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A set of SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms for OAuth
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Abstract

OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.

This document defines how an application client uses credentials obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) or the Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) to access a protected resource at a resource serve. Thereby, it enables schemes defined within the OAuth framework for non-HTTP-based application protocols.

Clients typically store the user's long term credential. This does, however, lead to significant security vulnerabilities, for example, when such a credential leaks. A significant benefit of OAuth for usage in those clients is that the password is replaced by a token. Tokens typically provided limited access rights and can be managed and revoked separately from the user's long-term credential (password).

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

OAuth [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. The core OAuth specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] does not define the interaction between the client and the resource server with the access to a protected resource using an Access Token. This functionality is described in separate specifications, for example [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer], [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac], and OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849] where the focus is on an HTTP-based environment only.

Figure 1 shows the abstract message flow as shown in Figure 1 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2].



Figure 1: Abstract OAuth 2.0 Protocol Flow

This document takes advantage of the OAuth protocol and its deployment base to provide a way to use SASL [RFC4422] as well as the GSS-API [RFC2743] to gain access to resources when using non-HTTP-based protocols, such as the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) [RFC3501] and SMTP [RFC5321], which is what this memo uses in the examples.

The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a framework for providing authentication and data security services in connection-oriented protocols via replaceable mechanisms. It provides a structured interface between protocols and mechanisms.

The resulting framework allows new protocols to reuse existing mechanisms and allows old protocols to make use of new mechanisms. The framework also provides a protocol for securing subsequent protocol exchanges within a data security layer.

The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) [RFC2743] provides a framework for applications to support multiple authentication mechanisms through a unified interface.

This document defines SASL mechanisms for OAuth, and it conforms to the new bridge between SASL and the GSS-API called GS2 [RFC5801]. This means that this document defines both SASL and GSS-API mechanisms. Implementers may be interested in either the SASL, the GSS-API, or even both mechanisms. To faciliate these two variants, the description has been split into two parts, one part that provides normative references for those interested in the SASL OAuth mechanism (see Section 3), and a second part for those implementers that wish to implement the GSS-API portion (see Section 4).

When OAuth is integrated into SASL and the GSS-API the high-level steps are as follows:

(A) The client requests authorization from the resource owner. The authorization request can be made directly to the resource owner (as shown), or preferably indirectly via the authorization server as an intermediary.

(B) The client receives an authorization grant which is a credential representing the resource owner's authorization, expressed using one of four grant types defined in this specification or using an extension grant type. The authorization grant type depends on the method used by the client to request authorization and the types supported by the authorization server.

(C) The client requests an access token by authenticating with the authorization server and presenting the authorization grant.

(D) The authorization server authenticates the client and validates the authorization grant, and if valid issues an access token.

(E) The client requests the protected resource from the resource server and authenticates by presenting the access token.

(F) The resource server validates the access token, and if valid, indicates a successful authentication.

Steps (E) and (F) are not defined in [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] and are the

main functionality specified within this document. Consequently, the message exchange shown in Figure 2 is the result of this specification. The client will genrally need to determine the authentication endpoints (and perhaps the service endpoints) before the OAuth 2.0 protocol exchange messages in steps (A)-(D) are executed. The discovery of the resource owner and authorization server endpoints is outside the scope of this specification. The client must discover those endpoints using a discovery mechanisms such as Webfinger using host-meta [I-D.jones-appsawg-webfinger]. In band discovery is not tenable if clients support the OAuth 2.0 password grant. Once credentials are obtained the client proceeds to steps (E) and (F) defined in this specification.



Figure 2: OAuth SASL Architecture

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terms used in the OAuth 2.0 specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2].

In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and server respectively. Line breaks have been inserted for readability.

Note that the IMAP SASL specification requires base64 encoding message, not this memo.

3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specification

SASL is used as a generalized authentication method in a variety of application layer protocols. This document defines the following SASL mechanisms for usage with OAuth:

OAUTHBEARER Authorization using Bearer tokens.

OAUTH10A Authorization using OAuth 1.0a tokens.

OAUTH10A-PLUS Adds channel binding [RFC5056] capability to OAUTH10A for additional security guarantees.

Any new OAuth token scheme MAY define a new SASL mechanism compatible with the mechanisms defined here by simply registering the new name(s) and citing this specification for the further definition. New channel binding enabled "-PLUS" mechanisms defined in this way MUST include message integrity protection.

These mechanisms are client initiated and lock-step, the server always replying to a client message. In the case where the client has and correctly uses a valid token the flow is:

- Client sends a valid and correct initial client response.
- Server responds with a successful authentication.

In the case where authorization fails the server sends an error result, then client MUST then send an additional message to the server in order to allow the server to finish the exchange. Some protocols and common SASL implementations do not support both sending a SASL message and finalizing a SASL negotiation, the additional client message in the error case deals with this problem. This exchange is:

- Client sends an invalid initial client response.
- Server responds with an error message.
- Client sends an empty client reponse.
- Server fails the authentication.

3.1. Initial Client Response

Client responses are a key/value pair sequence. The initial client response includes a gs2-header as defined in GS2 [RFC5801], which carries the authorization ID. These key/value pairs carry the equivalent values from an HTTP context in order to be able to complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization. The client MUST send an authorization ID in the gs2-header. The ABNF [RFC5234] syntax is:

```
kvsep          = %x01
key            = 1*ALPHA
value          = *(VCHAR | SP | HTAB | CR | LF )
kvpair         = key "=" value kvsep
client_resp    = 0*kvpair kvsep
;; gs2-header  = As defined in GSS-API
initial_client_resp = gs2-header kvsep client_resp
```

The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:

auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for an equivalent HTTP OAuth authroization.

user (REQUIRED): The authorization ID. The server MAY use this as a routing or database lookup hint. The server MUST NOT use this as authoritative, the user name MUST be asserted by the OAuth credential.

host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.

port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive integer string without leading zeros to which the client connected.

qs: The HTTP query string. In non-channel binding mechanisms this is reserved, the client SHOUD NOT send it, and has the default value of "". In "-PLUS" variants this carries a single key value pair "cbdata" for the channel binding data payload formatted as an HTTP query string.

In authorization schemes that use signatures, the client MUST send host and port number key/values, and the server MUST fail an authorization request requiring signatures that does not have host and port values. For authorization schemes that require a URI scheme as part of the data being signed "http" is always used. In OAuth

1.0a for example, the signature base string includes the reconstructed HTTP URL.

3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values

In these mechanisms values for path, query string and post body are assigned default values. OAuth authorization schemes MAY define usage of these in the SASL context and extend this specification. For OAuth schemes that use request signatures the default values MUST be used unless explict values are provided in the client response. The following key values are reserved for future use:

mthd (RESERVED): HTTP method for use in signatures, the default value is "POST".

path (RESERVED): HTTP path data, the default value is "/".

post (RESERVED): HTTP post data, the default value is "".

3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header

The OAuth scheme related mechanisms are also GSS-API mechanisms, see Section 4 for further detail. The gs2-header is used as follows:

- The "gs2-nonstd-flag" MUST NOT be present.
- The "gs2-authzid" carries the authorization identity as specified in [RFC5801].

In the non "-PLUS" mechanisms the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set to "n" because channel-binding [RFC5056] data is not expected. In the OAUTH10A-PLUS mechanism (or other -PLUS variants based on this specification) the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set appropriately by the client.

3.2. Server's Response

The server validates the response per the specification for the authorization scheme used. If the authorization scheme used includes signing of the request parameters the client must provide a client response that satisfies the data requirements for the scheme in use.

In a "-PLUS" mechanism the server examines the channel binding data, extracts the channel binding unique prefix, and extracts the raw channel biding data based on the channel binding type used. It then computes it's own copy of the channel binding payload and compares

that to the payload sent by the client in the cbdata key/value. Those two must be equal for channel binding to succeed.

The server responds to a successfully verified client message by completing the SASL negotiation. The authorization scheme MUST carry the user ID to be used as the authorization identity (identity to act as). The server MUST use the ID obtained from the credential as the user being authorized.

3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities

Some OAuth mechanisms can provide both an authorization identity and an authentication identity. An example of this is OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849] where the consumer key (oauth_consumer_key) identifies the entity using the token which equates to the SASL authentication identity, and is authenticated using the shared secret. The authorization identity in the OAuth 1.0a case is carried in the token (per the requirement above), which SHOULD be validated independently. The server MAY use a consumer key, a value derived from it, or other comparable identity in the OAuth authorization scheme as the SASL authentication identity. If an appropriate authentication identity is not available the server MUST use the authorization identity as the authentication identity.

3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication.

For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627] formatted error result, and fails the authentication. The error result consists of the following values:

status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error codes are defined in the IANA [[need registry name]] registry specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.

scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the service. This may be empty which implies that unscoped tokens are required, or a space separated list. Use of a space separated list is NOT RECOMMENDED.

If the resource server provides a scope the client SHOULD always request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. The client MAY use a scope other than the one provided by the resource server. Scopes other than those advertised by the resource server are be defined by the resource owner and provided in service documentation or discovery information (which is beyond the scope of this memo). If not present then the client SHOULD presume an empty scope (unscoped token) is

needed.

If channel binding is in use and the channel binding fails the server responds with a status code set to 412 to indicate that the channel binding precondition failed. If the authentication scheme in use does not include signing the server SHOULD revoke the presented credential and the client SHOULD discard that credential.

3.2.3. Completing an error message sequence.

If the client gets an error message from the server it MUST send an empty client response consisting of a single %x01 (control A) character, which is a correctly formatted client response with no key/value pairs. The server then completes the SASL negotiation with a failure result.

3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization

This mechanism supports authorization using signatures, which requires that both client and server construct the string to be signed. OAuth 2 is designed for authentication/authorization to access specific URIs. SASL is designed for user authentication, and has no facility for being more specific. In this mechanism we require or define default values for the data elements from an HTTP request which allow the signature base string to be constructed properly. The default HTTP path is "/" and the default post body is empty. These atoms are defined as extension points so that no changes are needed if there is a revision of SASL which supports more specific resource authorization, e.g. IMAP access to a specific folder or FTP access limited to a specific directory.

Using the example in the OAuth 1.0a specification as a starting point, on an IMAP server running on port 143 and given the OAuth 1.0a style authorization request (with %x01 shown as ^A and line breaks added for readability) below:

```
n,a=user@example.com,^A
host=example.com^A
user=user@example.com^A
port=143^A
auth=OAuth realm="Example",
           oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
           oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
           oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
           oauth_timestamp="137131201",
           oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
           oauth_signature="Tm90IGEgcmVhbCBzaWduYXR1cmU%3D"^A^A
```

The signature base string would be constructed per the OAuth 1.0 specification [RFC5849] with the following things noted:

- The method value is defaulted to POST.
- The scheme defaults to be "http", and any port number other than 80 is included.
- The path defaults to "/".
- The query string defaults to "".

In this example the signature base string with line breaks added for readability would be:

```
POST&http%3A%2F%2Fexample.com:143%2F&oauth_consumer_key%3D9djdj82h4
8djs9d2%26oauth_nonce%3D7d8f3e4a%26oauth_signature_method%3DHMAC-SH
A1%26oauth_timestamp%3D137131201%26oauth_token%3Dkkk9d7dh3k39sjv7
```

3.4. Channel Binding

The channel binding data is carried in the "qs" (query string) key value pair formatted as a standard HTTP query parameter with the name "cbdata". Channel binding requires that the channel binding data be integrity protected end-to-end in order to protect against man-in-the-middle attacks. All authorization schemes offered with "-PLUS" mechanisms MUST provide integrity protection. It should be noted that while the Bearer token scheme specifies SSL for normal usage it offers no integrity protection and is not suitable for use with channel binding.

The channel binding data is computed by the client based on it's choice of preferred channel binding type. As specified in [RFC5056], the channel binding information MUST start with the channel binding unique prefix, followed by a colon (ASCII 0x3A), followed by a base64 encoded channel binding payload. The channel binding payload is the raw data from the channel binding type. For example, if the client is using tls-unique for channel binding then the raw channel binding data is the TLS finished message as specified in section 3.1 of [RFC5929].

4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification

Note: The normative references in this section are informational for SASL implementers, but they are normative for GSS-API implementers.

The SASL OAuth mechanism is also a GSS-API mechanism and the messages described in Section 3 are the same with the following changes to the GS2 related elements:

1. the GS2 header on the client's first message and the following %x01 (control A) are excluded when used as a GSS-API mechanism.

2. the initial context token header is prefixed to the client's first authentication message (context token), as described in Section 3.1 of RFC 2743,

The GSS-API mechanism OID for OAuth is [[TBD: IANA]].

OAuth security contexts always have the mutual_state flag (GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) set to TRUE. OAuth supports credential delegation, therefore security contexts may have the deleg_state flag (GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) set to either TRUE or FALSE.

The mutual authentication property of this mechanism relies on successfully comparing the TLS server identity with the negotiated target name. Since the TLS channel is managed by the application outside of the GSS-API mechanism, the mechanism itself is unable to confirm the name while the application is able to perform this comparison for the mechanism. For this reason, applications MUST match the TLS server identity with the target name, as discussed in [RFC6125].

The OAuth mechanism does not support per-message tokens or GSS_Pseudo_random.

OAuth supports a standard generic name syntax for acceptors, such as GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE (see [RFC2743], Section 4.1). These service names MUST be associated with the "entityID" claimed by the RP. OAuth supports only a single name type for initiators: GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME. GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME is the default name type. The query, display, and exported name syntaxes for OAuth principal names are all the same. There is no OAuth-specific name syntax; applications SHOULD use generic GSS-API name types, such as GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME and GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE (see [RFC2743], Section 4). The exported name token does, of course, conform to [RFC2743], Section 3.2, but the "NAME" part of the token should be treated as a potential input string to the OAuth name normalization rules.

5. Examples

These example illustrate exchanges between an IMAP client and an IMAP server.

Note to implementers: Authorization scheme names are case insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be "bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".

5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange

This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.

```
S: * IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
C: t0 CAPABILITY
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZX
      J2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzA
      WF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZ
      Mjl0Q2c9PQEB
S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
```

As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long lines wrapped for readability) is:

```
n,a=user@example.com^Ahost=server.example.com^Auser=user@example.com^A
port=143^Aauth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A
```

The same credential used in an SMTP exchange is shown below. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values 0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.

```
[connection begins]
S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
C: EHLO sender.example.com
S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
S: 250-SIZE 35651584
S: 250-8BITMIME
S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
S: 250-PIPELINING
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZX
      J2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzA
      WF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZ
      Mjl0Q2c9PQEB
S: 235 Authentication successful.
[connection continues...]
```

5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding

This example shows channel binding in the context of an OAuth 1.0a signed authorization request. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.

```
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
     Ready
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A-PLUS eSxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZ
      XJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1PQXV0aCByZWFsbT0iRXhhb
      XBsZSIsb2F1dGhfY29uc3VtZXJfa2V5PSI5ZGpkajgyaDQ4ZGpzOWQyIixvYXV0a
      F90b2tlbj0ia2trOWQ3ZGgzazM5c2p2NyIsb2F1dGhfc2lnbmF0dXJlX21ldGhvZ
      D0iSE1BQy1TSEExIixvYXV0aF90aW1lc3RhbXA9IjEzNzEzMTIwMSIsb2F1dGhfb
      m9uY2U9IjdkOGYzZTRhIixvYXV0aF9zaWduYXR1cmU9IlNTZHRJR0VnYkdsMGRHe
      GxJSFJsWVNCd2IzUXUiAXFzPWNiZGF0YT10bHMtdW5pcXVlOlNHOTNJR0pwWnlCc
      GN5QmhJRlJNVXlCbWFXNWhiQ0J0WlhOellXZGxQd289AQE=
S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
```

As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and lines wrapped for readability) is:

```
y,a=user@example.com^A
host=server.example.com^A
user=user@example.com^A
port=143^A
auth=OAuth realm="Example",
           oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
           oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
           oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
           oauth_timestamp="137131201",
           oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
           oauth_signature="SSdtIGEgbGl0dGxlIHRlYSBwb3Qu"^A
qs=cbdata=tls-unique:SG93IGJpZyBpcyBhIFRMUyBmaW5hbCBtZXNzYWdlPwo=^A^A
```

In this example the signature base string with line breaks added for readability would be:

```
POST&http%3A%2F%2Fserver.example.com:143%2F&cbdata=tls-unique:SG93I
GJpZyBpcyBhIFRMUyBmaW5hbCBtZXNzYWdlPwo=%26oauth_consumer_key%3D9djd
j82h48djs9d2%26oauth_nonce%3D7d8f3e4a%26oauth_signature_method%3DHM
AC-SHA1%26oauth_timestamp%3D137131201%26oauth_token%3Dkkk9d7dh3k39s
jv7
```

5.3. Failed Exchange

This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.

```
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
     Ready
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD
      1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvc
      nQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AQE=
S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDAxIgoic2NvcGUiOiJleGFtcGxlX3Njb3BlIgp9
C: + AQ==
S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
```

The decoded initial client response is:

```
n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^Auser=user@example.
com^Aport=143^Aauth=^A^A
```

The decoded server error response is:

```
{
"status":"401",
"scope":"example_scope"
}
```

The client responds with the required empty response.

5.4. Failed Channel Binding

This example shows a channel binding failure in an empty request. The channel binding information is empty. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.

```
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
     Ready
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A-PLUS eSxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhv
      c3Q9c2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXVzZXI9dXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQF
      wb3J0PTE0MwFhdXRoPQFjYmRhdGE9AQE=
S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDEyIiwKInNjb3BlIjoiZXhhbXBsZV9zY29wZSIKfQ==
C: + AQ==
S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
```

The decoded initial client response is:

```
y,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A
user=user@example.com^Aport=143^Aauth=^Acbdata=^A^A
```

The decoded server response is:

```
{
"status":"412",
"scope":"example_scope"
}
```

The client responds with the required empty response.

5.5. SMTP Example of a failed negotiation.

This example shows an authorization failure in an SMTP exchange. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values 0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.

```
[connection begins]
S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
C: EHLO sender.example.com
S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
S: 250-SIZE 35651584
S: 250-8BITMIME
S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
S: 250-PIPELINING
C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER dXNlcj1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJlciB2
       RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQo=
S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia
      HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K
C: AQ==
S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at
S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth
[connection continues...]
```

The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the client responds with the required empty response, and the server finalizes the negotiation.

6. Security Considerations

This mechanism does not provide a security layer, but does provide a provision for channel binding. The OAuth 2 specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] allows for a variety of usages, and the security properties of these profiles vary. The usage of bearer tokens, for example, provide security features similar to cookies. Applications using this mechanism SHOULD exercise the same level of care using this mechanism as they would in using the SASL PLAIN mechanism. In particular, TLS 1.2 or an equivalent secure channel MUST be implemented and its usage is RECOMMENDED.

The channel binding in this mechanism has different properties based on the authentication scheme used. The integrity guarantee for channel binding depends on the quality of the guarantee in the the authorization scheme.

It is possible that SASL will be authenticating a connection and the life of that connection may outlast the life of the token used to authenticate it. This is a common problem in application protocols where connections are long-lived, and not a problem with this mechanism per se. Servers MAY unilaterally disconnect clients in accordance with the application protocol.

An OAuth credential is not equivalent to the password or primary account credential. There are protocols like XMPP that allow actions like change password. The server SHOULD ensure that actions taken in the authenticated channel are appropriate to the strength of the presented credential.

Tokens have a lifetime associated with them. Reducing the lifetime of a token provides security benefits in the case that tokens leak. In addition a previously obtained token MAY be revoked or rendered invalid at any time. The client MAY request a new access token for each connection to a resource server, but it SHOULD cache and re-use access credentials that appear to be valid.

7. IANA Considerations

7.1. SASL Registration

The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile:

SASL mechanism profile: OAUTHBEARER

Security Considerations: See this document

Published Specification: See this document

For further information: Contact the authors of this document.

Owner/Change controller: the IETF

Note: None

The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile:

SASL mechanism profile: OAUTH10A

Security Considerations: See this document

Published Specification: See this document

For further information: Contact the authors of this document.

Owner/Change controller: the IETF

Note: None

The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile:

SASL mechanism profile: OAUTH10A-PLUS

Security Considerations: See this document

Published Specification: See this document

For further information: Contact the authors of this document.

Owner/Change controller: the IETF

Note: None

7.2. GSS-API Registration

IANA is further requested to assign an OID for thESE GSS mechanismS in the SMI numbers registry, with the prefix of iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms (1.3.6.1.5.5) and to reference this specification in the registry.

8. References

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8.2. Informative References

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Appendix A. Acknowlegements

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Appendix B. Document History

[[to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC]]

-05

- Fixed the GS2 header language again.
- Separated out different OAuth schemes into different SASL mechanisms. Took out the scheme in the error return. Tuned up the IANA registrations.
- Added the user field back into the SASL message.
- Fixed the examples (again).
-

-04

- Changed user field to be carried in the gs2-header, and made gs2 header explicit in all cases.
- Converted MAC examples to OAuth 1.0a. Moved MAC to an informative reference.
- Changed to sending an empty client response (single control-A) as the second message of a failed sequence.
- Fixed channel binding prose to refer to the normative specs and removed the hashing of large channel binding data, which brought mroe problems than it solved.
- Added a SMTP examples for Bearer use case.

-03

- Added user field into examples and fixed egregious errors there as well.
- Added text reminding developers that Authorization scheme names are case insensitive.

-02

- Added the user data element back in.

- Minor editorial changes.

-01

- Ripping out discovery. Changed to refer to I-D.jones-appsawg-webfinger instead of WF and SWD older drafts.
- Replacing HTTP as the message format and adjusted all examples.

-00

- Renamed draft into proper IETF naming format now that it's adopted.
- Minor fixes.

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