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**Updates to [RFC 4572](#)
draft-ietf-mmusic-4572-update-06.txt**

Abstract

This document updates [RFC 4572](#) by clarifying the usage of multiple SDP 'fingerprint' attributes with a single TLS connection. The document also updates the preferred cipher suite with a stronger cipher suite, and removes the requirement to use the same hash function for calculating a certificate fingerprint that is used to calculate the certificate signature.

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Table of Contents

1.	Introduction	2
2.	Conventions	3
3.	Update to RFC 4572	3
3.1.	Update to the sixth paragraph of section 5	3
3.2.	New paragraphs to the end of section 5	4
4.	Security Considerations	5
5.	IANA Considerations	6
6.	Acknowledgements	6
7.	Change Log	6
8.	Normative References	7
	Author's Address	8

[1.](#) Introduction

[RFC 4572](#) [[RFC4572](#)] specifies how to establish Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections using the Session Description Protocol (SDP) [[RFC4566](#)].

[RFC 4572](#) defines the SDP 'fingerprint' attribute, which is used to carry a secure hash value (fingerprint) associated with a certificate. However, [RFC 4572](#) is currently unclear on whether multiple 'fingerprint' attributes can be associated with a single SDP media description ("m= line") [[RFC4566](#)], and the associated semantics. Multiple fingerprints are needed if an endpoints wants to provide fingerprints associated with multiple certificates. For example, with RTP-based media, an endpoint might use different certificates for RTP and RTCP.

[RFC 4572](#) also specifies a preferred cipher suite. However, the currently preferred cipher suite is considered outdated, and the preference needs to be updated.

[RFC 4572](#) mandates that the hash function used to calculate the fingerprint is the same hash function used to calculate the certificate signature. That requirement might prevent usage of newer, stronger and more collision-safe hash functions for calculating certificate fingerprints. This change also requires that multiple 'fingerprint' attributes can be associated with a single "m=" line, so that implementations are able to provide fingerprints calculated using updated hash functions alongside those that are needed to interoperate with existing implementations.

This document updates [RFC 4572](#) [[RFC4572](#)] by clarifying the usage of multiple SDP 'fingerprint' attributes. It is clarified that multiple 'fingerprint' attributes can be used to carry fingerprints, calculated using different hash functions, associated with a given certificate, and to carry fingerprints associated with multiple certificates. The fingerprint matching procedure, when multiple fingerprints are provided, are also clarified. The document also updates the preferred cipher suite with a stronger cipher suite, and removes the requirement to use the same hash function for calculating a certificate fingerprint and certificate signature.

NOTE: Even though this document updates the procedures in [RFC 4572](#), it does not make existing implementations non-compliant with [RFC 4572](#). The updated procedures in this document have been defined in order to be backward compatible with the procedures in [RFC 4572](#).

[2.](#) Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

[3.](#) Update to [RFC 4572](#)

This section updates [section 5 of RFC 4572](#).

[3.1.](#) Update to the sixth paragraph of [section 5](#)

OLD TEXT:

A certificate fingerprint MUST be computed using the same one-way hash function as is used in the certificate's signature algorithm. (This ensures that the security properties required for the certificate also apply for the fingerprint. It also guarantees that the fingerprint will be usable by the other endpoint, so long as the certificate itself is.) Following [RFC 3279](#) [7] as updated by [RFC 4055](#) [9], therefore, the defined hash functions are 'SHA-1' [11] [19], 'SHA-224' [11], 'SHA-256' [11], 'SHA-384' [11], 'SHA-512' [11], 'MD5' [12], and 'MD2' [13], with 'SHA-1' preferred. A new IANA registry of Hash Function Textual Names, specified in [Section 8](#), allows for addition of future tokens, but they may only be added if they are included in RFCs that update or obsolete [RFC 3279](#) [7]. Self-signed certificates (for which legacy certificates are not a consideration) MUST use one of the FIPS 180 algorithms (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512) as their signature algorithm, and thus also MUST use it to calculate certificate fingerprints.

NEW TEXT:

Following [RFC 3279](#) [7] as updated by [RFC 4055](#) [9], therefore, the defined hash functions are 'SHA-1' [11] [19], 'SHA-224' [11], 'SHA-256' [11], 'SHA-384' [11], 'SHA-512' [11], 'MD5' [12], and 'MD2' [13], with 'SHA-256' preferred. A new IANA registry of Hash Function Textual Names, specified in [Section 8](#), allows for addition of future tokens, but they may only be added if they are included in RFCs that update or obsolete [RFC 3279](#) [7].

[3.2.](#) New paragraphs to the end of [section 5](#)

NEW TEXT:

Multiple SDP fingerprint attributes can be associated with an m-line. This can occur if multiple fingerprints have been calculated for a certificate using different hash functions. It can also occur if one or more fingerprints associated with multiple certificates have been calculated. This might be needed if multiple certificates will be used for media associated with an m-line (e.g. if separate certificates are used for RTP and RTCP), or where it is not known which certificate will be used when the fingerprints are exchanged. In such cases, one or more fingerprints MUST be calculated for each possible certificate. An endpoint MUST, as a minimum, calculate a fingerprint using both the 'SHA-256' hash function algorithm and the hash function used to generate the signature on the certificate for each possible certificate. Including the hash from the signature algorithm ensures interoperability with strict implementations of [RFC 4572](#). Either of these fingerprints MAY be omitted if the endpoint includes a hash with a stronger hash algorithm that it knows that the peer supports, if it is known that the peer does not support the hash algorithm, or if local policy mandates use of stronger algorithms.

If fingerprints associated with multiple certificates are calculated, the same set of hash functions MUST be used to calculate fingerprints for each certificate associated with the m-line.

For each used certificate, an endpoint MUST be able to match at least one fingerprint, calculated using the hash function that the endpoint supports and considers most secure, with the used certificate. If the checked fingerprint does not match the used certificate, the endpoint MUST NOT establish the TLS connection. In addition, the endpoint MAY also check fingerprints calculated using other hash functions that it has received for a match. For each hash function checked, one of the received fingerprints calculated using the hash function MUST match the used certificate.

NOTE: The SDP fingerprint attribute does not contain a reference to a specific certificate. Endpoints need to compare the fingerprint with a certificate hash in order to look for a match.

[4.](#) Security Considerations

This document improves security. It updates the preferred hash function cipher suite from SHA-1 to SHA-256. By clarifying the usage and handling of multiple fingerprints, the document also enables hash

agility, and incremental deployment of newer, and more secure, cipher suites.

5. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to add a reference to this document for the att-field (both session and media level) registration "fingerprint" in Session Description Protocol (SDP) Parameters registry.

6. Acknowledgements

Martin Thomson, Paul Kyzivat, Jonathan Lennox and Roman Shpount provided valuable comments and input on this document.

7. Change Log

[RFC EDITOR NOTE: Please remove this section when publishing]

Changes from [draft-ietf-mmusic-4572-update-05](#)

- o Added a requirement to generate a fingerprint that matches the signature.
- o Added text clarifying that updates do not make existing implementations non-compliant with [RFC 4572](#).
- o IANA Considerations text added.

Changes from [draft-ietf-mmusic-4572-update-04](#)

- o Removed previously added requirement that endpoint must calculate at least one fingerprint using a hash function that was also used by the peer.

Changes from [draft-ietf-mmusic-4572-update-03](#)

- o Mandatory (except in specific situations) to provide a fingerprint calculated using SHA-256.
- o When an endpoint receives fingerprints from its peer, the endpoint must (except in specific situations) calculate at least one fingerprint using a hash function that was also used by the peer.

Changes from [draft-ietf-mmusic-4572-update-02](#)

- o Editorial fixes based on comments from Martin Thomson.
- o Non-used references removed.

Changes from [draft-ietf-mmusic-4572-update-01](#)

- o Changes based on comments from Martin Thomson.
- o - Editorial fixes
- o Changes in handling of multiple fingerprints.
- o - Sender must send same set of hash functions for each offered certificate.
- o - Receiver must check the hash function it considers most secure for a match. It may check other hash functions.

Changes from [draft-ietf-mmusic-4572-update-00](#)

- o Changes in handling of multiple fingerprints.
- o - Number of fingerprints calculated for each certificate does not have to match.
- o - Clarified that receiver shall check fingerprints using hash algorithms it considers safe.
- o - Additional text added to security considerations section.

Changes from [draft-holmberg-mmusic-4572-update-01](#)

- o Adopted WG document ([draft-ietf-mmusic-4572-update-00](#)) submitted.
- o IANA considerations section added.

8. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.
- [RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session Description Protocol", [RFC 4566](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC4566, July 2006, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566>>.
- [RFC4572] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)", [RFC 4572](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC4572, July 2006, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4572>>.

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