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K. Watsen Watsen Networks G. Wu Cisco Systems L. Xia Huawei November 20, 2019

YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server-17

Abstract

This document defines three YANG modules: the first defines groupings for a generic SSH client, the second defines groupings for a generic SSH server, and the third defines common identities and groupings used by both the client and the server. It is intended that these groupings will be used by applications using the SSH protocol.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.

This document contains references to other drafts in progress, both in the Normative References section, as well as in body text throughout. Please update the following references to reflect their final RFC assignments:

- o I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors
- o I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore

Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in progress. Please apply the following replacements:

- o "XXXX" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft
- o "YYYY" --> the assigned RFC value for I-D.ietf-netconf-trustanchors
- o "ZZZZ" --> the assigned RFC value for I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore

Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:

o "2019-11-20" --> the publication date of this draft

The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:

o Appendix A. Change Log

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

This document defines three YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] modules: the first defines a grouping for a generic SSH client, the second defines a grouping for a generic SSH server, and the third defines identities and groupings common to both the client and the server. It is intended that these groupings will be used by applications using the SSH protocol [RFC4252], [RFC4253], and [RFC4254]. For instance, these groupings could be used to help define the data model for an OpenSSH [OPENSSH] server or a NETCONF over SSH [RFC6242] based server.

The client and server YANG modules in this document each define one grouping, which is focused on just SSH-specific configuration, and

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specifically avoids any transport-level configuration, such as what ports to listen on or connect to. This affords applications the opportunity to define their own strategy for how the underlying TCP connection is established. For instance, applications supporting NETCONF Call Home [RFC8071] could use the "ssh-server-grouping" grouping for the SSH parts it provides, while adding data nodes for the TCP-level call-home configuration.

The modules defined in this document use groupings defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]

enabling keys

to be either locally defined or a reference to globally configured values.

The modules defined in this document optionally support [RFC6187] enabling X.509v3 certificate based host keys and public keys.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. The SSH Client Model

3.1. Tree Diagram

This section provides a tree diagram [RFC8340] for the "ietf-ssh-client" module that does not have groupings expanded.

```
======= NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) ========
module: ietf-ssh-client
  grouping ssh-client-grouping
    +-- client-identity
    | +-- username?
                               string
      +-- (auth-type)
         +--:(password)
         | +-- password?
                               string
         +--:(public-key)
         | +-- public-key
              +---u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
         +--:(certificate)
            +-- certificate {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
               +---u ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-\
grouping
    +-- server-authentication
    +-- ssh-host-keys!
    | | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-host-keys-grouping
     +-- ca-certs! {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
    | | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping
    +-- server-certs! {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
        +---u ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping
    +-- transport-params {ssh-client-transport-params-config}?
    +---u sshcmn:transport-params-grouping
   +-- keepalives! {ssh-client-keepalives}?
      +-- max-wait?
                          uint16
      +-- max-attempts? uint8
```

3.2. Example Usage

This section presents two examples showing the ssh-client-grouping populated with some data. These examples are effectively the same except the first configures the client identity using a local key while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both examples are consistent with the examples presented in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].

The following example configures the client identity using a local key:

```
======= NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) =========
<ssh-client
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-client"
 xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"
```

```
xmlns:algs="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common">
 <!-- how this client will authenticate itself to the server -->
  <cli>ent-identity>
    <username>foobar</username>
    <public-key>
      <local-definition>
        <algorithm>rsa2048</algorithm>
        <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format/public-key-form\
at>
        <public-key>base64encodedvalue==/public-key>
        <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\</pre>
ormat>
        <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
      </local-definition>
    </public-key>
 </client-identity>
 <!-- which host-keys will this client trust -->
 <server-authentication>
   <ssh-host-keys>
      <truststore-reference>explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys</frusts\</pre>
tore-reference>
   </ssh-host-keys>
  </server-authentication>
  <transport-params>
    <host-key>
      <host-key-alg>algs:ssh-rsa</host-key-alg>
    </host-key>
    <key-exchange>
      <key-exchange-alg>
        algs:diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
      </key-exchange-alg>
    </key-exchange>
    <encryption>
      <encryption-alg>algs:aes256-ctr</encryption-alg>
      <encryption-alg>algs:aes192-ctr</encryption-alg>
      <encryption-alg>algs:aes128-ctr</encryption-alg>
      <encryption-alg>algs:aes256-cbc</encryption-alg>
      <encryption-alg>algs:aes192-cbc</encryption-alg>
      <encryption-alg>algs:aes128-cbc</encryption-alg>
    </encryption>
    <mac>
      <mac-alg>algs:hmac-sha2-256</mac-alg>
      <mac-alg>algs:hmac-sha2-512</mac-alg>
    </mac>
  </transport-params>
```

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```
<keepalives>
    <max-wait>30</max-wait>
    <max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
  </keepalives>
</ssh-client>
The following example configures the client identity using a key from
the keystore:
======= NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) ========
<ssh-client
 xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-client"
 xmlns:algs="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common">
  <!-- how this client will authenticate itself to the server -->
 <cli>ent-identity>
    <username>foobar</username>
    <public-key>
      <keystore-reference>rsa-asymmetric-key</keystore-reference>
    </public-key>
  </client-identity>
 <!-- which host-keys will this client trust -->
 <server-authentication>
    <ssh-host-keys>
      <truststore-reference>explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys</frusts\</pre>
tore-reference>
    </ssh-host-keys>
  </server-authentication>
 <transport-params>
    <host-key>
      <host-key-alg>algs:ssh-rsa</host-key-alg>
    </host-key>
   <key-exchange>
      <key-exchange-alg>
        algs:diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
      </key-exchange-alg>
    </key-exchange>
    <encryption>
      <encryption-alg>algs:aes256-ctr</encryption-alg>
      <encryption-alg>algs:aes192-ctr</encryption-alg>
      <encryption-alg>algs:aes128-ctr</encryption-alg>
      <encryption-alg>algs:aes256-cbc</encryption-alg>
      <encryption-alg>algs:aes192-cbc</encryption-alg>
      <encryption-alg>algs:aes128-cbc</encryption-alg>
```

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```
</encryption>
       <mac>
         <mac-alg>algs:hmac-sha2-256</mac-alg>
         <mac-alg>algs:hmac-sha2-512</mac-alg>
       </mac>
     </transport-params>
    <keepalives>
       <max-wait>30</max-wait>
       <max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
     </keepalives>
   </ssh-client>
3.3. YANG Module
   This YANG module has normative references to
   [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors], and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
   <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ssh-client@2019-11-20.yang"
   module ietf-ssh-client {
    yang-version 1.1;
     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-client";
     prefix sshc;
     import ietf-ssh-common {
       prefix sshcmn;
       revision-date 2019-11-20; // stable grouping definitions
         "RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
     }
     import ietf-crypto-types {
       prefix ct;
       reference
         "RFC AAAA: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
     }
     import ietf-truststore {
       prefix ts;
       reference
         "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
     }
```

import ietf-keystore {

prefix ks;
reference

```
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
}
import ietf-netconf-acm {
  prefix nacm;
  reference
    "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
}
organization
  "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
  "WG Web:
              <a href="http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/">http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/</a>
   WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
   Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
   Author: Gary Wu <mailto:garywu@cisco.com>";
description
  "This module defines reusable groupings for SSH clients that
   can be used as a basis for specific SSH client instances.
   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified
   as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
   or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
   subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
   BSD License set forth in <u>Section 4</u>.c of the IETF Trust's
   Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>).
   This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
   (<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX</a>); see the RFC
   itself for full legal notices.;
   The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
   'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
   'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
   are to be interpreted as described in <a href="BCP 14">BCP 14</a> (RFC 2119)
   (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2019-11-20 {
  description
    "Initial version";
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
```

```
}
// Features
feature ssh-client-transport-params-config {
  description
    "SSH transport layer parameters are configurable on an SSH
     client.";
}
feature ssh-client-keepalives {
  description
    "Per socket SSH keepalive parameters are configurable for
     SSH clients on the server implementing this feature.";
}
// Groupings
grouping ssh-client-grouping {
  description
    "A reusable grouping for configuring a SSH client without
     any consideration for how an underlying TCP session is
     established.
     Note that this grouping uses fairly typical descendent
     node names such that a stack of 'uses' statements will
     have name conflicts. It is intended that the consuming
     data model will resolve the issue (e.g., by wrapping
     the 'uses' statement in a container called
     'ssh-client-parameters'). This model purposely does
     not do this itself so as to provide maximum flexibility
     to consuming models.";
  container client-identity {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    description
      "The credentials used by the client to authenticate to
       the SSH server.";
    leaf username {
      type string;
      description
        "The username of this user. This will be the username
         used, for instance, to log into an SSH server.";
    }
    choice auth-type {
      mandatory true;
      description
        "The authentication type. What happens when more than
```

```
one decendent is configured is undefined. FIXME.";
    leaf password {
      nacm:default-deny-all;
      type string;
      description
        "A password to be used for client authentication.";
    }
    container public-key {
      uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
        refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
          must 'public-key-format = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
        }
        // FIXME: also need a must expression to ensure the
                  *referenced* key's public-key-format is
        //
        //
                  "ct:ssh-public-key-format"
      }
      description
        "A locally-defined or referenced asymmetric key
         pair to be used for client authentication.";
      reference
        "RFC ZZZZ: YANG Data Model for a Centralized
                   Keystore Mechanism";
    }
    container certificate {
      if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
        ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping;
      description
        "A locally-defined or referenced certificate
         to be used for client authentication.";
      reference
        "RFC ZZZZ: YANG Data Model for a Centralized
                   Keystore Mechanism";
    }
} // container client-identity
container server-authentication {
  nacm:default-deny-write;
  must 'ssh-host-keys or ca-certs or server-certs';
  description
    "Specifies how the SSH client can authenticate SSH servers.
     Any combination of credentials is additive and unordered.";
  container ssh-host-keys {
    presence
      "Indicates that the client can authenticate servers
       using the configured SSH host keys.";
    description
```

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```
"A list of SSH host keys used by the SSH client to
       authenticate SSH server host keys. A server host key
       is authenticated if it is an exact match to a
       configured SSH host key.";
     reference
       "RFC YYYY: YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
    uses ts:local-or-truststore-host-keys-grouping;
  }
  container ca-certs {
    if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
    presence
      "Indicates that the client can authenticate servers
       using the configured trust anchor certificates.";
    description
      "A set of certificate authority (CA) certificates used by
       the SSH client to authenticate SSH servers. A server
       is authenticated if its certificate has a valid chain
       of trust to a configured CA certificate.";
     reference
       "RFC YYYY: YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
    uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
  }
  container server-certs {
    if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
    presence
      "Indicates that the client can authenticate servers
       using the configured server certificates.";
    description
      "A set of end-entity certificates used by the SSH client
       to authenticate SSH servers. A server is authenticated
       if its certificate is an exact match to a configured
       server certificate.";
     reference
       "RFC YYYY: YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
    uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
} // container server-authentication
container transport-params {
  nacm:default-deny-write;
  if-feature "ssh-client-transport-params-config";
  description
    "Configurable parameters of the SSH transport layer.";
  uses sshcmn:transport-params-grouping;
} // container transport-parameters
container keepalives {
  nacm:default-deny-write;
```

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```
if-feature "ssh-client-keepalives";
      presence "Indicates that keepalives are enabled.";
      description
        "Configures the keep-alive policy, to proactively test
         the aliveness of the SSH server. An unresponsive TLS
         server is dropped after approximately max-wait *
         max-attempts seconds.";
      leaf max-wait {
        type uint16 {
          range "1..max";
        units "seconds";
        default "30";
        description
          "Sets the amount of time in seconds after which if
           no data has been received from the SSH server, a
           TLS-level message will be sent to test the
           aliveness of the SSH server.";
      }
      leaf max-attempts {
        type uint8;
        default "3";
        description
          "Sets the maximum number of sequential keep-alive
           messages that can fail to obtain a response from
           the SSH server before assuming the SSH server is
           no longer alive.";
    } // container keepalives
 } // grouping ssh-client-grouping
<CODE ENDS>
```

4. The SSH Server Model

4.1. Tree Diagram

This section provides a tree diagram [RFC8340] for the "ietf-sshserver" module that does not have groupings expanded.

```
======= NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) ========
module: ietf-ssh-server
  grouping ssh-server-grouping
   +-- server-identity
     +-- host-key* [name]
         +-- name?
                                  string
         +-- (host-key-type)
            +--:(public-key)
            | +-- public-key
                  +---u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
            +--:(certificate)
               +-- certificate {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
                  +---u ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-k\
ey-grouping
   +-- client-authentication
    +-- supported-authentication-methods
      | +-- publickey?
                          empty
      | +-- passsword?
                          empty
      | +-- hostbased?
                          empty
     1 +-- none?
                          empty
      | +-- other*
                          string
      +-- users {client-auth-config-supported}?
      | +-- user* [name]
           +-- name?
                             string
           +-- password? ianach:crypt-hash
           +-- host-keys!
               +---u ts:local-or-truststore-host-keys-grouping
    | +-- ca-certs!
              {client-auth-config-supported, sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
     | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping
    | +-- client-certs!
              {client-auth-config-supported, sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
         +---u ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping
   +-- transport-params {ssh-server-transport-params-config}?
    +---u sshcmn:transport-params-grouping
   +-- keepalives! {ssh-server-keepalives}?
      +-- max-wait?
                          uint16
      +-- max-attempts?
                          uint8
```

4.2. Example Usage

This section presents two examples showing the ssh-server-grouping populated with some data. These examples are effectively the same except the first configures the server identity using a local key while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both examples are consistent with the examples presented in Section 2 of

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```
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and Section 3.2 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
The following example configures the server identity using a local
key:
======= NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) ========
<ssh-server
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server"
  xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"
  xmlns:algs="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common">
 <!-- which host-keys will this SSH server present -->
  <server-identity>
    <host-key>
      <name>deployment-specific-certificate</name>
      <public-key>
        <local-definition>
          <algorithm>rsa2048</algorithm>
          <algorithm>rsa2048</algorithm>
          <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format/public-key-fo\
rmat>
          <public-key>base64encodedvalue==/public-key>
          <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key\</pre>
-format>
          <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
        </local-definition>
      </public-key>
    </host-key>
  </server-identity>
 <!-- which client credentials will this SSH server trust -->
  <client-authentication>
    <supported-authentication-methods>
      <publickey/>
    </supported-authentication-methods>
    <users>
      <user>
        <name>mary</name>
        <password>$0$secret</password>
        <host-keys>
          <truststore-reference>explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys</tr\</pre>
uststore-reference>
        </host-keys>
      </user>
    </users>
    <ca-certs>
```

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```
<truststore-reference>explicitly-trusted-client-ca-certs/trus\
tstore-reference>
    </ca-certs>
    <client-certs>
     <truststore-reference>explicitly-trusted-client-certs/trustst\
ore-reference>
    </client-certs>
 </client-authentication>
 <transport-params>
    <host-key>
     <host-key-alg>algs:ssh-rsa</host-key-alg>
    </host-key>
   <key-exchange>
     <key-exchange-alg>
        algs:diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
     </key-exchange-alg>
    </key-exchange>
    <encryption>
     <encryption-alg>algs:aes256-ctr</encryption-alg>
     <encryption-alg>algs:aes192-ctr</encryption-alg>
     <encryption-alg>algs:aes128-ctr</encryption-alg>
     <encryption-alg>algs:aes256-cbc</encryption-alg>
     <encryption-alg>algs:aes192-cbc</encryption-alg>
     <encryption-alg>algs:aes128-cbc</encryption-alg>
    </encryption>
    <mac>
     <mac-alg>algs:hmac-sha2-256</mac-alg>
     <mac-alg>algs:hmac-sha2-512</mac-alg>
    </mac>
  </transport-params>
</ssh-server>
The following example configures the server identity using a key from
the keystore:
======= NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) ========
<ssh-server
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server"
  xmlns:algs="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common">
  <!-- which host-keys will this SSH server present -->
  <server-identity>
    <host-key>
     <name>deployment-specific-certificate</name>
     <public-key>
```

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4.3. YANG Module

```
This YANG module has normative references to
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] and
informative references to [RFC4253] and [RFC7317].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ssh-server@2019-11-20.yang"
module ietf-ssh-server {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server";
  prefix sshs;
  import ietf-ssh-common {
    prefix sshcmn;
    revision-date 2019-11-20; // stable grouping definitions
      "RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
  }
  import ietf-crypto-types {
    prefix ct;
    reference
      "RFC AAAA: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
  }
  import ietf-truststore {
    prefix ts;
    reference
      "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
  }
  import ietf-keystore {
    prefix ks;
    reference
      "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
  }
  import iana-crypt-hash {
    prefix ianach;
    reference
```

```
}
// Features
feature ssh-server-transport-params-config {
    "SSH transport layer parameters are configurable on an SSH
     server.";
}
feature ssh-server-keepalives {
  description
    "Per socket SSH keepalive parameters are configurable for
     SSH servers on the server implementing this feature.";
}
feature client-auth-config-supported {
  description
    "Indicates that the configuration for how to authenticate
     clients can be configured herein, as opposed to in an
     application specific location. That is, to support the
     consuming data models that prefer to place client
     authentication with client definitions, rather then
     in a data model principally concerned with configuring
     the transport.";
}
feature external-client-auth-supported {
  description
    "Indicates that the SSH server supports external configuration
     of client credentials.";
}
// Groupings
grouping ssh-server-grouping {
  description
    "A reusable grouping for configuring a SSH server without
     any consideration for how underlying TCP sessions are
     established.
     Note that this grouping uses fairly typical descendent
     node names such that a stack of 'uses' statements will
     have name conflicts. It is intended that the consuming
     data model will resolve the issue (e.g., by wrapping
```

the 'uses' statement in a container called 'ssh-server-parameters'). This model purposely does not do this itself so as to provide maximum flexibility

container certificate {

uses

if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";

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```
ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping;
        must "public-key-format = ct:ssh-public-key-format";
        description
          "A locally-defined or referenced end-entity
           certificate to be used for the SSH server's
           host key.";
        reference
          "RFC ZZZZ: YANG Data Model for a Centralized
                     Keystore Mechanism";
      }
    }
} // container server-identity
container client-authentication {
  nacm:default-deny-write;
  description
    "Specifies how the SSH server can authenticate SSH clients.";
  container supported-authentication-methods {
    description
      "Indicates which authentication methods the server
       supports.";
    leaf publickey {
      type empty;
      description
        "Indicates that the 'publickey' method is supported.
         Note that RFC 6187 X.509v3 Certificates for SSH uses
         the 'publickey' method name.";
      reference
        "RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication
                   Protocol.
         RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
                   Authentication.";
    }
    leaf passsword {
      type empty;
      description
        "Indicates that the 'password' method is supported.";
      reference
        "RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication
                   Protocol.";
    }
    leaf hostbased {
      type empty;
      description
        "Indicates that the 'hostbased' method is supported.";
      reference
        "RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication
```

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```
Protocol.";
  }
 leaf none {
    type empty;
    description
      "Indicates that the 'none' method is supported.";
    reference
      "RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication
                 Protocol.";
  }
  leaf-list other {
    type string;
    description
      "Indicates a supported method name not defined by
       RFC 4253.";
    reference
      "RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication
                 Protocol.";
 }
}
container users {
  if-feature "client-auth-config-supported";
 description
    "A list of locally configured users.";
 list user {
    key name;
    description
      "The list of local users configured on this device.";
    leaf name {
      type string;
      description
       "The user name string identifying this entry.";
    }
    leaf password {
      type ianach:crypt-hash;
      description
        "The password for this entry.";
    }
    container host-keys { // FIXME: plural too much?
      presence
        "Indicates that the server can authenticate this
         user using the configured SSH host keys.";
      description
        "A set of SSH host keys used by the SSH server to
         authenticate this user. A user is authenticated
         if its host key is an exact match to a configured
```

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```
host key.";
        reference
          "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer";
        uses ts:local-or-truststore-host-keys-grouping;
      }
    }
  }
  container ca-certs {
    if-feature "client-auth-config-supported";
    if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
    presence
      "Indicates that the SSH server can authenticate SSH
       clients using configured certificate authority (CA)
       certificates.";
    description
      "A set of certificate authority (CA) certificates used by
       the SSH server to authenticate SSH client certificates.
       A client certificate is authenticated if it has a valid
       chain of trust to a configured CA certificate.";
    reference
      "RFC YYYY:
        YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
    uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
  container client-certs {
                            // FIXME: plural too much?
    if-feature "client-auth-config-supported";
    if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
    presence
      "Indicates that the SSH server can authenticate SSH
       clients using configured client certificates.";
    description
      "A set of client certificates (i.e., end entity
       certificates) used by the SSH server to authenticate
       the certificates presented by SSH clients. A client
       certificate is authenticated if it is an exact match
       to a configured client certificate.";
    reference
      "RFC YYYY:
        YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
    uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
} // container client-authentication
container transport-params {
  nacm:default-deny-write;
  if-feature "ssh-server-transport-params-config";
  description
    "Configurable parameters of the SSH transport layer.";
```

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```
uses sshcmn:transport-params-grouping;
    } // container transport-params
   container keepalives {
      nacm:default-deny-write;
      if-feature "ssh-server-keepalives";
      presence "Indicates that keepalives are enabled.";
      description
        "Configures the keep-alive policy, to proactively test
         the aliveness of the SSL client. An unresponsive SSL
         client is dropped after approximately max-wait *
         max-attempts seconds.";
      leaf max-wait {
        type uint16 {
          range "1..max";
        }
        units "seconds";
        default "30";
        description
          "Sets the amount of time in seconds after which
           if no data has been received from the SSL client,
           a SSL-level message will be sent to test the
           aliveness of the SSL client.";
      }
      leaf max-attempts {
        type uint8;
        default "3";
        description
          "Sets the maximum number of sequential keep-alive
           messages that can fail to obtain a response from
           the SSL client before assuming the SSL client is
           no longer alive.";
      }
    } // container keepalives
 } // grouping server-identity-grouping
<CODE ENDS>
```

5. The SSH Common Model

The SSH common model presented in this section contains identities and groupings common to both SSH clients and SSH servers. The transport-params-grouping can be used to configure the list of SSH transport algorithms permitted by the SSH client or SSH server. The lists of algorithms are ordered such that, if multiple algorithms are permitted by the client, the algorithm that appears first in its list that is also permitted by the server is used for the SSH transport

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layer connection. The ability to restrict the algorithms allowed is provided in this grouping for SSH clients and SSH servers that are capable of doing so and may serve to make SSH clients and SSH servers compliant with security policies.

[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] defines six categories of cryptographic algorithms (hash-algorithm, symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm, mac-algorithm, asymmetric-key-encryption-algorithm, signature-algorithm, key-negotiation-algorithm) and lists several widely accepted algorithms for each of them. The SSH client and server models use one or more of these algorithms. The SSH common model includes four parameters for configuring its permitted SSH algorithms, which are: host-key-alg, key-exchange-alg, encryption-alg and mac-alg. The following tables are provided, in part, to define the subset of algorithms defined in the crypto-types model used by SSH and, in part, to ensure compatibility of configured SSH cryptographic parameters for configuring its permitted SSH algorithms ("sshcmn" representing SSH common model, and "ct" representing crypto-types model which the SSH client/server model is based on):

+	++
sshcmn:host-key-alg	ct:signature-algorithm
dsa-sha1	
rsa-pkcs1-sha1	rsa-pkcs1-sha1
rsa-pkcs1-sha256	rsa-pkcs1-sha256
rsa-pkcs1-sha512	rsa-pkcs1-sha512
ecdsa-secp256r1-sha256	ecdsa-secp256r1-sha256
ecdsa-secp384r1-sha384	ecdsa-secp384r1-sha384
ecdsa-secp521r1-sha512	ecdsa-secp521r1-sha512
x509v3-rsa-pkcs1-sha1	x509v3-rsa-pkcs1-sha1
x509v3-rsa2048-pkcs1-sha256	x509v3-rsa2048-pkcs1-sha1
x509v3-ecdsa-secp256r1-sha256	x509v3-ecdsa-secp256r1-sha256
x509v3-ecdsa-secp384r1-sha384	x509v3-ecdsa-secp384r1-sha384
x509v3-ecdsa-secp521r1-sha512	x509v3-ecdsa-secp521r1-sha512
+	++

Table 1 The SSH Host-key-alg Compatibility Matrix

```
+----+
| diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 | diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
| diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 | diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 |
| diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 | diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 |
| diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 | diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 |
| diffie-hellman-group17-sha512 | diffie-hellman-group17-sha512 |
| diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 | diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 |
+----+
```

Table 2 The SSH Key-exchange-alg Compatibility Matrix

```
+-----+
| sshcmn:encryption-alg | ct:symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm |
+----+
+----+
```

Table 3 The SSH Encryption-alg Compatibility Matrix

```
+----+
| sshcmn:mac-alg | ct:mac-algorithm |
+----+
| hmac-sha1 | hmac-sha1
| hmac-sha1-96 | hmac-sha1-96
| hmac-sha2-256 | hmac-sha2-256
| hmac-sha2-512 | hmac-sha2-512
+----+
```

Table 4 The SSH Mac-alg Compatibility Matrix

As is seen in the tables above, the names of the "sshcmn" algorithms are all identical to the names of algorithms defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. While appearing to be redundant, it is important to realize that not all the algorithms defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] are supported by SSH. That is, the algorithms supported by SSH are a subset of the algorithms defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. The algorithms used by SSH are redefined in this document in order to constrain the algorithms that may be selected to just the ones used by SSH.

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Features are defined for algorithms that are OPTIONAL or are not widely supported by popular implementations. Note that the list of algorithms is not exhaustive. As well, some algorithms that are REQUIRED by [RFC4253] are missing, notably "ssh-dss" and "diffiehellman-group1-sha1" due to their weak security and there being alternatives that are widely supported.

5.1. Tree Diagram

The following tree diagram [RFC8340] provides an overview of the data model for the "ietf-ssh-common" module.

```
module: ietf-ssh-common
  grouping transport-params-grouping
   +-- host-key
   | +-- host-key-alg*
                          identityref
   +-- key-exchange
   | +-- key-exchange-alg* identityref
   +-- encryption
   | +-- encryption-alg* identityref
   +-- mac
      +-- mac-alg* identityref
```

5.2. Example Usage

This following example illustrates how the transport-params-grouping appears when populated with some data.

"RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell

Authentication";

reference

}

```
feature ssh-dh-group-exchange {
  description
    "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange is supported for SSH.";
  reference
    "RFC 4419: Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the
               Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
feature ssh-ctr {
  description
    "SDCTR encryption mode is supported for SSH.";
  reference
    "RFC 4344: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
               Encryption Modes";
}
feature ssh-sha2 {
  description
    "The SHA2 family of cryptographic hash functions is
     supported for SSH.";
  reference
    "FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)";
}
// Identities
identity public-key-alg-base {
  description
    "Base identity used to identify public key algorithms.";
}
identity ssh-dss {
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Digital Signature Algorithm using SHA-1 as the
     hashing algorithm.";
  reference
    "RFC 4253:
       The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity ssh-rsa {
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme using SHA-1 as the
     hashing algorithm.";
  reference
```

"RFC 4253:

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```
The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using the
     nistp256 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
               Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}
identity ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using the
     nistp384 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
               Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}
identity ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using the
     nistp521 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
               Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}
identity x509v3-ssh-rsa {
  if-feature "ssh-x509-certs";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme using a public key stored
     in an X.509v3 certificate and using SHA-1 as the hashing
     algorithm.";
  reference
```

"RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell

Authentication";

}

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```
identity x509v3-rsa2048-sha256 {
  if-feature "ssh-x509-certs and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
 description
    "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme using a public key stored
     in an X.509v3 certificate and using SHA-256 as the hashing
     algorithm. RSA keys conveyed using this format MUST have a
     modulus of at least 2048 bits.";
  reference
    "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
              Authentication";
}
identity x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-x509-certs and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
     using the nistp256 curve with a public key stored in
     an X.509v3 certificate and using the SHA2 family of
     hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
              Authentication";
}
identity x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-x509-certs and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
 description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
     using the nistp384 curve with a public key stored in
     an X.509v3 certificate and using the SHA2 family of
     hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
              Authentication";
}
identity x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-x509-certs and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
     using the nistp521 curve with a public key stored in
     an X.509v3 certificate and using the SHA2 family of
     hashing algorithms.";
  reference
```

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```
"RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
               Authentication";
}
identity key-exchange-alg-base {
  description
    "Base identity used to identify key exchange algorithms.";
}
identity diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 {
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
    "Diffie-Hellman key exchange with SHA-1 as HASH and
     Oakley Group 14 (2048-bit MODP Group).";
  reference
    "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 {
  if-feature "ssh-dh-group-exchange";
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
    "Diffie-Hellman Group and Key Exchange with SHA-1 as HASH.";
  reference
    "RFC 4419: Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the
               Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 {
  if-feature "ssh-dh-group-exchange and ssh-sha2";
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
    "Diffie-Hellman Group and Key Exchange with SHA-256 as HASH.";
  reference
    "RFC 4419: Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the
               Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity ecdh-sha2-nistp256 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange using the
     nistp256 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
               Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}
```

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```
identity ecdh-sha2-nistp384 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
 base key-exchange-alg-base;
 description
    "Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange using the
     nistp384 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
               Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}
identity ecdh-sha2-nistp521 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
 base key-exchange-alg-base;
 description
    "Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange using the
     nistp521 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
               Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}
identity encryption-alg-base {
 description
    "Base identity used to identify encryption algorithms.";
}
identity triple-des-cbc {
 base encryption-alg-base;
 description
    "Three-key 3DES in CBC mode.";
  reference
    "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity aes128-cbc {
 base encryption-alg-base;
 description
    "AES in CBC mode, with a 128-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity aes192-cbc {
 base encryption-alg-base;
 description
    "AES in CBC mode, with a 192-bit key.";
```

reference

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```
"RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity aes256-cbc {
  base encryption-alg-base;
  description
    "AES in CBC mode, with a 256-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity aes128-ctr {
  if-feature "ssh-ctr";
  base encryption-alg-base;
  description
    "AES in SDCTR mode, with 128-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC 4344: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption
               Modes";
}
identity aes192-ctr {
  if-feature "ssh-ctr";
  base encryption-alg-base;
  description
    "AES in SDCTR mode, with 192-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC 4344: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption
               Modes";
}
identity aes256-ctr {
  if-feature "ssh-ctr";
  base encryption-alg-base;
  description
    "AES in SDCTR mode, with 256-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC 4344: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption
       Modes";
}
identity mac-alg-base {
  description
    "Base identity used to identify message authentication
     code (MAC) algorithms.";
}
```

identity hmac-sha1 {

```
base mac-alg-base;
  description
    "HMAC-SHA1";
  reference
    "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity hmac-sha2-256 {
  if-feature "ssh-sha2";
  base mac-alg-base;
  description
    "HMAC-SHA2-256";
  reference
    "RFC 6668: SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the
               Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity hmac-sha2-512 {
  if-feature "ssh-sha2";
  base mac-alg-base;
  description
    "HMAC-SHA2-512";
  reference
    "RFC 6668: SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the
               Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
// Groupings
grouping transport-params-grouping {
  description
    "A reusable grouping for SSH transport parameters.";
    "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
  container host-key {
    description
      "Parameters regarding host key.";
    leaf-list host-key-alg {
      type identityref {
        base public-key-alg-base;
      ordered-by user;
      description
        "Acceptable host key algorithms in order of descending
         preference. The configured host key algorithms should
         be compatible with the algorithm used by the configured
         private key. Please see Section 5 of RFC XXXX for
         valid combinations.
```

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```
If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
       the acceptable host key algorithms are implementation-
       defined.";
    reference
      "RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
  }
}
container key-exchange {
  description
    "Parameters regarding key exchange.";
  leaf-list key-exchange-alg {
    type identityref {
      base key-exchange-alg-base;
    }
    ordered-by user;
    description
      "Acceptable key exchange algorithms in order of descending
       preference.
       If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
       the acceptable key exchange algorithms are implementation
       defined.";
  }
}
container encryption {
  description
    "Parameters regarding encryption.";
  leaf-list encryption-alg {
    type identityref {
      base encryption-alg-base;
    ordered-by user;
    description
      "Acceptable encryption algorithms in order of descending
       preference.
       If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
       the acceptable encryption algorithms are implementation
       defined.";
  }
container mac {
  description
    "Parameters regarding message authentication code (MAC).";
  leaf-list mac-alg {
    type identityref {
      base mac-alg-base;
    }
```

```
ordered-by user;
description
   "Acceptable MAC algorithms in order of descending
   preference.

   If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
      the acceptable MAC algorithms are implementation-
      defined.";
}
}
```

<CODE ENDS>

6. Security Considerations

The YANG modules defined in this document are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.

The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content.

Since the modules in this document only define groupings, these considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that use these groupings.

There are a number of data nodes defined in the YANG modules that are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

*: All of the nodes defined by the grouping statement in both the "ietf-ssh-client" and "ietf-ssh-server" modules are sensitive to write operations. For instance, the addition or removal of references to keys, certificates, trusted anchors, etc., or even the modification of transport or keepalive parameters can dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason, all the nodes are protected the NACM extension "default-deny-write".

Some of the readable data nodes in the YANG modules may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

- ssh-client-grouping/client-identity/: This subtree in the "ietf-ssh-client" module contains nodes that are additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, they should never be returned to a client. Specifically, the descendent nodes 'password', 'public-key/local-definition/private-key' and 'certificate/local-definition/private-key'. For this reason, all of these node are protected by the NACM extension "default-deny-all".
- ssh-server-grouping/server-identity/: This subtree in the "ietf-ssh-server" module contains nodes that are additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, they should never be returned to a client. Specifically, the descendent nodes 'host-key/public-key/local-definition/private-key' and 'host-key/certificate/local-definition/private-key'. For this reason, both of these node are protected by the NACM extension "default-deny-all".

Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control access to these operations. These are the operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

*: The groupings defined in this document include "action" statements that come from groupings defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. Please consult that document for the security considerations of the "action" statements defined by the "grouping" statements defined in this document.

7. IANA Considerations

7.1. The IETF XML Registry

This document registers three URIs in the "ns" subregistry of the IETF XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registrations are requested:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-client
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.

 $\mathsf{XML}\colon\,\mathsf{N/A},\;\mathsf{the}\;\mathsf{requested}\;\mathsf{URI}\;\mathsf{is}\;\mathsf{an}\;\mathsf{XML}\;\mathsf{namespace}\,.$

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

7.2. The YANG Module Names Registry

This document registers three YANG modules in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the following registrations are requested:

name: ietf-ssh-client

namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-client

prefix: sshc
reference: RFC XXXX

name: ietf-ssh-server

namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server

prefix: sshs
reference: RFC XXXX

name: ietf-ssh-common

namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common

prefix: sshcmn
reference: RFC XXXX

8. References

8.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]

Watsen, K. and H. Wang, "Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography", draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-12 (work in progress), November 2019.

[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]

Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", <u>draftietf-netconf-keystore-14</u> (work in progress), November 2019.

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- [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]
 Watsen, K. and H. Birkholz, "A YANG Data Model for a
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8.2. Informative References

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- [RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242.
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- [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", <u>RFC 8040</u>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040.

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Appendix A. Change Log

A.1. 00 to 01

- o Noted that '0.0.0.0' and '::' might have special meanings.
- o Renamed "keychain" to "keystore".

A.2. 01 to 02

- o Removed the groupings 'listening-ssh-client-grouping' and 'listening-ssh-server-grouping'. Now modules only contain the transport-independent groupings.
- o Simplified the "client-auth" part in the ietf-ssh-client module. It now inlines what it used to point to keystore for.
- o Added cipher suites for various algorithms into new 'ietf-ssh-common' module.

A.3. 02 to 03

- o Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from 'password' leaf type.
- o Added a 'must' statement to container 'server-auth' asserting that at least one of the various auth mechanisms must be specified.
- o Fixed description statement for leaf 'trusted-ca-certs'.

A.4. 03 to 04

- o Change title to "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers"
- o Added reference to RFC 6668
- o Added <u>RFC 8174</u> to Requirements Language Section.
- o Enhanced description statement for ietf-ssh-server's "trusted-ca-certs" leaf.
- o Added mandatory true to ietf-ssh-client's "client-auth" 'choice' statement.
- o Changed the YANG prefix for module ietf-ssh-common from 'sshcom' to 'sshcmn'.
- o Removed the compression algorithms as they are not commonly configurable in vendors' implementations.

- o Updating descriptions in transport-params-grouping and the servers's usage of it.
- o Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams
- o Updated YANG to use typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore paths
- o Now inlines key and certificates (no longer a leafref to keystore)

A.5. 04 to 05

o Merged changes from co-author.

A.6. 05 to 06

- o Updated to use trust anchors from trust-anchors draft (was keystore draft)
- o Now uses new keystore grouping enabling asymmetric key to be either locally defined or a reference to the keystore.

A.7. 06 to 07

- o factored the ssh-[client|server]-groupings into more reusable groupings.
- o added if-feature statements for the new "ssh-host-keys" and "x509-certificates" features defined in <u>draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors</u>.

A.8. 07 to 08

- o Added a number of compatibility matrices to <u>Section 5</u> (thanks Frank!)
- o Clarified that any configured "host-key-alg" values need to be compatible with the configured private key.

A.9. 08 to 09

- o Updated examples to reflect update to groupings defined in the keystore -09 draft.
- o Add SSH keepalives features and groupings.
- o Prefixed top-level SSH grouping nodes with 'ssh-' and support mashups.

o Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, and folding algorithm.

A.10. 09 to 10

o Reformatted the YANG modules.

A.11. 10 to 11

o Reformatted lines causing folding to occur.

A.12. 11 to 12

- o Collapsed all the inner groupings into the top-level grouping.
- o Added a top-level "demux container" inside the top-level grouping.
- o Added NACM statements and updated the Security Considerations section.
- o Added "presence" statements on the "keepalive" containers, as was needed to address a validation error that appeared after adding the "must" statements into the NETCONF/RESTCONF client/server modules.
- o Updated the boilerplate text in module-level "description" statement to match copyeditor convention.

A.13. 12 to 13

- o Removed the "demux containers", floating the nacm:default-denywrite to each descendent node, and adding a note to model designers regarding the potential need to add their own demux containers.
- o Fixed a couple references (section 2 --> section 3)
- o In the server model, replaced <client-cert-auth> with <client-authentication> and introduced 'local-or-external' choice.

A.14. 13 to 14

o Updated to reflect changes in trust-anchors drafts (e.g., s/trustanchors/truststore/g + s/pinned.//)

A.15. 14 to 15

- o Updated examples to reflect ietf-crypto-types change (e.g., identities --> enumerations)
- o Updated "server-authentication" and "client-authentication" nodes from being a leaf of type "ts:host-keys-ref" or "ts:certificates-ref" to a container that uses "ts:local-or-truststore-host-keys-grouping" or "ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping".

A.16. 15 to 16

- o Removed unnecessary if-feature statements in the -client and -server modules.
- o Cleaned up some description statements in the -client and -server modules.
- o Fixed a canonical ordering issue in ietf-ssh-common detected by new pyang.

A.17. 16 to 17

- o Removed choice local-or-external by removing the 'external' case and flattening the 'local' case and adding a "client-auth-configsupported" feature.
- o Updated examples to include the "*-key-format" nodes.
- o Augmented-in "must" expressions ensuring that locally-defined public-key-format are "ct:ssh-public-key-format" (must expr for ref'ed keys are TBD).

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Authors' Addresses

Kent Watsen Watsen Networks

EMail: kent+ietf@watsen.net

Gary Wu Cisco Systems

EMail: garywu@cisco.com

Liang Xia Huawei

EMail: frank.xialiang@huawei.com