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SAML Enhanced Client SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms
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Abstract

Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 is a generalized framework for the exchange of security-related information between asserting and relying parties. Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) and the Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) are application frameworks to facilitate an extensible authentication model. This document specifies a SASL and GSS-API mechanism for SAML 2.0 that leverages the capabilities of a SAML-aware "enhanced client" to address significant barriers to federated authentication in a manner that encourages reuse of existing SAML bindings and profiles designed for non-browser scenarios.

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1. Introduction

Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0

[[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os](#)] is a modular specification that provides various means for a user to be identified to a relying party (RP) through the exchange of (typically signed) assertions issued by an identity provider (IdP). It includes a number of protocols, protocol bindings [[OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os](#)], and interoperability profiles [[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os](#)] designed for different use cases. Additional profiles and extensions are also routinely developed and published.

Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [[RFC4422](#)] is a generalized mechanism for identifying and authenticating a user and for optionally negotiating a security layer for subsequent protocol interactions. SASL is used by application protocols like IMAP, POP and XMPP [[RFC3920](#)]. The effect is to make authentication modular, so that newer authentication mechanisms can be added as needed.

The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) [[RFC2743](#)] provides a framework for applications to support multiple authentication mechanisms through a unified programming interface. This document defines a pure SASL mechanism for SAML, but it conforms to the bridge between SASL and the GSS-API called GS2 [[RFC5801](#)]. This means that this document defines both a SASL mechanism and a GSS-API mechanism. The GSS-API interface is optional for SASL implementers, and the GSS-API considerations can be avoided in environments that uses SASL directly without GSS-API.

The mechanisms specified in this document allow a SASL- or GSS-API-enabled server to act as a SAML relying party, or service provider (SP), by advertising this mechanism as an option for SASL or GSS-API clients that support the use of SAML to communicate identity and attribute information. Clients supporting this mechanism are termed "enhanced clients" in SAML terminology because they understand the federated authentication model and have specific knowledge of the IdP(s) associated with the user. This knowledge, and the ability to act on it, addresses a significant problem with browser-based SAML profiles known as the "discovery", or "where are you from?" (WAYF) problem. Obviating the need for the RP to interact with the client to determine the right IdP (and its network location) is both a user interface and security improvement.

The SAML mechanism described in this document is an adaptation of an existing SAML profile, the Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP) Profile (V2.0) [[SAMLECP20](#)], and therefore does not establish a separate authentication, integrity and confidentiality mechanism. It is anticipated that existing security layers, such as Transport Layer

Security (TLS) or Secure Shell (SSH), will continued to be used.

Figure 1 describes the interworking between SAML and SASL: this document requires enhancements to the RP and to the client (as the two SASL communication endpoints) but no changes to the SAML IdP are assumed apart from its support for the applicable SAML profile. To accomplish this, a SAML protocol exchange between the RP and the IdP, brokered by the client, is tunneled within SASL. There is no assumed communication between the RP and the IdP, but such communication may occur in conjunction with additional SAML-related profiles not in scope for this document.




Figure 1: Interworking Architecture

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

The reader is also assumed to be familiar with the terms used in the SAML 2.0 specification, and an understanding of the Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP) Profile (V2.0) [[SAMLECP20](#)] is necessary, as part of this mechanism explicitly reuses and references it.

This document can be implemented without knowledge of GSS-API since the normative aspects of the GS2 protocol syntax have been duplicated in this document. The document may also be implemented to provide a GSS-API mechanism, and then knowledge of GSS-API is essential. To facilitate these two variants, the references has been split into two parts, one part that provides normative references for all readers, and one part that adds additional normative references required for implementers that wish to implement the GSS-API portion.

3. Applicability for Non-HTTP Use Cases

While SAML is designed to support a variety of application scenarios, the profiles for authentication defined in the original standard are designed around HTTP [[RFC2616](#)] applications. They are not, however, limited to browsers, because it was recognized that browsers suffer from a variety of functional and security deficiencies that would be useful to avoid where possible. Specifically, the notion of an "Enhanced Client" (or a proxy acting as one on behalf of a browser, thus the term "ECP") was specified for a software component that acts somewhat like a browser from an application perspective, but includes limited, but sufficient, awareness of SAML to play a more conscious role in the authentication exchange between the RP and the IdP. What follows is an outline of the Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP) Profile (V2.0) [[SAMLECP20](#)], as applied to the web/HTTP service use case:

1. The Enhanced Client requests a resource of a Relying Party (RP) (via an HTTP request). In doing so, it advertises its "enhanced" capability using HTTP headers.
2. The RP, desiring SAML authentication and noting the client's capabilities, responds not with an HTTP redirect or form, but with a SOAP [[W3C.soap11](#)] envelope containing a SAML <AuthnRequest> along with some supporting headers. This request identifies the RP (and may be signed), and may provide hints to the client as to what IdPs the RP finds acceptable, but the choice of IdP is generally left to the client.
3. The client is then responsible for delivering the body of the SOAP message to the IdP it is instructed to use (often via configuration ahead of time). The user authenticates to the IdP ahead of, during, or after the delivery of this message, and perhaps explicitly authorizes the response to the RP.
4. Whether authentication succeeds or fails, the IdP responds with its own SOAP envelope, generally containing a SAML <Response> message for delivery to the RP. In a successful case, the message will include a SAML <Assertion> containing authentication, and possibly attribute, information about the user. Either the response or assertion alone is signed, and the assertion may be encrypted to a key negotiated with or known to belong to the RP.
5. The client then delivers the SOAP envelope containing the <Response> to the RP at a location the IdP directs (which acts as an additional, though limited, defense against MITM attacks). This completes the SAML exchange.

6. The RP now has sufficient identity information to approve the original HTTP request or not, and acts accordingly. Everything between the original request and this response can be thought of as an "interruption" of the original HTTP exchange.

When considering this flow in the context of an arbitrary application protocol and SASL, the RP and the client both must change their code to implement this SASL mechanism, but the IdP can remain untouched. The existing RP/client exchange that is tunneled through HTTP maps well to the tunneling of that same exchange in SASL. In the parlance of SASL [[RFC4422](#)], this mechanism is "client-first" for consistency with GS2. The steps are shown below:

1. The server MAY advertise the SAML20EC and/or SAML20EC-PLUS mechanisms.
2. The client initiates a SASL authentication with SAML20EC or SAML20EC-PLUS.
3. The server sends the client a challenge consisting of a SOAP envelope containing its SAML <AuthnRequest>.
4. The SASL client unpacks the SOAP message and communicates with its chosen IdP to relay the SAML <AuthnRequest> to it. This communication, and the authentication with the IdP, proceeds separately from the SASL process.
5. Upon completion of the exchange with the IdP, the client responds to the SASL server with a SOAP envelope containing the SAML <Response> it obtained, or a SOAP fault, as warranted.
6. The SASL Server indicates success or failure.

Note: The details of the SAML processing, which are consistent with the Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP) Profile (V2.0) [[SAML ECP20](#)], are such that the client MUST interact with the IdP in order to complete any SASL exchange with the RP. The assertions issued by the IdP for the purposes of the profile, and by extension this SASL mechanism, are short lived, and therefore cannot be cached by the client for later use.

Encompassed in step four is the client-driven selection of the IdP, authentication to it, and the acquisition of a response to provide to the SASL server. These processes are all external to SASL.

With all of this in mind, the typical flow appears as follows:




Figure 2: Authentication flow

4. SAML SASL Mechanism Specification

Based on the previous figures, the following operations are defined by the SAML SASL mechanism:

4.1. Advertisement

To advertise that a server supports this mechanism, during application session initiation, it displays the name "SAML20EC" and/or "SAML20EC-PLUS" in the list of supported SASL mechanisms (depending on its support for channel binding).

4.2. Initiation

A client initiates "SAML20EC" or "SAML20EC-PLUS" authentication. If supported by the application protocol, the client MAY include an initial response, otherwise it waits until the server has issued an empty challenge (because the mechanism is client-first).

The format of the initial client response is as follows:

```
hok = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:holder-of-key"
```

```
mutual = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:profiles:SSO:ecp:2.0:" \
        "WantAuthnRequestsSigned"
```

```
initial-resp = gs2-cb-flag "," [gs2-authzid] "," [hok] "," [mutual]
```

The gs2-cb-flag MUST be set as defined in [[RFC5801](#)] to indicate whether the client supports channel binding. This takes the place of the PAOS HTTP header extension used in [[SAMLECP20](#)] to indicate channel binding support.

The optional "gs2-authzid" field holds the authorization identity, as requested by the client.

The optional "hok" field is a constant that signals the client's support for stronger security by means of a locally held key. This takes the place of the PAOS HTTP header extension used in [[SAMLECP20](#)] to indicate "holder of key" support.

The optional "mutual" field is a constant that signals the client's desire for mutual authentication. If set, the SASL server MUST digitally sign its SAML <AuthnRequest> message. The URN constant above is a single string; the linefeed is shown for RFC formatting reasons.

4.3. Server Response

The SASL server responds with a SOAP envelope constructed in accordance with section 2.3.2 of [[SAMLECP20](#)]. This includes adhering to the SOAP header requirements of the SAML PAOS Binding [[OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os](#)], for compatibility with the existing profile. Various SOAP headers are also consumed by the client in exactly the same manner prescribed by that section.

4.4. User Authentication with Identity Provider

Upon receipt of the Server Response ([Section 4.3](#)), the steps described in sections [2.3.3](#) through [2.3.6](#) of [[SAMLECP20](#)] are performed between the client and the chosen IdP. The means by which the client determines the IdP to use, and where it is located, are out of scope of this mechanism.

The exact means of authentication to the IdP are also out of scope, but clients supporting this mechanism MUST support HTTP Basic Authentication as defined in [[RFC2617](#)] and TLS client authentication as defined in [[RFC5246](#)].

4.5. Client Response

Assuming a response is obtained from the IdP, the client responds to the SASL server with a SOAP envelope constructed in accordance with section 2.3.7 of [[SAMLECP20](#)]. This includes adhering to the SOAP header requirements of the SAML PAOS Binding [[OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os](#)], for compatibility with the existing profile. If the client is unable to obtain a response from the IdP, it responds to the SASL server with a SOAP envelope containing a SOAP fault.

4.6. Outcome

The SAML protocol exchange having completed, the SASL server will transmit the outcome to the client depending on local validation of the client responses. This outcome is transmitted in accordance with the application protocol in use.

4.7. Additional Notes

Because this mechanism is an adaptation of an HTTP-based profile, there are a few requirements outlined in [[SAMLECP20](#)] that make reference to a response URL that is normally used to regulate where the client returns information to the RP. There are also security-related checks built into the profile that involve this location.

For compatibility with existing IdP and profile behavior, and to provide for mutual authentication, the SASL server MUST populate the responseConsumerURL and AssertionConsumerServiceURL attributes with its service name. The parties then perform the steps described in [\[SAMLECP20\]](#) as usual.

Similarly, the use of HTTP status signaling between the RP and client mandated by [\[SAMLECP20\]](#) may not be applicable.

5. SAML EC GSS-API Mechanism Specification

This section and its sub-sections and all normative references of it not referenced elsewhere in this document are INFORMATIONAL for SASL implementors, but they are NORMATIVE for GSS-API implementors.

The SAML SASL Enhanced Clients mechanism is also a GSS-API mechanism. The messages are the same, but a) the GS2 header on the client's first message is excluded when SAML EC is used as a GSS-API mechanism, and b) the [RFC2743 section 3.1](#) initial context token header is prefixed to the client's first authentication message (context token).

The GSS-API mechanism OID for SAML EC is OID-TBD (IANA to assign: see IANA considerations). The DER encoding of the OID is TBD.

The `mutual_state` request flag (`GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG`) MAY be set to TRUE, resulting in the "mutual-auth" option set in the initial client response. The security context `mutual_state` flag is set to TRUE only if the server digitally signs its SAML <AuthnRequest> message, and the identity provider signals this to the client in an <ecp:RequestAuthenticated> SOAP header block.

If the `mutual_state` flag is not requested, or is not set, then the security layer managed by the application outside of the GSS-API mechanism is responsible for authenticating the acceptor. In this case, applications MUST match the server identity from the existing security layer with the target name. For TLS, this matching MUST be performed as discussed in [\[RFC6125\]](#). For SSH, this matching MUST be performed as discussed in [\[RFC4462\]](#).

The lifetime of a security context established with this mechanism SHOULD be limited by the value of a `SessionNotOnOrAfter` attribute, if any, in the <AuthnStatement> of the SAML assertion received by the RP.

SAML EC supports credential delegation through the issuance of SAML assertions that the issuing identity provider will accept as proof of authentication by a service on behalf of a user. Such assertions MUST contain an <AudienceRestriction> condition element identifying the identity provider, and a <SubjectConfirmation> element that the acceptor can satisfy. In such a case, the security context will have its `deleg_state` flag (`GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG`) set to TRUE.

5.1. Session Key Derivation

Some GSS-API features (discussed in the following sections) require a session key be established as a result security context

establishment. In the common case of a "bearer" assertion in SAML, there is no secure mechanism by which such a key can be established other than by exporting key material from TLS (discussed below). In other cases such as assertions based on "holder of key" confirmation, there may be additional methods available.

Information defining or describing the session key, or a process for deriving one, is communicated by the client to the server using an <ecp:SessionKey> SOAP header block, as defined in [SAMLECP20]. This header contains a <ds:KeyInfo> element as a generic container, and is designed to support reuse of mechanisms defined by [XMLENC11] or other specifications.

5.1.1. TLS-Exported Session Keys

If a TLS session is established between the initiator and acceptor, it may be used to produce a session key using the mechanism defined by [RFC5705]. The disambiguating label string MUST be set to "EXPORTER_SAML20EC". [Remove upon publication, IANA to assign at the following location: <http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#exporter-labels>] The per-association context value MUST be set to a 128-bit pseudorandom value generated by the client. The pseudorandom octets are then base64- encoded and placed in a <CipherData> element inside a <ecp:SessionKey> SOAP header block in the following manner:

```
<ecp:SessionKey S:mustUnderstand="1"
  S:actor="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/actor/next"
  xmlns:ecp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:profiles:SSO:ecp"
  xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
    <xenc11:DerivedKey xmlns:xenc11="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#">
      <xenc11:KeyDerivationMethod Algorithm="TBD">
        <xenc:CipherData xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
          <xenc:CipherValue>h1dqhs+aHxYjYNKiEwzjVg==</xenc:CipherValue>
        </xenc:CipherData>
      </xenc11:KeyDerivationMethod>
    </xenc11:DerivedKey>
  </ds:KeyInfo>
</ecp:SessionKey>
```

The derivation algorithm of TBD (IANA to assign: see IANA considerations) signifies the TLS-Exported approach described above.

5.1.2. Bearer Assertion Session Keys

In the event that a client is not capable of supporting the "holder of key" option (or if other infrastructure components do not do so) and cannot use a TLS-exported key, but still wishes to make use of a session key, the client MAY generate a pseudorandom value of 128 bits to use as a key. The octets are then base64-encoded and placed in a <CipherData> element inside a <ecp:SessionKey> SOAP header block in the following manner:

```
<ecp:SessionKey S:mustUnderstand="1"
  S:actor="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/actor/next"
  xmlns:ecp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:profiles:SSO:ecp"
  xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
    <xenc11:DerivedKey xmlns:xenc11="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#">
      <xenc11:KeyDerivationMethod Algorithm="TBD">
        <xenc:CipherData xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
          <xenc:CipherValue>h1dqhs+aHxYjYNKiEwzjVg==</xenc:CipherValue>
        </xenc:CipherData>
      </xenc11:KeyDerivationMethod>
    </xenc11:DerivedKey>
  </ds:KeyInfo>
</ecp:SessionKey>
```

The derivation algorithm of TBD (IANA to assign: see IANA considerations) signifies the client-generated approach described above.

Applications that rely on this mechanism do so with the understanding that it is not a secure approach, but merely for compatibility if the risk is acceptable.

5.1.3. Holder of Key Session Keys

In the event that a client is proving possession of a secret or private key, the session key can be communicated in a manner that proves its authenticity, or a formal key agreement algorithm may be supported. For example, if the server has an elliptic curve public key, the ECDH-ES key agreement algorithm, as defined in [XMLENC11] may be used.

If a key agreement or derivation process is not possible, then the mechanism defined in the previous section can be used, with the added benefit that the client's request will be strongly authenticated by a key. However, if channel binding is not used, the generated key

SHOULD be wrapped or transported under the protection of a key belonging to the server, such as an RSA public key. The <xenc:EncryptedKey> element and associated key wrap and transport algorithms (see [[XMLENC11](#)]) can be used for this purpose.

Note that this serves no purpose in the bearer case, since if channel binding is not used, an attacker can generate its own key, and if it is used, there is no MITM to see the key.

5.2. Per-Message Tokens

The per-message tokens SHALL be the same as those for the Kerberos V GSS-API mechanism [[RFC4121](#)] (see [Section 4.2](#) and sub-sections), using the Kerberos V "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96" enctype [[RFC3962](#)].

The `replay_det_state` (GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG), `sequence_state` (GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG), `conf_avail` (GSS_C_CONF_FLAG) and `integ_avail` (GSS_C_CONF_FLAG) security context flags are always set to TRUE.

The 128-bit session "protocol key" SHALL be a session key established in a manner described in the previous section. "Specific keys" are then derived as usual as described in [Section 2 of \[RFC4121\]](#), [[RFC3961](#)], and [[RFC3962](#)].

The terms "protocol key" and "specific key" are Kerberos V5 terms [[RFC3961](#)].

SAML20EC is PROT_READY as soon as the SAML response message has been seen.

5.3. Pseudo-Random Function (PRF)

The GSS-API has been extended with a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) interface in [[RFC4401](#)]. The purpose is to enable applications to derive a cryptographic key from an established GSS-API security context. This section defines a GSS_Pseudo_random that is applicable for the SAML20EC GSS-API mechanism.

The GSS_Pseudo_random() [[RFC4401](#)] SHALL be the same as for the Kerberos V GSS-API mechanism [[RFC4402](#)]. There is no acceptor-asserted sub-session key, thus GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL and GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL are equivalent. The protocol key to be used for the GSS_Pseudo_random() SHALL be the same as the key defined in the previous section.

5.4. GSS-API Principal Name Types for SAML EC

Services that act as SAML relying parties are typically identified by means of a URI called an "entityID". Clients that are named in the <Subject> element of a SAML assertion are typically identified by means of a <NameID> element, which is an extensible XML structure containing, at minimum, an element value that names the subject and a Format attribute.

In practice, a GSS-API client and server are unlikely to know in advance the name of the initiator as it will be expressed by the SAML identity provider upon completion of authentication. It is also generally incorrect to assume that a particular acceptor name will directly map into a particular RP entityID, because there is often a layer of naming indirection between particular services on hosts and the identity of a relying party in SAML terms.

To avoid complexity, and avoid unnecessary use of XML within the naming layer, the SAML EC mechanism relies on the common/expected name types used for acceptors and initiators, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE and GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME. The mechanism provides for validation of the host-based service name in conjunction with the SAML exchange. It does not attempt to solve the problem of mapping between an initiator "username", the user's identity while authenticating to the identity provider, and the information supplied by the identity provider to the acceptor. These relationships must be managed through local policy at the initiator and acceptor.

SAML-based information associated with the initiator SHOULD be expressed to the acceptor using GSS-API naming extensions [[I-D.ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts](#)], in accordance with [[I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap-naming](#)].

5.4.1. User Naming Considerations

The GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME form represents the name of an individual user. Clients often rely on this value to determine the appropriate credentials to use in authenticating to the identity provider, and supply it to the server for use by the acceptor.

Upon successful completion of this mechanism, the server MUST construct the authenticated initiator name based on the <saml:NameID> element in the assertion it successfully validated. The name is constructed as a UTF-8 string in the following form:

```
name = element-value "!" Format "!" NameQualifier
      "!" SPNameQualifier "!" SPProvidedID
```


The "element-value" token refers to the content of the <saml:NameID> element. The other tokens refer to the identically named XML attributes defined for use with the element. If an attribute is not present, which is common, it is omitted (i.e., replaced with the empty string). The Format value is never omitted; if not present, the SAML-equivalent value of "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified" is used.

Not all SAML assertions contain a <saml:NameID> element. In the event that no such element is present, including the exceptional cases of a <saml:BaseID> element or a <saml:EncryptedID> element that cannot be decrypted, the GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS name type MUST be used for the initiator name.

As noted in the previous section, it is expected that most applications able to rely on SAML authentication would make use of naming extensions to obtain additional information about the user based on the assertion. This is particularly true in the anonymous case, or in cases in which the SAML name is pseudonymous or transient in nature. The ability to express the SAML name in GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME form is intended for compatibility with applications that cannot make use of additional information.

5.4.2. Service Naming Considerations

The GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE name form represents a service running on a host; it is textually represented as "service@host". This name form is required by most SASL profiles and is used by many existing applications that use the Kerberos GSS-API mechanism. Such a name is used directly by this mechanism as the effective AssertionConsumerService of the server.

This value is used in the construction of the responseConsumerURL and AssertionConsumerServiceURL attributes, and for eventual comparison and validation by the client before completing the exchange. The value MUST be securely associated with the SAML entityID claimed by the server by the identity provider, such as through the use of SAML metadata [[OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os](#)].

6. Example

Suppose the user has an identity at the SAML IdP `saml.example.org` and a Jabber Identifier (jid) `"somenode@example.com"`, and wishes to authenticate his XMPP connection to `xmpp.example.com` (and `example.com` and `example.org` have established a SAML-capable trust relationship). The authentication on the wire would then look something like the following:

Step 1: Client initiates stream to server:

```
<stream:stream xmlns='jabber:client'
xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
to='example.com' version='1.0'>
```

Step 2: Server responds with a stream tag sent to client:

```
<stream:stream
xmlns='jabber:client' xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
id='some_id' from='example.com' version='1.0'>
```

Step 3: Server informs client of available authentication mechanisms:

```
<stream:features>
  <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
    <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
    <mechanism>PLAIN</mechanism>
    <mechanism>SAML20EC</mechanism>
  </mechanisms>
</stream:features>
```

Step 4: Client selects an authentication mechanism and sends the initial client response (it is base64 encoded as specified by the XMPP SASL protocol profile):

```
<auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl' mechanism='SAML20EC'>
biwsLA==
</auth>
```

The initial response is `"n,, "` which signals that channel binding is


```

<S:Envelope
  xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
  xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
  xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <S:Header>
    <paos:Request xmlns:paos="urn:liberty:paos:2003-08"
      messageID="c3a4f8b9c2d" S:mustUnderstand="1"
      S:actor="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/actor/next"
      responseConsumerURL="xmpp@xmpp.example.com"
      service="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:profiles:SSO:ecp"/>
    <ecp:Request
      xmlns:ecp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:profiles:SSO:ecp"
      S:actor="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/actor/next"
      S:mustUnderstand="1" ProviderName="Jabber at example.com">
      <saml:Issuer>https://xmpp.example.com</saml:Issuer>
    </ecp:Request>
  </S:Header>
  <S:Body>
    <samlp:AuthnRequest
      ID="c3a4f8b9c2d" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2007-12-10T11:39:34Z"
      ProtocolBinding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:PAOS"
      AssertionConsumerServiceURL="xmpp@xmpp.example.com">
      <saml:Issuer xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
        https://xmpp.example.com
      </saml:Issuer>
      <samlp:NameIDPolicy AllowCreate="true"
        Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent"/>
      <samlp:RequestedAuthnContext Comparison="exact">
        <saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
          urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes>PasswordProtectedTransport
        </saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
      </samlp:RequestedAuthnContext>
    </samlp:AuthnRequest>
  </S:Body>
</S:Envelope>

```

Step 5 (alt): Server returns error to client:

```

<failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
  <incorrect-encoding/>
</failure>
</stream:stream>

```

Step 6: Client relays the request to IdP in a SOAP message transmitted over HTTP (over TLS). HTTP portion not shown, use of

Basic Authentication is assumed. The body of the SOAP envelope is exactly the same as received in the previous step.

```
<S:Envelope
  xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
  xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
  xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <S:Body>
    <samlp:AuthnRequest>
      <!-- same as above -->
    </samlp:AuthnRequest>
  </S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
```

Step 7: IdP responds to client with a SOAP response containing a SAML <Response> containing a short-lived SSO assertion (shown as an encrypted variant in the example).

```
<S:Envelope
  xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
  xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
  xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <S:Header>
    <ecp:Response S:mustUnderstand="1"
      S:actor="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/actor/next"
      AssertionConsumerServiceURL="xmpp@xmpp.example.com"/>
  </S:Header>
  <S:Body>
    <samlp:Response ID="d43h94r389309r" Version="2.0"
      IssueInstant="2007-12-10T11:42:34Z" InResponseTo="c3a4f8b9c2d"
      Destination="xmpp@xmpp.example.com">
      <saml:Issuer>https://saml.example.org</saml:Issuer>
      <samlp:Status>
        <samlp:StatusCode
          Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
      </samlp:Status>
      <saml:EncryptedAssertion>
        <!-- contents elided -->
      </saml:EncryptedAssertion>
    </samlp:Response>
  </S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
```

Step 8: Client sends SOAP envelope containing the SAML <Response> as

a response to the SASL server's challenge:

```
<response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>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</response>
```

The Base64 [[RFC4648](#)] decoded envelope:


```
<S:Envelope
  xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
  xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
  xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <S:Header>
    <paos:Response xmlns:paos="urn:liberty:paos:2003-08"
      S:actor="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/actor/next"
      S:mustUnderstand="1" refToMessageID="6c3a4f8b9c2d"/>
  </S:Header>
  <S:Body>
    <samlp:Response ID="d43h94r389309r" Version="2.0"
      IssueInstant="2007-12-10T11:42:34Z" InResponseTo="c3a4f8b9c2d"
      Destination="xmpp@xmpp.example.com">
      <saml:Issuer>https://saml.example.org</saml:Issuer>
      <samlp:Status>
        <samlp:StatusCode
          Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
      </samlp:Status>
      <saml:EncryptedAssertion>
        <!-- contents elided -->
      </saml:EncryptedAssertion>
    </samlp:Response>
  </S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
```

Step 9: Server informs client of successful authentication:

```
<success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>
```

Step 9 (alt): Server informs client of failed authentication:

```
<failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
  <temporary-auth-failure/>
</failure>
</stream:stream>
```

Step 10: Client initiates a new stream to server:

```
<stream:stream xmlns='jabber:client'
  xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
  to='example.com' version='1.0'>
```


Step 11: Server responds by sending a stream header to client along with any additional features (or an empty features element):

```
<stream:stream xmlns='jabber:client'
xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
id='c2s_345' from='example.com' version='1.0'>
<stream:features>
  <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'/>
  <session xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-session'/>
</stream:features>
```

Step 12: Client binds a resource:

```
<iq type='set' id='bind_1'>
  <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'>
    <resource>someresource</resource>
  </bind>
</iq>
```

Step 13: Server informs client of successful resource binding:

```
<iq type='result' id='bind_1'>
  <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'>
    <jid>somenode@example.com/someresource</jid>
  </bind>
</iq>
```

Please note: line breaks were added to the base64 for clarity.

7. Security Considerations

This section will address only security considerations associated with the use of SAML with SASL applications. For considerations relating to SAML in general, the reader is referred to the SAML specification and to other literature. Similarly, for general SASL Security Considerations, the reader is referred to that specification.

Version 2.0 of the Enhanced Client or Proxy Profile [[SAMLECP20](#)] adds optional support for channel binding and use of "Holder of Key" subject confirmation. The former is strongly recommended for use with this mechanism to detect "Man in the Middle" attacks between the client and the RP without relying on flawed commercial TLS infrastructure. The latter may be impractical in many cases, but is a valuable way of strengthening client authentication, protecting against phishing, and improving the overall mechanism.

7.1. Risks Left Unaddressed

The adaptation of a web-based profile that is largely designed around security-oblivious clients and a bearer model for security token validation results in a number of basic security exposures that should be weighed against the compatibility and client simplification benefits of this mechanism.

When channel binding is not used, protection against "Man in the Middle" attacks is left to lower layer protocols such as TLS, and the development of user interfaces able to implement that has not been effectively demonstrated. Failure to detect a MITM can result in phishing of the user's credentials if the attacker is between the client and IdP, or the theft and misuse of a short-lived credential (the SAML assertion) if the attacker is able to impersonate a RP. SAML allows for source address checking as a minor mitigation to the latter threat, but this is often impractical. IdPs can mitigate to some extent the exposure of personal information to RP attackers by encrypting assertions with authenticated keys.

7.2. User Privacy

The IdP is aware of each RP that a user logs into. There is nothing in the protocol to hide this information from the IdP. It is not a requirement to track the activity, but there is nothing technically that prohibits the collection of this information. SASL servers should be aware that SAML IdPs will track - to some extent - user access to their services.

It is also out of scope of the mechanism to determine under what

conditions an IdP will release particular information to a relying party, and it is generally unclear in what fashion user consent could be established in real time for the release of particular information. The SOAP exchange with the IdP does not preclude such interaction, but neither does it define that interoperably.

7.3. Collusion between RPs

Depending on the information supplied by the IdP, it may be possible for RPs to correlate data that they have collected. By using the same identifier to log into every RP, collusion between RPs is possible. SAML supports the notion of pairwise, or targeted/directed, identity. This allows the IdP to manage opaque, pairwise identifiers for each user that are specific to each RP. However, correlation is often possible based on other attributes supplied, and is generally a topic that is beyond the scope of this mechanism. It is sufficient to say that this mechanism does not introduce new correlation opportunities over and above the use of SAML in web-based use cases.

8. IANA Considerations

The IANA is requested to assign a new entry for this GSS mechanism in the sub-registry for SMI Security for Mechanism Codes, whose prefix is iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms (1.3.6.1.5.5) and to reference this specification in the registry.

The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile:

SASL mechanism profiles: SAML20EC and SAML20EC-PLUS

Security Considerations: See this document

Published Specification: See this document

For further information: Contact the authors of this document.

Owner/Change controller: the IETF

Note: None

The IANA is requested to assign a new entry of "EXPORTER_SAML20EC" in the TLS Parameters Exporter Label Registry.

The IANA is requested to assign two URIs to identify the key derivation algorithms described in this document for TLS-exported, and client-generated session keys.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

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9.2. Normative References for GSS-API Implementers

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[Appendix A](#). Acknowledgments

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[Appendix B](#). Changes

This section to be removed prior to publication.

- o 03, added TLS key export as a session key option, revised GSS naming material based on list discussion
- o 02, major revision of GSS-API material and updated references
- o 01, SSH language added, noted non-assumption of HTTP error handling, added guidance on life of security context.
- o 00, Initial Revision, first WG-adopted draft. Removed support for unsolicited SAML responses.

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