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Problem Statement: Mobile IPv4 Traversal of VPN Gateways
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Abstract

Deploying Mobile-IP v4 in networks which are connected to the Internet through a VPN (Virtual Private Network) gateway presents some problems which do not currently have well-described solutions. This document aims to describe and illustrate these problems, and propose some guidelines for possible solutions.

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1. Introduction

Mobile IP [[RFC3344](#)] agents are being deployed in enterprise networks to enable mobility across wired and wireless LANs while roaming inside the enterprise Intranet. With the growing deployment of IEEE 802.11 access points ("hot spots") in public places such as hotels, airports, and convention centers, and wireless WAN data networks such as GPRS, the need for enabling mobile users to maintain their transport connections and constant reachability while connecting back to their target "home" networks protected by Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology is increasing. This implies that Mobile IP and VPN technologies have to coexist and function together in order to provide mobility and security to the enterprise mobile users.

The goal of this draft is to:

- o Identify and describe practical deployment scenarios for Mobile IP and VPN in enterprise and operator environments.
- o Identify example usage scenarios for remote users roaming outside the "home" network protected by a VPN gateway.
- o Articulate the problems resulting from Mobile IP and VPN coexistence. Specify a set of framework guidelines to evaluate proposed solutions, supporting multi-vendor seamless IPv4 mobility across IPsec-based VPN gateways.

1.1 Overview of the Problem

Real life networks typically consist of three different domains from a corporate point of view. The first domain is the Internet (i.e., the untrusted external network). The second domain is the trusted Intranet (also referred to as VPN Domain in this document). The third domain is the DMZ, which is between the Internet and the Intranet.

Access to the Intranet is typically guarded by both a firewall and a VPN device. The Intranet can only be accessed by respecting the security policies in the firewall and the VPN device.

When MIP is deployed in a corporate network behind a VPN device, roaming between these two different domains (i.e., the untrusted Internet and the trusted Intranet) becomes problematic. It would be desirable to have seamless session mobility between the two domains, because MIP was designed for session mobility regardless of the network point of attachment. Unfortunately, the current MIP standards fall short of this promise for an important customer segment, corporate users behind VPN gateways.

Because current standards do not provide for session mobility across these two domains the possibility of finding a solution to this

problem has been investigated. The goal is to provide seamless session mobility when the mobile node moves between these two domains or between subnets in either domain.

From the beginning it was also assumed that VPNs and firewalls were to be taken as more or less granted because they have much wider deployments than MIP at the present. Therefore any solutions would need to minimize impact on existing VPN and firewall deployments, related standards and "de facto" standards.

1.2 Specification of Requirements

In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

1.3 Terminology

MIPv4 Mobile IP for IPv4 [[RFC3344](#)]

MIPv6 Mobile IP for IPv6

VPN Virtual Private Network

GW Gateway

VPN Domain

 An Intranet protected by a VPN gateway.

DMZ

 (Demilitarized Zone) A small network inserted as a "neutral zone" between a company's private network and the outside public network to prevent outside users from getting direct access to the company's private network

Home Network

 A network, possibly virtual, having a network prefix matching that of a mobile node's home address.

Home Agent

 A router on a mobile node's home network which tunnels datagrams for delivery to the mobile node when it is away from home, and maintains current location information for the mobile node.

MIPv4 inside IPsec-ESP tunnel

 MIPv4 packet is encapsulated in an IPsec-ESP tunnel established between the Mobile Node and the VPN gateway.

IPsec-ESP inside MIPv4 tunnel

 IPsec-ESP packet is encapsulated in an MIPv4 tunnel established between the Mobile Node and the home agent.

2. MIP and VPN Deployment Scenarios

This section describes a set of deployment scenarios where MIP agents and VPN gateways have to coexist to provide mobility and security. The intention is to identify practical deployment scenarios for MIP and VPNs where MIP technology might be extended to solve problems resulting from the desire for co-existence.

In all scenarios, "MN" refers to a mobile node that runs both MIP and IPsec-based VPN client software. The foreign network might or might not employ a foreign agent. And, the term "Intranet" refers to a private network protected by a VPN gateway and perhaps a layer-3 transparent or non-transparent firewall. Please note that firewalls are purposely omitted from the following scenarios, because they may be installed in a number of different ways, and the fact that this draft's focus is the relationship between MIP and VPN.

Finally, the scenarios assume that encryption is not enforced inside the VPN domain because 1) the VPN domain (Intranet) is viewed as a trusted network, and users allowed inside the Intranet are also trusted 2) it is a common VPN deployment practice where the VPN is used to guard the Intranet resources from unauthorized users attached to an untrusted network, and to provide a secure communication channel for authorized users to access resources inside the Intranet from outside.

The following sub-sections introduce five representative combinations of MIPv4 HA and VPN gateway placement.

2.1 MIPv4 HA(s) Inside the Intranet behind a VPN Gateway

MIPv4 HAs are deployed inside the Intranet protected by a VPN gateway, and are not directly reachable by the MNs outside the Intranet.

This deployment scenario may not be common yet, but it is practical and becoming important as there is an increasing need for providing corporate remote users with continuous access to the Intranet resources.

2.2 VPN Gateway and MIPv4 HA(s) on the VPN domain border

A MIPv4 HA is deployed on the VPN domain border (e.g., in the DMZ) together with the VPN gateway, and it is directly reachable by MNs inside or outside the Intranet.




Figure 2

The MIPv4 HA has a public interface connected to the Internet, and a private interface attached to the Intranet. Mobile users will most likely have a virtual home network associated with the MIPv4 HA's private interface, so that the mobile users are always away from home and hence registered with the MIPv4 HA. Furthermore, in deployments where the VPN gateway and the HA are placed in a corporate DMZ, this implies that MIPv4 traffic will always be routed through the DMZ (regardless of whether MNs are located outside or inside the Intranet), which may not be acceptable by IT departments in large corporations.

This deployment can be used with two different configurations: "MIPv4 inside IPsec-ESP tunnel" and "IPsec-ESP inside MIPv4 tunnel". The "MIPv4 inside IPsec-ESP tunnel" has the same problems as the scenario of [Section 2.1](#) (namely, MIPv4 registration becomes impossible when the registration is to be done via an FA and furthermore in co-located mode, the VPN tunnel has to be re-negotiated every time the MN changes its point of attachment). The "IPsec-ESP inside MIPv4 tunnel" does not have problems described in [Section 2.1](#), however it will require some modifications to the routing logic of the MIPv4 HA or the VPN gateway.

2.3 Combined VPN Gateway and MIPv4 HA

This is similar to deployment scenario described in [Section 2.2](#), with the exception that the VPN gateway and MIPv4 HA are running on the

same physical machine.




Figure 3

Running MIPv4 HA and VPN on the same machine resolves routing related issues that exist in [Section 2.2](#) when a "IPsec-ESP inside MIPv4 tunnel" configuration is used. However, it does not promote multi-vendor interoperability in environments where MIPv4 HA and VPN technologies must be acquired from different vendors.

2.4 MIPv4 HA(s) Outside the VPN domain

In this scenario, MIPv4 HAs are deployed outside the Intranet (e.g., in an operator network), as depicted in Figure 4 below.




Figure 4

In this deployment scenario the goal is to provide remote users with continuous access to the Intranet resources while they are roaming outside the Intranet only (i.e., mobility is not supported inside the Intranet). In this case it is most practical to run IPsec-ESP inside a MIPv4 tunnel (i.e., MIPv4 tunnel end-points are the MN and the HA; the IPsec-ESP packet from the MN and to the VPN gateway is encapsulated in the MIPv4 tunnel) as the MNs can register with the HA without establishing an IPsec tunnel to the VPN gateway. This should work without any technical problems. The IPsec tunnel end-points will be the MN and the VPN gateway. The 'home network' will be a virtual home network, located at the HA, from which it is possible to reach the Corporate Intranet through the VPN gateway.

2.5 Combined VPN Gateway and MIPv4 HA(s) on the Local Link

This is similar to the deployment scenario described in [Section 2.3](#), with the difference that the VPN gateway/HA is sitting on the local link. In this the VPN gateway and HA would most naturally be co-located in the same box, although this is in no way a requirement.




Figure 5

This deployment works today without any technical problems with IPsec-ESP running inside a MIPv4 tunnel. If however MIPv4 is run inside the IPsec-ESP tunnel it has the same problems as in [Section 2.1](#) (namely, MIPv4 registration becomes impossible when the registration is to be done via an FA and furthermore in co-located mode, the VPN tunnel has to be re-negotiated every time the MN changes its point of attachment). This deployment is not common or practical for large deployments (on the order of thousands of users) because of the large and distributed security perimeter.

3. Deployment Scenarios Selection

The deployment scenarios described in [Section 2](#) were evaluated to identify the ones most in need of solving. The evaluation was done based on two main criteria: 1) Is the deployment scenario common and practical? and 2) Does the deployment scenario reveal any problems resulting from MIPv4 and VPN coexistence?

There was a consensus about importance and practicality of the scenario in [Section 2.1](#) because of rising needs to provide corporate remote users with continuous access to their Intranet resources. After analyzing each scenario one realizes that problems occurring in scenarios in [Section 2.2](#) and [Section 2.4](#) are either the same as or a subset of those in the scenario in [Section 2.1](#). Therefore, solving the scenario in [Section 2.1](#) will also solve the scenarios in [Section 2.2](#) and [Section 2.4](#). The scenarios in [Section 2.3](#) and [Section 2.5](#) do not introduce functional problems resulting from MIPv4 and VPN co-existence, hence there is no need to seek a solution. A solution for the deployment scenario in [Section 2.1](#) is therefore seen as essential, and this in turn can also be applied to solve problems in other scenarios. For the remainder of this draft, we will articulate the roaming scenarios, the problems, and the solution guidelines

relevant to the scenario in [Section 2.1](#).

4. Problem statement

This section describes roaming scenarios corresponding to the deployment scenario in [Section 2.1](#) where an MN needs to have continuous access to the Intranet resources regardless of whether it is roaming inside or outside the Intranet, and their associated problems. The scenarios are constructed based on a multi-subnetted, MIPv4-enabled Intranet (hereafter, referred to as Intranet or VPN domain) protected by an IPsec-based VPN gateway as depicted in Figure 6.




Figure 6: Intranet protected by a VPN Gateway

The Intranet, depicted in Figure 6, may include both wired (IEEE 802.3) and IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN deployments. However, it is also possible to see IEEE 802.11 deployments outside the Intranet due to the perceived lack of current 802.11 security, as depicted in Figure 7.




Figure 7: IEEE 802.11 Wireless deployment outside the home network

4.1 Registering in co-located mode

In co-located mode, the IPsec tunnel endpoints would be at the MN and the VPN gateway, which (supposing we have the scenario described in [Section 2.1](#)) results in the mobile-ip tunnel from MN to HA being encapsulated inside the IPsec tunnel. See Figure 8 below. This scenario is still possible, but has some major drawbacks.




Figure 8

The MN obtains an address at its point of attachment (via DHCP [[RFC2131](#)] or some other means), and then first sets up an IPsec tunnel to the VPN gateway, after which it can successfully register with its HA through the IPsec tunnel. The problem is that in an end-to-end security model, an IPsec tunnel that terminates at the VPN gateway must protect the IP traffic originating at the MN. As the MN's IPsec tunnel address is the address obtained at the point of

attachment, it will change during movement, and the VPN tunnel security association must be refreshed after each IP subnet handoff. This could have noticeable performance implications on real-time applications. In effect, we don't have mobility support for the tunnel endpoint changes associated with MN movements.

4.2 Registering via an FA

In the case where a mobile node is in a network where mobility support is provided through the use of an FA, and no DHCP allocated address and co-located mode is possible, we run into severe trouble. Figure 9 below illustrates this:




Figure 9

The mobile node, when arriving at this network, may have a IPsec session going with its VPN gateway. This session will not be passed through the FA as long as the MN has not registered and a mip tunnel has been set up. But the MN, which is secure inside the IPsec based VPN, will not even hear the FA advertisements. And any IPsec traffic from the Intranet (via the VPN gateway and IPsec tunnel) will not be understood by the FA. Simply put, you could say that the FA needs to see the mip tunnel outermost, while the VPN-GW needs to see the IPsec tunnel outermost. Or in more details:

Firstly, the MN must have a IPsec tunnel established with the VPN-GW in order to reach the HA, which places the IPsec tunnel outside the mip traffic between MN and HA. The FA (which is likely in a different administrative domain) cannot decrypt MIPv4 packets between the MN and the VPN gateway, and will consequently be not able to relay the MIPv4 packets. This is because the MIPv4 headers (which the FA should be able to interpret) will be encrypted and protected by IPsec.

Secondly, when the MN is communicating with the VPN-GW, an explicit bypass policy for MIP packets is required, so that the MN can hear FA advertisements and send and receive MIP registration packets. Although not a problem in principle, there may be practical problems when VPN and MIP clients from different vendors are used.

The use of a 'trusted FA' has been suggested in this scenario; meaning an FA which is actually a combined VPN GW and FA. The scenario will work fine in this case; effectively we are then operating within the VPN established between the two VPN gateways, and the case is analogous to deploying mobile-ip within a corporate Intranet which is not physically disjoint. See Figure 10 below. However, we cannot expect that e.g. wireless hot-spots or CDMA 2000 FAs will have VPN gateways with security associations with any given corporate network, so this is not particularly realistic in the general mobility case.




Figure 10

Furthermore, this solution would leave the traffic between FA and MN unprotected, and as this link in particular may be a wireless link, this is clearly undesirable.

4.3 Summary: MIP Incompatibilities with IPsec-based VPN Gateways

An MN roaming outside the Intranet has to establish an IPsec tunnel to its home VPN gateway first, in order to be able to register with its home agent. This is because the MN cannot reach its HA (inside the private protected network) directly from the outside. This implies that the MIPv4 traffic from the MN to a node inside the Intranet is forced to run inside an IPsec tunnel, and hence will not be in the clear. This in turn leads to two distinct problems depending on whether the MN uses co-located or non co-located modes to register with its HA.

5. Solution Guidelines

This section describes guidelines for a solution to MIPv4 traversal across VPN gateways.

5.1 Preservation of Existing VPN Infrastructure

- o The solution **MUST** preserve the investment in existing VPN gateways.
- o The solution **MUST** provide security which is not inferior to what is already provided to existing "nomadic computing" remote access users, i.e. for confidentiality, authentication, message integrity, protection against replay attacks and related security services.

5.2 Software Upgrades to Existing VPN Client and Gateways

- o The solution **SHOULD** minimize changes to existing VPN client/gateway software.

5.3 IPsec Protocol

- o The solution **SHOULD NOT** require any changes to existing IPsec or key exchange standard protocols implemented by VPN gateways.
- o The solution **SHOULD NOT** require that the VPN gateway or the VPN client implement any new protocols in addition to the existing standard protocols.

5.4 Multi-Vendor Interoperability

- o The solution **MUST** provide multi-vendor interoperability, where MIPv4 mobility agents, mobility clients (MN), VPN server, and VPN client solutions may come from four different vendors. This is typical for medium and large enterprises which purchase and deploy best-of-breed multi-vendor solutions for IP routing, VPNs, firewalls etc.

5.5 MIPv4 Protocol

- o The solution **MUST** adhere to MIPv4 protocol [[RFC3344](#)]. That is, the solution **MUST NOT** impose any changes that violates MIPv4 protocol.
- o The solution **MAY** introduce new extensions to MIPv4 nodes per guidelines specified in the MIPv4 protocol [[RFC3344](#)]. However, it is highly desirable to avoid any changes to MIPv4 mobility agents such as the FA and HA in order to overcome barriers to deployment.

- o The solution MAY require more than one instance of MIPv4 running in parallel (multiple encapsulation).

5.6 Handoff Overhead

- o It is imperative to keep the key management overhead down to a minimum, in order to support fast handoffs across IP subnets. Hence, the solution MUST propose a mechanism to avoid or minimize IPsec tunnel SA renegotiation and IKE renegotiation as the MN changes its current point of network attachment.

5.7 Scalability, Availability, Reliability, and Performance

- o The solution complexity MUST increase at most linearly with the number of MNs registered and accessing resources inside the Intranet.
- o The solution MAY introduce additional header or tunnelling overhead if needed.

5.8 Functional Entities

- o The solution MAY introduce new MIPv4 compliant functional entities.

5.9 Implications of Intervening NAT Gateways

- o The solution MUST be able to leverage the existing MIPv4 and IPsec NAT traversal solutions [[RFC3519](#)][IPSEC-NAT][[IKE-NAT](#)].

5.10 Security Requirements

- o The solution MUST NOT introduce any new vulnerabilities to the MIPv4 or IPsec as specified in related RFCs.

6. Security Considerations

This document describes an existing problem and proposes guidelines for possible solutions; as such its security implications are indirect, through the guidelines it proposes for the solutions. [Section 5.10](#) gives the relevant security requirements.

7. Acknowledgements

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