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## **Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms**

### **Abstract**

This document updates RFC 4210 describing the conventions for using concrete cryptographic algorithms with the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). CMP is used to enroll and further manage the lifecycle of X.509 certificates.

### **Status of This Memo**

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## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## 2. Message Digest Algorithms

This section provides references to object identifiers and conventions to be employed by CMP implementations that support SHA2 or SHAKE message digest algorithms.

Digest algorithm identifiers are located in:

- \*hashAlg field of OOB CertHash and CertStatus
- \*owf field of Challenge, PBMPParameter, and DHBMPParameter
- \*digestAlgorithms field of SignedData
- \*digestAlgorithm field of SignerInfo

Digest values are located in:

- \*hashVal field of OOB CertHash
- \*certHash field of CertStatus
- \*witness field of Challenge

In addition, digest values are input to signature algorithms.

### 2.1. SHA2

The SHA2 algorithm family is defined in [FIPS Pub 180-4](#) [[NIST.FIPS.180-4](#)].

The message digest algorithms SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are identified by the following OIDs:

```

id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
    us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
    hashalgs(2) 4 }
id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
    us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
    hashalgs(2) 1 }
id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
    us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
    hashalgs(2) 2 }
id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
    us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
    hashalgs(2) 3 }

```

Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC 5754 Section 2](#) [[RFC5754](#)].

## 2.2. SHAKE

The SHA-3 family of hash functions is defined in [FIPS Pub 202](#) [[NIST.FIPS.202](#)] and includes fixed output length variants SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, as well as extendable-output functions (SHAKEs) SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. Currently SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are the only members of the SHA3-family which are specified for use in X.509 and PKIX [[RFC8692](#)], and CMS [[RFC8702](#)] as one-way hash function for use with RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA as one-way hash function for use with RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA.

SHAKE is an extendable-output function and [FIPS Pub 202](#) [[NIST.FIPS.202](#)] prohibits using SHAKE as general-purpose hash function. When SHAKE is used in CMP as a message digest algorithm, the message digested by the SHAKE function MUST be appended with the OCTET\_STRING equivalent of "CMP\_SHAKE128" for SHAKE128 and "CMP\_SHAKE256" for SHAKE 256 and the output length MUST be 256 bits for SHAKE128 and 512 bits for SHAKE256.

< ToDo: This note must be checked and confirmed by experts. >

The message digest algorithms SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are identified by the following OIDs:

```

id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
    us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
    hashalgs(2) 11 }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
    us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
    hashalgs(2) 12 }

```

Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC 8702](#) [Section 3.1](#) [[RFC8702](#)].

### 3. Signature Algorithms

This section provides references to object identifiers and conventions to be employed by CMP implementations that support RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA signature algorithms.

The signature algorithm is referred to as MSG\_SIG\_ALG in [Section 7.2](#), [RFC 4210 Appendix D and E](#) [[RFC4210](#)], and in the [Lightweight CMP Profile](#) [[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile](#)].

Signature algorithm identifiers are located in:

- \*protectionAlg field of PKIHeader
- \*algorithmIdentifier field of POPOSigningKey
- \*signatureAlgorithm field of CertificationRequest, SignKeyPairTypes, and SignerInfo

Signature values are located in:

- \*protection field of PKIMessage
- \*signature field of POPOSigningKey
- \*signature field of CertificationRequest and SignerInfo

#### 3.1. RSA

The RSA (RSASSA-PSS and PKCS#1 version 1.5) signature algorithm is defined in [RFC 8017](#) [[RFC8017](#)].

The algorithm identifier for RSASAA-PSS signatures used with SHA2 message digest algorithms is identified by the following OID:

```
id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 10 }
```

Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC 4056](#) [[RFC4056](#)].

The signature algorithm RSASSA-PSS used with SHAKE message digest algorithms are identified by the following OIDs:

```

id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
  identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
  mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 30 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
  identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
  mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 31 }

```

Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC 8702 Section 3.2.1 \[RFC8702\]](#).

The signature algorithm PKCS#1 version 1.5 used with SHA2 message digest algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:

```

sha224WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
  member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 14 }
sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
  member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 11 }
sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
  member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 12 }
sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
  member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 13 }

```

Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC 5754 Section 3.2 \[RFC5754\]](#).

### 3.2. ECDSA

The ECDSA signature algorithm is defined in [FIPS Pub 186-4 \[NIST.FIPS.186-4\]](#).

The signature algorithm ECDSA used with SHA2 message digest algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:

```

ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
  us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }
ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
  us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
  us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
  us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }

```

As specified in RFC 5480 [RFC5480] the NIST-recommended SECP curves are identified by the following OIDs:

```

secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 1 }
secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 }
secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 7 }
secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 }
secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 }

```

Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC 5754 Section 3.3](#) [[RFC5754](#)].

The signature algorithm ECDSA used with SHAKE message digest algorithms are identified by the following OIDs:

```

id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
    mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 32 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
    mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 33 }

```

Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC 8702 Section 3.2.2](#) [[RFC8702](#)].

### 3.3. EdDSA

The EdDSA signature algorithm is defined in [RFC 8032 Section 3.3](#) [[RFC8032](#)] and [FIPS Pub 186-5 \(Draft\)](#) [[NIST.FIPS.186-5](#)].

The signature algorithm Ed25519 that MUST be used with SHA-512 message digest algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:

```

id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 112 }

```

The signature algorithm Ed448 that MUST be used with SHAKE256 message digest algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:

```

id-Ed448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 113 }

```

Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC 8419](#) [[RFC8419](#)].

Note: The hash algorithm used to calculate the certHash in certConf messages MUST be SHA512 if the certificate to be confirmed has been signed using Ed25519 and SHAKE256 with d=512 if signed using Ed448.

< ToDo: This note must be checked and confirmed by experts. >

## 4. Key Management Algorithms

CMP utilizes the following general key management techniques: key agreement, key transport, and passwords.

[CRME](#) [[RFC4211](#)] and [CMP Updates](#) [[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates](#)] promotes the use of [CMS](#) [[RFC5652](#)] EnvelopedData by deprecating the use of EncryptedValue.

### 4.1. Key Agreement Algorithms

The key agreement algorithm is referred to as PROT\_ENC\_ALG in [RFC 4210 Appendix D and E](#) [[RFC4210](#)] and as KM\_KA\_ALG in the [Lightweight CMP Profile](#) [[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile](#)], as well as in [Section 7](#).

Key agreement algorithms are only used in CMP when using [CMS](#) [[RFC5652](#)] EnvelopedData together with the key agreement key management technique. When a key agreement algorithm is used, a key-encryption algorithm ([Section 4.3](#)) is needed next to the content-encryption algorithm ([Section 5](#)).

Key agreement algorithm identifiers are located in:

- \*keyEncryptionAlgorithm field of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

Key wrap algorithm identifiers are located in:

- \*KeyWrapAlgorithm parameters within keyEncryptionAlgorithm field of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

Wrapped content-encryption keys are located in:

- \*encryptedKey field of RecipientEncryptedKeys



#### 4.1.1. Diffie-Hellman

Diffie-Hellman key agreement is defined in [RFC 2631](#) [[RFC2631](#)] and SHALL be used in the ephemeral-static as specified in [RFC 3370](#) [[RFC3370](#)]. Static-static variants SHALL NOT be used.

The Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm is identified by the following OID:

```
id-alg-ESDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 5 }
```

Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC 3370](#) [Section 4.1](#) [[RFC3370](#)].

#### 4.1.2. ECDH

Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement is defined in [RFC 5753](#) [[RFC5753](#)] and SHALL be used in the ephemeral-static variant as specified in [RFC 5753](#) [[RFC5753](#)] or the 1-Pass ECMQV variant as specified in [RFC 5753](#) [[RFC5753](#)]. Static-static variants SHALL NOT be used.

The ECDH key agreement algorithm used together with NIST-recommended SECP curves are identified by the following OIDs:

```

dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 11(11) 0 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 11(11) 1 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 11(11) 2 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 11(11) 3 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1)
    14(14) 0 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1)
    14(14) 1 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1)
    14(14) 2 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1)
    14(14) 3 }
mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 15(15) 0 }
mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 15(15) 1 }
mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 15(15) 2 }
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 15(15) 3 }

```

As specified in [RFC 5480](#) [[RFC5480](#)] the NIST-recommended SECP curves are identified by the following OIDs:

```

secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 1 }
secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 }
secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 7 }
secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 }
secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 }

```

Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC 5753](#) [[RFC5753](#)].

The ECDH key agreement algorithm used together with curve25519 or curve448 are identified by the following OIDs:

```
id-X25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 110 }
id-X448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 111 }
```

Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC 8418](#) [[RFC8418](#)].

## 4.2. Key Transport Algorithms

The key transport algorithm is also referred to as PROT\_ENC\_ALG in [RFC 4210 Appendix D and E](#) [[RFC4210](#)] and as KM\_KL\_ALG in the [Lightweight CMP Profile](#) [[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile](#)], as well as in [Section 7](#).

Key transport algorithms are only used in CMP when using [CMS](#) [[RFC5652](#)] EnvelopedData together with the key transport key management technique.

Key transport algorithm identifiers are located in:

- \*keyEncryptionAlgorithm field of KeyTransRecipientInfo

Key transport encrypted content-encryption keys are located in:

- \*encryptedKey field of KeyTransRecipientInfo

### 4.2.1. RSA

The RSA key transport algorithm is the RSA encryption scheme defined in [RFC 8017](#) [[RFC8017](#)].

The algorithm identifier for RSA (PKCS #1 v1.5) is:

```
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 }
```

The algorithm identifier for RSAES-OAEP is:

```
id-RSAES-OAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 7 }
```

Further conventions to be considered for PKCS #1 v1.5 are specified in [RFC 3370 Section 4.2.1](#) [[RFC3370](#)] and for RSAES-OAEP in [RFC 3560](#) [[RFC3560](#)].

#### 4.3. Symmetric Key-Encryption Algorithms

The symmetric key-encryption algorithm is also referred to as KM\_KW\_ALG in [Section 7.2](#) and in the [Lightweight CMP Profile](#) [[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile](#)].

As symmetric key-encryption key management technique is not used by CMP, the symmetric key-encryption algorithm is only needed when using the key agreement or password-based key management technique with [CMS](#) [[RFC5652](#)] EnvelopedData.

Key wrap algorithm identifiers are located in:

- \*parameters field of the KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo and PasswordRecipientInfo

Wrapped content-encryption keys are located in:

- \*encryptedKey field of RecipientEncryptedKeys (for key agreement) and PasswordRecipientInfo (for password-based key management)

##### 4.3.1. AES Key Wrap

The AES encryption algorithm is defined in [FIPS Pub 197](#) [[NIST.FIPS.197](#)] and the key wrapping is defined in [RFC 3394](#) [[RFC3394](#)].

AES key encryption has the algorithm identifier:

```
id-aes128-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 5 }
id-aes192-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 25 }
id-aes256-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 45 }
```

The underlying encryption functions for the key wrap and content-encryption algorithms (as specified in Section 5) and the key sizes for the two algorithms MUST be the same (e.g., AES-128 key wrap algorithm with AES-128 content-encryption algorithm), see also [RFC 8551](#) [[RFC8551](#)].

Further conventions to be considered for AES key wrap are specified in [RFC 3394 Section 2.2](#) [[RFC3394](#)] and [RFC 3565 Section 2.3.2](#) [[RFC3565](#)].

#### 4.4. Key Derivation Algorithms

The key derivation algorithm is also referred to as KM\_KD\_ALG in [Section 7.2](#) and in the [Lightweight CMP Profile](#) [[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile](#)].

Key derivation algorithms are only used in CMP when using [CMS](#) [[RFC5652](#)] EnvelopedData together with password-based key management technique.

Key derivation algorithm identifiers are located in:

\*keyDerivationAlgorithm field of PasswordRecipientInfo

When using the password-based key management technique with EnvelopedData as specified in CMP Updates together with MAC-based PKIProtection, the salt for the password-based MAC and KDF must be chosen independently to ensure usage of independent symmetric keys.

##### 4.4.1. PBKDF2

The password-based key derivation function 2 (PBKDF2) is defined in [RFC 8018](#) [[RFC8018](#)].

Password-based key derivation function 2 has the algorithm identifier:

```
id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
    rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-5(5) 12 }
```

Further conventions to be considered for PBKDF2 are specified in [RFC 3370 Section 4.4.1](#) [[RFC3370](#)] and [RFC 8018 Section 5.2](#) [[RFC8018](#)].

#### 5. Content Encryption Algorithms

The content encryption algorithm is also referred to as PROT\_SYM\_ALG in [Section 7](#), [RFC 4210 Appendix D and E](#) [[RFC4210](#)], and the [Lightweight CMP Profile](#) [[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile](#)].

Content encryption algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS [[RFC5652](#)] EnvelopedData to transport a signed private key package in case of central key generation or key archiving, a certificate to facilitate implicit proof-of-possession, or a revocation passphrase in encrypted form.

Content encryption algorithm identifiers are located in:

\*contentEncryptionAlgorithm field of EncryptedContentInfo

Encrypted content is located in:

\*encryptedContent field of EncryptedContentInfo

### 5.1. AES-CBC

The AES encryption algorithm is defined in [FIPS Pub 197](#) [[NIST.FIPS.197](#)].

AES-CBC content encryption has the algorithm identifier:

```
id-aes128-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 2 }
id-aes192-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1)22 }
id-aes256-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1)42 }
```

Specific conventions to be considered for AES-CBC content encryption are specified in [RFC 3565](#) [[RFC3565](#)].

## 6. Message Authentication Code Algorithms

The message authentication code is either used for shared secret-based CMP message protection or together with the password-based key derivation function (PBKDF2).

The message authentication code algorithm is also referred to as MSG\_MAC\_ALG in [Section 7](#), [RFC 4210 Appendix D and E](#) [[RFC4210](#)], and the [Lightweight CMP Profile](#) [[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile](#)].

### 6.1. Password-based MAC

Password-based MAC algorithms combine the derivation of a symmetric key from a password or other shared secret information and a symmetric key-based MAC function as specified in Section 6.2 using this derived key.

Message authentication code algorithm identifiers are located in:

\*`protectionAlg` field of `PKIHeader`

Message authentication code values are located in:

\*`PKIProtection` field of `PKIMessage`

#### 6.1.1. PasswordBasedMac

The PasswordBasedMac algorithm is defined in [RFC 4210 Section 5.1.3.1 \[RFC4210\]](#), [RFC 4211 Section 4.4 \[RFC4211\]](#), and [Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format \(CRMF\) \[RFC9045\]](#).

The PasswordBasedMac algorithm is identified by the following OID:

```
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
  us(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
```

Further conventions to be considered for password-based MAC are specified in [RFC 4210 Section 5.1.3.1 \[RFC4210\]](#), [RFC 4211 Section 4.4 \[RFC4211\]](#), and [Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format \(CRMF\) \[RFC9045\]](#).

#### 6.1.2. PBMAC1

The Password-Based Message Authentication Code 1 (PBMAC1) is defined in [RFC 8018 \[RFC8018\]](#). PBMAC1 combines a password-based key derivation function like PBKDF2 ([Section 4.4.1](#)) with an underlying symmetric key-based message authentication scheme.

PBMAC1 has the following OID:

```
id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
  rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-5(5) 14 }
```

Specific conventions to be considered for PBMAC1 are specified in [RFC 8018 Section 7.1 and A.5 \[RFC8018\]](#).

#### 6.2. Symmetric key-based MAC

Symmetric key-based MAC algorithms are used for deriving the symmetric encryption key when using PBKDF2 as described in [Section](#)

[4.4.1](#) as well as with Password-based MAC as described in [Section 6.1](#).

Message authentication code algorithm identifiers are located in:

- \*protectionAlg field of PKIHeader
- \*messageAuthScheme field of PBMAC1
- \*mac field of PBMPParameter
- \*prf field of PBKDF2-params

Message authentication code values are located in:

- \*PKIProtection field of PKIMessage

#### **6.2.1. SHA2-based HMAC**

The HMAC algorithm is defined in [RFC 2104](#) [[RFC2104](#)] and [FIPS Pub 198-1](#) [[NIST.FIPS.198-1](#)].

The HMAC algorithm used with SHA2 message digest algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:

```
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }
id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }
```

Specific conventions to be considered for SHA2-based HMAC are specified in [RFC 4231 Section 3.1](#) [[RFC4231](#)].

#### **6.2.2. AES-GMAC**

The AES-GMAC algorithm is defined in [FIPS Pub 197](#) [[NIST.FIPS.197](#)] and [NIST SP 800-38d](#) [[NIST.SP.800-38d](#)].

Note: AES-GMAC MUST NOT be used twice with the same parameter set, especially the same nonce. Therefore, it MUST NOT be used together with PBKDF2. When using it with PBMAC1 it MUST be ensured that AES-GMAC is only used as message authentication scheme and not for the key derivation function PBKDF2.

The AES-GMAC algorithm is identified by the following OIDs:



```

id-aes128-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 9 }
id-aes192-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 29 }
id-aes256-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 49 }

```

Specific conventions to be considered for AES-GMAC are specified in [RFC 9044](#) [[RFC9044](#)].

### 6.2.3. SHAKE-based KMAC

The KMAC algorithm is defined in [RFC 8702](#) [[RFC8702](#)] and [FIPS SP 800-185](#) [[NIST.SP.800-185](#)].

Note: Currently it is assumed that the advantage of a HW implementation over a SW implementation of KMAC is greater than of HMAC-SHA2. Therefore, the advantage of an attacker is greater if KMAC is used as a prf in PasswordBasedMac and PBKDF2. For this reason, the use of KMAC as a prf in PasswordBasedMac and PBKDF2 is discouraged.

< ToDo: This note must be checked and confirmed by experts. >

The SHAKE-based KMAC algorithm is identified by the following OIDs:

```

id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 }
id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 }

```

Specific conventions to be considered for KMAC with SHAKE are specified in [RFC 8702 Section 3.4](#) [[RFC8702](#)].

## 7. Algorithm Use Profiles

This section provides profiles of algorithms and respective conventions for different application use cases.

Recommendations like [NIST SP 800-57 Recommendation for Key Management Table2](#) [[NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5](#)] and [ECRYPT Algorithms, Key](#)

[Size and Protocols Report \(2018\) Section 4.6 \[ECRYPT.CSA.D5.4\]](#)

provide general information on current cryptographic algorithms.

The overall cryptographic strength of a CMP deployment will depend on several factors, including:

- \*Capabilities of the end entity: What kind of algorithms does the end entity support. The cryptographic strength of the system SHOULD be at least as strong as the algorithms and keys used for the certificate being managed.

- \*Algorithm profile: The overall strength of the profile will be the strength of the weakest algorithm it contains.

- \*Message protection: The overall strength of the CMC message protection

  - MAC-based protection: The entropy of the shared secret information or password when MAC-based message protection is used (MSG\_MAC\_ALG).

  - Signature-based protection: The strength of the key pair and signature algorithm when signature-based protection is used (MSG\_SIG\_ALG).

  - Protection of centrally generated keys: The strength of the algorithms used for the key management technique ([Section 7.2](#): PROT\_ENC\_ALG or [Section 7.1](#): KM\_KA\_ALG, KM\_KT\_ALG, KM\_KD\_ALG) and the encryption of the content-encryption key and private key ([Section 7.2](#): SYM\_PENC\_ALG, PROT\_SYM\_ALG or [Section 7.1](#): KM\_KW\_ALG, PROT\_SYM\_ALG).

The following table shows the algorithms listed in this document sorted by their bits of security. If an implementation intends to enroll and manage certificate for keys of a specific security, it SHALL implement and use algorithms of at least that strength for the respective PKI management operation. If one column does not provide a suitable algorithm, the implementer MUST choose one offering more bits of security.

Bits of security	Recommended for managing keys up to	RSA / D-H	Elliptic curve	Hash function or XOF with specified output length (d)	Symmetric encryption
112	RSA2048 secp224r1	RSA2048 D- H(2048)	secp224r1	SHA224	
128					AES-128

Bits of security	Recommended for managing keys up to	RSA / D-H	Elliptic curve	Hash function or XOF with specified output length (d)	Symmetric encryption
	RSA3072 secp256r1 Ed25519	RSA3072 D- H(3072)	secp256r1 Ed25519/ X25519	SHA256 SHAKE128(d=256)	
192	secp384r1		secp384r1	SHA384	AES-192
224	Ed448		Ed448/ X448		
256	secp521r1		secp521r1	SHA512 SHAKE256(d=512)	AES-256

Table 1: Cryptographic algorithms sorted by their bits of security

The following table shows the cryptographic algorithms sorted by their usage in CMP and with more details.

Bits of security	Recommended for managing keys up to	CMP protection	Key management technique	Key-wrap and symmetric encryption
		MSG_SIG_ALG, MSG_MAC_ALG	PROT_ENC_ALG or KM_KA_ALG, KM_KT_ALG, KM_KD_ALG	PROT_SYM_ALG, SYM_PENC_ALG or KM_KW_ALG
112	RSA2048, secp224r1	RSASSA-PSS (2048, SHA224 or SHAKE128), RSAEncryption (2048, SHA224), ECDSA (secp224r1, SHA224 or SHAKE128), PBMAC1 (HMAC- SHA224)	ESDH (2048), RSAES-OAEP (2048, SHA224), RSAEncryption (2048), ECDH (secp224r1, SHA224), PBKDF2 (HMAC- SHA224)	
128	RSA3072, secp256r1, Ed25519	RSASSA-PSS (3072, SHA256 or SHAKE128), RSAEncryption (3072, SHA256), ECDSA (secp256r1, SHA256 or SHAKE128),	ESDH (3072), RSAES-OAEP (3072, SHA256), RSAEncryption (3072), ECDH (secp256r1, SHA256), ECDH	AES-128

Bits of security	Recommended for managing keys up to	CMP protection	Key management technique	Key-wrap and symmetric encryption
		Ed25519 (SHA512), PBMAC1 (HMAC-SHA256)	(X25519), PBKDF2 (HMAC-SHA256)	
192	secp384r1	ECDSA (secp384r1, SHA384), PBMAC1 (HMAC-SHA384)	ECDH (secp384r1, SHA384), PBKDF2 (HMAC-SHA384)	AES-192
224	Ed448	Ed448 (SHAKE256)	ECDH (X448)	
256	secp521r1	ECDSA (secp521r1, SHA512 or SHAKE256), PBMAC1 (HMAC-SHA512)	ECDH (secp521r1, SHA512), PBKDF2 (HMAC-SHA512)	AES-256

Table 2: Cryptographic algorithms sorted by their bits of security and usage by CMP

< ToDo: Table 1 and 2 above must be checked and confirmed by experts. >

To avoid consuming too much computational resources it is recommended to choose a set of algorithms offering roughly the same level of security. Below are provided several algorithm profiles which are balanced, assuming the implementer chooses MAC secrets and/or certificate profiles of at least equivalent strength.

### 7.1. Algorithm Profile for RFC 4210 PKI Management Message Profiles

The following table updates the definitions of algorithms used within PKI Management Message Profiles as defined in [CMP Appendix D.2 \[RFC4210\]](#).

The columns in the table are:

Name: An identifier used for message profiles

Use: Description of where and for what the algorithm is used

Mandatory: Algorithms which MUST be supported by conforming implementations

Optional: Algorithms which are OPTIONAL to support

Deprecated: Algorithms from RFC 4210 [RFC4210] which SHOULD NOT be used anymore

Name	Use	Mandatory	Optional	Deprecated
MSG_SIG_ALG	protection of PKI messages using signature	RSA	ECDSA, EdDSA	DSA, combinations with MD5 and SHA-1
MSG_MAC_ALG	protection of PKI messages using MACing	PBMAC1	PasswordBasedMac, HMAC, KMAC	X9.9
SYM_PENC_ALG	symmetric encryption of an end entity's private key where symmetric key is distributed out-of-band	AES-wrap		3-DES(3-key-EDE, CBC Mode), RC5, CAST-128
PROT_ENC_ALG	asymmetric algorithm used for encryption of (symmetric keys for encryption of) private keys transported in PKIMessages	D-H	ECDH, RSA	
PROT_SYM_ALG	symmetric encryption algorithm used for encryption of private key bits (a key of this type is encrypted using PROT_ENC_ALG)	AES-CBC		3-DES(3-key-EDE, CBC Mode), RC5, CAST-128

Table 3: Algorithms used within [RFC4210]

Mandatory Algorithm Identifiers and Specifications:

RSA: sha256WithRSAEncryption with 2048 bit, see [Section 3.1](#)

PasswordBasedMac: id-PasswordBasedMac, see [Section 6.1](#) (with id-sha256 as the owf parameter, see [Section 2.1](#) and id-hmacWithSHA256 as the mac parameter, see [Section 6.2.1](#))

PBMAC1: id-PBMAC1, see [Section 6.1.2](#) (with id-PBKDF2 as the key derivation function, see [Section 4.4.1](#) and id-hmacWithSHA256 as message authentication scheme, see [Section 6.2.1](#)). It is RECOMMENDED to prefer the usage of PBMAC1 instead of PasswordBasedMac.

D-H: id-alg-ESDH, see [Section 4.1.1](#)

AES-wrap: id-aes128-wrap, see [Section 4.3.1](#)

AES-CBC: id-aes128-CBC, see [Section 5.1](#)

## 7.2. Algorithm Profile for Lightweight CMP Profile

The following table contains definitions of algorithms which MAY be supported by implementations of the [Lightweight CMP Profile](#) [[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile](#)].

As the set of algorithms to be used for implementations of the Lightweight CMP Profile heavily depends on the PKI management operations implemented, the certificates used for messages protection, and the certificates to be managed, this document will not specify a specific set that is mandatory to support for conforming implementations.

The columns in the table are:

Name: An identifier used for message profiles

Use: Description of where and for what the algorithm is used

Examples: Lists the algorithms as described in this document. The list of algorithms depends on the set of PKI management operations to be implemented.

Note: It is RECOMMENDED to prefer the usage of PBMAC1 instead of PasswordBasedMac.

Name	Use	Examples
MSG_SIG_ALG	protection of PKI messages using signature and for SignedData, e.g., a private key transported in PKIMessages	RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA
MSG_MAC_ALG		

Name	Use	Examples
	protection of PKI messages using MACing	PasswordBasedMac (see <a href="#">Section 9</a> ), PBMAC1, HMAC, KMAC
KM_KA_ALG	asymmetric key agreement algorithm used for agreement of a symmetric key for use with KM_KW_ALG	D-H, ECDH
KM_KT_ALG	asymmetric key encryption algorithm used for transport of a symmetric key for PROT_SYM_ALG	RSA
KM_KD_ALG	symmetric key derivation algorithm used for derivation of a symmetric key for use with KM_KW_ALG	PBKDF2
KM_KW_ALG	algorithm to wrap a symmetric key for PROT_SYM_ALG	AES-wrap
PROT_SYM_ALG	symmetric content encryption algorithm used for encryption of EnvelopedData, e.g., a private key transported in PKIMessages	AES-CBC

Table 4: Algorithms used within *[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]*

## 8. IANA Considerations

This document does not request changes to the IANA registry.

## 9. Security Considerations

[RFC 4210 Appendix D.2](#) [[RFC4210](#)] contains a set of algorithms, mandatory to be supported by conforming implementations. These algorithms were appropriate at the time CMP was released, but as cryptographic algorithms weaken over time, some of them should not be used anymore. In general, new attacks are emerging due to research cryptanalysis or increase in computing power. New algorithms were introduced that are more resistant to today's attacks.

This document lists many cryptographic algorithms usable with CMP to offer implementer a more up to date choice. Finally, the algorithms to be supported also heavily depend on the certificates and PKI management operations utilized in the target environment. The algorithm with the lowest security strength and the entropy of shared secret information define the security of the overall solution, see [Section 7](#).

SHAKE is an extendable-output function and [FIPS Pub 202](#) [[NIST.FIPS.202](#)] prohibits using SHAKE as general-purpose hash function. To prevent known attacks SHAKE MUST only be used as hash function within [CMP](#) [[RFC4210](#)] and [CMP Updates](#) [[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates](#)] if the output length is fixed to d=256 for SHAKE128 and d=512 for SHAKE256 as described in [[RFC8702](#)] and MUST NOT be used with different output lengths.

< ToDo: The above security consideration must be checked and confirmed by experts. >

When using MAC-based message protection the use of PBMAC1 is preferable to that of PasswordBasedMac. First, PBMAC1 is a well-known scrutinized algorithm, which is not true for PasswordBasedMac. Second, the PasswordBasedMac algorithm as specified in [RFC 4211 Section 4.4](#) [[RFC4211](#)] is essentially PBKDF1 (as defined in [RFC 8018 Section 5.1](#) [[RFC8018](#)]) with an HMAC step at the end. Here we update to use the PBKDF2-HMAC construct defined as PBMAC1 in [[RFC8018](#)]. PBKDF2 is superior to PBKDF1 in an improved internal construct for iterated hashing, and in removing PBKDF1's limitation of only being able to derive keys up to the size of the underlying hash function. Additionally, PBKDF1 is not recommended for new applications as stated in [Section 5.1 of RFC 8018](#) [[RFC8018](#)] and no longer an approved algorithm by most standards bodies, and therefore presents difficulties to implementer who are submitting their CMP implementations for certification, hence moving to a PBKDF2-based mechanism. This change is in alignment with [[RFC9045](#)] which updates [[RFC4211](#)] to allow the use of PBMAC1 in CRMF.

AES-GMAC MUST NOT be used as the pseudo random function in PBKDF2; the use of AES-GMAC more than once with the same key and the same nonce will break the security.

Currently it is assumed that the advantage of a HW implementation over a SW implementation of KMAC is greater than of HMAC-SHA2. Therefore, the advantage of an attacker is greater if KMAC is used as a prf in PasswordBasedMac and PBKDF2. For this reason, the use of KMAC as a prf in PasswordBasedMac and PBKDF2 is discouraged.

< ToDo: This security consideration must be checked and confirmed by experts. >

In [Section 7](#) of this document there is also an update to the [Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210](#) [[RFC4210](#)] and a set of algorithms that MAY be supported when implementing the [Lightweight CMP Profile](#) [[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile](#)].

It is recognized that there may be older CMP implementations in use that conform to the algorithm use profile from [Appendix D.2 of](#)



[RFC 4210](#) [[RFC4210](#)]. For example, the use of AES is now mandatory for PROT\_SYM\_ALG but in [RFC 4210](#) [[RFC4210](#)] 3-DES was mandatory. Therefore, it is expected that many CMP systems may already support the recommended algorithms in this specification. In such systems the weakened algorithms should be disabled from further use. If critical systems cannot be immediately updated to conform to the recommended algorithm use profile, it is recommended a plan to migrate the infrastructure to conforming profiles be adopted as soon as possible.

Symmetric key-based MAC algorithms as described in [Section 6.2](#) MAY be used as MSG\_MAC\_ALG. The implementer MUST choose a suitable PRF and ensure that the key has sufficient entropy to match the overall security level of the algorithm profile. These considerations are outside the scope of the profile.

## 10. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Russ Housley for supporting this draft with submitting [[RFC9044](#)] and [[RFC9045](#)].

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## **Appendix A. History of changes**

Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the document.

From version 07 -> 08:

- \*Fixing issues from WG and AD review
- \*Adding Note to Section 2.2, 3.3, and 6.2.3 regarding usage of SHAKE and KMAC and added ToDo regarding checking respective notes
- \*Added two tables showing algorithms sorted by their strength to Section 7 and added ToDo regarding checking theses tables
- \*Updates the algorithm use profile in Section 7.1
- \*Updated and added security consideration on SHAKE, PasswordBasedMac, KMAC, and symmetric key-based MAC functions and added ToDo regarding checking the security consideration on SHAKE

From version 06 -> 07:

- \*Fixing minor formatting nits

From version 05 -> 06:

- \*Added text to Section 2 and Section 3.3 to clearly specify the hash algorithm to use for certConf messages for certificates signed with EdDSA (see thread "[CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash")
- \*Updated new RFC numbers for I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg and I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs

From version 04 -> 05:

- \*Minor changes and corrections in wording

From version 03 -> 04:

- \*Added John Gray to the list of authors due to his extensive support and valuable feedback
- \*Added some clarification of the use AES-GMAC to Section 6.2.1
- \*Extended the guidance on how to select a set of algorithms in Section 7 and deleted former Section 7.1
- \*Deleted the algorithms mandatory to support in Section 7.2 as discussed at IETF 110
- \*Extended the Security considerations in Section 9
- \*Minor changes in wording

From version 02 -> 03:

- \*Moved former Appendix A to new Section 7 as suggested by Rich and Russ (see thread "I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-02.txt")
- \*Added a column to Table 1 in Section 7.2 to reflect the changes to RFC 4210
- \*Updated Table 2 in Section 7.3
- \*Added a paragraph to Section 9 to discuss backward compatibility with RFC 4210
- \*Minor changes in wording

From version 01 -> 02:

- \*Added Hans Aschauer, Mike Ounsworth, and Serge Mister as co-author
- \*Changed to XML V3
- \*Added SHAKE digest algorithm to Section 2 as discussed at IETF 109
- \*Deleted DSA from Section 3 as discussed at IETF 109
- \*Added RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE to Section 3

- \*Added SECP curves the section on ECDSA with SHA2, ECDSA with SHAKE, and EdDSA to Section 3 as discussed at IETF 109
- \*Deleted static-static D-H and ECDH from Section 4.1 based on the discussion on the mailing list (see thread "[CMP Algorithms] Section 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 drop static-static (EC)DH key agreement algorithms for use in CMP")
- \*Added ECDH OIDs and SECP curves, as well as ECDH with curve25519 and curve448 to Section 4.1 as discussed at IETF 109
- \*Deleted RSA-OAEP from Section 4.2 first as discussed at IETF 109, but re-added it after discussion on the mailing list (see thread "Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms")
- \*Added a paragraph to Section 4.3.1 to explain that the algorithms and key length for content encryption and key wrapping must be aligned as discussed on the mailing list (see thread "[CMP Algorithms] Use Key-Wrap with or without padding in Section 4.3 and Section 5")
- \*Deleted AES-CCM and AES-GMC from and added AES-CBC to Section 5 as discussed at IETF 109
- \*Added Section 6.1.2 to offer PBMAC1 as discusses on the mailing list (see thread "Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-02") and restructured text in Section 6 to be easier to differentiate between password- and shared-key-based MAC
- \*Deleted Diffie-Hellmann based MAC from Section 6 as is only relevant when using enrolling Diffie-Hellmann certificates
- \*Added AES-GMAC and SHAKE-based KMAC to Section 6 as discussed at IETF 109
- \*Extended Section 9 to mention Russ supporting with two additional I-Ds and name further supporters of the draft
- \*Added a first draft of a generic algorithm selection guideline to Appendix A
- \*Added a first proposal for mandatory algorithms for the Lightweight CMP Profile to Appendix A
- \*Minor changes in wording

From version 00 -> 01:

- \*Changed sections Symmetric Key-Encryption Algorithms and Content Encryption Algorithms based on the discussion on the mailing list (see thread "[CMP Algorithms] Use Key-Wrap with or without padding in Section 4.3 and Section 5")
- \*Added Appendix A with updated algorithms profile for RDC4210 Appendix D.2 and first proposal for the Lightweight CMP Profile
- \*Minor changes in wording

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