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Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)  
Freshness Extension  
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## Abstract

This document describes how to further extend the Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT) extension [[RFC4556](#)] to exchange an opaque data blob which a KDC can validate to ensure that the client is currently in possession of the private key during a PKInit AS exchange.

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## [1.](#) Introduction

The Kerberos PKINIT extension [[RFC4556](#)] defines two schemes for using asymmetric cryptography in a Kerberos preauthenticator. One uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the other depends on public key encryption. The public key encryption scheme is less commonly used for two reasons:

- o Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Support for PKINIT [[RFC5349](#)] only specified Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement so it cannot be used for public key encryption.
- o Public key encryption requires certificates with an encryption key which is not deployed on many existing smart cards.

In the Diffie-Hellman exchange, the client uses its private key only to sign the AuthPack structure specified in [Section 3.2.1 of](#)

[\[RFC4556\]](#) which is performed before any traffic is sent to the KDC. Thus a client can generate requests with future times in the PKAuthenticator, and then send those requests at those future times. Unless the time is outside the validity period of the client's

certificate, the KDC will validate the PKAuthenticator and return a TGT the client can use without possessing the private key.

As a result, a client performing PKINIT with the Diffie-Hellman key exchange does not prove current possession of the private key being used for authentication. It proves only prior use of that key. Ensuring that the client has current possession of the private key requires that the signed PKAuthenticator data include information that the client could not have predicted.

### [1.1.](#) Kerberos message flow using KRB\_AS\_REQ without pre-authentication

Today some password-based AS exchanges [\[RFC4120\]](#) depend on the client sending a KRB\_AS\_REQ without pre-authentication to trigger the KDC to provide the Kerberos client with information needed to complete an AS exchange such as the supported encryption types and salt values (see the message flow below):




Figure 1

We can use this mechanism in PKInit for KDCs to provide data which the client returns as part of the KRB\_AS\_REQ to ensure that the PA\_PK\_AS\_REQ [\[RFC4556\]](#) was not pregenerated.

### [1.2.](#) Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

## [2.](#) Message Exchanges

The following summarizes the message flow with extensions to [\[RFC4120\]](#) and [\[RFC4556\]](#) required to support a KDC provided freshness token during the initial request for a ticket:

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1. The client generates a KRB\_AS\_REQ as specified in [Section 2.9.3 of \[RFC4120\]](#) without an authenticator which includes the freshness token request to the KDC.
2. The KDC generates a KRB\_ERROR as specified in [Section 3.1.3 of \[RFC4120\]](#) providing a freshness token.
3. The client receives the error as specified in [Section 3.1.4 of \[RFC4120\]](#) and includes the freshness token as part of the KRB\_AS\_REQ as specified in [\[RFC4120\]](#) and [\[RFC4556\]](#).
4. The KDC receives and validates the KRB\_AS\_REQ as specified in [Section 3.2.2 of \[RFC4556\]](#) then additionally validates the freshness token.
5. The KDC and client continue as specified in [\[RFC4120\]](#) and [\[RFC4556\]](#).

### [2.1.](#) Generation of KRB\_AS\_REQ Message

The client indicates support of freshness tokens by adding a PA\_AS\_FRESHNESS padata type with an empty octet string as the padata-value.

### [2.2.](#) Generation of KRB\_ERROR Message

The KDC will respond by adding a PA\_AS\_FRESHNESS padata type with the freshness token as the padata-value to the METHOD-DATA object.

### [2.3.](#) Generation of KRB\_AS\_REQ Message

After the client receives the KRB-ERROR message containing a freshness token, it extracts the PA\_AS\_FRESHNESS padata-value field of the PA\_DATA structure as an opaque data blob. The PA\_AS\_FRESHNESS padata-value field of the PA\_DATA structure SHALL then be added as an opaque blob in the freshnessToken field when the client generates the PKAuthenticator for the PA\_PK\_AS\_REQ message. This ensures that the freshness token value will be included in the signed data portion of the KRB\_AS\_REQ value.

### [2.4.](#) Receipt of KRB\_AS\_REQ Message

After validating the PA\_PK\_AS\_REQ message normally, the KDC will validate the freshnessToken value in the PKAuthenticator in an implementation specific way. If the freshness token is not valid, the KDC MUST return KDC\_ERR\_PREAUTH\_FAILED with PA\_AS\_FRESHNESS. Since the freshness tokens are validated by KDCs in the same realm,

standardizing the contents of the freshness token is not a concern for interoperability.

### [2.5.](#) Receipt of second KRB\_ERROR Message

Clients SHOULD retry in the cases when receiving a KDC\_ERR\_PREAUTH\_FAILED KRB\_ERROR message which includes a freshness token where there is a possibility that there was too much delay between the client receiving the freshness token and sending the PA\_PK\_AS\_REQ message.

## [3.](#) PreAuthentication Data Types

The following are the new PreAuthentication data types:

| Padata and Data Type | Padata-type Value |
|----------------------|-------------------|
| PA_AS_FRESHNESS      | TBD               |

## [4.](#) Extended PKAuthenticator

The PKAuthenticator structure specified in [Section 3.2.1 \[RFC4556\]](#) is extended to include a new freshnessToken as follows:

```
PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
    cusec          [0] INTEGER (0..999999),
    ctime          [1] KerberosTime,
    -- cusec and ctime are used as in [RFC4120], for
    -- replay prevention.
    nonce          [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
    -- Chosen randomly; this nonce does not need to
    -- match with the nonce in the KDC-REQ-BODY.
    paChecksum     [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
    -- MUST be present.
    -- Contains the SHA1 checksum, performed over
    -- KDC-REQ-BODY.
    ...,
    freshnessToken [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
    -- PA_AS_FRESHNESS padata value as recieved from the
    -- KDC. MUST be present if sent by KDC
    ...
}
```

## [5.](#) Acknowledgements

Henry B. Hotz, Nico Williams, Sam Hartman, Tom Yu, Martin Rex, and Douglas E. Engert were key contributors to the discover of the freshness issue in PKINIT.

Greg Hudson, Nathan Ide, Benjamin Kaduk, Magnus Nystrom, Nico Williams and Tom Yu reviewed the document and provided suggestions for improvements.

## [6.](#) IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign numbers for PA\_AS\_FRESHNESS listed in the Kerberos Parameters registry Pre-authentication and Typed Data as follows:

| Type | Value           | Reference  |
|------|-----------------|------------|
| TBD  | PA_AS_FRESHNESS | [This RFC] |

## 7. Security Considerations

The freshness token SHOULD include signing, encrypting or sealing data from the KDC to determine authenticity and prevent tampering. Kerberos error messages are not integrity protected unless authenticated using Kerberos FAST [[RFC6113](#)]. Even if FAST is required to provide integrity protection, a different KDC would not be able to validate freshness tokens without some kind of shared database.

## 8. Interoperability Considerations

Since the client treats the KDC provided data blob as opaque, changing the contents will not impact existing clients. Thus extensions to the freshness token do not impact client interoperability.

## 9. References

### 9.1. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), March 1997.

- [RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", [RFC 4120](#), July 2005.
- [RFC4556] Zhu, L. and B. Tung, "Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)", [RFC 4556](#), June 2006.
- [RFC5349] Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and K. Lauter, "Elliptic Curve

Cryptography (ECC) Support for Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)", [RFC 5349](#), September 2008.

## [9.2.](#) Informative References

[RFC6113] Hartman, S. and L. Zhu, "A Generalized Framework for Kerberos Pre-Authentication", [RFC 6113](#), April 2011.

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