Asymmetric Manifest Based Integrity
draft-ietf-mboned-ambi-01

Abstract

   This document defines Asymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity (AMBI).
   AMBI allows each receiver or forwarder of a stream of multicast
   packets to check the integrity of the contents of each packet in the
   data stream. AMBI operates by passing cryptographically verifiable
   hashes of the data packets inside manifest messages, and sending the
   manifests over authenticated out-of-band communication channels.

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1. Introduction

   Multicast transport poses security problems that are not easily
   addressed by the same security mechanisms used for unicast transport.

The "Introduction" sections of the documents describing TESLA
[RFC4082], and TESLA in SRTP [RFC4383], and TESLA with ALC and NORM
[RFC5776] present excellent overviews of the challenges unique to
multicast authentication, briefly summarized here:

o A MAC based on a symmetric shared secret cannot be used because
   each packet has multiple receivers that do not trust each other,
   and using a symmetric shared secret exposes the same secret to
   each receiver.

o Asymmetric per-packet signatures can handle only very low bit-
   rates because of the computational overhead.

o An asymmetric signature of a larger message comprising multiple
   packets requires reliable receipt of all such packets, something
   that cannot be guaranteed in a timely manner even for protocols
   that do provide reliable delivery, and the retransmission of which
   may anyway exceed the useful lifetime for data formats that can
   otherwise tolerate some degree of loss.

Aymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity (AMBI) defines a method for
receivers or middle boxes to cryptographically authenticate and
verify the integrity of a stream of packets, by communicating packet
"manifests" (described in Section 2.4) via an out-of-band
communication channel that provides authentication and verifiable
integrity.

Each manifest contains a message digest (described in Section 2.3)
for each packet in a sequence of packets from the data stream,
hereafter called a "packet digest". The packet digest incorporates a
cryptographic hash of the packet contents and some identifying data
from the packet, according to a defined digest profile for the data
stream.

Each manifest MUST be delivered in a way that provides cryptographic
integrity guarantees of the authenticity of the manifest. For
example, TLS could be used to deliver a stream of manifests over a
unicast data stream from a set of trusted senders to each receiver,
or a protocol that asymmetrically signs each message could be used to
transport authenticated manifests over a multicast channel. Note
that a UDP-based protocol might drop or reorder manifests while still
providing authentication.

Upon successful verification of a manifest and receipt of any subset
of the corresponding data packets, the receiver has proof of the
integrity of the contents of the data packets that are listed in the
manifest.

Authenticating the integrity of the data packets depends on:

o the authenticity of the manifests

o the authenticity of the digest profile used for construction of
   the packet digests

o the difficulty of generating a collision for the packet digests
   contained in the manifest.

This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] module that augments the DORMS
[I-D.draft-ietf-mboned-dorms-00] YANG module to provide a way to
communicate a digest profile, described in Section 2.3.1, for
construction of the packet digests, described in Section 2.3. When
obtaining the digest profile by using DORMS, the authenticity of the
data stream relies on a trust relationship with the DORMS server,
since that anchors the authenticity of the digest profile for
constructing packet digests.

1.1. Comparison with TESLA

AMBI and TESLA [RFC4082] and [RFC5776] attempt to achieve a similar
goal of authenticating the integrity of streams of multicast packets.
AMBI imposes a higher overhead, as measured in the amount of extra
data required, than TESLA imposes. In exchange, AMBI relaxes the
requirement for establishing an upper bound on clock synchronization
between sender and receiver, and allows for the use case of
authenticating multicast traffic before forwarding it through the
network, while also allowing receivers to authenticate the same
traffic. By contrast, this is not possible with TESLA because the
data packets can't be authenticated until a key is disclosed, so
either the middlebox has to forward data packets without first
authenticating them so that the receiver has them prior to key
disclosure, or the middlebox has to hold packets until the key is
disclosed, at which point the receiver can no longer establish their
authenticity.

The other new capability is that because AMBI provides authentication
information out of band, authentication can be retrofitted into some
pre-existing deployments without changing the protocol of the data
packets, under some restrictions outlined in Section 7. By contrast,
TESLA requires a MAC to be added to each authenticated message.

1.2. Threat Model

TBD: Summarize the applicable threat model this protects against. A
diagram plus a cleaned-up version of the on-list explanation here is

probably appropriate: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/mboned/
CG9FLjPwuno3MtvYvgNcD5p69I4/

Reference [RFC3552] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3552#section-3

1.3. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119] and [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

1.4. Notes for Contributors and Reviewers

Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and its subsections
before publication.

This section is to provide references to make it easier to review the
development and discussion on the draft so far.

1.4.1. Venues for Contribution and Discussion

This document is in the Github repository at:

https://github.com/GrumpyOldTroll/ietf-dorms-cluster

Readers are welcome to open issues and send pull requests for this
document.

Please note that contributions may be merged and substantially
edited, and as a reminder, please carefully consider the Note Well
before contributing: https://datatracker.ietf.org/submit/note-well/

Substantial discussion of this document should take place on the
MBONED working group mailing list (mboned@ietf.org).

o Join: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mboned

o Search: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/mboned/

2. Protocol Operation

2.1. Overview

In order to authenticate a data packet, AMBI receivers need to hold
these three pieces of information at the same time:

o the data packet

o an authenticated manifest containing the packet digest for the
   data packet

o a digest profile defining the transformation from the data packet
   to its packet digest

The manifests are delivered as a stream of manifests over an
authenticated data channel. Manifest contents MUST be authenticated
before they can be used to authenticate data packets.

The manifest stream is composed of an ordered sequence of manifests
that each contain an ordered sequence of packet digests,
corresponding to the original packets as sent from their origin, in
the same order.

Note that a manifest contains potentially many packet digests, and
its size can be tuned to fit within a convenient PDU (Protocol Data
Unit) of the manifest transport stream. By doing so, many packet
digests for the multicast data stream can be delivered per packet of
the manifest transport. The intent is that even with unicast-based
manifest transport, multicast-style efficiencies of scale can still
be realized with only a relatively small unicast overhead, when
manifests use a unicast transport.

2.2. Buffering and Validation Windows

Using different communication channels for the manifest stream and
the data stream introduces a possibility of desynchronization in the
timing of the received data between the different channels, so
receivers hold data packets and packet digests from the manifest
stream in buffers for some duration while awaiting the arrival of
their counterparts.

While holding a data packet, if the corresponding packet digest for
that packet arrives in the manifest stream and can be authenticated,
the data packet is authenticated.

While holding an authenticated packet digest, if the corresponding
data packet arrives with a matching packet digest, the data packet is
authenticated.

Once a data packet is authenticated, the corresponding packet digest
can be discarded and the data packet can be further processed by the
receiving application or forwarded through the receiving network.
Authenticating a data packet consumes one packet digest and prevents
re-learning, with a hold-down time equal to the hold time for packet

digests. A different manifest might provide the same packet digest
with the same packet sequence number, but the digest remains consumed
if it has been used to authenticate a data packet.

If the receiver's hold duration for a data packet expires without
authenticating the packet, the packet SHOULD be dropped as
unauthenticated. If the hold duration of a manifest expires, packet
digests last received in that manifest SHOULD be discarded. (Note
that in some cases, packet digests can be sent redundantly in more
than one manifest. In such cases, the latest received time for an
authenticated packet digest should be used for the expiration time.)

Since packet digests are usually smaller than the data packets, it's
RECOMMENDED that senders generate and send manifests with timing such
that the packet digests in a manifest will typically be received by
subscribed receivers before the data packets corresponding to those
digests are received.

This strategy reduces the buffering requirements at receivers at, the
cost of introducing some buffering of data packets at the sender,
since data packets are generated before their packet digests can be
added to manifests.

The RECOMMENDED default hold times at receivers are:

o 2 seconds for data packets

o 10 seconds for packet digests

The sender MAY recommend different values for specific data streams,
in order to tune different data streams for different performance
goals. The YANG model in Section 5 provides a mechanism for senders
to communicate the sender's recommendation for buffering durations,
when using DORMS.

Receivers SHOULD follow the recommendations for hold times provided
by the sender, subject to their capabilities and any administratively
configured limits on buffer sizes at the receiver.

However receivers MAY deviate from the values recommended by the
sender for a variety of reasons. Decreasing the buffering durations
recommended by the server increases the risk of losing packets, but
can be an appropriate tradeoff for specific network conditions and
hardware constraints on some devices.

2.2.1. Inter-packet Gap

It's RECOMMENDED that middle boxes forwarding buffered data packets
preserve the inter-packet gap between packets in the same data
stream, and that receiving libraries that perform AMBI-based
authentication provide mechanisms to expose the network arrival times
of packets to applications.

The purpose for this recommendation is to preserve the capability of
receivers to use techniques for available bandwidth detection or
network congestion based on observation of packet times. Examples of
such techniques include paced chirping and pathrate.

Note that this recommendation SHOULD NOT prevent the transmission of
an authenticated packet because the prior packet is unauthenticated.
This recommendation only asks implementations to delay the
transmission of an authenticated packet to correspond to the
interpacket gap if an authenticated packet was previously transmitted
and the authentication of the subsequent packet would otherwise burst
the packets more quickly.

This does not prevent the transmission of packets out of order
according to their order of authentication, only the timing of
packets that are transmitted, after authentication, in the same order
they were received.

For receiver applications, the time that the original packet was
received from the network SHOULD be made available to the receiving
application.

2.3. Packet Digests

2.3.1. Digest Profile

A packet digest is a message digest for a data packet, built
according to a digest profile defined by the sender.

The digest profile is defined by the sender, and specifies:

1. A cryptographically secure hash algorithm (REQUIRED)

2. A manifest stream identifier

3. Whether to hash the IP payload or the UDP payload. (see
    Section 2.3.1.1)

The hash algorithm is applied to a pseudoheader followed by the
packet payload, as determined by the digest profile. The computed
hash value is the packet digest.

TBD: there should also be a way to specify that only packets to a
specific UDP port are applicable. I think this is not quite right
today and probably should be done with a grouping in the yang model,
so that the profile appears either inside a "protocol" container
inside the (S,G) or inside the udp-stream inside the "protocol", but
am not sure. Follow-up on this after the first reference
implementation...

TBD: As recommended by https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7696#section-
2.2 [1], a companion document containing the mandatory-to-implement
cipher suite should also be published separately and referenced by
this document.

2.3.1.1. Payload Type

2.3.1.1.1. UDP vs. IP payload validation

When the digest profile indicates that UDP payloads are validated,
the IP protocol for the packets MUST be UDP (0x11) and the payload
used for calculating the packet digest includes only the UDP payload,
with length as the number of UDP payload octets, as calculated by
subtracting the size of the UDP header from the UDP payload length.

When the digest profile indicates that IP payloads are validated, the
IP payload of the packet is used, using the outermost IP layer that
contains the (S,G) corresponding to the (S,G) protected by the
manifest. There is no restriction on the IP protocols that can be
authenticated. The length field in the pseudoheader is calculated by
subtracting the IP Header Length from the IP length, and is equal to
the number of octets in the payload for the digest calculation.

2.3.1.1.2. Motivation

Full IP payloads often aren't available to receivers without extra
privileges on end user operating systems, so it's useful to provide a
way to authenticate only the UDP payload, which is often the only
portion of the packet available to many receiving applications.

However, for some use cases a full IP payload is appropriate. For
example, when retrofitting some existing protocols, some packets may
be predictable or frequently repeated. Use of an IPSec
Authentication Header [RFC4302] is one way to disambiguate such
packets. Even though the shared secret means the Authentication
Header can't itself be used to authenticate the packet contents, the

sequence number in the Authentication Header can ensure that specific
packets are not repeated at the IP layer, and so it's useful for AMBI
to have the capability to authenticate such packets.

Another example: some services might need to authenticate the UDP
options [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-udp-options]. When using the UDP payload,
the UDP options would not be part of the authenticated payload, but
would be included when using the IP payload type.

Lastly, since (S,G) subscription operates at the IP layer, it's
possible that some non-UDP protocols will need to be authenticated.

2.3.2. Pseudoheader

When calculating the hash for the packet digest, the hash algorithm
is applied to a pseudoheader followed by the payload from the packet.
The complete sequence of octets used to calculate the hash is
structured as follows:

```
 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|        Source Address (32 bits IPv4/128 bits IPv6)           |
|                            ...                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|      Destination Address (32 bits IPv4/128 bits IPv6)        |
|                            ...                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|    Zeroes    |    Protocol   |            Length             |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|        Source Port          |        Destination Port       |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                    Manifest Identifier                       |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                       Payload Data                           |
|                            ...                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

2.3.2.1. Source Address

The IPv4 or IPv6 source address of the packet.

2.3.2.2. Destination Address

The IPv4 or IPv6 destination address of the packet.

2.3.2.3. **Zeroes**

   All bits set to 0.

2.3.2.4. **Protocol**

   The IP Protocol field from IPv4, or the Next Header field for IPv6.
   When UDP payload is indicated, this value MUST be UDP (0x11).

2.3.2.5. **Length**

   The length in octets of the Payload Data field, expressed as an
   unsigned 16-bit integer.

2.3.2.6. **Source Port**

   The source port of the packet. Zeroes if using a protocol that does
   not use source ports.

2.3.2.7. **Destination Port**

   The destination port of the packet. Zeroes if using a protocol that
   does not use destination ports.

   TBD: there's something I hate about the source and destination ports.
   Maybe it should only be active in UDP-payload mode, instead of zeroes
   when not UDP? But I suspect there's a better approach than UDP-or-
   not, so it's this way for now, with hopes of finding something better
   in the next version.

2.3.2.8. **Manifest Identifier**

   The 32-bit identifier for the manifest stream.

2.3.2.9. **Payload Data**

   The payload data includes either the IP payload or the UDP payload,
   as indicated by the digest profile.

   The payload type is configurable because when sending UDP, some
   legacy networks may strip the UDP option space, and it's necessary to
   provide a manifest stream capable of authentication that can
   interoperate with these networks. However, for non-UDP traffic or in
   order to authenticate the UDP options, some use cases may require
   support for authenticating the full IP payload.

[2.4](#). **Manifests**

[2.4.1](#). **Manifest Layout**

```
 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                   Manifest Stream Identifier                  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                   Manifest sequence number                   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                   First packet sequence number               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|       Refresh Deadline       |      Packet Digest Count      |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                 ... Packet Content Expansions ...            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                      ... Packet Digests ...                  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

[2.4.1.1](#). **Manifest Stream Identifier**

   A 32-bit unsigned integer chosen by the sender.

[2.4.1.2](#). **Manifest Sequence Number**

   A monotonically increasing 32-bit unsigned integer. Each manifest
   sent by the sender increases this value by 1. On overflow it wraps
   to 0.

   It's RECOMMENDED to expire the manifest stream and start a new stream
   for the data packets before a sequence number wrap is necessary.

[2.4.1.3](#). **First Packet Sequence Number**

   A monotonically increasing 32-bit unsigned integer. Each packet in
   the data stream increases this value by 1.

   It's RECOMMENDED to expire the manifest stream and start a new stream
   for the data packets before a sequence number wrap is necessary.

   Note: for redundancy, especially if using a manifest stream with
   unreliable transport, successive manifests MAY provide duplicates of
   the same packet digest with the same packet sequence number, using
   overapping sets of packet sequence numbers. When received, these
   reset the hold timer for the listed packet digests.

2.4.1.4. Refresh Deadline

   A 16-bit unsigned integer number of seconds.

   A zero value means the current digest profile for the current
   manifest stream is stable.

   A nonzero value means that the authentication is transitioning to a
   new manifest stream, and the set of digest profiles SHOULD be
   refreshed by receivers that might stay joined longer than this
   duration, and a different manifest stream SHOULD be selected, before
   this many seconds have elapsed, in order to avoid a disruption. See
   Section 2.5.

2.4.1.5. Packet Digest Count

   The count of packet digests in the manifest.

2.4.1.6. Packet Digests

   Packet digests appended one after the other, aligned to 8-bit
   boundaries with zero padding (if the bit length of the digests are
   not multiples of 8 bits).

2.5. Transitioning to Other Manifest Streams

   It's possible for multiple manifest streams authenticating the same
   data stream to be active at the same time. The different manifest
   streams can have different hash algorithms, manifest ids, and current
   packet sequence numbers for the same data stream. These result in
   different sets of packet digests for the same data packets, one
   digest per packet per digest profile.

   It's necessary sometimes to transition gracefully from one manifest
   stream to another. The Refresh Deadline field from the manifest is
   used to signal to receivers the need to transition.

   When a receiver gets a nonzero refresh deadline in a manifest the
   sender SHOULD have an alternate manifest stream ready and available,
   and the receiver SHOULD learn the alternate manifest stream, join the
   new one, and leave the old one before the number of seconds given in
   the refresh deadline. After the refresh deadline has expired, a
   manifest stream MAY end.

   The receivers SHOULD use a random value between now and one half the
   number of seconds in the deadline field, to spread the spike of load
   on the DORMS server during a large multicast event.

3. Transport Considerations

3.1. Overview

   AMBI manifests MUST be authenticated, but any transport protocol
   providing authentication can be used. This section discusses several
   viable options for the use of an authenticating transport, and some
   associated design considerations.

   TBD: extend the 'manifest-transport' in the YANG model to make an
   extensible mechanism to advertise different transport options for
   receiving manifest streams.

   TBD: add ALTA to the list when and if it gets further along
   [I-D.draft-krose-mboned-alta-01]. Sending an authenticatable
   multicast stream (instead of the below unicast-based proposals) is a
   worthwhile goal, else a 1% unicast authentication overhead becomes a
   new unicast limit to the scalability.

   TBD: add a recommendation about scalability, like with DORMS, when
   using a unicast hash stream. CDN or other kind of fanout solution
   that can scale the delivery, and still generally hit the time window.

3.2. HTTPS

   This document defines a new media type 'application/ambi' for use
   with HTTPS.

   An HTTPS stream carrying the 'application/ambi' media type is
   composed of a sequence of binary AMBI manifests. It is RECOMMENDED
   to use Chunked encoding.

   Complete packet Digests from partially received manifests MAY be used
   by the receiver for authentication, even if the full manifest is not
   yet delivered.

3.3. DTLS

   TBD: DTLS [RFC6347] can provide authentication for datagrams, so if
   manifests can be constructed to fit within datagrams, it is an
   appropriate choice. (IPSec is similar-worth adding as an option?).

   This option provides no native redundancy or retransmission, but
   packet digests can be repeated in different manifests to provide some
   resilience to loss. Lost manifests that result in the loss of blocks
   of packet digests can be expensive, since they would make received
   data packets unauthenticatable. TBD: should we therefore not support

   this case? (probably still worthwhile-the manifests can still contain
   redundant hashes)

[3.4](). **DTLS + FECFRAME**

   DTLS for manifests that do not fit into single-packet payloads can
   still be delivered by using FECFRAME [[RFC6363]()], particularly Reed-
   Solomon [[RFC6865]()] or possibly Raptor [[RFC6681]()]. This has some
   advantages compared to HTTPS because of the absence of HOL-blocking,
   while providing for tunable redundancy. This has some advantages
   relative to DTLS because of overhead reduction and non-integer
   redundancy tunability (e.g. 1.5 becomes a viable redundancy factor).

   TBD: define this method, possibly in another RFC.

[4](). **Examples**

   TBD: walk through some examples as soon as we have a build running.
   Likely to need some touching up.

[5](). **YANG Module**

[5.1](). **Tree Diagram**

   The tree diagram below follows the notation defined in [[RFC8340]()].

```
   module: ietf-ambi
     augment /dorms:metadata/dorms:sender/dorms:group/dorms:udp-stream:
       +--rw manifest-stream* [id]
          +--rw id                   uint32
          +--rw manifest-transport*    inet:uri
          +--rw hash-algorithm         iha:hash-algorithm-type
          +--rw payload-type           enumeration
          +--rw data-hold-time-ms?     uint32
          +--rw digest-hold-time-ms?   uint32
```

[5.2](). **Module**

```
   <CODE BEGINS> file ietf-ambi@2020-10-31.yang
   module ietf-ambi {
       yang-version 1.1;

       namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ambi";
       prefix "ambi";

       import ietf-dorms {
           prefix "dorms";
```

```
        reference "I-D.jholland-mboned-dorms";
    }

    import ietf-inet-types {
        prefix "inet";
        reference "RFC6991 Section 4";
    }

    import iana-hash-algs {
        prefix "iha";
        reference "draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types";
    }

    organization "IETF";

    contact
        "Author:    Jake Holland
                    <mailto:jholland@akamai.com>
        ";

    description
    "Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
     authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

     Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
     without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
     the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set
     forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
     Relating to IETF Documents
     (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

     This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
     (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself
     for full legal notices.

     The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
     NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
     'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
     described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
     they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

     This module contains the definition for the AMBI data types.
     It provides metadata for authenticating SSM channels as an
     augmentation to DORMS.";

    revision 2019-08-25 {
        description "Initial revision as an extension.";
        reference
```

```
              "";
        }

        augment
          "/dorms:metadata/dorms:sender/dorms:group/dorms:udp-stream" {
            description "Definition of the manifest stream providing
                integrity info for the data stream";

          list manifest-stream {
              key id;
              description "Definition of a manifest stream.";
              leaf id {
                  type uint32;
                  mandatory true;
                  description
                    "The Manifest ID referenced in a manifest.";
              }
              leaf-list manifest-transport {
                  type inet:uri;
                  description "A URI that provides a location for the
                      manifest stream";
              }
              leaf hash-algorithm {
                  type iha:hash-algorithm-type;
                  mandatory true;
                  description
                      "The hash algorithm for the packet hashes within
                       manifests in this stream.";
              }
              leaf payload-type {
                  type enumeration {
                      enum udp {
                        description "The hash includes only the UDP
                            payload.";
                      }
                      enum ip {
                        description "The hash includes the full IP
                            payload.";
                      }
                  }
                  mandatory true;
                  description "The contents of the payload for the
                      digest profile";
              }
              leaf data-hold-time-ms {
                  type uint32;
                  default 2000;
                  description
```

```
                     "The number of milliseconds to hold data
                      packets waiting for a corresponding digest before
                      discarding";
                }
                leaf digest-hold-time-ms {
                    type uint32;
                    default 10000;
                    description
                      "The number of milliseconds to hold packet
                       digests waiting for a corresponding data packet
                       before discarding";
                }
            }
        }
    }

    <CODE ENDS>
```

6. IANA Considerations

6.1. The YANG Module Names Registry

This document adds one YANG module to the "YANG Module Names"
registry maintained at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/yang-
parameters>. The following registrations are made, per the format in
Section 14 of [RFC6020]:

```
        name:      ietf-ambi
        namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ambi
        prefix:    ambi
        reference: I-D.draft-jholland-mboned-ambi
```

6.2. The XML Registry

This document adds the following registration to the "ns" subregistry
of the "IETF XML Registry" defined in [RFC3688], referencing this
document.

```
        URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ambi
        Registrant Contact: The IESG.
        XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
```

6.3. Media Type

TBD: Register 'application/ambi' according to advice from:
https://www.iana.org/form/media-types

TBD: check guidelines in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5226

7. Security Considerations

7.1. Predictable Packets

   Protocols that have predictable packets run the risk of offline
   attacks for hash collisions against those packets. When
   authenticating a protocol that might have predictable packets, it's
   RECOMMENDED to use a hash function secure against such attacks or to
   add content to the packets to make them unpredictable, such as an
   Authentication Header ([RFC4302]), or the addition of an ignored
   field with random content to the packet payload.

   TBD: explain attack from generating malicious packets and then
   looking for collisions, as opposed to having to generate a collision
   on packet contents that include a sequence number and then hitting a
   match.

   TBD: follow the rest of the guidelines: https://tools.ietf.org/html/
   rfc3552

8. Acknowledgements

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