) provides for the use of Elliptic Curve cryptography, which is able to provide equivalent security to RSA cryptography but using shorter key sizes and with greater processing speed for many operations. This means that ECDSA digital signatures will be substantially smaller in terms of length than equivalently strong RSA digital signatures.

This specification defines the use of ECDSA with the P-256 curve and the SHA-256 cryptographic hash function, ECDSA with the P-384 curve and the SHA-384 hash function, and ECDSA with the P-521 curve and the SHA-512 hash function. The P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves are defined in [\[DSS\]](#).

The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows:

1. Generate a digital signature of the JWS Signing Input using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 with the desired private key. The output will be the pair (R, S), where R and S are 256 bit unsigned integers.

2. Turn R and S into octet sequences in big endian order, with each array being 32 octets long. The octet sequence representations MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets contained in the values.
3. Concatenate the two octet sequences in the order R and then S. (Note that many ECDSA implementations will directly produce this concatenation as their output.)
4. The resulting 64 octet sequence is the JWS Signature value.

The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWS Signature is a digital signature value computed using the corresponding algorithm:

+-----+-----+	
alg Param Value Digital Signature Algorithm	
+-----+-----+	
ES256	ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256
ES384	ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384
ES512	ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512
+-----+-----+	

The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows:

1. The JWS Signature value MUST be a 64 octet sequence. If it is not a 64 octet sequence, the validation has failed.
2. Split the 64 octet sequence into two 32 octet sequences. The first octet sequence represents R and the second S. The values R and S are represented as octet sequences using the Integer-to-OctetString Conversion defined in [Section 2.3.7](#) of SEC1 [[SEC1](#)] (in big endian octet order).
3. Submit the JWS Signing Input R, S and the public key (x, y) to the ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 validator.

Signing and validation with the ECDSA P-384 SHA-384 and ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 -- just using the corresponding hash algorithms with correspondingly larger result values. For ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, R and S will be 384 bits each, resulting in a 96 octet sequence. For ECDSA P-521 SHA-512, R and S will be 521 bits each, resulting in a 132 octet sequence. (Note that the Integer-to-OctetString Conversion defined in [Section 2.3.7](#) of SEC1 [[SEC1](#)] used to represent R and S as octet sequences adds zero-valued high-order padding bits when needed to round the size up to a multiple of 8 bits; thus, each 521-bit

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integer is represented using 528 bits in 66 octets.)

Examples using these algorithms are shown in Appendices A.3 and A.4 of [JWS].

3.5. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PSS

This section defines the use of the RSASSA-PSS digital signature algorithm as defined in [Section 8.1 of RFC 3447](#) [RFC3447] with the MGF1 mask generation function and SHA-2 hash functions, always using the same hash function for both the RSASSA-PSS hash function and the MGF1 hash function. The size of the salt value is the same size as the hash function output. All other algorithm parameters use the defaults specified in Section A.2.3 of [RFC 3447](#).

A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.

The RSASSA-PSS SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows: Generate a digital signature of the JWS Signing Input using RSASSA-PSS-SIGN, the SHA-256 hash function, and the MGF1 mask generation function with SHA-256 with the desired private key. This is the JWS signature value.

The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWS Signature is a digital signature value computed using the corresponding algorithm:

alg	Param Value	Digital Signature Algorithm
PS256		RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256
PS384		RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and MGF1 with SHA-384
PS512		RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and MGF1 with SHA-512

The RSASSA-PSS SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows: Submit the JWS Signing Input, the JWS Signature, and the public key corresponding to the private key used by the signer to the RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY algorithm using SHA-256 as the hash function and using MGF1 as the mask generation function with SHA-256.

Signing and validation with the RSASSA-PSS SHA-384 and RSASSA-PSS SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for RSASSA-PSS SHA-256 -- just using the alternative hash algorithm in both roles.

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[3.6.](#) Using the Algorithm "none"

JWSs MAY also be created that do not provide integrity protection. Such a JWS is called an Unsecured JWS. An Unsecured JWS uses the "alg" value "none" and is formatted identically to other JWSs, but MUST use the empty octet sequence as its JWS Signature value. Recipients MUST verify that the JWS Signature value is the empty octet sequence.

Implementations that support Unsecured JWSs MUST NOT accept such objects as valid unless the application specifies that it is acceptable for a specific object to not be integrity protected. Implementations MUST NOT accept Unsecured JWSs by default. In order to mitigate downgrade attacks, applications MUST NOT signal acceptance of Unsecured JWSs at a global level, and SHOULD signal acceptance on a per-object basis. See [Section 8.5](#) for security considerations associated with using this algorithm.

[4.](#) Cryptographic Algorithms for Key Management

JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt or determine the Content Encryption Key (CEK).

[4.1.](#) "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE

The table below is the set of "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE. These algorithms are used to encrypt the CEK, producing the JWE Encrypted Key, or to use key agreement to agree upon the CEK.

alg	Param	Value	Key Management Algorithm	More Header Params	Implementation Requirements
RSA1_5			RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5	(none)	Recommended-
RSA-OAEP			RSAES OAEP using default parameters	(none)	Recommended+
RSA-OAEP-256			RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256	(none)	Optional
A128KW			AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 128 bit key	(none)	Recommended
A192KW			AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 192 bit key	(none)	Optional
A256KW			AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 256 bit key	(none)	Recommended
dir			Direct use of a shared symmetric key as the CEK	(none)	Recommended
ECDH-ES			Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static key agreement using Concat KDF	"epk", "apu", "apv"	Recommended+
ECDH-ES+A128KW			ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A128KW"	"epk", "apu", "apv"	Recommended
ECDH-ES+A192KW			ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A192KW"	"epk", "apu", "apv"	Optional
ECDH-ES+A256KW			ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A256KW"	"epk", "apu", "apv"	Recommended
A128GCMKW			Key wrapping with AES GCM using 128 bit key	"iv", "tag"	Optional

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A192GCMKW	Key wrapping with	"iv",	Optional	
	AES GCM using 192	"tag"		
	bit key			
A256GCMKW	Key wrapping with	"iv",	Optional	
	AES GCM using 256	"tag"		
	bit key			
PBES2-HS256+A128KW	PBES2 with HMAC	"p2s",	Optional	
	SHA-256 and	"p2c"		
	"A128KW" wrapping			
PBES2-HS384+A192KW	PBES2 with HMAC	"p2s",	Optional	
	SHA-384 and	"p2c"		
	"A192KW" wrapping			
PBES2-HS512+A256KW	PBES2 with HMAC	"p2s",	Optional	
	SHA-512 and	"p2c"		
	"A256KW" wrapping			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+				

The More Header Params column indicates what additional Header Parameters are used by the algorithm, beyond "alg", which all use. All but "dir" and "ECDH-ES" also produce a JWE Encrypted Key value.

The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification.

See [Appendix A.2](#) for a table cross-referencing the JWE "alg" (algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.

[4.2.](#) Key Encryption with RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5

This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 [[RFC3447](#)]. The "alg" Header Parameter value "RSA1_5" is used for this algorithm.

A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.

An example using this algorithm is shown in [Appendix A.2](#) of [[JWE](#)].

[4.3.](#) Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP

This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with RSAES using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [[RFC3447](#)]. Two sets of parameters for using OAEP are defined, which use different hash functions. In the first case, the default parameters specified by [RFC 3447](#) in Section A.2.1 are used. (Those default parameters are the SHA-1 hash function and the MGF1 with SHA-1 mask generation function.) In the second case, the SHA-256 hash function and the

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MGF1 with SHA-256 mask generation function are used.

The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the CEK using the corresponding algorithm:

alg	Param Value	Key Management Algorithm
RSA-OAEP		RSAES OAEP using default parameters
RSA-OAEP-256		RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256

A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms. (This requirement is based on Table 4 (Security-strength time frames) of NIST SP 800-57 [NIST.800-57], which requires 112 bits of security for new uses, and Table 2 (Comparable strengths) of the same, which states that 2048 bit RSA keys provide 112 bits of security.)

An example using RSAES OAEP with the default parameters is shown in [Appendix A.1](#) of [JWE].

4.4. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap

This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm [RFC3394] using the default initial value specified in [Section 2.2.3.1](#).

The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the CEK using the corresponding algorithm and key size:

alg	Param Value	Key Management Algorithm
A128KW		AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 128 bit key
A192KW		AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 192 bit key
A256KW		AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 256 bit key

An example using this algorithm is shown in [Appendix A.3](#) of [JWE].

4.5. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key

This section defines the specifics of directly performing symmetric key encryption without performing a key wrapping step. In this case, the shared symmetric key is used directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value for the "enc" algorithm. An empty octet sequence is used as the JWE Encrypted Key value. The "alg" Header Parameter value "dir" is used in this case.

Refer to the security considerations on key lifetimes in [Section 8.2](#) and AES GCM in [Section 8.4](#) when considering utilizing direct encryption.

4.6. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static (ECDH-ES)

This section defines the specifics of key agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static [[RFC6090](#)], in combination with the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [[NIST.800-56A](#)]. The key agreement result can be used in one of two ways:

1. directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) for the "enc" algorithm, in the Direct Key Agreement mode, or
2. as a symmetric key used to wrap the CEK with the "A128KW", "A192KW", or "A256KW" algorithms, in the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode.

A new ephemeral public key value MUST be generated for each key agreement operation.

In Direct Key Agreement mode, the output of the Concat KDF MUST be a key of the same length as that used by the "enc" algorithm. In this case, the empty octet sequence is used as the JWE Encrypted Key value. The "alg" Header Parameter value "ECDH-ES" is used in the Direct Key Agreement mode.

In Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode, the output of the Concat KDF MUST be a key of the length needed for the specified key wrapping algorithm. In this case, the JWE Encrypted Key is the CEK wrapped with the agreed upon key.

The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the CEK using the result of the key agreement algorithm as the key encryption key for the corresponding key wrapping algorithm:

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+-----+-----+-----+	
alg Param	Key Management Algorithm
Value	
+-----+-----+-----+	
ECDH-ES+A128KW	ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with
	"A128KW"
ECDH-ES+A192KW	ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with
	"A192KW"
ECDH-ES+A256KW	ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with
	"A256KW"
+-----+-----+-----+	

4.6.1. Header Parameters Used for ECDH Key Agreement

The following Header Parameter names are used for key agreement as defined below.

4.6.1.1. "epk" (Ephemeral Public Key) Header Parameter

The "epk" (ephemeral public key) value created by the originator for the use in key agreement algorithms. This key is represented as a JSON Web Key [[JWK](#)] public key value. It MUST contain only public key parameters and SHOULD contain only the minimum JWK parameters necessary to represent the key; other JWK parameters included can be checked for consistency and honored or can be ignored. This Header Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used.

4.6.1.2. "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter

The "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) value for key agreement algorithms using it (such as "ECDH-ES"), represented as a base64url encoded string. When used, the PartyUInfo value contains information about the producer. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. This Header Parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used.

4.6.1.3. "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter

The "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) value for key agreement algorithms using it (such as "ECDH-ES"), represented as a base64url encoded string. When used, the PartyVInfo value contains information about the recipient. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. This Header Parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used.

4.6.2. Key Derivation for ECDH Key Agreement

The key derivation process derives the agreed upon key from the shared secret Z established through the ECDH algorithm, per [Section 6.2.2.2](#) of [[NIST.800-56A](#)].

Key derivation is performed using the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [[NIST.800-56A](#)], where the Digest Method is SHA-256. The Concat KDF parameters are set as follows:

Z

This is set to the representation of the shared secret Z as an octet sequence.

keydatalen

This is set to the number of bits in the desired output key. For "ECDH-ES", this is length of the key used by the "enc" algorithm. For "ECDH-ES+A128KW", "ECDH-ES+A192KW", and "ECDH-ES+A256KW", this is 128, 192, and 256, respectively.

AlgorithmID

The AlgorithmID value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a fixed-length, big endian 32 bit counter that indicates the length (in octets) of Data. In the Direct Key Agreement case, Data is set to the octets of the ASCII representation of the "enc" Header Parameter value. In the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping case, Data is set to the octets of the ASCII representation of the "alg" Header Parameter value.

PartyUInfo

The PartyUInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a fixed-length, big endian 32 bit counter that indicates the length (in octets) of Data. If an "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url decoding the "apu" value and Datalen is set to the number of octets in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to the empty octet sequence.

PartyVInfo

The PartyVInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a fixed-length, big endian 32 bit counter that indicates the length (in octets) of Data. If an "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url decoding the "apv" value and Datalen is set to the number of octets in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to

the empty octet sequence.

SuppPubInfo

This is set to the keydatalen represented as a 32 bit big endian integer.

SuppPrivInfo

This is set to the empty octet sequence.

Applications need to specify how the "apu" and "apv" parameters are used for that application. The "apu" and "apv" values MUST be distinct, when used. Applications wishing to conform to [\[NIST.800-56A\]](#) need to provide values that meet the requirements of that document, e.g., by using values that identify the producer and consumer. Alternatively, applications MAY conduct key derivation in a manner similar to The Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method [\[RFC2631\]](#): In that case, the "apu" field MAY either be omitted or represent a random 512-bit value (analogous to PartyAInfo in Ephemeral-Static mode in [RFC 2631](#)) and the "apv" field SHOULD NOT be present.

See [Appendix C](#) for an example key agreement computation using this method.

4.7. Key Encryption with AES GCM

This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE Content Encryption Key (CEK) with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [\[AES, NIST.800-38D\]](#).

Use of an Initialization Vector of size 96 bits is REQUIRED with this algorithm. The Initialization Vector is represented in base64url encoded form as the "iv" (initialization vector) Header Parameter value.

The Additional Authenticated Data value used is the empty octet string.

The requested size of the Authentication Tag output MUST be 128 bits, regardless of the key size.

The JWE Encrypted Key value is the Ciphertext output.

The Authentication Tag output is represented in base64url encoded form as the "tag" (authentication tag) Header Parameter value.

The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the

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CEK using the corresponding algorithm and key size:

alg	Param Value	Key Management Algorithm
A128GCMKW		Key wrapping with AES GCM using 128 bit key
A192GCMKW		Key wrapping with AES GCM using 192 bit key
A256GCMKW		Key wrapping with AES GCM using 256 bit key

[4.7.1.](#) Header Parameters Used for AES GCM Key Encryption

The following Header Parameters are used for AES GCM key encryption.

[4.7.1.1.](#) "iv" (Initialization Vector) Header Parameter

The "iv" (initialization vector) Header Parameter value is the base64url encoded representation of the 96 bit Initialization Vector value used for the key encryption operation. This Header Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used.

[4.7.1.2.](#) "tag" (Authentication Tag) Header Parameter

The "tag" (authentication tag) Header Parameter value is the base64url encoded representation of the 128 bit Authentication Tag value resulting from the key encryption operation. This Header Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used.

[4.8.](#) Key Encryption with PBES2

This section defines the specifics of performing password-based encryption of a JWE CEK, by first deriving a key encryption key from a user-supplied password using PBES2 schemes as specified in [Section 6.2 of \[RFC2898\]](#), then by encrypting the JWE CEK using the derived key.

These algorithms use HMAC SHA-2 algorithms as the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the PBKDF2 key derivation and AES Key Wrap [\[RFC3394\]](#) for the encryption scheme. The PBES2 password input is an octet sequence; if the password to be used is represented as a text string rather than an octet sequence, the UTF-8 encoding of the text string MUST be used as the octet sequence. The salt parameter MUST be computed from the "p2s" (PBES2 salt input) Header Parameter value and the "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value as specified in the "p2s" definition below. The iteration count parameter MUST be provided as the "p2c" Header Parameter value. The algorithms

respectively use HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, and HMAC SHA-512 as the PRF and use 128, 192, and 256 bit AES Key Wrap keys. Their derived-key lengths respectively are 16, 24, and 32 octets.

The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the CEK using the result of the corresponding password-based encryption algorithm as the key encryption key for the corresponding key wrapping algorithm:

alg Param Value	Key Management Algorithm
PBES2-HS256+A128KW	PBES2 with HMAC SHA-256 and "A128KW" wrapping
PBES2-HS384+A192KW	PBES2 with HMAC SHA-384 and "A192KW" wrapping
PBES2-HS512+A256KW	PBES2 with HMAC SHA-512 and "A256KW" wrapping

See [Appendix C](#) of JSON Web Key (JWK) [[JWK](#)] for an example key encryption computation using "PBES2-HS256+A128KW".

4.8.1. Header Parameters Used for PBES2 Key Encryption

The following Header Parameters are used for Key Encryption with PBES2.

4.8.1.1. "p2s" (PBES2 salt input) Parameter

The "p2s" (PBES2 salt input) Header Parameter encodes a Salt Input value, which is used as part of the PBKDF2 salt value. The "p2s" value is `BASE64URL(Salt Input)`. This Header Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used.

The salt expands the possible keys that can be derived from a given password. A Salt Input value containing 8 or more octets MUST be used. A new Salt Input value MUST be generated randomly for every encryption operation; see [RFC 4086](#) [[RFC4086](#)] for considerations on generating random values. The salt value used is `(UTF8(Alg) || 0x00 || Salt Input)`, where Alg is the "alg" Header Parameter value.

4.8.1.2. "p2c" (PBES2 count) Parameter

The "p2c" (PBES2 count) Header Parameter contains the PBKDF2 iteration count, represented as a positive JSON integer. This Header

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Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations when these algorithms are used.

The iteration count adds computational expense, ideally compounded by the possible range of keys introduced by the salt. A minimum iteration count of 1000 is RECOMMENDED.

5. Cryptographic Algorithms for Content Encryption

JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt and integrity protect the Plaintext and to also integrity protect additional authenticated data.

5.1. "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE

The table below is the set of "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE.

enc Param Value	Content Encryption Algorithm	Implementation Requirements
A128CBC-HS256	AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption algorithm, as defined in Section 5.2.3	Required
A192CBC-HS384	AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 authenticated encryption algorithm, as defined in Section 5.2.4	Optional
A256CBC-HS512	AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption algorithm, as defined in Section 5.2.5	Required
A128GCM	AES GCM using 128 bit key	Recommended
A192GCM	AES GCM using 192 bit key	Optional
A256GCM	AES GCM using 256 bit key	Recommended

All also use a JWE Initialization Vector value and produce JWE Ciphertext and JWE Authentication Tag values.

See [Appendix A.3](#) for a table cross-referencing the JWE "enc" (encryption algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.

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5.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms

This section defines a family of authenticated encryption algorithms built using a composition of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [[AES](#)] in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode [[NIST.800-38A](#)] with PKCS #7 padding [[RFC5652](#)], [Section 6.3](#) operations and HMAC [[RFC2104](#), [SHS](#)] operations. This algorithm family is called AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2. It also defines three instances of this family, the first using 128 bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA-256, the second using 192 bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA-384, and the third using 256 bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA-512. Test cases for these algorithms can be found in [Appendix B](#).

These algorithms are based upon Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA [[I-D.mcgregw-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2](#)], performing the same cryptographic computations, but with the Initialization Vector and Authentication Tag values remaining separate, rather than being concatenated with the Ciphertext value in the output representation. This option is discussed in [Appendix B](#) of that specification. This algorithm family is a generalization of the algorithm family in [[I-D.mcgregw-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2](#)], and can be used to implement those algorithms.

5.2.1. Conventions Used in Defining AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2

We use the following notational conventions.

CBC-PKCS5-ENC(X, P) denotes the AES CBC encryption of P using PKCS #7 padding using the cipher with the key X.

MAC(Y, M) denotes the application of the Message Authentication Code (MAC) to the message M, using the key Y.

5.2.2. Generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithm

This section defines AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 in a manner that is independent of the AES CBC key size or hash function to be used. [Section 5.2.2.1](#) and [Section 5.2.2.2](#) define the generic encryption and decryption algorithms. Sections [5.2.3](#) through [5.2.5](#) define instances of AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 that specify those details.

5.2.2.1. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption

The authenticated encryption algorithm takes as input four octet strings: a secret key K, a plaintext P, additional authenticated data A, and an initialization vector IV. The authenticated ciphertext value E and the authentication tag value T are provided as outputs. The data in the plaintext are encrypted and authenticated, and the additional authenticated data are authenticated, but not encrypted.

The encryption process is as follows, or uses an equivalent set of steps:

1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the input key K as follows. Each of these two keys is an octet string.

MAC_KEY consists of the initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in order.

ENC_KEY consists of the final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in order.

The number of octets in the input key K MUST be the sum of MAC_KEY_LEN and ENC_KEY_LEN. The values of these parameters are specified by the Authenticated Encryption algorithms in Sections 5.2.3 through 5.2.5. Note that the MAC key comes before the encryption key in the input key K; this is in the opposite order of the algorithm names in the identifier "AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2".

2. The Initialization Vector (IV) used is a 128 bit value generated randomly or pseudorandomly for use in the cipher.
3. The plaintext is CBC encrypted using PKCS #7 padding using ENC_KEY as the key, and the IV. We denote the ciphertext output from this step as E.
4. The octet string AL is equal to the number of bits in the additional authenticated data A expressed as a 64-bit unsigned big endian integer.
5. A message authentication tag T is computed by applying HMAC [\[RFC2104\]](#) to the following data, in order:

the additional authenticated data A,

the initialization vector IV,

the ciphertext E computed in the previous step, and

the octet string AL defined above.

The string MAC_KEY is used as the MAC key. We denote the output of the MAC computed in this step as M. The first T_LEN bits of M are used as T.

6. The Ciphertext E and the Authentication Tag T are returned as the outputs of the authenticated encryption.

The encryption process can be illustrated as follows. Here K, P, A, IV, and E denote the key, plaintext, additional authenticated data, initialization vector, and ciphertext, respectively.

MAC_KEY = initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K,

ENC_KEY = final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K,

E = CBC-PKCS5-ENC(ENC_KEY, P),

M = MAC(MAC_KEY, A || IV || E || AL),

T = initial T_LEN octets of M.

5.2.2.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption

The authenticated decryption operation has five inputs: K, A, IV, E, and T as defined above. It has only a single output, either a plaintext value P or a special symbol FAIL that indicates that the inputs are not authentic. The authenticated decryption algorithm is as follows, or uses an equivalent set of steps:

1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the input key K as in Step 1 of [Section 5.2.2.1](#).
2. The integrity and authenticity of A and E are checked by computing an HMAC with the inputs as in Step 5 of [Section 5.2.2.1](#). The value T, from the previous step, is compared to the first MAC_KEY length bits of the HMAC output. If those values are identical, then A and E are considered valid, and processing is continued. Otherwise, all of the data used in the MAC validation are discarded, and the Authenticated Encryption decryption operation returns an indication that it failed, and the operation halts. (But see Section 11.5 of [\[JWE\]](#) for security considerations on thwarting timing attacks.)
3. The value E is decrypted and the PKCS #7 padding is checked and removed. The value IV is used as the initialization vector. The value ENC_KEY is used as the decryption key.
4. The plaintext value is returned.

5.2.3. AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256

This algorithm is a concrete instantiation of the generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithm above. It uses the HMAC message authentication code [\[RFC2104\]](#) with the SHA-256 hash function [\[SHS\]](#) to provide message authentication, with the HMAC output truncated to 128

bits, corresponding to the HMAC-SHA-256-128 algorithm defined in [RFC4868]. For encryption, it uses AES in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation as defined in Section 6.2 of [NIST.800-38A], with PKCS #7 padding and a 128 bit initialization vector (IV) value.

The AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 parameters specific to AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 are:

The input key K is 32 octets long.

ENC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets.

MAC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets.

The SHA-256 hash algorithm is used for the HMAC.

The HMAC-SHA-256 output is truncated to T_LEN=16 octets, by stripping off the final 16 octets.

5.2.4. AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384

AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 is based on AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256, but with the following differences:

The input key K is 48 octets long instead of 32.

ENC_KEY_LEN is 24 octets instead of 16.

MAC_KEY_LEN is 24 octets instead of 16.

SHA-384 is used for the HMAC instead of SHA-256.

The HMAC SHA-384 value is truncated to T_LEN=24 octets instead of 16.

5.2.5. AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512

AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 is based on AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256, but with the following differences:

The input key K is 64 octets long instead of 32.

ENC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets instead of 16.

MAC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets instead of 16.

SHA-512 is used for the HMAC instead of SHA-256.

The HMAC SHA-512 value is truncated to T_LEN=32 octets instead of 16.

5.2.6. Content Encryption with AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2

This section defines the specifics of performing authenticated encryption with the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms.

The CEK is used as the secret key K.

The following "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Ciphertext and JWE Authentication Tag values have been computed using the corresponding algorithm:

enc Param Value	Content Encryption Algorithm
A128CBC-HS256	AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption algorithm, as defined in Section 5.2.3
A192CBC-HS384	AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 authenticated encryption algorithm, as defined in Section 5.2.4
A256CBC-HS512	AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption algorithm, as defined in Section 5.2.5

5.3. Content Encryption with AES GCM

This section defines the specifics of performing authenticated encryption with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [[AES](#), [NIST.800-38D](#)].

The CEK is used as the encryption key.

Use of an initialization vector of size 96 bits is REQUIRED with this algorithm.

The requested size of the Authentication Tag output MUST be 128 bits, regardless of the key size.

The following "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate that the JWE Ciphertext and JWE Authentication Tag values have been computed using the corresponding algorithm and key size:

+-----+-----+-----+		
enc Param Value	Content Encryption Algorithm	
+-----+-----+-----+		
A128GCM	AES GCM using 128 bit key	
A192GCM	AES GCM using 192 bit key	
A256GCM	AES GCM using 256 bit key	
+-----+-----+-----+		

An example using this algorithm is shown in [Appendix A.1](#) of [\[JWE\]](#).

6. Cryptographic Algorithms for Keys

A JSON Web Key (JWK) [\[JWK\]](#) is a JSON data structure that represents a cryptographic key. These keys can be either asymmetric or symmetric. They can hold both public and private information about the key. This section defines the parameters for keys using the algorithms specified by this document.

6.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values

The table below is the set of "kty" (key type) parameter values that are defined by this specification for use in JWKs.

+-----+-----+-----+		
kty Param	Key Type	Implementation
Value		Requirements
+-----+-----+-----+		
EC	Elliptic Curve [DSS]	Recommended+
RSA	RSA [RFC3447]	Required
oct	Octet sequence (used to represent	Required
	symmetric keys)	
+-----+-----+-----+		

The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification.

6.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys

JWKs can represent Elliptic Curve [\[DSS\]](#) keys. In this case, the "kty" member value is "EC".

6.2.1. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys

An elliptic curve public key is represented by a pair of coordinates drawn from a finite field, which together define a point on an elliptic curve. The following members **MUST** be present for all

elliptic curve public keys:

- o "crv"
- o "x"

The following member **MUST** also be present for elliptic curve public keys for the three curves defined in the following section:

- o "y"

6.2.1.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter

The "crv" (curve) member identifies the cryptographic curve used with the key. Curve values from [\[DSS\]](#) used by this specification are:

- o "P-256"
- o "P-384"
- o "P-521"

These values are registered in the IANA JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve registry defined in [Section 7.6](#). Additional "crv" values can be registered by other specifications. Specifications registering additional curves must define what parameters are used to represent keys for the curves registered. The "crv" value is a case-sensitive string.

SEC1 [\[SEC1\]](#) point compression is not supported for any of these three curves.

6.2.1.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter

The "x" (x coordinate) member contains the x coordinate for the elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the octet string representation of the coordinate, as defined in [Section 2.3.5](#) of SEC1 [\[SEC1\]](#). The length of this octet string **MUST** be the full size of a coordinate for the curve specified in the "crv" parameter. For example, if the value of "crv" is "P-521", the octet string must be 66 octets long.

6.2.1.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter

The "y" (y coordinate) member contains the y coordinate for the elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the octet string representation of the coordinate, as defined in [Section 2.3.5](#) of SEC1 [\[SEC1\]](#). The length of this octet string **MUST** be the full size of a coordinate for the curve specified in the "crv" parameter. For example, if the value of "crv" is "P-521", the octet string must be 66 octets long.

[6.2.2.](#) Parameters for Elliptic Curve Private Keys

In addition to the members used to represent Elliptic Curve public keys, the following member MUST be present to represent Elliptic Curve private keys.

[6.2.2.1.](#) "d" (ECC Private Key) Parameter

The "d" (ECC private key) member contains the Elliptic Curve private key value. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the octet string representation of the private key value, as defined in [Section 2.3.7](#) of SEC1 [[SEC1](#)]. The length of this octet string MUST be ceiling(log-base-2(n)/8) octets (where n is the order of the curve).

[6.3.](#) Parameters for RSA Keys

JWKs can represent RSA [[RFC3447](#)] keys. In this case, the "kty" member value is "RSA". The semantics of the parameters defined below are the same as those defined in Sections [3.1](#) and [3.2](#) of [RFC 3447](#).

[6.3.1.](#) Parameters for RSA Public Keys

The following members MUST be present for RSA public keys.

[6.3.1.1.](#) "n" (Modulus) Parameter

The "n" (modulus) member contains the modulus value for the RSA public key. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt encoded value.

Note that implementers have found that some cryptographic libraries prefix an extra zero-valued octet to the modulus representations they return, for instance, returning 257 octets for a 2048 bit key, rather than 256. Implementations using such libraries will need to take care to omit the extra octet from the base64url encoded representation.

[6.3.1.2.](#) "e" (Exponent) Parameter

The "e" (exponent) member contains the exponent value for the RSA public key. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt encoded value.

For instance, when representing the value 65537, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST consist of the three octets [1, 0, 1]; the resulting representation for this value is "AQAB".

6.3.2. Parameters for RSA Private Keys

In addition to the members used to represent RSA public keys, the following members are used to represent RSA private keys. The parameter "d" is REQUIRED for RSA private keys. The others enable optimizations and SHOULD be included by producers of JWKs representing RSA private keys. If the producer includes any of the other private key parameters, then all of the others MUST be present, with the exception of "oth", which MUST only be present when more than two prime factors were used.

6.3.2.1. "d" (Private Exponent) Parameter

The "d" (private exponent) member contains the private exponent value for the RSA private key. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt encoded value.

6.3.2.2. "p" (First Prime Factor) Parameter

The "p" (first prime factor) member contains the first prime factor. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt encoded value.

6.3.2.3. "q" (Second Prime Factor) Parameter

The "q" (second prime factor) member contains the second prime factor. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt encoded value.

6.3.2.4. "dp" (First Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter

The "dp" (first factor CRT exponent) member contains the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) exponent of the first factor. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt encoded value.

6.3.2.5. "dq" (Second Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter

The "dq" (second factor CRT exponent) member contains the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) exponent of the second factor. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt encoded value.

6.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter

The "qi" (first CRT coefficient) member contains the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) coefficient of the second factor. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt encoded value.

6.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter

The "oth" (other primes info) member contains an array of information about any third and subsequent primes, should they exist. When only two primes have been used (the normal case), this parameter MUST be omitted. When three or more primes have been used, the number of array elements MUST be the number of primes used minus two. For more information on this case, see the description of the OtherPrimeInfo parameters in Section A.1.2 of [RFC 3447](#) [RFC3447], upon which the following parameters are modelled. If the consumer of a JWK does not support private keys with more than two primes and it encounters a private key that includes the "oth" parameter, then it MUST NOT use the key. Each array element MUST be an object with the following members:

6.3.2.7.1. "r" (Prime Factor)

The "r" (prime factor) parameter within an "oth" array member represents the value of a subsequent prime factor. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt encoded value.

6.3.2.7.2. "d" (Factor CRT Exponent)

The "d" (Factor CRT Exponent) parameter within an "oth" array member represents the CRT exponent of the corresponding prime factor. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt encoded value.

6.3.2.7.3. "t" (Factor CRT Coefficient)

The "t" (factor CRT coefficient) parameter within an "oth" array member represents the CRT coefficient of the corresponding prime factor. It is represented as a Base64urlUInt encoded value.

6.4. Parameters for Symmetric Keys

When the JWK "kty" member value is "oct" (octet sequence), the member "k" is used to represent a symmetric key (or another key whose value is a single octet sequence). An "alg" member SHOULD also be present to identify the algorithm intended to be used with the key, unless the application uses another means or convention to determine the algorithm used.

6.4.1. "k" (Key Value) Parameter

The "k" (key value) member contains the value of the symmetric (or other single-valued) key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the octet sequence containing the key value.

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7. IANA Considerations

The following registration procedure is used for all the registries established by this specification.

Values are registered on a Specification Required [[RFC5226](#)] basis after a three-week review period on the jose-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.

Registration requests must be sent to the jose-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register algorithm: example").

Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.

Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Expert(s) includes determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application, and whether the registration description is clear.

IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list.

It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Expert(s).

[*Note to the RFC Editor and IANA: Pearl Liang of ICANN had requested that the draft supply the following proposed registry description information. It is to be used for all registries established by this specification.*]

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- o Protocol Category: JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
- o Registry Location: <http://www.iana.org/assignments/jose>
- o Webpage Title: (same as the protocol category)
- o Registry Name: (same as the section title, but excluding the word "Registry", for example "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms")

]]

7.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry

This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry for values of the JWS and JWE "alg" (algorithm) and "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameters. The registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm usage locations, implementation requirements, and a reference to the specification that defines it. The same algorithm name can be registered multiple times, provided that the sets of usage locations are disjoint.

It is suggested that when multiple variations of algorithms are being registered that use keys of different lengths and the key lengths for each need to be fixed (for instance, because they will be created by key derivation functions), that the length of the key be included in the algorithm name. This allows readers of the JSON text to more easily make security decisions.

The Designated Expert(s) should perform reasonable due diligence that algorithms being registered are either currently considered cryptographically credible or are being registered as Deprecated or Prohibited.

The implementation requirements of an algorithm may be changed over time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of an algorithm to Deprecated, or to change the status of an algorithm from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis after review by the Designated Experts(s), with the new specification defining the revised implementation requirements level.

7.1.1. Registration Template

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Algorithm Name:

The name requested (e.g., "HS256"). This name is a case-sensitive ASCII string. Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) state that there is a compelling reason to allow an exception in this particular case.

Algorithm Description:

Brief description of the Algorithm (e.g., "HMAC using SHA-256").

Algorithm Usage Location(s):

The algorithm usage location. This must be one or more of the values "alg" or "enc" if the algorithm is to be used with JWS or JWE. The value "JWK" is used if the algorithm identifier will be used as a JWK "alg" member value, but will not be used with JWS or JWE; this could be the case, for instance, for non-authenticated encryption algorithms. Other values may be used with the approval of a Designated Expert.

JOSE Implementation Requirements:

The algorithm implementation requirements for JWS and JWE, which must be one the words Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated, or Prohibited. Optionally, the word can be followed by a "+" or "-". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use of "-" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification. Any identifiers registered for non-authenticated encryption algorithms or other algorithms that are otherwise unsuitable for direct use as JWS or JWE algorithms must be registered as "Prohibited".

Change Controller:

For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

Specification Document(s):

Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

Algorithm Analysis Documents(s):

References to publication(s) in well-known cryptographic conferences, by national standards bodies, or by other authoritative sources analyzing the cryptographic soundness of the algorithm to be registered. The designated experts may require convincing evidence of the cryptographic soundness of a new

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algorithm to be provided with the registration request unless the algorithm is being registered as Deprecated or Prohibited. Having gone through working group and IETF review, the initial registrations made by this document are exempt from the need to provide this information.

7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents

- o Algorithm Name: "HS256"
- o Algorithm Description: HMAC using SHA-256
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "HS384"
- o Algorithm Description: HMAC using SHA-384
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "HS512"
- o Algorithm Description: HMAC using SHA-512
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "RS256"
- o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-256
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "RS384"
- o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-384
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]

- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
- o Algorithm Name: "RS512"
- o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-512
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
- o Algorithm Name: "ES256"
- o Algorithm Description: ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
- o Algorithm Name: "ES384"
- o Algorithm Description: ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
- o Algorithm Name: "ES512"
- o Algorithm Description: ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
- o Algorithm Name: "PS256"
- o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
- o Algorithm Name: "PS384"
- o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and MGF1 with SHA-384

- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
 - o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
 - o Change Controller: IESG
 - o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]
 - o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
-
- o Algorithm Name: "PS512"
 - o Algorithm Description: RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and MGF1 with SHA-512
 - o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
 - o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
 - o Change Controller: IESG
 - o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]
 - o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
-
- o Algorithm Name: "none"
 - o Algorithm Description: No digital signature or MAC performed
 - o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
 - o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
 - o Change Controller: IESG
 - o Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [[this document]]
 - o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
-
- o Algorithm Name: "RSA1_5"
 - o Algorithm Description: RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5
 - o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
 - o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended-
 - o Change Controller: IESG
 - o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.1](#) of [[this document]]
 - o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
-
- o Algorithm Name: "RSA-OAEP"
 - o Algorithm Description: RSAES OAEP using default parameters
 - o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
 - o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+
 - o Change Controller: IESG
 - o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.1](#) of [[this document]]
 - o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
-
- o Algorithm Name: "RSA-OAEP-256"
 - o Algorithm Description: RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256
 - o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
 - o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
 - o Change Controller: IESG
 - o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.1](#) of [[this document]]

- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
- o Algorithm Name: "A128KW"
- o Algorithm Description: AES Key Wrap using 128 bit key
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
- o Algorithm Name: "A192KW"
- o Algorithm Description: AES Key Wrap using 192 bit key
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
- o Algorithm Name: "A256KW"
- o Algorithm Description: AES Key Wrap using 256 bit key
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
- o Algorithm Name: "dir"
- o Algorithm Description: Direct use of a shared symmetric key
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
- o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES"
- o Algorithm Description: ECDH-ES using Concat KDF
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a
- o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES+A128KW"
- o Algorithm Description: ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and "A128KW" wrapping
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"

- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES+A192KW"
- o Algorithm Description: ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and "A192KW" wrapping
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES+A256KW"
- o Algorithm Description: ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and "A256KW" wrapping
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "A128GCMKW"
- o Algorithm Description: Key wrapping with AES GCM using 128 bit key
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.7](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "A192GCMKW"
- o Algorithm Description: Key wrapping with AES GCM using 192 bit key
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.7](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "A256GCMKW"
- o Algorithm Description: Key wrapping with AES GCM using 256 bit key
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.7](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "PBES2-HS256+A128KW"
- o Algorithm Description: PBES2 with HMAC SHA-256 and "A128KW" wrapping
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.8](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "PBES2-HS384+A192KW"
- o Algorithm Description: PBES2 with HMAC SHA-384 and "A192KW" wrapping
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.8](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "PBES2-HS512+A256KW"
- o Algorithm Description: PBES2 with HMAC SHA-512 and "A256KW" wrapping
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.8](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "A128CBC-HS256"
- o Algorithm Description: AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption algorithm
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 5.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "A192CBC-HS384"
- o Algorithm Description: AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 authenticated encryption algorithm
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 5.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "A256CBC-HS512"

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- o Algorithm Description: AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption algorithm
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 5.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "A128GCM"
- o Algorithm Description: AES GCM using 128 bit key
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 5.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "A192GCM"
- o Algorithm Description: AES GCM using 192 bit key
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 5.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

- o Algorithm Name: "A256GCM"
- o Algorithm Description: AES GCM using 256 bit key
- o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 5.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a

[7.2.](#) Header Parameter Names Registration

This specification registers the Header Parameter names defined in [Section 4.6.1](#), [Section 4.7.1](#), and [Section 4.8.1](#) in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry defined in [[JWS](#)].

[7.2.1.](#) Registry Contents

- o Header Parameter Name: "epk"
- o Header Parameter Description: Ephemeral Public Key
- o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.6.1.1](#) of [[this document]]

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- o Header Parameter Name: "apu"
- o Header Parameter Description: Agreement PartyUInfo
- o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.6.1.2](#) of [[this document]]
- o Header Parameter Name: "apv"
- o Header Parameter Description: Agreement PartyVInfo
- o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.6.1.3](#) of [[this document]]
- o Header Parameter Name: "iv"
- o Header Parameter Description: Initialization Vector
- o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.7.1.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Header Parameter Name: "tag"
- o Header Parameter Description: Authentication Tag
- o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.7.1.2](#) of [[this document]]
- o Header Parameter Name: "p2s"
- o Header Parameter Description: PBES2 salt
- o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.8.1.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Header Parameter Name: "p2c"
- o Header Parameter Description: PBES2 count
- o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 4.8.1.2](#) of [[this document]]

[7.3.](#) JSON Web Encryption Compression Algorithms Registry

This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Encryption Compression Algorithms registry for JWE "zip" member values. The registry records the compression algorithm value and a reference to the specification that defines it.

[7.3.1.](#) Registration Template

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Compression Algorithm Value:

The name requested (e.g., "DEF"). Because a core goal of this specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) state that there is a compelling reason to allow an exception in this particular case.

Compression Algorithm Description:

Brief description of the compression algorithm (e.g., "DEFLATE").

Change Controller:

For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

Specification Document(s):

Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

7.3.2. Initial Registry Contents

- o Compression Algorithm Value: "DEF"
- o Compression Algorithm Description: DEFLATE
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [[JWE](#)]

7.4. JSON Web Key Types Registry

This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Key Types registry for values of the JWK "kty" (key type) parameter. The registry records the "kty" value, implementation requirements, and a reference to the specification that defines it.

The implementation requirements of a key type may be changed over time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of a key type to Deprecated, or to change the status of a key type from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis after review by the Designated Experts(s), with the new specification defining the revised implementation requirements level.

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7.4.1. Registration Template

"kty" Parameter Value:

The name requested (e.g., "EC"). Because a core goal of this specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) state that there is a compelling reason to allow an exception in this particular case.

Key Type Description:

Brief description of the Key Type (e.g., "Elliptic Curve").

Change Controller:

For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

JOSE Implementation Requirements:

The key type implementation requirements for JWS and JWE, which must be one the words Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated, or Prohibited. Optionally, the word can be followed by a "+" or "-". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use of "-" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification.

Specification Document(s):

Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

7.4.2. Initial Registry Contents

This specification registers the values defined in [Section 6.1](#).

- o "kty" Parameter Value: "EC"
- o Key Type Description: Elliptic Curve
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.2](#) of [[this document]]

- o "kty" Parameter Value: "RSA"

- o Key Type Description: RSA
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.3](#) of [[this document]]
- o "kty" Parameter Value: "oct"
- o Key Type Description: Octet sequence
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.4](#) of [[this document]]

[7.5.](#) JSON Web Key Parameters Registration

This specification registers the parameter names defined in Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 in the IANA JSON Web Key Parameters registry defined in [\[JWK\]](#).

[7.5.1.](#) Registry Contents

- o Parameter Name: "crv"
- o Parameter Description: Curve
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "EC"
- o Parameter Information Class: Public
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.2.1.1](#) of [[this document]]
- o Parameter Name: "x"
- o Parameter Description: X Coordinate
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "EC"
- o Parameter Information Class: Public
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.2.1.2](#) of [[this document]]
- o Parameter Name: "y"
- o Parameter Description: Y Coordinate
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "EC"
- o Parameter Information Class: Public
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.2.1.3](#) of [[this document]]
- o Parameter Name: "d"
- o Parameter Description: ECC Private Key
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "EC"
- o Parameter Information Class: Private
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.2.2.1](#) of [[this document]]

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- o Parameter Name: "n"
- o Parameter Description: Modulus
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA"
- o Parameter Information Class: Public
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.3.1.1](#) of [[this document]]

- o Parameter Name: "e"
- o Parameter Description: Exponent
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA"
- o Parameter Information Class: Public
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.3.1.2](#) of [[this document]]

- o Parameter Name: "d"
- o Parameter Description: Private Exponent
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA"
- o Parameter Information Class: Private
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.3.2.1](#) of [[this document]]

- o Parameter Name: "p"
- o Parameter Description: First Prime Factor
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA"
- o Parameter Information Class: Private
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.3.2.2](#) of [[this document]]

- o Parameter Name: "q"
- o Parameter Description: Second Prime Factor
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA"
- o Parameter Information Class: Private
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.3.2.3](#) of [[this document]]

- o Parameter Name: "dp"
- o Parameter Description: First Factor CRT Exponent
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA"
- o Parameter Information Class: Private
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.3.2.4](#) of [[this document]]

- o Parameter Name: "dq"
- o Parameter Description: Second Factor CRT Exponent
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA"
- o Parameter Information Class: Private

- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.3.2.5](#) of [[this document]]
- o Parameter Name: "qi"
- o Parameter Description: First CRT Coefficient
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA"
- o Parameter Information Class: Private
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.3.2.6](#) of [[this document]]
- o Parameter Name: "oth"
- o Parameter Description: Other Primes Info
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "RSA"
- o Parameter Information Class: Private
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.3.2.7](#) of [[this document]]
- o Parameter Name: "k"
- o Parameter Description: Key Value
- o Used with "kty" Value(s): "oct"
- o Parameter Information Class: Private
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.4.1](#) of [[this document]]

[7.6.](#) JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve Registry

This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve registry for JWK "crv" member values. The registry records the curve name, implementation requirements, and a reference to the specification that defines it. This specification registers the parameter names defined in [Section 6.2.1.1](#).

The implementation requirements of a curve may be changed over time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of a curve to Deprecated, or to change the status of a curve from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis after review by the Designated Experts(s), with the new specification defining the revised implementation requirements level.

[7.6.1.](#) Registration Template

Curve Name:

The name requested (e.g., "P-256"). Because a core goal of this specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a

case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) state that there is a compelling reason to allow an exception in this particular case.

Curve Description:

Brief description of the curve (e.g., "P-256 curve").

JOSE Implementation Requirements:

The curve implementation requirements for JWS and JWE, which must be one the words Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated, or Prohibited. Optionally, the word can be followed by a "+" or "-". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use of "-" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification.

Change Controller:

For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

Specification Document(s):

Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

7.6.2. Initial Registry Contents

- o Curve Name: "P-256"
- o Curve Description: P-256 curve
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.2.1.1](#) of [[this document]]

- o Curve Name: "P-384"
- o Curve Description: P-384 curve
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.2.1.1](#) of [[this document]]

- o Curve Name: "P-521"
- o Curve Description: P-521 curve
- o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): [Section 6.2.1.1](#) of [[this document]]

8. Security Considerations

All of the security issues that are pertinent to any cryptographic application must be addressed by JWS/JWE/JWK agents. Among these issues are protecting the user's asymmetric private and symmetric secret keys and employing countermeasures to various attacks.

The security considerations in [\[AES\]](#), [\[DSS\]](#), [\[JWE\]](#), [\[JWK\]](#), [\[JWS\]](#), [\[NIST.800-38D\]](#), [\[NIST.800-56A\]](#), [\[NIST.800-107\]](#), [\[RFC2104\]](#), [\[RFC3394\]](#), [\[RFC3447\]](#), [\[RFC5116\]](#), [\[RFC6090\]](#), and [\[SHS\]](#) apply to this specification.

8.1. Cryptographic Agility

Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular cryptographic algorithm will be reduced. Therefore, implementers and deployments must be prepared for the set of algorithms that are supported and used to change over time. Thus, cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular, allowing new algorithms to be readily inserted.

8.2. Key Lifetimes

Many algorithms have associated security considerations related to key lifetimes and/or the number of times that a key may be used. Those security considerations continue to apply when using those algorithms with JOSE data structures. See NIST SP 800-57 [\[NIST.800-57\]](#) for specific guidance on key lifetimes.

8.3. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 Security Considerations

While [Section 8 of RFC 3447](#) [\[RFC3447\]](#) explicitly calls for people not to adopt RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 for new applications and instead requests that people transition to RSASSA-PSS, this specification does include RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5, for interoperability reasons, because it is commonly implemented.

Keys used with RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 must follow the constraints in [Section 7.2 of RFC 3447](#). Also, keys with a low public key exponent value, as described in [Section 3](#) of Twenty years of attacks on the RSA cryptosystem [\[Boneh99\]](#), must not be used.

8.4. AES GCM Security Considerations

Keys used with AES GCM must follow the constraints in [Section 8.3](#) of [\[NIST.800-38D\]](#), which states: "The total number of invocations of the

authenticated encryption function shall not exceed 2^{32} , including all IV lengths and all instances of the authenticated encryption function with the given key". In accordance with this rule, AES GCM MUST NOT be used with the same key value more than 2^{32} times.

An Initialization Vector value MUST NOT ever be used multiple times with the same AES GCM key. One way to prevent this is to store a counter with the key and increment it with every use. The counter can also be used to prevent exceeding the 2^{32} limit above.

This security consideration does not apply to the composite AES-CBC HMAC SHA-2 or AES Key Wrap algorithms.

8.5. Unsecured JWS Security Considerations

Unsecured JWSs (JWSs that use the "alg" value "none") provide no integrity protection. Thus, they must only be used in contexts in which the payload is secured by means other than a digital signature or MAC value, or need not be secured.

An example means of preventing accepting Unsecured JWSs by default is for the "verify" method of a hypothetical JWS software library to have a Boolean "acceptUnsecured" parameter that indicates "none" is an acceptable "alg" value. As another example, the "verify" method might take a list of algorithms that are acceptable to the application as a parameter and would reject Unsecured JWS values if "none" is not in that list.

The following example illustrates the reasons for not accepting Unsecured JWSs at a global level. Suppose an application accepts JWSs over two channels, (1) HTTP and (2) HTTPS with client authentication. It requires a JWS signature on objects received over HTTP, but accepts Unsecured JWSs over HTTPS. If the application were to globally indicate that "none" is acceptable, then an attacker could provide it with an Unsecured JWS over HTTP and still have that object successfully validate. Instead, the application needs to indicate acceptance of "none" for each object received over HTTPS (e.g., by setting "acceptUnsecured" to "true" for the first hypothetical JWS software library above), but not for each object received over HTTP.

8.6. Denial of Service Attacks

Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could supply content using keys that would result in excessive

cryptographic processing, for example, keys larger than those mandated in this specification. Implementations should set and enforce upper limits on the key sizes they accept. [Section 5.6.1](#) (Comparable Algorithm Strengths) of NIST SP 800-57 [[NIST.800-57](#)] contains statements on largest approved key sizes that may be applicable.

[8.7.](#) Reusing Key Material when Encrypting Keys

It is NOT RECOMMENDED to reuse the same entire set of key material (Key Encryption Key, Content Encryption Key, Initialization Vector, etc.) to encrypt multiple JWK or JWK Set objects, or to encrypt the same JWK or JWK Set object multiple times. One suggestion for preventing re-use is to always generate at least one new piece of key material for each encryption operation (e.g., a new Content Encryption Key, a new Initialization Vector, and/or a new PBES2 Salt), based on the considerations noted in this document as well as from [RFC 4086](#) [[RFC4086](#)].

[8.8.](#) Password Considerations

Passwords are vulnerable to a number of attacks. To help mitigate some of these limitations, this document applies principles from [RFC 2898](#) [[RFC2898](#)] to derive cryptographic keys from user-supplied passwords.

However, the strength of the password still has a significant impact. A high-entropy password has greater resistance to dictionary attacks. [[NIST.800-63-1](#)] contains guidelines for estimating password entropy, which can help applications and users generate stronger passwords.

An ideal password is one that is as large as (or larger than) the derived key length. However, passwords larger than a certain algorithm-specific size are first hashed, which reduces an attacker's effective search space to the length of the hash algorithm. It is RECOMMENDED that a password used for "PBES2-HS256+A128KW" be no shorter than 16 octets and no longer than 128 octets and a password used for "PBES2-HS512+A256KW" be no shorter than 32 octets and no longer than 128 octets long.

Still, care needs to be taken in where and how password-based encryption is used. These algorithms can still be susceptible to dictionary-based attacks if the iteration count is too small; this is of particular concern if these algorithms are used to protect data that an attacker can have indefinite number of attempts to circumvent the protection, such as protected data stored on a file system.

[8.9.](#) Key Entropy and Random Values

See Section 10.1 of [\[JWS\]](#) for security considerations on key entropy and random values.

[8.10.](#) Differences between Digital Signatures and MACs

See Section 10.5 of [\[JWS\]](#) for security considerations on differences between digital signatures and MACs.

[8.11.](#) Using Matching Algorithm Strengths

See Section 11.3 of [\[JWE\]](#) for security considerations on using matching algorithm strengths.

[8.12.](#) Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks

See Section 11.4 of [\[JWE\]](#) for security considerations on adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks.

[8.13.](#) Timing Attacks

See Section 10.9 of [\[JWS\]](#) and [Section 11.5](#) of [\[JWE\]](#) for security considerations on timing attacks.

[8.14.](#) RSA Private Key Representations and Blinding

See Section 9.3 of [\[JWK\]](#) for security considerations on RSA private key representations and blinding.

[9.](#) Internationalization Considerations

Passwords obtained from users are likely to require preparation and normalization to account for differences of octet sequences generated by different input devices, locales, etc. It is RECOMMENDED that applications to perform the steps outlined in [\[I-D.ietf-precis-saslprepbis\]](#) to prepare a password supplied directly by a user before performing key derivation and encryption.

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[10.1.](#) Normative References

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[Appendix A](#). Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference

This appendix contains tables cross-referencing the cryptographic algorithm identifier values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. See XML DSIG [[RFC3275](#)], XML DSIG 2.0 [[W3C.NOTE-xmlldsig-core2-20130411](#)], XML Encryption [[W3C.REC-xmlenc-core-20021210](#)], XML Encryption 1.1 [[W3C.REC-xmlenc-core1-20130411](#)], and Java Cryptography Architecture [[JCA](#)] for more information about the names defined by those documents.

A.1. Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference

This section contains a table cross-referencing the JWS digital signature and MAC "alg" (algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.

JWS	XML DSIG	JCA	OID
HS256	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha256	HmacSHA256	1.2.840.1135.49.2.9
HS384	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha384	HmacSHA384	1.2.840.1135.49.2.10
HS512	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha512	HmacSHA512	1.2.840.1135.49.2.11
RS256	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256	SHA256withRSA	1.2.840.1135.49.1.1.11
RS384	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha384	SHA384withRSA	1.2.840.1135.49.1.1.12
RS512	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha512	SHA512withRSA	1.2.840.1135.49.1.1.13
ES256	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256	SHA256withECDSA	1.2.840.1004.5.4.3.2
ES384	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha384	SHA384withECDSA	1.2.840.1004.5.4.3.3
ES512	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha512	SHA512withECDSA	1.2.840.1004.5.4.3.4
PS256	http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xmldsig-more#sha256-rsa-MGF1	SHA256withRSAandMGF1	1.2.840.1135.49.1.1.10
PS384	http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xmldsig-more#sha384-rsa-MGF1	SHA384withRSAandMGF1	1.2.840.1135.49.1.1.10
PS512	http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xmldsig-more#sha512-rsa-MGF1	SHA512withRSAandMGF1	1.2.840.1135.49.1.1.10

A.2. Key Management Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference

This section contains a table cross-referencing the JWE "alg" (algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.

JWE	XML ENC	JCA	OID
RSA1_5	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5	RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding	1.2.840.113.549.1.1.1
RSA-OAEP	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p	RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-1AndMGF1Padding	1.2.840.113.549.1.1.7
RSA-OAEP-256	http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#rsa-oaep-mgf1sha256	RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-256AndMGF1PaddingAndMGF1ParameterSpec.SHA256	1.2.840.113.549.1.1.7
ECDH-ES	http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#ECDH-ES	ECDH	1.3.132.1.1.2
A128KW	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128	AESWrap	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.5
A192KW	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes192	AESWrap	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2
A256KW	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes256	AESWrap	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.4

A.3. Content Encryption Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference

This section contains a table cross-referencing the JWE "enc" (encryption algorithm) values defined in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.

For the composite algorithms "A128CBC-HS256", "A192CBC-HS384", and "A256CBC-HS512", the corresponding AES CBC algorithm identifiers are listed.

JWE	XML ENC	JCA	OID
A128CBC-HS256	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc	AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2
A192CBC-HS384	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes192-cbc	AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.22
A256CBC-HS512	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc	AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42
A128GCM	http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes128-gcm	AES/GCM/NoPadding	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.6

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A192GCM	http://www.w3.org/2009/	AES/GCM/NoPa	2.16.840.1.10	
	xmlenc11#aes192-gcm	dding	1.3.4.1.26	
A256GCM	http://www.w3.org/2009/	AES/GCM/NoPa	2.16.840.1.10	
	xmlenc11#aes256-gcm	dding	1.3.4.1.46	
+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+

Appendix B. Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms

The following test cases can be used to validate implementations of the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms defined in [Section 5.2](#). They are also intended to correspond to test cases that may appear in a future version of [[I-D.mcgreww-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2](#)], demonstrating that the cryptographic computations performed are the same.

The variable names are those defined in [Section 5.2](#). All values are hexadecimal.

B.1. Test Cases for AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256

AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256

K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f

MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f

ENC_KEY = 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f

P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20
 6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75
 69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65
 74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62
 65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69
 6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66
 20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f
 75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65

IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04

A = 54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63
 69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20
 4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73

AL = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50

E = c8 0e df a3 2d df 39 d5 ef 00 c0 b4 68 83 42 79
 a2 e4 6a 1b 80 49 f7 92 f7 6b fe 54 b9 03 a9 c9
 a9 4a c9 b4 7a d2 65 5c 5f 10 f9 ae f7 14 27 e2
 fc 6f 9b 3f 39 9a 22 14 89 f1 63 62 c7 03 23 36
 09 d4 5a c6 98 64 e3 32 1c f8 29 35 ac 40 96 c8
 6e 13 33 14 c5 40 19 e8 ca 79 80 df a4 b9 cf 1b
 38 4c 48 6f 3a 54 c5 10 78 15 8e e5 d7 9d e5 9f
 bd 34 d8 48 b3 d6 95 50 a6 76 46 34 44 27 ad e5
 4b 88 51 ff b5 98 f7 f8 00 74 b9 47 3c 82 e2 db

M = 65 2c 3f a3 6b 0a 7c 5b 32 19 fa b3 a3 0b c1 c4
 e6 e5 45 82 47 65 15 f0 ad 9f 75 a2 b7 1c 73 ef

T = 65 2c 3f a3 6b 0a 7c 5b 32 19 fa b3 a3 0b c1 c4

B.2. Test Cases for AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384

K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f

MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

ENC_KEY = 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f

P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20
 6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75
 69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65
 74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62
 65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69
 6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66
 20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f
 75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65

IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04

A = 54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63
 69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20
 4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73

AL = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50

E = ea 65 da 6b 59 e6 1e db 41 9b e6 2d 19 71 2a e5
 d3 03 ee b5 00 52 d0 df d6 69 7f 77 22 4c 8e db
 00 0d 27 9b dc 14 c1 07 26 54 bd 30 94 42 30 c6
 57 be d4 ca 0c 9f 4a 84 66 f2 2b 22 6d 17 46 21
 4b f8 cf c2 40 0a dd 9f 51 26 e4 79 66 3f c9 0b
 3b ed 78 7a 2f 0f fc bf 39 04 be 2a 64 1d 5c 21
 05 bf e5 91 ba e2 3b 1d 74 49 e5 32 ee f6 0a 9a
 c8 bb 6c 6b 01 d3 5d 49 78 7b cd 57 ef 48 49 27
 f2 80 ad c9 1a c0 c4 e7 9c 7b 11 ef c6 00 54 e3

M = 84 90 ac 0e 58 94 9b fe 51 87 5d 73 3f 93 ac 20
 75 16 80 39 cc c7 33 d7 45 94 f8 86 b3 fa af d4
 86 f2 5c 71 31 e3 28 1e 36 c7 a2 d1 30 af de 57

T = 84 90 ac 0e 58 94 9b fe 51 87 5d 73 3f 93 ac 20
 75 16 80 39 cc c7 33 d7

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B.3. Test Cases for AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512

```

K =      00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
        10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
        20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f
        30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f

MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
        10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f

ENC_KEY = 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f
        30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f

P =      41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20
        6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75
        69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65
        74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62
        65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69
        6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66
        20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f
        75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65

IV =     1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04

A =      54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63
        69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20
        4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73

AL =     00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50

E =      4a ff aa ad b7 8c 31 c5 da 4b 1b 59 0d 10 ff bd
        3d d8 d5 d3 02 42 35 26 91 2d a0 37 ec bc c7 bd
        82 2c 30 1d d6 7c 37 3b cc b5 84 ad 3e 92 79 c2
        e6 d1 2a 13 74 b7 7f 07 75 53 df 82 94 10 44 6b
        36 eb d9 70 66 29 6a e6 42 7e a7 5c 2e 08 46 a1
        1a 09 cc f5 37 0d c8 0b fe cb ad 28 c7 3f 09 b3
        a3 b7 5e 66 2a 25 94 41 0a e4 96 b2 e2 e6 60 9e
        31 e6 e0 2c c8 37 f0 53 d2 1f 37 ff 4f 51 95 0b
        be 26 38 d0 9d d7 a4 93 09 30 80 6d 07 03 b1 f6

M =      4d d3 b4 c0 88 a7 f4 5c 21 68 39 64 5b 20 12 bf
        2e 62 69 a8 c5 6a 81 6d bc 1b 26 77 61 95 5b c5
        fd 30 a5 65 c6 16 ff b2 f3 64 ba ec e6 8f c4 07
        53 bc fc 02 5d de 36 93 75 4a a1 f5 c3 37 3b 9c

T =      4d d3 b4 c0 88 a7 f4 5c 21 68 39 64 5b 20 12 bf
        2e 62 69 a8 c5 6a 81 6d bc 1b 26 77 61 95 5b c5

```

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[Appendix C](#). Example ECDH-ES Key Agreement Computation

This example uses ECDH-ES Key Agreement and the Concat KDF to derive the Content Encryption Key (CEK) in the manner described in [Section 4.6](#). In this example, the ECDH-ES Direct Key Agreement mode ("alg" value "ECDH-ES") is used to produce an agreed upon key for AES GCM with a 128 bit key ("enc" value "A128GCM").

In this example, a producer Alice is encrypting content to a consumer Bob. The producer (Alice) generates an ephemeral key for the key agreement computation. Alice's ephemeral key (in JWK format) used for the key agreement computation in this example (including the private part) is:

```
{ "kty": "EC",  
  "crv": "P-256",  
  "x": "gI0GAiLBdu7T53akrFmMyGcsF3n5d07MmwNBHKW5SV0",  
  "y": "SLW_xSffz1PwrHEVI30DHM_4egVwt3NQqeUD7nMFpps",  
  "d": "0_NxaRPUmQoAJt50Gz8YiTr8gRTwyEaCumd-MToTmIo"  
}
```

The consumer's (Bob's) key (in JWK format) used for the key agreement computation in this example (including the private part) is:

```
{ "kty": "EC",  
  "crv": "P-256",  
  "x": "weNJy2HscCSM6AEDTDg04bi0vhFhyWv0HQfeF_PxMQ",  
  "y": "e8lnCO-AlStT-NJVX-crHB7QRYhiix03illJOVA0yck",  
  "d": "VEmDZpDXXK8p8N0Cndsxs924q6nS1RXFASRl6BfUqdw"  
}
```

Header Parameter values used in this example are as follows. In this example, the "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) parameter value is the base64url encoding of the UTF-8 string "Alice" and the "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) parameter value is the base64url encoding of the UTF-8 string "Bob". The "epk" parameter is used to communicate the producer's (Alice's) ephemeral public key value to the consumer (Bob).

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```
{ "alg": "ECDH-ES",  
  "enc": "A128GCM",  
  "apu": "QWxpY2U",  
  "apv": "Qm9i",  
  "epk":  
    { "kty": "EC",  
      "crv": "P-256",  
      "x": "gI0GAILBdu7T53akrFmMyGcsF3n5d07MmwNBHKW5SV0",  
      "y": "SLW_xSffz1PWrHEVI30DHM_4egVwt3NQqeUD7nMFpps"  
    }  
}
```

The resulting Concat KDF [[NIST.800-56A](#)] parameter values are:

Z

This is set to the ECDH-ES key agreement output. (This value is often not directly exposed by libraries, due to NIST security requirements, and only serves as an input to a KDF.) In this example, Z is following the octet sequence (using JSON array notation):

[158, 86, 217, 29, 129, 113, 53, 211, 114, 131, 66, 131, 191, 132, 38, 156, 251, 49, 110, 163, 218, 128, 106, 72, 246, 218, 167, 121, 140, 254, 144, 196].

keydatalen

This value is 128 - the number of bits in the desired output key (because "A128GCM" uses a 128 bit key).

AlgorithmID

This is set to the octets representing the 32 bit big endian value 7 - [0, 0, 0, 7] - the number of octets in the AlgorithmID content "A128GCM", followed, by the octets representing the ASCII string "A128GCM" - [65, 49, 50, 56, 71, 67, 77].

PartyUInfo

This is set to the octets representing the 32 bit big endian value 5 - [0, 0, 0, 5] - the number of octets in the PartyUInfo content "Alice", followed, by the octets representing the UTF-8 string "Alice" - [65, 108, 105, 99, 101].

PartyVInfo

This is set to the octets representing the 32 bit big endian value 3 - [0, 0, 0, 3] - the number of octets in the PartyUInfo content "Bob", followed, by the octets representing the UTF-8 string "Bob" - [66, 111, 98].

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SuppPubInfo

This is set to the octets representing the 32 bit big endian value 128 - [0, 0, 0, 128] - the keydatalen value.

SuppPrivInfo

This is set to the empty octet sequence.

Concatenating the parameters AlgorithmID through SuppPubInfo results in an OtherInfo value of:

[0, 0, 0, 7, 65, 49, 50, 56, 71, 67, 77, 0, 0, 0, 5, 65, 108, 105, 99, 101, 0, 0, 0, 3, 66, 111, 98, 0, 0, 0, 128]

Concatenating the round number 1 ([0, 0, 0, 1]), Z, and the OtherInfo value results in the Concat KDF round 1 hash input of:

[0, 0, 0, 1, 158, 86, 217, 29, 129, 113, 53, 211, 114, 131, 66, 131, 191, 132, 38, 156, 251, 49, 110, 163, 218, 128, 106, 72, 246, 218, 167, 121, 140, 254, 144, 196, 0, 0, 0, 7, 65, 49, 50, 56, 71, 67, 77, 0, 0, 0, 5, 65, 108, 105, 99, 101, 0, 0, 0, 3, 66, 111, 98, 0, 0, 0, 128]

The resulting derived key, which is the first 128 bits of the round 1 hash output is:

[86, 170, 141, 234, 248, 35, 109, 32, 92, 34, 40, 205, 113, 167, 16, 26]

The base64url encoded representation of this derived key is:

VqqN6vgjbSBcIijNcacQGg

[Appendix D](#). Acknowledgements

Solutions for signing and encrypting JSON content were previously explored by Magic Signatures [[MagicSignatures](#)], JSON Simple Sign [[JSS](#)], Canvas Applications [[CanvasApp](#)], JSON Simple Encryption [[JSE](#)], and JavaScript Message Security Format [[I-D.rescorla-jsms](#)], all of which influenced this draft.

The Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA [[I-D.mcgregw-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2](#)] specification, upon which the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms are based, was written by David A. McGrew and Kenny Paterson. The test cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 are based upon those for [[I-D.mcgregw-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2](#)] by John Foley.

Matt Miller wrote Using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Encryption (JWE) for Protecting JSON Web Key (JWK) Objects

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[[I-D.miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk](#)], which the password-based encryption content of this draft is based upon.

This specification is the work of the JOSE Working Group, which includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording that influenced this specification:

Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, Carsten Bormann, John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Alissa Cooper, Breno de Medeiros, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Roni Even, Stephen Farrell, Yaron Y. Golan, Dick Hardt, Joe Hildebrand, Jeff Hodges, Edmund Jay, Charlie Kaufman, Barry Leiba, James Manger, Matt Miller, Kathleen Moriarty, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, John Panzer, Emmanuel Raviart, Eric Rescorla, Pete Resnick, Nat Sakimura, Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner.

Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, and Kathleen Moriarty served as Security area directors during the creation of this specification.

[Appendix E](#). Document History

[[to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC]]

-39

- o Added the Algorithm Analysis Documents(s) field to the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry.
- o Updated the reference to [draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis](#).

-38

- o Require discarding private keys with an "oth" parameter when the implementation does not support private keys with more than two primes.
- o Replaced uses of the phrases "JWS object" and "JWE object" with "JWS" and "JWE".

-37

- o Restricted algorithm names to using only ASCII characters.
- o Added language about ignoring private keys with an "oth" parameter when the implementation does not support private keys with more than two primes.

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- o Updated the example IANA registration request subject line.

-36

- o Moved the normative "alg":"none" security considerations text into the algorithm definition.
- o Specified that registration reviews occur on the jose-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list.

-35

- o Addressed AppsDir reviews by Carsten Bormann.
- o Adjusted some table column widths.

-34

- o Addressed IESG review comments by Barry Leiba, Alissa Cooper, Pete Resnick, Stephen Farrell, and Richard Barnes.

-33

- o Changed the registration review period to three weeks.
- o Acknowledged additional contributors.

-32

- o Added a note to implementers about libraries that prefix an extra zero-valued octet to RSA modulus representations returned.
- o Addressed secdir review comments by Charlie Kaufman, Scott Kelly, and Stephen Kent.
- o Addressed Gen-ART review comments by Roni Even.
- o Replaced the term Plaintext JWS with Unsecured JWS.

-31

- o Referenced NIST SP 800-57 for guidance on key lifetimes.
- o Updated the reference to [draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2](#).

-30

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[Page 68]

- o Cleaned up the reference syntax in a few places.
- o Applied minor wording changes to the Security Considerations section.

-29

- o Replaced the terms JWS Header, JWE Header, and JWT Header with a single JOSE Header term defined in the JWS specification. This also enabled a single Header Parameter definition to be used and reduced other areas of duplication between specifications.

-28

- o Specified the use of PKCS #7 padding with AES CBC, rather than PKCS #5. (PKCS #7 is a superset of PKCS #5, and is appropriate for the 16 octet blocks used by AES CBC.)
- o Revised the introduction to the Security Considerations section. Also introduced additional subsection headings for security considerations items and moved a few security consideration items from here to the JWS and JWE drafts.

-27

- o Described additional security considerations.
- o Updated the JCA and XMLENC parameters for "RSA-OAEP-256" and the JCA parameters for "A128KW", "A192KW", "A256KW", and "ECDH-ES".

-26

- o Added algorithm identifier "RSA-OAEP-256" for RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256.
- o Clarified that the ECDSA signature values R and S are represented as octet sequences as defined in [Section 2.3.7](#) of SEC1 [[SEC1](#)].
- o Noted that octet sequences are depicted using JSON array notation.
- o Updated references, including to W3C specifications.

-25

- o Corrected an external section number reference that had changed.

-24

- o Replaced uses of the term "associated data" wherever it was used to refer to a data value with "additional authenticated data", since both terms were being used as synonyms, causing confusion.

- o Updated the JSON reference to [RFC 7159](#).

-23

- o No changes were made, other than to the version number and date.

-22

- o Corrected [RFC 2119](#) terminology usage.
- o Replaced references to [draft-ietf-json-rfc4627bis](#) with [RFC 7158](#).

-21

- o Compute the PBES2 salt parameter as (UTF8(Alg) || 0x00 || Salt Input), where the "p2s" Header Parameter encodes the Salt Input value and Alg is the "alg" Header Parameter value.
- o Changed some references from being normative to informative, addressing issue #90.

-20

- o Replaced references to [RFC 4627](#) with [draft-ietf-json-rfc4627bis](#), addressing issue #90.

-19

- o Used tables to show the correspondence between algorithm identifiers and algorithm descriptions and parameters in the algorithm definition sections, addressing issue #183.
- o Changed the "Implementation Requirements" registry field names to "JOSE Implementation Requirements" to make it clear that these implementation requirements apply only to JWS and JWE implementations.

-18

- o Changes to address editorial and minor issues #129, #134, #135, #158, #161, #185, #186, and #187.
- o Added and used Description registry fields.

-17

- o Explicitly named all the logical components of a JWS and JWE and defined the processing rules and serializations in terms of those components, addressing issues #60, #61, and #62.
- o Removed processing steps in algorithm definitions that duplicated processing steps in JWS or JWE, addressing issue #56.
- o Replaced verbose repetitive phrases such as "base64url encode the octets of the UTF-8 representation of X" with mathematical notation such as "BASE64URL(UTF8(X))".
- o Terms used in multiple documents are now defined in one place and incorporated by reference. Some lightly used or obvious terms were also removed. This addresses issue #58.
- o Changes to address minor issue #53.

-16

- o Added a DataLen prefix to the AlgorithmID value in the Concat KDF computation.
- o Added OIDs for encryption algorithms, additional signature algorithm OIDs, and additional XML DSIG/ENC URIs in the algorithm cross-reference tables.
- o Changes to address editorial and minor issues #28, #36, #39, #52, #53, #55, #127, #128, #136, #137, #141, #150, #151, #152, and #155.

-15

- o Changed statements about rejecting JWSs to statements about validation failing, addressing issue #35.
- o Stated that changes of implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis, addressing issue #38.
- o Made "oct" a required key type, addressing issue #40.
- o Updated the example ECDH-ES key agreement values.
- o Changes to address editorial and minor issues #34, #37, #49, #63, #123, #124, #125, #130, #132, #133, #138, #139, #140, #142, #143, #144, #145, #148, #149, #150, and #162.

-14

- o Removed "PBKDF2" key type and added "p2s" and "p2c" header parameters for use with the PBES2 algorithms.
- o Made the RSA private key parameters that are there to enable optimizations be RECOMMENDED rather than REQUIRED.
- o Added algorithm identifiers for AES algorithms using 192 bit keys and for RSASSA-PSS using HMAC SHA-384.
- o Added security considerations about key lifetimes, addressing issue #18.
- o Added an example ECDH-ES key agreement computation.

-13

- o Added key encryption with AES GCM as specified in [draft-jones-jose-aes-gcm-key-wrap-01](#), addressing issue #13.
- o Added security considerations text limiting the number of times that an AES GCM key can be used for key encryption or direct encryption, per [Section 8.3](#) of NIST SP 800-38D, addressing issue #28.
- o Added password-based key encryption as specified in [draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-02](#).

-12

- o In the Direct Key Agreement case, the Concat KDF AlgorithmID is set to the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the "enc" header parameter value.
- o Restored the "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) parameter.
- o Moved the "epk", "apu", and "apv" Header Parameter definitions to be with the algorithm descriptions that use them.
- o Changed terminology from "block encryption" to "content encryption".

-11

- o Removed the Encrypted Key value from the AAD computation since it is already effectively integrity protected by the encryption process. The AAD value now only contains the representation of

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the JWE Encrypted Header.

- o Removed "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) since it is no longer used.
- o Added more information about the use of PartyUInfo during key agreement.
- o Use the keydatalen as the SuppPubInfo value for the Concat KDF when doing key agreement, as [RFC 2631](#) does.
- o Added algorithm identifiers for RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256 and SHA-512.
- o Added a Parameter Information Class value to the JSON Web Key Parameters registry, which registers whether the parameter conveys public or private information.

-10

- o Changed the JWE processing rules for multiple recipients so that a single AAD value contains the header parameters and encrypted key values for all the recipients, enabling AES GCM to be safely used for multiple recipients.

-09

- o Expanded the scope of the JWK parameters to include private and symmetric key representations, as specified by [draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key-00](#).
- o Changed term "JWS Secured Input" to "JWS Signing Input".
- o Changed from using the term "byte" to "octet" when referring to 8 bit values.
- o Specified that AES Key Wrap uses the default initial value specified in [Section 2.2.3.1 of RFC 3394](#). This addressed issue #19.
- o Added Key Management Mode definitions to terminology section and used the defined terms to provide clearer key management instructions. This addressed issue #5.
- o Replaced "A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512" with "A128CBC-HS256" and "A256CBC-HS512". The new algorithms perform the same cryptographic computations as [[I-D.mcgregor-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2](#)], but with the Initialization Vector and Authentication Tag values remaining separate from the Ciphertext value in the output

representation. Also deleted the header parameters "epu" (encryption PartyUInfo) and "epv" (encryption PartyVInfo), since they are no longer used.

- o Changed from using the term "Integrity Value" to "Authentication Tag".

-08

- o Changed the name of the JWK key type parameter from "alg" to "kty".
- o Replaced uses of the term "AEAD" with "Authenticated Encryption", since the term AEAD in the [RFC 5116](#) sense implied the use of a particular data representation, rather than just referring to the class of algorithms that perform authenticated encryption with associated data.
- o Applied editorial improvements suggested by Jeff Hodges. Many of these simplified the terminology used.
- o Added seriesInfo information to Internet Draft references.

-07

- o Added a data length prefix to PartyUInfo and PartyVInfo values.
- o Changed the name of the JWK RSA modulus parameter from "mod" to "n" and the name of the JWK RSA exponent parameter from "xpo" to "e", so that the identifiers are the same as those used in [RFC 3447](#).
- o Made several local editorial changes to clean up loose ends left over from the decision to only support block encryption methods providing integrity.

-06

- o Removed the "int" and "kdf" parameters and defined the new composite Authenticated Encryption algorithms "A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512" to replace the former uses of AES CBC, which required the use of separate integrity and key derivation functions.
- o Included additional values in the Concat KDF calculation -- the desired output size and the algorithm value, and optionally PartyUInfo and PartyVInfo values. Added the optional header parameters "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo), "apv" (agreement

PartyVInfo), "epu" (encryption PartyUInfo), and "epv" (encryption PartyVInfo).

- o Changed the name of the JWK RSA exponent parameter from "exp" to "xpo" so as to allow the potential use of the name "exp" for a future extension that might define an expiration parameter for keys. (The "exp" name is already used for this purpose in the JWT specification.)
- o Applied changes made by the RFC Editor to [RFC 6749](#)'s registry language to this specification.

-05

- o Support both direct encryption using a shared or agreed upon symmetric key, and the use of a shared or agreed upon symmetric key to key wrap the CMK. Specifically, added the "alg" values "dir", "ECDH-ES+A128KW", and "ECDH-ES+A256KW" to finish filling in this set of capabilities.
- o Updated open issues.

-04

- o Added text requiring that any leading zero bytes be retained in base64url encoded key value representations for fixed-length values.
- o Added this language to Registration Templates: "This name is case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted."
- o Described additional open issues.
- o Applied editorial suggestions.

-03

- o Always use a 128 bit "authentication tag" size for AES GCM, regardless of the key size.
- o Specified that use of a 128 bit IV is REQUIRED with AES CBC. It was previously RECOMMENDED.
- o Removed key size language for ECDSA algorithms, since the key size is implied by the algorithm being used.

- o Stated that the "int" key size must be the same as the hash output size (and not larger, as was previously allowed) so that its size is defined for key generation purposes.
- o Added the "kdf" (key derivation function) header parameter to provide crypto agility for key derivation. The default KDF remains the Concat KDF with the SHA-256 digest function.
- o Clarified that the "mod" and "exp" values are unsigned.
- o Added Implementation Requirements columns to algorithm tables and Implementation Requirements entries to algorithm registries.
- o Changed AES Key Wrap to RECOMMENDED.
- o Moved registries JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters and JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values to the JWS specification.
- o Moved JSON Web Key Parameters registry to the JWK specification.
- o Changed registration requirements from RFC Required to Specification Required with Expert Review.
- o Added Registration Template sections for defined registries.
- o Added Registry Contents sections to populate registry values.
- o No longer say "the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Secured Input (which is the same as the ASCII representation)". Just call it "the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input".
- o Added "Collision Resistant Namespace" to the terminology section.
- o Numerous editorial improvements.

-02

- o For AES GCM, use the "additional authenticated data" parameter to provide integrity for the header, encrypted key, and ciphertext and use the resulting "authentication tag" value as the JWE Authentication Tag.
- o Defined minimum required key sizes for algorithms without specified key sizes.
- o Defined KDF output key sizes.

- o Specified the use of PKCS #5 padding with AES CBC.
- o Generalized text to allow key agreement to be employed as an alternative to key wrapping or key encryption.
- o Clarified that ECDH-ES is a key agreement algorithm.
- o Required implementation of AES-128-KW and AES-256-KW.
- o Removed the use of "A128GCM" and "A256GCM" for key wrapping.
- o Removed "A512KW" since it turns out that it's not a standard algorithm.
- o Clarified the relationship between "typ" header parameter values and MIME types.
- o Generalized language to refer to Message Authentication Codes (MACs) rather than Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) unless in a context specific to HMAC algorithms.
- o Established registries: JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters, JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms, JSON Web Signature and Encryption "typ" Values, JSON Web Key Parameters, and JSON Web Key Algorithm Families.
- o Moved algorithm-specific definitions from JWK to JWA.
- o Reformatted to give each member definition its own section heading.

-01

- o Moved definition of "alg":"none" for JWSs here from the JWT specification since this functionality is likely to be useful in more contexts than just for JWTs.
- o Added Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm using 512 bit keys ("A512KW").
- o Added text "Alternatively, the Encoded JWS Signature MAY be base64url decoded to produce the JWS Signature and this value can be compared with the computed HMAC value, as this comparison produces the same result as comparing the encoded values".
- o Corrected the Magic Signatures reference.

- o Made other editorial improvements suggested by JOSE working group participants.

-00

- o Created the initial IETF draft based upon [draft-jones-json-web-signature-04](#) and [draft-jones-json-web-encryption-02](#) with no normative changes.
- o Changed terminology to no longer call both digital signatures and HMACs "signatures".

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