

**Desired Enhancements to GSSAPI Naming  
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Abstract

The Generic Security Services API (GSS-API) provides a naming architecture that supports name-based authorization. GSS-API authenticates two named parties to each other. Names can be stored on access control lists to make authorization decisions. Advances in security mechanisms and the way implementers wish to use GSS-API require this model to be extended. Some mechanisms such as public-key mechanisms do not have a single name to be used across all environments. Other mechanisms such as Kerberos allow names to



change as people move around organizations. This document proposes expanding the definition of GSS-API names to deal with these situations.

## **1. Introduction**

The Generic Security Services API [[1](#)] authenticates two named parties to each other. GSS names can be imported in a variety of formats through the `gss_import_name` call. Several mechanism-independent name formats such as `GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE` for services running on an Internet host and `GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME` for the names of users. Other mechanism-specific name types are also provided. By the time a name is used in acquiring a mechanism-specific credential or establishing a security context, it has been transformed into one of these mechanism-specific name types. In addition, the GSS-API provides a function called `gss_export_name` that will flatten a GSS-API name into a binary blob suitable for comparisons. This binary blob can be stored on ACLs and then authorization decisions can be made simply by comparing the name exported from a newly accepted context to the name on the ACL.

Inherent in this model is the idea that mechanism names need to be able to be represented in a single canonical form. Anyone importing that name needs to be able to retrieve the canonical form of that name.

Several security mechanisms have been proposed for which this naming architecture is too restrictive. In some cases it is not always possible to canonicalize any name that is imported. In other cases there is no single canonical name.

Storing names on ACLs can be problematic because names tend to change over time. If the name contains organizational information such as a domain part or an indication of what department someone works for, this changes as the person moves around the organization. Even if no organizational information is included in the name, the name will change as people change their names. Updating ACLs to reflect name changes is difficult.

Also, as GSS-API is used in more complex environments, there is a desire to use attribute certificates [[5](#)], Kerberos authorization data [[2](#)], or other non-name-based authorization models. GSS-API needs to be enhanced in order to support these uses in a mechanism-independent manner.

This draft discusses two different cases where the current GSS-API naming seems inadequate. Two proposals that have been discussed within the IETF Kitten community are discussed. Finally, the problems that need to be resolved to adopt either of these proposals are discussed.



## **2. Kerberos Naming**

The Kerberos Referrals draft [3] proposes a new type of Kerberos name called an enterprise name. The intent is that the enterprise name is an alias that the user knows for themselves and can use to login. The Kerberos KDC translates this name into a normal Kerberos principal and gives the user tickets for this principal. This normal principal is used for authorization. The intent is that the enterprise name tracks the user as they move throughout the organization, even if they move to parts of the organization that have different naming policies. The name they type at login remains constant, but the Kerberos principal used to authenticate them to services changes.

Performing a mapping from enterprise name to principal name is not generally possible for unauthenticated services. So in order to canonicalize an enterprise name to get a principal, a service must have credentials. However it may not be desirable to allow services to map enterprise names to principal names in the general case. Also, Kerberos does not (and does not plan to) provide a mechanism for mapping enterprise names to principals besides authentication as the enterprise name. Thus, any such mapping would be vendor-specific. With this feature in Kerberos, it is not possible to implement `gss_canonicalize_name` for enterprise name types.

Another issue arises with enterprise names. IN some cases it would be desirable to put the enterprise name on the ACL instead of a principal name. Thus, it would be desirable to include the enterprise name in the name exported by `gss_export_name`. Unfortunately, if this were done, the exported name would change whenever the mapping changed, invalidating any ACL entries based off the old exported name and defeating the purpose of including the enterprise name. In some cases it would be desirable to have the exported name be based on the enterprise name and in others based on the principal name, but this is not permitted by the current GSS-API.

Another development also complicates GSS-API naming for Kerberos. Several vendors have been looking at mechanisms to include group membership information in Kerberos authorization data. It is desirable to put these group names on ACLs. Again, GSS-API currently has no mechanism to use this information.



### **3. X.509 Names**

X.509 names are at least as complex as Kerberos names. It seems the subject name might be the appropriate name to use as the name to be exported in a GSS-API mechanism. However [RFC 3280](#) [4] does not even require the subject name to be a non-empty sequence. Instead there are cases where the subjectAltName extension is the only thing to identify the subject of the certificate. As in the case of Kerberos group memberships, there may be many subjectAltName extensions available in a certificate. Different applications will care about different extensions. Thus there is no single value that can be defined as the exported GSS-API name that will be useful in all environments.

A profile of a particular X.509 GSS-API mechanism could require a specific name be used. However this would limit that mechanism to require a particular type of certificate. There is interest in being able to use arbitrary X.509 certificates with GSS-API for some applications.





## **4. Composite Names**

One proposal to solve these problems is to extend the concept of a GSS-API name to include a set of name attributes. Each attribute would be an octet-string labeled by an OID. Examples of attributes would include Kerberos enterprise names, group memberships in an authorization infrastructure, Kerberos authorization data attributes and subjectAltName attributes in a certificate. Several new operations would be needed:

1. Add attribute to name
2. Query attributes of name
3. Query values of an attribute
4. Delete an attribute from a name

### **4.1 Usage of Name Attributes**

Since attributes are part of GSS-API names, the acceptor can retrieve the attributes of the initiator's name from the context. These attributes can then be used for authorization.

Most name attributes will probably not come from explicit operations to add attributes to a name. Instead, name attributes will probably come from mechanism specific credentials. Mechanism specific naming and group membership can be mapped into name attributes by the mechanism implementation. The specific form of this mapping will generally require protocol specification for each mechanism.

The value of many name attributes may be suitable for use in binary comparison. This should enable applications to use these name attributes on ACLs the same way exported names are now used on ACLs. For example if a particular SubjectAltName extension contains the appropriate identity for an application, then the name attribute for this SubjectAltName can be placed on the ACL. This is only true if the name attribute is stored in some canonical form.

### **4.2 Open issues**

This section describes parts of the proposal to add attributes to names that will need to be explored before the proposal can become a protocol specification.

Are mechanisms expected to be able to carry arbitrary name attributes as part of a context establishment? At first it seems like this would be desirable. However the purpose of GSS-API is to establish an authenticated context between two peers. In particular, a context authenticates two named entities to each other. The names of these entities and attributes associated with these names will be used for authorization decisions. If an initiator or acceptor is allowed to



assert name attributes and the authenticity of these assertions is not validated by the mechanisms, then security problems will result. On the other hand, requiring that name attributes be mechanism specific and only be carried by mechanisms that understand the name attributes and can validate them compromises GSS-API's place as a generic API. Application authors would be forced to understand mechanism-specific attributes to make authorization decisions. In addition if mechanisms are not required to transport arbitrary attributes, then application authors will need to deal with different implementations of the same mechanism that support different sets of name attributes. One possible solution is to carry a source along with each name attribute; this source could indicate whether the attribute comes from a mechanism data structure or from the other party in the authentication.

Another related question is how will name attributes be mapped into their mechanism-specific forms. For example it would be desirable to map many Kerberos authorization data elements into name attributes. In the case of the Microsoft PAC, it would be desirable for some applications to get the entire PAC. However in many cases, the specific lists of security IDs contained in the PAC would be more directly useful to an application. So there may not be a good one-to-one mapping between the mechanism-specific elements and the representation desirable at the GSS-API layer.

Specific name matching rules need to be developed. How do names with attributes compare? What is the effect of a name attribute on a target name in `gss_accept_sec_context`?

#### **4.3 Handling `gss_export_name`**

For many mechanisms, there will be an obvious choice to use for the name exported by `gss_export_name`. For example in the case of Kerberos, the principal name can continue to be used as the exported name. This will allow applications depending on existing GSS-API name-based authorization to continue to work. However it is probably desirable to allow GSS-API mechanisms for which `gss_export_name` cannot meaningfully be defined. The behavior of `gss_export_name` in such cases should probably be to return some error. Such mechanisms may not work with existing applications and cannot conform to the current version of the GSS-API.



## **5. Credential Extensions**

An alternative to the name attributes proposal is to extend GSS-API credentials with extensions labeled by OIDs. Interfaces would be needed to manipulate these credential extensions and to retrieve the credential extensions for credentials used to establish a context. Even if name attributes are used, credential extensions may be useful for other unrelated purposes.

It is possible to solve problems discussed in this document using some credential extension mechanism. Doing so will have many of the same open issues as discussed in the composite names proposal. The main advantage of a credential extensions proposal is that it avoids specifying how name attributes interact with name comparison or target names.

The primary advantage of the name attributes proposal over credential extensions is that name attributes seem to fit better into the GSS-API authorization model. Names are already available at all points when authorization decisions are made. In addition, for many mechanisms the sort of information carried as name attributes will also be carried as part of the name in the mechanism



## **6. Mechanisms for Export Name**

Another proposal is to define some GSS-API mechanisms whose only purpose is to have an exportable name form that is useful. For example, you might be able to export a name as a local machine user ID with such a mechanism.

This solution works well especially for name information that can be looked up in a directory. It was unclear from the previous discussion whether this solution would allow mechanism-specific name information to be extracted from a context. If so, then this solution would meet many of the goals of this document.

One advantage of this solution is that it requires few if any changes to GSS-API semantics. It is not as flexible as other solutions. Also, it is not clear how to handle mechanisms that do not have a well defined name to export with this solution.





## **7. Deferring Credential Binding**

Currently GSS-API credentials represent a single mechanism name. While working on other issues discussion focused around choosing the correct credential for a particular target. There are several situations where an implementation can do a better job of choosing a default source name to use given the name of the target to connect to. Currently, GSS-API does not provide a mechanism to do this. Adding such a mechanism would be desirable.

## **8. Security Considerations**

GSS-API sets up a security context between two named parties. The GSS-API names are security assertions that are authenticated by the context establishment process. As such the GSS naming architecture is critical to the security of GSS-API.

Currently GSS-API uses a simplistic naming model for authorization. Names can be compared against a set of names on an access control list. This architecture is relatively simple and its security properties are well understood. However it does not provide the flexibility and feature set for future deployments of GSS-API.

This proposal will significantly increase the complexity of the GSS naming architecture. As this proposal is fleshed out, we need to consider ways of managing security exposures created by this increased complexity.



## **9. Acknowledgements**

John Brezak, Paul Leach and Nicolas Williams all participated in discussions that lead to a desire to enhance GSS naming. Martin Rex provided descriptions of the current naming architecture and pointed out many ways in which proposed enhancements would create interoperability problems or increase complexity. Martin also provided excellent information on what aspects of GSS naming have tended to be implemented badly or have not met the needs of some customers.

Nicolas Williams helped describe the possible approaches for enhancing naming.

## **10 Informative References**

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