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**MPLS-TP Security Framework**  
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Abstract

This document provides a security framework for Multiprotocol Label Switching Transport Profile (MPLS-TP). MPLS-TP extends MPLS technologies and introduces new OAM capabilities, a transport-oriented path protection mechanism, and strong emphasis on static provisioning supported by network management systems. This document addresses the security aspects relevant in the context of MPLS-TP specifically. It describes potential security threats, security requirements for MPLS-TP, and mitigation procedures for MPLS-TP networks and MPLS-TP interconnection to other MPLS and GMPLS networks. This document is built on [RFC5920](#) "MPLS and GMPLS MPLS and GMPLS security framework" by providing additional security considerations which are applicable to the MPLS-TP extensions. All the security considerations from [RFC5920](#) are assumed to apply.

This document is a product of a joint Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) / International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) effort to include an MPLS Transport Profile within the IETF MPLS and PWE3 architectures to support the capabilities and functionality of a packet transport network.

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## **1. Introduction**

This document provides a security framework for Multiprotocol Label Switching Transport Profile (MPLS-TP).

As defined in MPLS-TP Requirements [[RFC5654](#)] and MPLS-TP Framework [[RFC5921](#)], MPLS-TP uses a subset of MPLS features and introduces extensions to reflect the characteristics of the transport technology. The additional functionalities include in-band OAM, transport-oriented path protection and recovery mechanisms, and new OAM capabilities developed for MPLS-TP but apply to general MPLS and GMPLS. There is strong emphasis in MPLS-TP on static provisioning support through network management systems (NMS) or Operation Support Systems (OSS).

This document is built on [RFC 5920](#) by providing additional security considerations which are applicable to the MPLS-TP extensions. The security models, threats, requirements, and defense techniques previously defined in [[RFC5920](#)] are assumed to apply to general aspect of MPLS-TP.

This document is a product of a joint Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) / International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) effort to include an MPLS Transport Profile within the IETF MPLS and PWE3 architectures to support the capabilities and functionality of a packet transport network.

Readers can refer to [[RFC5654](#)] and [[RFC5921](#)] for MPLS-TP terminologies, and [[RFC5920](#)] for security terminologies which are relevant to MPLS and GMPLS.

## **2. Security Reference Models**

This section defines reference models for security in MPLS-TP networks.

The models are built on the architecture of MPLS-TP defined in [[RFC5921](#)]. The placement of Service Provider (SP) boundaries plays important role in determining the security models for any particular deployment.

This document defines a trusted zone as being where a single SP has total operational control over that part of the network. A primary concern is about security aspects that relate to breaches of security from the "outside" of a trusted zone to the "inside" of this zone.

### **2.1. Security Reference Model 1**



In reference model 1, a single SP has total control of the PE/T-PE to PE/T-PE part of the MPLS-TP network.

Security reference model 1(a) An MPLS-TP network with Single Segment Pseudowire (SS-PW) from PE to PE. The trusted zone is PE1 to PE2 as illustrated in Figure 1.








Figure 1. MPLS-TP Security Model 1(a)

Security reference model 1(b)

An MPLS-TP network with Multi-Segment Pseudowire (MS-PW) from T-PE to T-PE. The trusted zone is T-PE1 to T-PE2 in Figure 2.




Figure 2. MPLS-TP Security Model 1(b)



**2.2. Security Reference Model 2**

In reference model 2, a single SP does not have total control of the PE/T-PE to PE/T-PE part of the MPLS-TP network. S-PE and T-PE may be under the control of different SPs, or their customers or may not be trusted for some other reason. The MPLS-TP network is not contained within a single trusted zone.

Security Reference Model 2(a)

An MPLS-TP network with Multi-Segment Pseudowire (MS-PW) from T-PE to T-PE. The trusted zone is T-PE1 to S-PE, as illustrated in Figure 3.




Figure 3. MPLS-TP Security Model 2(a)

Security Reference Model 2(b)

An MPLS-TP network with Multi-Segment Pseudowire (MS-PW) from T-PE to T-PE. The trusted zone is the S-PE, as illustrated in Figure 4.





In general, the boundaries of a trusted zone must be carefully defined when analyzing the security properties of each individual network. The security boundaries determine which reference model

should be applied to given network topology.

### **3. Security Threats**

This section discuss various network security threats which are to MPLS-TP and may endanger MPLS-TP networks.

A successful attack on a particular MPLS-TP network or on a SP's MPLS-TP infrastructure may cause one or more adverse effects.

Attacks to GAL or G-ACh may include:

- GAL or BFD label manipulation, which includes insertion of false labels, messages modification, deletion, or replay.
- DoS attack through in-band OAM G-ACh/GAL and BFD messages.

These attacks can cause unauthorized protection switchover, inability to restore, or loss of network connectivity.

When a NMS is used for LSP setup, the attacks to NMS can cause the above effect as well. Although this is not unique to MPLS-TP, but MPLS-TP network can be particularly venerable as static provisioning through NMS is a commonly used model.

Observation (including traffic pattern analysis), modification, or deletion of a provider's or user's data, as well as replay or insertion of inauthentic data into a provider's or user's data stream. These types of attacks apply to MPLS-TP traffic regardless of how the LSP or PW is set up in a similar way to how they apply to MPLS traffic regardless how the LSP is set up.

The threats may be resulting from malicious behavior or accidental errors. For example: Users of the MPLS-TP network may attack the network or other users; employees of the MPLS-TP operators, especially people who operate the NMS, attackers who obtain physical access to a MPLS-TP SP's site; Other SPs in the case of MPLS-TP inter-provider connection.

### **4. Defensive Techniques**

The defensive techniques presented in this document and in [[RFC5920](#)] are intended to describe methods by which some security threats can be addressed. They are not intended as requirements for all MPLS-TP deployments. The specific operational environment determines the security requirements for any instance of MPLS-TP. Therefore, protocol designers should provide a full set of security capabilities, which can be selected and used where appropriate. The





MPLS-TP provider should determine the applicability of these techniques to the provider's specific service offerings, and the end user may wish to assess the value of these techniques to the user's service requirements.

The techniques discussed here include entity authentication for identity verification, encryption for confidentiality, message integrity and replay detection to ensure the validity of message streams, network-based access controls such as packet filtering and firewalls, host-based access controls, isolation, aggregation, protection against denial of service, and event logging. Where these techniques apply to MPLS and GMPLS in general, they are described in [Section 5.2 of \[RFC5920\]](#). The remainder of this section covers aspects that apply particularly to MPLS-TP.

- Use of Isolated Infrastructure for MPLS-TP

This is one way to protect the infrastructure used for support of MPLS-TP to separate the resources for support of MPLS-TP services from the resources used for other purposes. For example, in security model 2 ([Section 2.2](#)), the potential risk of attacks on the S-PE or T-PE in the trusted zone may be reduced by using non-IP-based communication paths.

- Verification of Connectivity

To protect against deliberate or accidental disconnection, mechanisms can be put in place to verify both end-to-end connectivity and segment-by-segment resources. These mechanisms can trace the routes of LSPs in both the control plane and the data plane. Note that the connectivity verification are now developed for general MPLS networks as well.

The defense techniques that apply generally to MPLS/GMPLS are not detailed here, for example: 1) Authentication: including Management System Authentication, Peer-to-Peer Authentication, Cryptographic Techniques for Authenticating Identity; 2) Access Control Techniques; 3) Use of Aggregated Infrastructure; 4) Use of Aggregated Infrastructure; 5) Mitigation of Denial of Service Attacks; 6) Monitoring, Detection, and Reporting of Security Attacks. Please refer to [\[RFC5920\]](#) for details.

## **5. Security Considerations**

Security considerations constitute the sole subject of this document and hence are discussed throughout.

This document evaluates MPLS-TP specific security risks and



mitigation mechanisms which may be used to counter the potential threats. All of the techniques presented involve mature and widely implemented technologies that are practical to implement. It is meant

to assist equipment vendors and service providers, who must ultimately decide what threats to protect against in any given configuration or service offering from a customer's perspective as well as from a service provider's perspective.

## **6. IANA Considerations**

This document contains no new IANA considerations.

## **7. Acknowledgements**

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