

Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography
draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-08

Abstract

This document defines YANG identities, typedefs, the groupings useful for cryptographic applications.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.

Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in progress. Please apply the following replacements:

- o "XXXX" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft

Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:

- o "2019-06-17" --> the publication date of this draft

The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:

- o [Appendix B](#). Change Log

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

This document defines a YANG 1.1 [\[RFC7950\]](#) module specifying identities, typedefs, and groupings useful for cryptography.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [\[RFC2119\]](#) [\[RFC8174\]](#) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. The Crypto Types Module

2.1. Tree Diagram

This section provides a tree diagram [\[RFC8340\]](#) for the "ietf-crypto-types" module. Only the groupings as represented, as tree diagrams have no means to represent identities or typedefs.

module: ietf-crypto-types

```

grouping symmetric-key-grouping:
+---- algorithm      identityref
+---- (key-type)
+--:(key)
| +---- key?      binary
+--:(hidden-key)
+---- hidden-key?  empty
grouping public-key-grouping:
+---- algorithm      asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref
+---- public-key      binary
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping:
+---- algorithm      asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref
+---- public-key      binary
+---- (private-key-type)
+--:(private-key)
| +---- private-key?  binary
+--:(hidden-private-key)
+---- hidden-private-key?  empty
grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping:
+---- cert?          trust-anchor-cert-cms
+---n certificate-expiration
+--ro expiration-date  ietf-yang-types:date-and-time

```



```
grouping trust-anchor-certs-grouping:
  +---- cert*                               trust-anchor-cert-cms
  +---n certificate-expiration
    +--ro expiration-date ietf-yang-types:date-and-time
grouping end-entity-cert-grouping:
  +---- cert?                               end-entity-cert-cms
  +---n certificate-expiration
    +--ro expiration-date ietf-yang-types:date-and-time
grouping end-entity-certs-grouping:
  +---- cert*                               end-entity-cert-cms
  +---n certificate-expiration
    +--ro expiration-date ietf-yang-types:date-and-time
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping:
  +---- algorithm
  |   asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref
  +---- public-key                           binary
  +---- (private-key-type)
  |   +---:(private-key)
  |   |   +---- private-key? binary
  |   |   +---:(hidden-private-key)
  |   |   +---- hidden-private-key? empty
  +---- cert?                               end-entity-cert-cms
  +---n certificate-expiration
    +--ro expiration-date ietf-yang-types:date-and-time
  +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
    +---- input
    |   +---w subject binary
    |   +---w attributes? binary
    +---- output
    |   +--ro certificate-signing-request binary
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping:
  +---- algorithm
  |   asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref
  +---- public-key                           binary
  +---- (private-key-type)
  |   +---:(private-key)
  |   |   +---- private-key? binary
  |   |   +---:(hidden-private-key)
  |   |   +---- hidden-private-key? empty
  +---- certificates
  |   +---- certificate* [name]
  |   |   +---- name string
  |   |   +---- cert? end-entity-cert-cms
  |   +---n certificate-expiration
  |   |   +--ro expiration-date ietf-yang-types:date-and-time
  +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
    +---- input
    |   +---w subject binary
```



```
| +---w attributes?   binary
+---- output
  +--ro certificate-signing-request   binary
```

2.2. YANG Module

This module has normative references to [\[RFC2404\]](#), [\[RFC3565\]](#), [\[RFC3686\]](#), [\[RFC4106\]](#), [\[RFC4253\]](#), [\[RFC4279\]](#), [\[RFC4309\]](#), [\[RFC4494\]](#), [\[RFC4543\]](#), [\[RFC4868\]](#), [\[RFC5280\]](#), [\[RFC5652\]](#), [\[RFC5656\]](#), [\[RFC6187\]](#), [\[RFC6991\]](#), [\[RFC7919\]](#), [\[RFC8268\]](#), [\[RFC8332\]](#), [\[RFC8341\]](#), [\[RFC8422\]](#), [\[RFC8446\]](#), and [\[ITU.X690.2015\]](#).

This module has an informational reference to [\[RFC2986\]](#), [\[RFC3174\]](#), [\[RFC4493\]](#), [\[RFC5915\]](#), [\[RFC6125\]](#), [\[RFC6234\]](#), [\[RFC6239\]](#), [\[RFC6507\]](#), [\[RFC8017\]](#), [\[RFC8032\]](#), [\[RFC8439\]](#).

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-crypto-types@2019-06-17.yang"

```
module ietf-crypto-types {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types";
  prefix ct;

  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix yang;
    reference
      "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
  }

  import ietf-netconf-acm {
    prefix nacm;
    reference
      "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
  }

  organization
    "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

  contact
    "WG Web:  <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
    WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
    Author:   Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
    Author:   Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>;

  description
    "This module defines common YANG types for cryptographic
    applications."
```


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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX (<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX>); see the RFC itself for full legal notices.;

The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) ([RFC 2119](#)) ([RFC 8174](#)) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";

```
revision 2019-06-17 {
  description
    "Initial version";
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
}
```

```
/* *****
/* Identities for Hash Algorithms */
/* *****
```

```
identity hash-algorithm {
  description
    "A base identity for hash algorithm verification.";
}
```

```
identity sha-224 {
  base hash-algorithm;
  description
    "The SHA-224 algorithm.";
  reference
    "RFC 6234: US Secure Hash Algorithms.";
}
```

```
identity sha-256 {
  base hash-algorithm;
```



```
    description
      "The SHA-256 algorithm.";
    reference
      "RFC 6234: US Secure Hash Algorithms.";
  }

  identity sha-384 {
    base hash-algorithm;
    description
      "The SHA-384 algorithm.";
    reference
      "RFC 6234: US Secure Hash Algorithms.";
  }

  identity sha-512 {
    base hash-algorithm;
    description
      "The SHA-512 algorithm.";
    reference
      "RFC 6234: US Secure Hash Algorithms.";
  }

  /******
  /* Identities for Asymmetric Key Algorithms */
  /******

  identity asymmetric-key-algorithm {
    description
      "Base identity from which all asymmetric key
      encryption Algorithm.";
  }

  identity rsa1024 {
    base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
    description
      "The RSA algorithm using a 1024-bit key.";
    reference
      "RFC 8017:
      PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
  }

  identity rsa2048 {
    base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
    description
      "The RSA algorithm using a 2048-bit key.";
    reference
      "RFC 8017:
      PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
```



```
}

identity rsa3072 {
  base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
  description
    "The RSA algorithm using a 3072-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC 8017:
      PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
}

identity rsa4096 {
  base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
  description
    "The RSA algorithm using a 4096-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC 8017:
      PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
}

identity rsa7680 {
  base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
  description
    "The RSA algorithm using a 7680-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC 8017:
      PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
}

identity rsa15360 {
  base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
  description
    "The RSA algorithm using a 15360-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC 8017:
      PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
}

identity secp192r1 {
  base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
  description
    "The ECDSA algorithm using a NIST P192 Curve.";
  reference
    "RFC 6090:
      Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms.
    RFC 5480:
      Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
```



```
identity secp224r1 {
  base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
  description
    "The ECDSA algorithm using a NIST P224 Curve.";
  reference
    "RFC 6090:
    Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms.
    RFC 5480:
    Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}

identity secp256r1 {
  base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
  description
    "The ECDSA algorithm using a NIST P256 Curve.";
  reference
    "RFC 6090:
    Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms.
    RFC 5480:
    Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}

identity secp384r1 {
  base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
  description
    "The ECDSA algorithm using a NIST P384 Curve.";
  reference
    "RFC 6090:
    Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms.
    RFC 5480:
    Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}

identity secp521r1 {
  base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
  description
    "The ECDSA algorithm using a NIST P521 Curve.";
  reference
    "RFC 6090:
    Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms.
    RFC 5480:
    Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}

/*****/
/*  Identities for MAC Algorithms  */
/*****/
```



```
identity mac-algorithm {
  description
    "A base identity for mac generation.";
}

identity hmac-sha1 {
  base mac-algorithm;
  description
    "Generating MAC using SHA1 hash function";
  reference
    "RFC 3174: US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)";
}

identity hmac-sha1-96 {
  base mac-algorithm;
  description
    "Generating MAC using SHA1 hash function";
  reference
    "RFC 2404: The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH";
}

identity hmac-sha2-224 {
  base mac-algorithm;
  description
    "Generating MAC using SHA2 hash function";
  reference
    "RFC 6234:
      US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and
      HKDF)";
}

identity hmac-sha2-256 {
  base mac-algorithm;
  description
    "Generating MAC using SHA2 hash function";
  reference
    "RFC 6234:
      US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and
      HKDF)";
}

identity hmac-sha2-256-128 {
  base mac-algorithm;
  description
    "Generating a 256 bits MAC using SHA2 hash function and
      truncate it to 128 bits";
  reference
    "RFC 4868:";
```



```
        Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512
        with IPsec";
    }

    identity hmac-sha2-384 {
        base mac-algorithm;
        description
            "Generating MAC using SHA2 hash function";
        reference
            "RFC 6234:
            US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and
            HKDF)";
    }

    identity hmac-sha2-384-192 {
        base mac-algorithm;
        description
            "Generating a 384 bits MAC using SHA2 hash function and
            truncate it to 192 bits";
        reference
            "RFC 4868:
            Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with
            IPsec";
    }

    identity hmac-sha2-512 {
        base mac-algorithm;
        description
            "Generating MAC using SHA2 hash function";
        reference
            "RFC 6234:
            US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and
            HKDF)";
    }

    identity hmac-sha2-512-256 {
        base mac-algorithm;
        description
            "Generating a 512 bits MAC using SHA2 hash function and
            truncating it to 256 bits";
        reference
            "RFC 4868:
            Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with
            IPsec";
    }

    identity aes-128-gmac {
        base mac-algorithm;
```



```
description
  "Generating MAC using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
  Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) as a mechanism to
  provide data origin authentication";
reference
  "RFC 4543:
  The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in
  IPsec ESP and AH";
}

identity aes-192-gmac {
  base mac-algorithm;
  description
    "Generating MAC using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
    Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) as a mechanism to
    provide data origin authentication";
  reference
    "RFC 4543:
    The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in
    IPsec ESP and AH";
}

identity aes-256-gmac {
  base mac-algorithm;
  description
    "Generating MAC using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
    Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) as a mechanism to
    provide data origin authentication";
  reference
    "RFC 4543:
    The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in
    IPsec ESP and AH";
}

identity aes-cmac-96 {
  base mac-algorithm;
  description
    "Generating MAC using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
    Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)";
  reference
    "RFC 4494: The AES-CMAC-96 Algorithm and its Use with IPsec";
}

identity aes-cmac-128 {
  base mac-algorithm;
  description
    "Generating MAC using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
    Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)";
```



```
    reference
      "RFC 4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm";
  }

  /*****
  /*  Identities for Encryption Algorithms  */
  *****/

  identity encryption-algorithm {
    description
      "A base identity for encryption algorithm.";
  }

  identity aes-128-cbc {
    base encryption-algorithm;
    description
      "Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CBC mode with a key
       length of 128 bits";
    reference
      "RFC 3565:
       Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Encryption
       Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
  }

  identity aes-192-cbc {
    base encryption-algorithm;
    description
      "Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CBC mode with a key
       length of 192 bits";
    reference
      "RFC 3565:
       Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Encryption
       Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
  }

  identity aes-256-cbc {
    base encryption-algorithm;
    description
      "Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CBC mode with a key
       length of 256 bits";
    reference
      "RFC 3565:
       Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Encryption
       Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
  }

  identity aes-128-ctr {
    base encryption-algorithm;
```



```
    description
      "Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CTR mode with a key
       length of 128 bits";
    reference
      "RFC 3686:
       Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode with
       IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)";
  }

  identity aes-192-ctr {
    base encryption-algorithm;
    description
      "Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CTR mode with a key
       length of 192 bits";
    reference
      "RFC 3686:
       Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode with
       IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)";
  }

  identity aes-256-ctr {
    base encryption-algorithm;
    description
      "Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CTR mode with a key
       length of 256 bits";
    reference
      "RFC 3686:
       Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode with
       IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)";
  }

  /*****
  /*  Identities for Encryption and MAC Algorithms  */
  /*****/

  identity encryption-and-mac-algorithm {
    description
      "A base identity for encryption and MAC algorithm.";
  }

  identity aes-128-ccm {
    base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
    description
      "Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CCM mode with a key
       length of 128 bits; it can also be used for generating MAC";
    reference
      "RFC 4309:
       Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM Mode with
```



```
        IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)";
    }

    identity aes-192-ccm {
        base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
        description
            "Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CCM mode with a key
            length of 192 bits; it can also be used for generating MAC";
        reference
            "RFC 4309:
            Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM Mode with
            IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)";
    }

    identity aes-256-ccm {
        base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
        description
            "Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CCM mode with a key
            length of 256 bits; it can also be used for generating MAC";
        reference
            "RFC 4309:
            Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM Mode with
            IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)";
    }

    identity aes-128-gcm {
        base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
        description
            "Encrypt message with AES algorithm in GCM mode with a key
            length of 128 bits; it can also be used for generating MAC";
        reference
            "RFC 4106:
            The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating
            Security Payload (ESP)";
    }

    identity aes-192-gcm {
        base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
        description
            "Encrypt message with AES algorithm in GCM mode with a key
            length of 192 bits; it can also be used for generating MAC";
        reference
            "RFC 4106:
            The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating
            Security Payload (ESP)";
    }

    identity mac-aes-256-gcm {
```



```
    base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
    description
      "Encrypt message with AES algorithm in GCM mode with a key
       length of 128 bits; it can also be used for generating MAC";
    reference
      "RFC 4106:
       The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating
       Security Payload (ESP)";
  }

  identity chacha20-poly1305 {
    base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
    description
      "Encrypt message with chacha20 algorithm and generate MAC with
       POLY1305; it can also be used for generating MAC";
    reference
      "RFC 8439: ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols";
  }

  /* ***** */
  /* Identities for signature algorithm */
  /* ***** */

  identity signature-algorithm {
    description
      "A base identity for asymmetric key encryption algorithm.";
  }

  identity dsa-sha1 {
    base signature-algorithm;
    description
      "The signature algorithm using DSA algorithm with SHA1 hash
       algorithm";
    reference
      "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
  }

  identity rsassa-pkcs1-sha1 {
    base signature-algorithm;
    description
      "The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with the SHA1
       hash algorithm.";
    reference
      "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
  }

  identity rsassa-pkcs1-sha256 {
    base signature-algorithm;
```



```
description
  "The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with the
  SHA256 hash algorithm.";
reference
  "RFC 8332:
  Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in the Secure Shell
  (SSH) Protocol
  RFC 8446:
  The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity rsassa-pkcs1-sha384 {
  base signature-algorithm;
  description
    "The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with the
    SHA384 hash algorithm.";
  reference
    "RFC 8446:
    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity rsassa-pkcs1-sha512 {
  base signature-algorithm;
  description
    "The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with the
    SHA512 hash algorithm.";
  reference
    "RFC 8332:
    Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in the Secure Shell
    (SSH) Protocol
    RFC 8446:
    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity rsassa-pss-rsae-sha256 {
  base signature-algorithm;
  description
    "The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS with mask generation
    function 1 and SHA256 hash algorithm. If the public key is
    carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the rsaEncryption
    OID";
  reference
    "RFC 8446:
    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity rsassa-pss-rsae-sha384 {
  base signature-algorithm;
```



```
description
  "The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS with mask generation
  function 1 and SHA384 hash algorithm. If the public key is
  carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the rsaEncryption
  OID";
reference
  "RFC 8446:
  The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity rsassa-pss-rsae-sha512 {
  base signature-algorithm;
  description
    "The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS with mask generation
    function 1 and SHA512 hash algorithm. If the public key is
    carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the rsaEncryption
    OID";
  reference
    "RFC 8446:
    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity rsassa-pss-pss-sha256 {
  base signature-algorithm;
  description
    "The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS with mask generation
    function 1 and SHA256 hash algorithm. If the public key is
    carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the RSASSA-PSS
    OID";
  reference
    "RFC 8446:
    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity rsassa-pss-pss-sha384 {
  base signature-algorithm;
  description
    "The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS with mask generation
    function 1 and SHA256 hash algorithm. If the public key is
    carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the RSASSA-PSS
    OID";
  reference
    "RFC 8446:
    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity rsassa-pss-pss-sha512 {
  base signature-algorithm;
```



```
description
  "The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS with mask generation
  function 1 and SHA256 hash algorithm. If the public key is
  carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the RSASSA-PSS
  OID";
reference
  "RFC 8446:
  The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity ecdsa-secp256r1-sha256 {
  base signature-algorithm;
  description
    "The signature algorithm using ECDSA with curve name secp256r1
    and SHA256 hash algorithm.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
    Secure Shell Transport Layer
    RFC 8446:
    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity ecdsa-secp384r1-sha384 {
  base signature-algorithm;
  description
    "The signature algorithm using ECDSA with curve name secp384r1
    and SHA384 hash algorithm.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
    Secure Shell Transport Layer
    RFC 8446:
    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity ecdsa-secp521r1-sha512 {
  base signature-algorithm;
  description
    "The signature algorithm using ECDSA with curve name secp521r1
    and SHA512 hash algorithm.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
    Secure Shell Transport Layer
    RFC 8446:
    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity ed25519 {
  base signature-algorithm;
```



```
    description
      "The signature algorithm using EdDSA as defined in RFC 8032 or
      its successors.";
    reference
      "RFC 8032: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)";
  }

  identity ed448 {
    base signature-algorithm;
    description
      "The signature algorithm using EdDSA as defined in RFC 8032 or
      its successors.";
    reference
      "RFC 8032: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)";
  }

  identity eccsi {
    base signature-algorithm;
    description
      "The signature algorithm using ECCSI signature as defined in
      RFC 6507.";
    reference
      "RFC 6507:
      Elliptic Curve-Based Certificateless Signatures for
      Identity-based Encryption (ECCSI)";
  }

  /******
  /* Identities for key exchange algorithms */
  /******

  identity key-exchange-algorithm {
    description
      "A base identity for Diffie-Hellman based key exchange
      algorithm.";
  }

  identity psk-only {
    base key-exchange-algorithm;
    description
      "Using Pre-shared key for authentication and key exchange";
    reference
      "RFC 4279:
      Pre-Shared Key cipher suites for Transport Layer Security
      (TLS)";
  }

  identity dhe-ffdhe2048 {
```



```
    base key-exchange-algorithm;
    description
      "Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with 2048 bit
       finite field";
    reference
      "RFC 7919:
       Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters
       for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
  }

  identity dhe-ffdhe3072 {
    base key-exchange-algorithm;
    description
      "Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with 3072 bit finite
       field";
    reference
      "RFC 7919:
       Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters
       for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
  }

  identity dhe-ffdhe4096 {
    base key-exchange-algorithm;
    description
      "Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with 4096 bit
       finite field";
    reference
      "RFC 7919:
       Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters
       for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
  }

  identity dhe-ffdhe6144 {
    base key-exchange-algorithm;
    description
      "Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with 6144 bit
       finite field";
    reference
      "RFC 7919:
       Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters
       for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
  }

  identity dhe-ffdhe8192 {
    base key-exchange-algorithm;
    description
      "Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with 8192 bit
       finite field";
```



```
reference
  "RFC 7919:
    Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters
    for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}

identity psk-dhe-ffdhe2048 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
  description
    "Key exchange using pre-shared key with Diffie-Hellman key
    generation mechanism, where the DH group is FFDHE2048";
  reference
    "RFC 8446:
      The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity psk-dhe-ffdhe3072 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
  description
    "Key exchange using pre-shared key with Diffie-Hellman key
    generation mechanism, where the DH group is FFDHE3072";
  reference
    "RFC 8446:
      The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity psk-dhe-ffdhe4096 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
  description
    "Key exchange using pre-shared key with Diffie-Hellman key
    generation mechanism, where the DH group is FFDHE4096";
  reference
    "RFC 8446:
      The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity psk-dhe-ffdhe6144 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
  description
    "Key exchange using pre-shared key with Diffie-Hellman key
    generation mechanism, where the DH group is FFDHE6144";
  reference
    "RFC 8446:
      The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity psk-dhe-ffdhe8192 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
```



```
description
  "Key exchange using pre-shared key with Diffie-Hellman key
  generation mechanism, where the DH group is FFDHE8192";
reference
  "RFC 8446:
  The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}

identity ecdhe-secp256r1 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
  description
    "Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with elliptic group
    over curve secp256r1";
  reference
    "RFC 8422:
    Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
    Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier";
}

identity ecdhe-secp384r1 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
  description
    "Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with elliptic group
    over curve secp384r1";
  reference
    "RFC 8422:
    Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
    Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier";
}

identity ecdhe-secp521r1 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
  description
    "Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with elliptic group
    over curve secp521r1";
  reference
    "RFC 8422:
    Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
    Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier";
}

identity ecdhe-x25519 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
  description
    "Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with elliptic group
    over curve x25519";
  reference
    "RFC 8422:"
```



```
        Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
        Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier";
    }

    identity ecdhe-x448 {
        base key-exchange-algorithm;
        description
            "Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with elliptic group
            over curve x448";
        reference
            "RFC 8422:
            Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
            Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier";
    }

    identity psk-ecdh-secp256r1 {
        base key-exchange-algorithm;
        description
            "Key exchange using pre-shared key with elliptic group-based
            Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve secp256r1";
        reference
            "RFC 8446:
            The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
    }

    identity psk-ecdh-secp384r1 {
        base key-exchange-algorithm;
        description
            "Key exchange using pre-shared key with elliptic group-based
            Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve secp384r1";
        reference
            "RFC 8446:
            The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
    }

    identity psk-ecdh-secp521r1 {
        base key-exchange-algorithm;
        description
            "Key exchange using pre-shared key with elliptic group-based
            Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve secp521r1";
        reference
            "RFC 8446:
            The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
    }

    identity psk-ecdh-x25519 {
        base key-exchange-algorithm;
        description
```



```
    "Key exchange using pre-shared key with elliptic group-based  
    Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve x25519";  
    reference  
    "RFC 8446:  
    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";  
}  
  
identity psk-ecdhe-x448 {  
    base key-exchange-algorithm;  
    description  
        "Key exchange using pre-shared key with elliptic group-based  
        Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve x448";  
    reference  
    "RFC 8446:  
    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";  
}  
  
identity diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 {  
    base key-exchange-algorithm;  
    description  
        "Using DH group14 and SHA1 for key exchange";  
    reference  
    "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";  
}  
  
identity diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 {  
    base key-exchange-algorithm;  
    description  
        "Using DH group14 and SHA256 for key exchange";  
    reference  
    "RFC 8268:  
    More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH)  
    Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)";  
}  
  
identity diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 {  
    base key-exchange-algorithm;  
    description  
        "Using DH group15 and SHA512 for key exchange";  
    reference  
    "RFC 8268:  
    More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH)  
    Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)";  
}  
  
identity diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 {  
    base key-exchange-algorithm;  
    description
```



```
    "Using DH group16 and SHA512 for key exchange";
  reference
    "RFC 8268:
    More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH)
    Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)";
}

identity diffie-hellman-group17-sha512 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
  description
    "Using DH group17 and SHA512 for key exchange";
  reference
    "RFC 8268:
    More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH)
    Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)";
}

identity diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
  description
    "Using DH group18 and SHA512 for key exchange";
  reference
    "RFC 8268:
    More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH)
    Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)";
}

identity ecdh-sha2-secp256r1 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
  description
    "Elliptic curve-based Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve
    secp256r1 and using SHA2 for MAC generation";
  reference
    "RFC 6239: Suite B Cryptographic Suites for Secure Shell
    (SSH)";
}

identity ecdh-sha2-secp384r1 {
  base key-exchange-algorithm;
  description
    "Elliptic curve-based Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve
    secp384r1 and using SHA2 for MAC generation";
  reference
    "RFC 6239: Suite B Cryptographic Suites for Secure Shell
    (SSH)";
}

identity rsaes-oaep {
```



```
    base key-exchange-algorithm;
    description
      "RSAES-OAEP combines the RSAEP and RSADP primitives with the
       EME-OAEP encoding method";
    reference
      "RFC 8017:
       PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
  }

  identity rsaes-pkcs1-v1_5 {
    base key-exchange-algorithm;
    description
      " RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 combines the RSAEP and RSADP primitives
       with the EME-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method";
    reference
      "RFC 8017:
       PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
  }

  /*****
  /*  Typedefs for identityrefs to above base identities  */
  /*****/

  typedef hash-algorithm-ref {
    type identityref {
      base hash-algorithm;
    }
    description
      "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
       identityref to the 'hash-algorithm' base identity.";
  }

  typedef signature-algorithm-ref {
    type identityref {
      base signature-algorithm;
    }
    description
      "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
       identityref to the 'signature-algorithm' base identity.";
  }

  typedef mac-algorithm-ref {
    type identityref {
      base mac-algorithm;
    }
    description
      "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
       identityref to the 'mac-algorithm' base identity.";
```



```
}

typedef encryption-algorithm-ref {
  type identityref {
    base encryption-algorithm;
  }
  description
    "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
    identityref to the 'encryption-algorithm'
    base identity.";
}

typedef encryption-and-mac-algorithm-ref {
  type identityref {
    base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
  }
  description
    "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
    identityref to the 'encryption-and-mac-algorithm'
    base identity.";
}

typedef asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref {
  type identityref {
    base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
  }
  description
    "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
    identityref to the 'asymmetric-key-algorithm'
    base identity.";
}

typedef key-exchange-algorithm-ref {
  type identityref {
    base key-exchange-algorithm;
  }
  description
    "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
    identityref to the 'key-exchange-algorithm' base identity.";
}

/*****/
/*  Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 5280  */
/*****/

typedef x509 {
  type binary;
  description
```



```
"A Certificate structure, as specified in RFC 5280,
  encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
  as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
  "RFC 5280:
    Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
    and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
  ITU-T X.690:
    Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
    Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
    Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
    Encoding Rules (DER).";
}

typedef crl {
  type binary;
  description
    "A CertificateList structure, as specified in RFC 5280,
    encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
    as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
  reference
    "RFC 5280:
      Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
      and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
    ITU-T X.690:
      Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
      Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
      Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
      Encoding Rules (DER).";
}

/*****
/*   Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from 5652   */
*****/

typedef cms {
  type binary;
  description
    "A ContentInfo structure, as specified in RFC 5652,
    encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
    as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
  reference
    "RFC 5652:
      Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
    ITU-T X.690:
      Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
      Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
      Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
```



```
        Encoding Rules (DER).";
    }

    typedef data-content-cms {
        type cms;
        description
            "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
            data content type, as described by Section 4 in RFC 5652.";
        reference
            "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
    }

    typedef signed-data-cms {
        type cms;
        description
            "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
            signed-data content type, as described by Section 5 in
RFC 5652.";
        reference
            "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
    }

    typedef enveloped-data-cms {
        type cms;
        description
            "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
            enveloped-data content type, as described by Section 6
in RFC 5652.";
        reference
            "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
    }

    typedef digested-data-cms {
        type cms;
        description
            "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
            digested-data content type, as described by Section 7
in RFC 5652.";
        reference
            "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
    }

    typedef encrypted-data-cms {
        type cms;
        description
            "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
            encrypted-data content type, as described by Section 8
in RFC 5652.";
    }
```



```
reference
  "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}

typedef authenticated-data-cms {
  type cms;
  description
    "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
    authenticated-data content type, as described by Section 9
    in RFC 5652.";
  reference
    "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}

/*****
/*   Typedefs for structures related to RFC 4253   */
*****/

typedef ssh-host-key {
  type binary;
  description
    "The binary public key data for this SSH key, as
    specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.:"

    string      certificate or public key format
                identifier
    byte[n]     key/certificate data.";
  reference
    "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
    Protocol";
}

/*****
/*   Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5280   */
*****/

typedef trust-anchor-cert-x509 {
  type x509;
  description
    "A Certificate structure that MUST encode a self-signed
    root certificate.";
}

typedef end-entity-cert-x509 {
  type x509;
  description
    "A Certificate structure that MUST encode a certificate
    that is neither self-signed nor having Basic constraint
```



```
    CA true.";
}

/*****
/*  Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5652  */
*****/

typedef trust-anchor-cert-cms {
  type signed-data-cms;
  description
    "A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the chain of
    X.509 certificates needed to authenticate the certificate
    presented by a client or end-entity.

    The CMS MUST contain only a single chain of certificates.
    The client or end-entity certificate MUST only authenticate
    to last intermediate CA certificate listed in the chain.

    In all cases, the chain MUST include a self-signed root
    certificate. In the case where the root certificate is
    itself the issuer of the client or end-entity certificate,
    only one certificate is present.

    This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is
    used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local
    policy) revocation objects with which the device can
    verify the revocation status of the certificates.

    This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
    structure that is commonly used to disseminate X.509
    certificates and revocation objects (RFC 5280).";
  reference
    "RFC 5280:
    Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
    and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.";
}

typedef end-entity-cert-cms {
  type signed-data-cms;
  description
    "A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the end
    entity certificate itself, and MAY contain any number
    of intermediate certificates leading up to a trust
    anchor certificate. The trust anchor certificate
    MAY be included as well.

    The CMS MUST contain a single end entity certificate.
    The CMS MUST NOT contain any spurious certificates.
```


This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local policy) revocation objects with which the device can verify the revocation status of the certificates.

This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData structure that is commonly used to disseminate X.509 certificates and revocation objects ([RFC 5280](#)).";

reference

["RFC 5280](#):

Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.";

}

```
/*
 * Groupings for keys and/or certificates
 */
```

grouping symmetric-key-grouping {

description

"A symmetric key and algorithm.";

leaf algorithm {

type identityref {

base "ct:encryption-algorithm";

}

mandatory true;

description

"The algorithm to be used when generating the key.";

reference

"RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";

}

choice key-type {

mandatory true;

description

"Choice between key types.";

leaf key {

nacm:default-deny-all;

type binary;

description

"The binary value of the key. The interpretation of the value is defined by 'algorithm'. For example, FIXME.";

reference

"RFC XXXX: FIXME";

}

leaf hidden-key {

nacm:default-deny-write;

type empty;


```
        description
          "A permanently hidden key. How such keys are created
           is outside the scope of this module.";
      }
    }
  }

  grouping public-key-grouping {
    description
      "A public key and its associated algorithm.";
    leaf algorithm {
      nacm:default-deny-write;
      type asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref;
      mandatory true;
      description
        "Identifies the key's algorithm.";
      reference
        "RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
    }
    leaf public-key {
      nacm:default-deny-write;
      type binary;
      mandatory true;
      description
        "The binary value of the public key. The interpretation of
         the value is defined by 'algorithm'. For example, a DSA
         key is an integer, an RSA key is represented as RSAPublicKey
         per RFC 8017, and an ECC key is represented using the
         'publicKey' described in RFC 5915.";
      reference
        "RFC 8017: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
         RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.
         RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
    }
  }

  grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping {
    description
      "A private key and its associated public key and algorithm.";
    uses public-key-grouping;
    choice private-key-type {
      mandatory true;
      description
        "Choice between key types.";
      leaf private-key {
        nacm:default-deny-all;
        type binary;
        description
```



```
    "The value of the binary key. The key's value is
    interpreted by the 'algorithm'. For example, a DSA key
    is an integer, an RSA key is represented as RSAPrivateKey
    as defined in RFC 8017, and an ECC key is represented as
    ECPrivateKey as defined in RFC 5915.";
  reference
    "RFC 8017: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
    RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.
    RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
leaf hidden-private-key {
  nacm:default-deny-write;
  type empty;
  description
    "A permanently hidden key. How such keys are created
    is outside the scope of this module.";
}
}
}

grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping {
  description
    "A trust anchor certificate, and a notification for when
    it is about to (or already has) expire.";
  leaf cert {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    type trust-anchor-cert-cms;
    description
      "The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
    reference
      "RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
  }
  notification certificate-expiration {
    description
      "A notification indicating that the configured certificate
      is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
      send notifications is an implementation specific decision,
      but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
      month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
      then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.";
    leaf expiration-date {
      type yang:date-and-time;
      mandatory true;
      description
        "Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
    }
  }
}
}
```



```
grouping trust-anchor-certs-grouping {
  description
    "A list of trust anchor certificates, and a notification
    for when one is about to (or already has) expire.";
  leaf-list cert {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    type trust-anchor-cert-cms;
    description
      "The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
    reference
      "RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
  }
  notification certificate-expiration {
    description
      "A notification indicating that the configured certificate
      is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
      send notifications is an implementation specific decision,
      but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
      month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
      then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.";
    leaf expiration-date {
      type yang:date-and-time;
      mandatory true;
      description
        "Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
    }
  }
}

grouping end-entity-cert-grouping {
  description
    "An end entity certificate, and a notification for when
    it is about to (or already has) expire. Implementations
    SHOULD assert that, where used, the end entity certificate
    contains the expected public key.";
  leaf cert {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    type end-entity-cert-cms;
    description
      "The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
    reference
      "RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
  }
  notification certificate-expiration {
    description
      "A notification indicating that the configured certificate
      is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
      send notifications is an implementation specific decision,
```



```
        but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
        month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
        then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.";
    leaf expiration-date {
        type yang:date-and-time;
        mandatory true;
        description
            "Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
    }
}

grouping end-entity-certs-grouping {
    description
        "A list of end entity certificates, and a notification for
        when one is about to (or already has) expire.";
    leaf-list cert {
        nacm:default-deny-write;
        type end-entity-cert-cms;
        description
            "The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
        reference
            "RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
    }
    notification certificate-expiration {
        description
            "A notification indicating that the configured certificate
            is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
            send notifications is an implementation specific decision,
            but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
            month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
            then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.";
        leaf expiration-date {
            type yang:date-and-time;
            mandatory true;
            description
                "Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
        }
    }
}

grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping {
    description
        "A private/public key pair and an associated certificate.
        Implementations SHOULD assert that certificates contain
        the matching public key.";

    uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
```


uses end-entity-cert-grouping;

```
action generate-certificate-signing-request {
  nacm:default-deny-all;
  description
    "Generates a certificate signing request structure for
    the associated asymmetric key using the passed subject
    and attribute values. The specified assertions need
    to be appropriate for the certificate's use. For
    example, an entity certificate for a TLS server
    SHOULD have values that enable clients to satisfy
    RFC 6125 processing.";
  input {
    leaf subject {
      type binary;
      mandatory true;
      description
        "The 'subject' field per the CertificationRequestInfo
        structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1
        encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
        rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
      reference
        "RFC 2986:
        PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
        Specification Version 1.7.
        ITU-T X.690:
        Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
        Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
        Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
        Encoding Rules (DER).";
    }
    leaf attributes {
      type binary;      // FIXME: does this need to be mandatory?
      description
        "The 'attributes' field from the structure
        CertificationRequestInfo as specified by RFC 2986,
        Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
        encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
      reference
        "RFC 2986:
        PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
        Specification Version 1.7.
        ITU-T X.690:
        Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
        Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
        Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
        Encoding Rules (DER).";
    }
  }
}
```



```
}
output {
  leaf certificate-signing-request {
    type binary;
    mandatory true;
    description
      "A CertificationRequest structure as specified by
      RFC 2986, Section 4.2 encoded using the ASN.1
      distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
      in ITU-T X.690.";
    reference
      "RFC 2986:
      PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
      Specification Version 1.7.
      ITU-T X.690:
      Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
      Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
      Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
      Encoding Rules (DER).";
  }
}
} // generate-certificate-signing-request
} // asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping

grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
  description
    "A private/public key pair and associated certificates.
    Implementations SHOULD assert that certificates contain
    the matching public key.";
  uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
  container certificates {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    description
      "Certificates associated with this asymmetric key.
      More than one certificate supports, for instance,
      a TPM-protected asymmetric key that has both IDevID
      and LDevID certificates associated.";
    list certificate {
      key "name";
      description
        "A certificate for this asymmetric key.";
      leaf name {
        type string;
        description
          "An arbitrary name for the certificate. If the name
          matches the name of a certificate that exists
          independently in <operational> (i.e., an IDevID),
```



```
        then the 'cert' node MUST NOT be configured.";
    }
    uses end-entity-cert-grouping;
}
} // certificates

action generate-certificate-signing-request {
    nacm:default-deny-all;
    description
        "Generates a certificate signing request structure for
        the associated asymmetric key using the passed subject
        and attribute values. The specified assertions need
        to be appropriate for the certificate's use. For
        example, an entity certificate for a TLS server
        SHOULD have values that enable clients to satisfy
        RFC 6125 processing.";
    input {
        leaf subject {
            type binary;
            mandatory true;
            description
                "The 'subject' field per the CertificationRequestInfo
                structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1
                encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
                rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
            reference
                "RFC 2986:
                PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
                Specification Version 1.7.
                ITU-T X.690:
                Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                Encoding Rules (DER).";
        }
        leaf attributes {
            type binary; // FIXME: does this need to be mandatory?
            description
                "The 'attributes' field from the structure
                CertificationRequestInfo as specified by RFC 2986,
                Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
                encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
            reference
                "RFC 2986:
                PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
                Specification Version 1.7.
                ITU-T X.690:
                Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
```



```
        Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
        Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
        Encoding Rules (DER).";
    }
}
output {
  leaf certificate-signing-request {
    type binary;
    mandatory true;
    description
      "A CertificationRequest structure as specified by
      RFC 2986, Section 4.2 encoded using the ASN.1
      distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
      in ITU-T X.690.";
    reference
      "RFC 2986:
      PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
      Specification Version 1.7.
      ITU-T X.690:
      Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
      Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
      Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
      Encoding Rules (DER).";
  }
}
} // generate-certificate-signing-request
} // asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
}

<CODE ENDS>
```

3. Security Considerations

3.1. Support for Algorithms

In order to use YANG identities for algorithm identifiers, only the most commonly used RSA key lengths are supported for the RSA algorithm. Additional key lengths can be defined in another module or added into a future version of this document.

This document limits the number of elliptical curves supported. This was done to match industry trends and IETF best practice (e.g., matching work being done in TLS 1.3). If additional algorithms are needed, they can be defined by another module or added into a future version of this document.

3.2. No Support for CRMF

This document uses PKCS #10 [[RFC2986](#)] for the "generate-certificate-signing-request" action. The use of Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [[RFC4211](#)] was considered, but it was unclear if there was market demand for it. If it is desired to support CRMF in the future, a backwards compatible solution can be defined at that time.

3.3. Access to Data Nodes

The YANG module in this document defines "grouping" statements that are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [[RFC6241](#)] and RESTCONF [[RFC8040](#)]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.

The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [[RFC8341](#)] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content.

Since the module in this document only defines groupings, these considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that use these groupings.

There are a number of data nodes defined by the grouping statements that are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). Some of these data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

- *: All of the data nodes defined by all the groupings are considered sensitive to write operations. For instance, the modification of a public key or a certificate can dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been applied to all the data nodes defined by all the groupings.

Some of the readable data nodes in the YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

- /private-key: The "private-key" node defined in the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping is additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never be

returned to a client. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all" has been applied to it here.

Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control access to these operations. These are the operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

*: All of the "action" statements defined by groupings SHOULD only be executed by authorized users. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all" has been applied to all of them. Note that NACM uses "default-deny-all" to protect "RPC" and "action" statements; it does not define, e.g., an extension called "default-deny-execute".

generate-certificate-signing-request: For this action, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations assert channel binding [[RFC5056](#)], so as to ensure that the application layer that sent the request is the same as the device authenticated when the secure transport layer was established.

4. IANA Considerations

4.1. The IETF XML Registry

This document registers one URI in the "ns" subregistry of the IETF XML Registry [[RFC3688](#)]. Following the format in [[RFC3688](#)], the following registration is requested:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

4.2. The YANG Module Names Registry

This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names registry [[RFC6020](#)]. Following the format in [[RFC6020](#)], the the following registration is requested:

name: ietf-crypto-types
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types
prefix: ct
reference: RFC XXXX

5. References

5.1. Normative References

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[Appendix A](#). Examples

[A.1](#). The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" Grouping

The following example module has been constructed to illustrate use of the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module.

Note that the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping uses both the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" and "end-entity-cert-grouping" groupings, and that the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping uses the "public-key-grouping" grouping. Thus, a total of four of the five groupings defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module are illustrated through the use of this one grouping. The only grouping not represented is the "trust-anchor-cert-grouping" grouping.


```
module ex-crypto-types-usage {
  yang-version 1.1;

  namespace "http://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage";
  prefix "ectu";

  import ietf-crypto-types {
    prefix ct;
    reference
      "RFC XXXX: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
  }

  organization
    "Example Corporation";

  contact
    "Author: YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>";

  description
    "This module illustrates the grouping
    defined in the crypto-types draft called
    'asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping'.";

  revision "1001-01-01" {
    description
      "Initial version";
    reference
      "RFC ????: Usage Example for RFC XXXX";
  }

  container keys {
    description
      "A container of keys.";
    list key {
      key name;
      leaf name {
        type string;
        description
          "An arbitrary name for this key.";
      }
      uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping;
      description
        "An asymmetric key pair with associated certificates.";
    }
  }
}
```


Given the above example usage module, the following example illustrates some configured keys.

```
<keys xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage">
  <key>
    <name>ex-key</name>
    <algorithm
      xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
      ct:rsa2048
    </algorithm>
    <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
    <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
    <certificates>
      <certificate>
        <name>ex-cert</name>
        <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
      </certificate>
    </certificates>
  </key>
  <key>
    <name>ex-hidden-key</name>
    <algorithm
      xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
      ct:rsa2048
    </algorithm>
    <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
    <hidden-private-key/>
    <certificates>
      <certificate>
        <name>ex-hidden-key-cert</name>
        <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
      </certificate>
    </certificates>
  </key>
</keys>
```

[A.2.](#) The "generate-certificate-signing-request" Action

The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-request" action in use with the NETCONF protocol.

REQUEST

```
<rpc message-id="101"
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
    <keys xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage">
      <key>
        <name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
        <generate-certificate-signing-request>
          <subject>base64encodedvalue==</subject>
          <attributes>base64encodedvalue==</attributes>
        </generate-certificate-signing-request>
      </key>
    </keys>
  </action>
</rpc>
```

RESPONSE

```
<rpc-reply message-id="101"
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <certificate-signing-request
    xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage">
    base64encodedvalue==
  </certificate-signing-request>
</rpc-reply>
```

[A.3.](#) The "certificate-expiration" Notification

The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration" notification in use with the NETCONF protocol.


```
<notification
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
  <eventTime>2018-05-25T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
  <keys xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage">
    <key>
      <name>locally-defined key</name>
      <certificates>
        <certificate>
          <name>my-cert</name>
          <certificate-expiration>
            <expiration-date>
              2018-08-05T14:18:53-05:00
            </expiration-date>
          </certificate-expiration>
        </certificate>
      </certificates>
    </key>
  </keys>
</notification>
```

[Appendix B.](#) Change Log

[B.1.](#) I-D to 00

- o Removed groupings and notifications.
- o Added typedefs for identityrefs.
- o Added typedefs for other [RFC 5280](#) structures.
- o Added typedefs for other [RFC 5652](#) structures.
- o Added convenience typedefs for [RFC 4253](#), [RFC 5280](#), and [RFC 5652](#).

[B.2.](#) 00 to 01

- o Moved groupings from the [draft-ietf-netconf-keystore](#) here.

[B.3.](#) 01 to 02

- o Removed unwanted "mandatory" and "must" statements.
- o Added many new crypto algorithms (thanks Haiguang!)
- o Clarified in asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping, in certificates/certificate/name/description, that if the name MUST NOT match the name of a certificate that exists independently in

<operational>, enabling certs installed by the manufacturer (e.g., an IDevID).

B.4. 02 to 03

- o renamed base identity 'asymmetric-key-encryption-algorithm' to 'asymmetric-key-algorithm'.
- o added new 'asymmetric-key-algorithm' identities for secp192r1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1.
- o removed 'mac-algorithm' identities for mac-aes-128-ccm, mac-aes-192-ccm, mac-aes-256-ccm, mac-aes-128-gcm, mac-aes-192-gcm, mac-aes-256-gcm, and mac-chacha20-poly1305.
- o for all -cbc and -ctr identities, renamed base identity 'symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm' to 'encryption-algorithm'.
- o for all -ccm and -gcm identities, renamed base identity 'symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm' to 'encryption-and-mac-algorithm' and renamed the identity to remove the "enc-" prefix.
- o for all the 'signature-algorithm' based identities, renamed from 'rsa-*' to 'rsassa-*'.
- o removed all of the "x509v3-" prefixed 'signature-algorithm' based identities.
- o added 'key-exchange-algorithm' based identities for 'rsaes-oaep' and 'rsaes-pkcs1-v1_5'.
- o renamed typedef 'symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm-ref' to 'symmetric-key-algorithm-ref'.
- o renamed typedef 'asymmetric-key-encryption-algorithm-ref' to 'asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref'.
- o added typedef 'encryption-and-mac-algorithm-ref'.
- o Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, and folding algorithm.

B.5. 03 to 04

- o ran YANG module through formatter.

B.6. 04 to 05

- o fixed broken symlink causing reformatted YANG module to not show.

B.7. 05 to 06

- o Added NACM annotations.
- o Updated Security Considerations section.
- o Added 'asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping' grouping.
- o Removed text from 'permanently-hidden' enum regarding such keys not being backed up or restored.
- o Updated the boilerplate text in module-level "description" statement to match copyeditor convention.
- o Added an explanation to the 'public-key-grouping' and 'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' statements as for why the nodes are not mandatory (e.g., because they may exist only in <operational>).
- o Added 'must' expressions to the 'public-key-grouping' and 'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' statements ensuring sibling nodes are either all exist or do not all exist.
- o Added an explanation to the 'permanently-hidden' that the value cannot be configured directly by clients and servers MUST fail any attempt to do so.
- o Added 'trust-anchor-certs-grouping' and 'end-entity-certs-grouping' (the plural form of existing groupings).
- o Now states that keys created in <operational> by the *-hidden-key actions are bound to the lifetime of the parent 'config true' node, and that subsequent invocations of either action results in a failure.

B.8. 06 to 07

- o Added clarifications that implementations SHOULD assert that configured certificates contain the matching public key.
- o Replaced the 'generate-hidden-key' and 'install-hidden-key' actions with special 'crypt-hash' -like input/output values.

B.9. 07 to 08

- o Removed the 'generate-key' and 'hidden-key' features.
- o Added grouping symmetric-key-grouping
- o Modified 'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' to have a 'choice' statement for the keystone module to augment into, as well as replacing the 'union' with leafs (having different NACM settings).

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