Authors: K. Watsen   G. Wu
         Watsen Networks   Cisco Systems
YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers

Abstract

   This document defines three YANG modules: the first defines
   groupings for a generic SSH client, the second defines groupings for
   a generic SSH server, and the third defines common identities and
   groupings used by both the client and the server. It is intended
   that these groupings will be used by applications using the SSH
   protocol.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

   This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced with
   finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes
   all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor
   instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.

   Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
   progress. Please apply the following replacements:

     *AAAA --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-
      types

     *BBBB --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-trust-
      anchors

     *CCCC --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-keystore

     *DDDD --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-tcp-
      client-server

     *EEEE --> the assigned RFC value for this draft

   Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
   publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:

     *2020-07-08 --> the publication date of this draft

The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:

   *Appendix A. Change Log

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This document defines three YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] modules: the first
defines a grouping for a generic SSH client, the second defines a
grouping for a generic SSH server, and the third defines identities
and groupings common to both the client and the server. It is
intended that these groupings will be used by applications using the
SSH protocol [RFC4252], [RFC4253], and [RFC4254]. For instance,
these groupings could be used to help define the data model for an

OpenSSH [OPENSSH] server or a NETCONF over SSH [RFC6242] based
server.

The client and server YANG modules in this document each define one
grouping, which is focused on just SSH-specific configuration, and
specifically avoids any transport-level configuration, such as what
ports to listen on or connect to. This affords applications the
opportunity to define their own strategy for how the underlying TCP
connection is established. For instance, applications supporting
NETCONF Call Home [RFC8071] could use the "ssh-server-grouping"
grouping for the SSH parts it provides, while adding data nodes for
the TCP-level call-home configuration.

The modules defined in this document use groupings defined in [I-
D.ietf-netconf-keystore] enabling keys to be either locally defined
or a reference to globally configured values.

The modules defined in this document optionally support [RFC6187]
enabling X.509v3 certificate based host keys and public keys.

1.1. Relation to other RFCs

This document presents one or more YANG modules [RFC7950] that are
part of a collection of RFCs that work together to define
configuration modules for clients and servers of both the NETCONF
[RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040] protocols.

The modules have been defined in a modular fashion to enable their
use by other efforts, some of which are known to be in progress at
the time of this writing, with many more expected to be defined in
time.

The relationship between the various RFCs in the collection is
presented in the below diagram. The labels in the diagram represent
the primary purpose provided by each RFC. Links the each RFC are
provided below the diagram.

```
                        crypto-types
                           ^       ^
                          /         \
                         /           \
                 truststore         keystore
                 ^       ^           ^   ^
                 |   +---------+     |   |
                 |   |         |     |   |
                 |   |    +-----------+  |
  tcp-client-server  |   /           |   |
     ^     ^    ssh-client-server    |   |
     |     |         ^         tls-client-server
     |     |         |         ^       ^     http-client-server
     |     |         |         |       |            ^
     |     |         |     +-----+   +---------+     |
     |     |         |     |         |         |     |
     |   +-----------|--------|-------------+  |     |
     |     |         |         |           |   |     |
   +-----------+     |         |           |   |     |
         |     |     |         |           |   |     |
         |     |     |         |           |   |     |
         netconf-client-server        restconf-client-server
```

Label in Diagram	Originating RFC
crypto-types	[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]
truststore	[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]
keystore	[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
tcp-client-server	[I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server]
ssh-client-server	[I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server]
tls-client-server	[I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server]
http-client-server	[I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server]
netconf-client-server	[I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server]
restconf-client-server	[I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server]

Table 1: Label to RFC Mapping

1.2. Specification Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

1.3. Adherence to the NMDA

This document in compliant with the Network Management Datastore
Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, as described in [I-
```

D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore], trust
anchors and keys installed during manufacturing are expected to
appear in <operational>.

## 2.  The "ietf-ssh-common" Module

The SSH common model presented in this section contains identities
and groupings common to both SSH clients and SSH servers. The
"transport-params-grouping" grouping can be used to configure the
list of SSH transport algorithms permitted by the SSH client or SSH
server. The lists of algorithms are ordered such that, if multiple
algorithms are permitted by the client, the algorithm that appears
first in its list that is also permitted by the server is used for
the SSH transport layer connection. The ability to restrict the
algorithms allowed is provided in this grouping for SSH clients and
SSH servers that are capable of doing so and may serve to make SSH
clients and SSH servers compliant with security policies.

Features are defined for algorithms that are OPTIONAL or are not
widely supported by popular implementations. Note that the list of
algorithms is not exhaustive. As well, some algorithms that are
REQUIRED by [RFC4253] are missing, notably "ssh-dss" and "diffie-
hellman-group1-sha1" due to their weak security and there being
alternatives that are widely supported.

### 2.1.  Data Model Overview

#### 2.1.1.  Features

The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in
the "ietf-ssh-common" module:

```
Features:
  +-- ssh-ecc
  +-- ssh-x509-certs
  +-- ssh-dh-group-exchange
  +-- ssh-ctr
  +-- ssh-sha2
```

2.1.2. Identities

The following diagram illustrates the relationship amongst the
"identity" statements defined in the "ietf-ssh-common" module:

```
Identities:
  +-- public-key-alg-base
  |  +-- ssh-dss
  |  +-- ssh-rsa
  |  +-- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
  |  +-- ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
  |  +-- ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
  |  +-- x509v3-ssh-rsa
  |  +-- x509v3-rsa2048-sha256
  |  +-- x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
  |  +-- x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
  |  +-- x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
  +-- key-exchange-alg-base
  |  +-- diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
  |  +-- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
  |  +-- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
  |  +-- ecdh-sha2-nistp256
  |  +-- ecdh-sha2-nistp384
  |  +-- ecdh-sha2-nistp521
  +-- encryption-alg-base
  |  +-- triple-des-cbc
  |  +-- aes128-cbc
  |  +-- aes192-cbc
  |  +-- aes256-cbc
  |  +-- aes128-ctr
  |  +-- aes192-ctr
  |  +-- aes256-ctr
  +-- mac-alg-base
     +-- hmac-sha1
     +-- hmac-sha2-256
     +-- hmac-sha2-512
```

Comments:

  *The diagram shows that there are four base identities.
  *These identities are used by this module to define algorithms for
   public-key, key-exchange, encryption, and MACs.
  *These base identities are "abstract", in the object orientied
   programming sense, in that they only define a "class" of
   algorithms, rather than a specific algorithm.

2.1.3. Groupings

  The following diagram lists all the "grouping" statements defined in
  the "ietf-ssh-common" module:

```
Groupings:
  +-- transport-params-grouping
```

Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.

2.1.3.1. The "transport-params-grouping" Grouping

The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "transport-params-grouping" grouping:

```
grouping transport-params-grouping
  +-- host-key
  |  +-- host-key-alg*   identityref
  +-- key-exchange
  |  +-- key-exchange-alg*   identityref
  +-- encryption
  |  +-- encryption-alg*   identityref
  +-- mac
     +-- mac-alg*   identityref
```

Comments:

   *This grouping is used by both the "ssh-client-grouping" and the
    "ssh-server-grouping" groupings defined in Section 3.1.2.1 and
    Section 4.1.2.1, respectively.

   *This grouping enables client and server configurations to specify
    the algorithms that are to be used when establishing SSH
    sessions.

   *Each list is "ordered-by user".

2.1.4. Protocol-accessible Nodes

The "ietf-ssh-common" module does not contain any protocol-accessible nodes, but the module needs to be "implemented", as described in Section 5.6.5 of [RFC7950], in order for the identities in Section 2.1.2 to be defined.

2.2. Example Usage

This following example illustrates how the "transport-params-grouping' grouping appears when populated with some data.

```
<transport-params
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common"
  xmlns:algs="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common">
  <host-key>
    <host-key-alg>algs:x509v3-rsa2048-sha256</host-key-alg>
    <host-key-alg>algs:ssh-rsa</host-key-alg>
  </host-key>
  <key-exchange>
    <key-exchange-alg>
      algs:diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
    </key-exchange-alg>
  </key-exchange>
  <encryption>
    <encryption-alg>algs:aes256-ctr</encryption-alg>
    <encryption-alg>algs:aes192-ctr</encryption-alg>
    <encryption-alg>algs:aes128-ctr</encryption-alg>
    <encryption-alg>algs:aes256-cbc</encryption-alg>
    <encryption-alg>algs:aes192-cbc</encryption-alg>
    <encryption-alg>algs:aes128-cbc</encryption-alg>
  </encryption>
  <mac>
    <mac-alg>algs:hmac-sha2-256</mac-alg>
    <mac-alg>algs:hmac-sha2-512</mac-alg>
  </mac>
</transport-params>
```

2.3. YANG Module

This YANG module has normative references to [RFC4253], [RFC4344],
[RFC4419], [RFC5656], [RFC6187], and [RFC6668].

   <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ssh-common@2020-07-08.yang"

```
module ietf-ssh-common {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common";
  prefix sshcmn;

  organization
    "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

  contact
    "WG Web:   <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
     WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
     Author:   Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
     Author:   Gary Wu <mailto:garywu@cisco.com>";

  description
    "This module defines a common features, identities, and
     groupings for Secure Shell (SSH).

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     as authors of the code. All rights reserved.

     Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
     or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
     subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
     BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
     Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
     (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

     This version of this YANG module is part of RFC EEEE
     (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcEEEE); see the RFC
     itself for full legal notices.;

     The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
     'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
     'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
     are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
     (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
     capitals, as shown here.";

  revision 2020-07-08 {
    description
      "Initial version";
    reference
      "RFC EEEE: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
  }

  // Features

  feature ssh-ecc {
    description
```

```
        "Elliptic Curve Cryptography is supported for SSH.";
      reference
        "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
                   Secure Shell Transport Layer";
  }

  feature ssh-x509-certs {
    description
      "X.509v3 certificates are supported for SSH per RFC 6187.";
    reference
      "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
                 Authentication";
  }

  feature ssh-dh-group-exchange {
    description
      "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange is supported for SSH.";
    reference
      "RFC 4419: Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the
                 Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
  }

  feature ssh-ctr {
    description
      "SDCTR encryption mode is supported for SSH.";
    reference
      "RFC 4344: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
                 Encryption Modes";
  }

  feature ssh-sha2 {
    description
      "The SHA2 family of cryptographic hash functions is
       supported for SSH.";
    reference
      "FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)";
  }

  // Identities

  identity public-key-alg-base {
    description
      "Base identity used to identify public key algorithms.";
  }

  identity ssh-dss {
    base public-key-alg-base;
    description
      "Digital Signature Algorithm using SHA-1 as the
```

```
      hashing algorithm.";
    reference
      "RFC 4253:
        The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}

identity ssh-rsa {
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme using SHA-1 as the
     hashing algorithm.";
  reference
    "RFC 4253:
      The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}

identity ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using the
     nistp256 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
               Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}

identity ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using the
     nistp384 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
               Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}

identity ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using the
     nistp521 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
               Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}
```

```
identity x509v3-ssh-rsa {
  if-feature "ssh-x509-certs";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme using a public key stored
     in an X.509v3 certificate and using SHA-1 as the hashing
     algorithm.";
  reference
    "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
              Authentication";
}

identity x509v3-rsa2048-sha256 {
  if-feature "ssh-x509-certs and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme using a public key stored
     in an X.509v3 certificate and using SHA-256 as the hashing
     algorithm.  RSA keys conveyed using this format MUST have a
     modulus of at least 2048 bits.";
  reference
    "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
              Authentication";
}

identity x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-x509-certs and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
     using the nistp256 curve with a public key stored in
     an X.509v3 certificate and using the SHA2 family of
     hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
              Authentication";
}

identity x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-x509-certs and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
     using the nistp384 curve with a public key stored in
     an X.509v3 certificate and using the SHA2 family of
     hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
              Authentication";
```

```
     }

     identity x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 {
       if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-x509-certs and ssh-sha2";
       base public-key-alg-base;
       description
         "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
          using the nistp521 curve with a public key stored in
          an X.509v3 certificate and using the SHA2 family of
          hashing algorithms.";
       reference
         "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
                    Authentication";
     }

     identity key-exchange-alg-base {
       description
         "Base identity used to identify key exchange algorithms.";
     }

     identity diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 {
       base key-exchange-alg-base;
       description
         "Diffie-Hellman key exchange with SHA-1 as HASH and
          Oakley Group 14 (2048-bit MODP Group).";
       reference
         "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
     }

     identity diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 {
       if-feature "ssh-dh-group-exchange";
       base key-exchange-alg-base;
       description
         "Diffie-Hellman Group and Key Exchange with SHA-1 as HASH.";
       reference
         "RFC 4419: Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the
                    Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
     }

     identity diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 {
       if-feature "ssh-dh-group-exchange and ssh-sha2";
       base key-exchange-alg-base;
       description
         "Diffie-Hellman Group and Key Exchange with SHA-256 as HASH.";
       reference
         "RFC 4419: Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the
                    Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
     }
```

```
identity ecdh-sha2-nistp256 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange using the
     nistp256 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
               Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}

identity ecdh-sha2-nistp384 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange using the
     nistp384 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
               Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}

identity ecdh-sha2-nistp521 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange using the
     nistp521 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.";
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
               Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}

identity encryption-alg-base {
  description
    "Base identity used to identify encryption algorithms.";
}

identity triple-des-cbc {
  base encryption-alg-base;
  description
    "Three-key 3DES in CBC mode.";
  reference
    "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}

identity aes128-cbc {
  base encryption-alg-base;
  description
```

```
      "AES in CBC mode, with a 128-bit key.";
    reference
      "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
  }

  identity aes192-cbc {
    base encryption-alg-base;
    description
      "AES in CBC mode, with a 192-bit key.";
    reference
      "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
  }

  identity aes256-cbc {
    base encryption-alg-base;
    description
      "AES in CBC mode, with a 256-bit key.";
    reference
      "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
  }

  identity aes128-ctr {
    if-feature "ssh-ctr";
    base encryption-alg-base;
    description
      "AES in SDCTR mode, with 128-bit key.";
    reference
      "RFC 4344: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption
                 Modes";
  }

  identity aes192-ctr {
    if-feature "ssh-ctr";
    base encryption-alg-base;
    description
      "AES in SDCTR mode, with 192-bit key.";
    reference
      "RFC 4344: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption
                 Modes";
  }

  identity aes256-ctr {
    if-feature "ssh-ctr";
    base encryption-alg-base;
    description
      "AES in SDCTR mode, with 256-bit key.";
    reference
      "RFC 4344: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption
         Modes";
```

```
        }

        identity mac-alg-base {
          description
            "Base identity used to identify message authentication
             code (MAC) algorithms.";
        }

        identity hmac-sha1 {
          base mac-alg-base;
          description
            "HMAC-SHA1";
          reference
            "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
        }

        identity hmac-sha2-256 {
          if-feature "ssh-sha2";
          base mac-alg-base;
          description
            "HMAC-SHA2-256";
          reference
            "RFC 6668: SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the
                       Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
        }

        identity hmac-sha2-512 {
          if-feature "ssh-sha2";
          base mac-alg-base;
          description
            "HMAC-SHA2-512";
          reference
            "RFC 6668: SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the
                       Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
        }

        // Groupings

        grouping transport-params-grouping {
          description
            "A reusable grouping for SSH transport parameters.";
          reference
            "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
          container host-key {
            description
              "Parameters regarding host key.";
            leaf-list host-key-alg {
              type identityref {
                base public-key-alg-base;
```

```
          }
          ordered-by user;
          description
            "Acceptable host key algorithms in order of descending
             preference.  The configured host key algorithms should
             be compatible with the algorithm used by the configured
             private key.  Please see Section 5 of RFC EEEE for
             valid combinations.

             If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
             the acceptable host key algorithms are implementation-
             defined.";
          reference
            "RFC EEEE: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
        }
      }
      container key-exchange {
        description
          "Parameters regarding key exchange.";
        leaf-list key-exchange-alg {
          type identityref {
            base key-exchange-alg-base;
          }
          ordered-by user;
          description
            "Acceptable key exchange algorithms in order of descending
             preference.

             If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
             the acceptable key exchange algorithms are implementation
             defined.";
        }
      }
      container encryption {
        description
          "Parameters regarding encryption.";
        leaf-list encryption-alg {
          type identityref {
            base encryption-alg-base;
          }
          ordered-by user;
          description
            "Acceptable encryption algorithms in order of descending
             preference.

             If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
             the acceptable encryption algorithms are implementation
             defined.";
        }
```

```
      }
    container mac {
      description
        "Parameters regarding message authentication code (MAC).";
      leaf-list mac-alg {
        type identityref {
          base mac-alg-base;
        }
        ordered-by user;
        description
          "Acceptable MAC algorithms in order of descending
           preference.

           If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
           the acceptable MAC algorithms are implementation-
           defined.";
      }
    }
  }
}
```

```
   <CODE ENDS>
```

3. The "ietf-ssh-client" Module

3.1. Data Model Overview

3.1.1. Features

The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in
the "ietf-ssh-client" module:

```
Features:
  +-- ssh-client-transport-params-config
  +-- ssh-client-keepalives
  +-- client-identity-password
  +-- client-identity-publickey
  +-- client-identity-hostbased
  +-- client-identity-none
```

3.1.2. Groupings

The following diagram lists all the "grouping" statements defined in
the "ietf-ssh-client" module:

```
Groupings:
  +-- ssh-client-grouping
```

Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.

3.1.2.1. The "ssh-client-grouping" Grouping

The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "ssh-client-
grouping" grouping:

```
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

grouping ssh-client-grouping
  +-- client-identity
  |  +-- username?       string
  |  +-- public-key! {client-identity-publickey}?
  |  |  +---u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
  |  +-- password?       string {client-identity-password}?
  |  +-- hostbased! {client-identity-hostbased}?
  |  |  +---u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
  |  +-- none?           empty {client-identity-none}?
  |  +-- certificate! {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
  |     +---u ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-groupi\
ng
  +-- server-authentication
  |  +-- ssh-host-keys!
  |  |  +---u ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping
  |  +-- ca-certs! {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
  |  |  +---u ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping
  |  +-- ee-certs! {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
  |     +---u ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping
  +-- transport-params {ssh-client-transport-params-config}?
  |  +---u sshcmn:transport-params-grouping
  +-- keepalives! {ssh-client-keepalives}?
     +-- max-wait?       uint16
     +-- max-attempts?   uint8
```

Comments:

  *The "client-identity" node configures a "username" and
   credentials, each enabled by a "feature" statement defined in
   [Section 3.1.1](#).

  *The "server-authentication" node configures trust anchors for
   authenticating the SSH server, with each option enabled by a
   "feature" statement.

  *The "transport-params" node, which must be enabled by a feature,
   configures parameters for the SSH sessions established by this
   configuration.

  *The "keepalives" node, which must be enabled by a feature,
   configures a "presence" container for testing the aliveness of
   the SSH server. The aliveness-test occurs at the SSH protocol
   layer.

  *For the referenced grouping statement(s):

     -The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping is
      discussed in [Section 2.1.3.4](#) of [[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore](#)].

-The "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping"
 grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.6 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-
 keystore].
-The "local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping" grouping is
 discussed in Section 2.1.3.2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-
 anchors].
-The "local-or-truststore-certs-grouping" grouping is discussed
 in Section 2.1.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].
-The "transport-params-grouping" grouping is discussed in
 Section 2.1.3.1 in this document.

3.2. Example Usage

This section presents two examples showing the "ssh-client-grouping"
grouping populated with some data. These examples are effectively
the same except the first configures the client identity using a
local key while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both
examples are consistent with the examples presented in Section 2 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-
netconf-keystore].

The following configuration example uses local-definitions for the
client identity and server authentication:

```
=============== NOTE: '\\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===============

<ssh-client
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-client"
  xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"
  xmlns:algs="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common">

  <!-- how this client will authenticate itself to the server -->
  <client-identity>
    <username>foobar</username>
    <public-key>
      <local-definition>
        <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format</public-key-form\
\at>
        <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
        <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\
\ormat>
        <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
      </local-definition>
    </public-key>
  </client-identity>

  <!-- which host keys will this client trust -->
  <server-authentication>
    <ssh-host-keys>
      <local-definition> <!-- FIXME: float 'local-def' down to each?\
\ -->
        <!--<ssh-public-key>-->
        <public-key>
          <name>corp-fw1</name>
          <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format</public-key-fo\
\rmat>
          <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
          <!--
        </ssh-public-key>
        <ssh-public-key>
        -->
        </public-key>
        <public-key>
          <name>corp-fw2</name>
          <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format</public-key-fo\
\rmat>
          <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
          <!--</ssh-public-key>-->
        </public-key>
      </local-definition>
    </ssh-host-keys>
    <ca-certs>
      <local-definition>
```

```xml
        <certificate>
          <name>Server Cert Issuer #1</name>
          <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
        </certificate>
        <certificate>
          <name>Server Cert Issuer #2</name>
          <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
        </certificate>
      </local-definition>
    </ca-certs>
    <ee-certs>
      <local-definition>
        <certificate>
          <name>My Application #1</name>
          <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
        </certificate>
        <certificate>
          <name>My Application #2</name>
          <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
        </certificate>
      </local-definition>
    </ee-certs>
  </server-authentication>

  <keepalives>
    <max-wait>30</max-wait>
    <max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
  </keepalives>

</ssh-client>
```

The following configuration example uses keystore-references for the
client identity and truststore-references for server authentication:
from the keystore:

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

```
<ssh-client
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-client"
  xmlns:algs="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common">

  <!-- how this client will authenticate itself to the server -->
  <client-identity>
    <username>foobar</username>
    <!-- can an SSH client have move than one key?
    <public-key>
      <keystore-reference>ssh-rsa-key</keystore-reference>
    </public-key>
    -->
    <certificate>
      <keystore-reference>
        <asymmetric-key>ssh-rsa-key-with-cert</asymmetric-key>
        <certificate>ex-rsa-cert2</certificate>
      </keystore-reference>
    </certificate>
  </client-identity>

  <!-- which host-keys will this client trust -->
  <server-authentication>
    <ssh-host-keys> <!-- FIXME: should 'ts-ref' be to bag or each ke\
y? -->
      <truststore-reference>trusted-ssh-public-keys</truststore-refe\
rence>
    </ssh-host-keys>
    <ca-certs> <!-- FIXME: should 'ts-ref' be to bag or each key? -->
      <truststore-reference>trusted-server-ca-certs</truststore-refe\
rence>
    </ca-certs>
    <ee-certs> <!-- FIXME: should 'ts-ref' be to bag or each key? -->
      <truststore-reference>trusted-server-ee-certs</truststore-refe\
rence>
    </ee-certs>
  </server-authentication>

  <keepalives>
    <max-wait>30</max-wait>
    <max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
  </keepalives>

</ssh-client>
```

3.3. YANG Module

This YANG module has normative references to [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors], and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ssh-client@2020-07-08.yang"

```
module ietf-ssh-client {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-client";
  prefix sshc;

  import ietf-netconf-acm {
    prefix nacm;
    reference
      "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
  }

  import ietf-crypto-types {
    prefix ct;
    reference
      "RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
  }

  import ietf-truststore {
    prefix ts;
    reference
      "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
  }

  import ietf-keystore {
    prefix ks;
    reference
      "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
  }

  import ietf-ssh-common {
    prefix sshcmn;
    revision-date 2020-07-08; // stable grouping definitions
    reference
      "RFC EEEE: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
  }

  organization
    "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

  contact
    "WG Web:   <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
     WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
     Author:   Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
     Author:   Gary Wu <mailto:garywu@cisco.com>";

  description
    "This module defines reusable groupings for SSH clients that
     can be used as a basis for specific SSH client instances.

     Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified
```

```
  revision 2020-07-08 {
    description
      "Initial version";
    reference
      "RFC EEEE: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
  }

  // Features

  feature ssh-client-transport-params-config {
    description
      "SSH transport layer parameters are configurable on an SSH
       client.";
  }

  feature ssh-client-keepalives {
    description
      "Per socket SSH keepalive parameters are configurable for
       SSH clients on the server implementing this feature.";
  }

  feature client-identity-password {
    description
      "Indicates that the 'password' authentication type
       is supported for client identification.";
  }

  feature client-identity-publickey {
    description
      "Indicates that the 'publickey' authentication type
```

```
        is supported for client identification.

        The 'publickey' authentication type is required by
        RFC 4252, but common implementations enable it to
        be disabled.";
  }

  feature client-identity-hostbased {
    description
      "Indicates that the 'hostbased' authentication type
       is supported for client identification.";
  }

  feature client-identity-none {
    description
      "Indicates that the 'none' authentication type is
       supported for client identification.";
  }

  // Groupings

  grouping ssh-client-grouping {
    description
      "A reusable grouping for configuring a SSH client without
       any consideration for how an underlying TCP session is
       established.

       Note that this grouping uses fairly typical descendent
       node names such that a stack of 'uses' statements will
       have name conflicts.  It is intended that the consuming
       data model will resolve the issue (e.g., by wrapping
       the 'uses' statement in a container called
       'ssh-client-parameters').  This model purposely does
       not do this itself so as to provide maximum flexibility
       to consuming models.";

    container client-identity {
      nacm:default-deny-write;
      must
        'public-key or password or hostbased or none or certificate';
      description
        "The credentials that the client may use, pending
         the SSH server's requirements, by the SSH client
         to authenticate to the SSH server.";
      leaf username {
        type string;
        description
          "The username of this user.  This will be the username
           used, for instance, to log into an SSH server.";
```

```
      }
      container public-key {
        if-feature client-identity-publickey;
        presence
          "Indicates that publickey-based authentication
           is configured";
        description
          "A locally-defined or referenced asymmetric key
           pair to be used for client identification.";
        reference
          "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
        uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
          refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
            must 'public-key-format = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
          }
          refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/keystore-reference" {
            must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
                  + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
          }
        }
      }
      leaf password {
        if-feature client-identity-password;
        nacm:default-deny-all;
        type string;
        description
          "A password to be used for client identification.";
      }
      container hostbased {
        if-feature client-identity-hostbased;
        presence
          "Indicates that hostbased authentication is configured";
        description
          "A locally-defined or referenced asymmetric key
           pair to be used for host identification.";
        reference
          "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
        uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
          refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
            must 'public-key-format = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
          }
          refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/keystore-reference" {
            must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
                  + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
          }
        }
      }
      leaf none {
        if-feature client-identity-none;
```

```
        type empty;
        description
          "Indicates that 'none' algorithm is used for client
           identification.";
      }
      container certificate {
        if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
        presence
          "Indicates that certificate-based authentication
           is configured";
        description
          "A locally-defined or referenced certificate
           to be used for client identification.";
        reference
          "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
        uses
        ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping {
          refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
            must
              'public-key-format'
              + ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
          }
          refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/keystore-reference"
                + "/asymmetric-key" {
            must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
                + ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
          }
        }
      }
    }
  } // container client-identity

  container server-authentication {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    must 'ssh-host-keys or ca-certs or ee-certs';
    description
      "Specifies how the SSH client can authenticate SSH servers.
       Any combination of credentials is additive and unordered.";
    container ssh-host-keys {
      presence
        "Indicates that the client can authenticate servers
         using the configured SSH host keys.";
      description
        "A list of SSH host keys used by the SSH client to
         authenticate SSH server host keys.  A server host key
         is authenticated if it is an exact match to a
         configured SSH host key.";
      reference
          "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
      uses ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping {
```

```
        refine
          "local-or-truststore/local/local-definition/public-key" {
          must 'public-key-format = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
        }
        refine
          "local-or-truststore/truststore/truststore-reference" {
          must 'deref(.)/../*/ts:public-key-format'
                + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
        }
      }
    }
  }
  container ca-certs {
    if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
    presence
      "Indicates that the client can authenticate servers
       using the configured trust anchor certificates.";
    description
      "A set of certificate authority (CA) certificates used by
       the SSH client to authenticate SSH servers.  A server
       is authenticated if its certificate  has a valid chain
       of trust to a configured CA certificate.";
     reference
       "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
    uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
  }
  container ee-certs {
    if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
    presence
      "Indicates that the client can authenticate servers
       using the configured end-entity certificates.";
    description
      "A set of end-entity certificates used by the SSH client
       to authenticate SSH servers.  A server is authenticated
       if its certificate is an exact match to a configured
       end-entity certificate.";
     reference
       "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
    uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
  }
} // container server-authentication

container transport-params {
  nacm:default-deny-write;
  if-feature "ssh-client-transport-params-config";
  description
    "Configurable parameters of the SSH transport layer.";
  uses sshcmn:transport-params-grouping;
} // container transport-parameters
```

```
    container keepalives {
      nacm:default-deny-write;
      if-feature "ssh-client-keepalives";
      presence
        "Indicates that the SSH client proactively tests the
         aliveness of the remote SSH server.";
      description
        "Configures the keep-alive policy, to proactively test
         the aliveness of the SSH server.  An unresponsive TLS
         server is dropped after approximately max-wait *
         max-attempts seconds.  Per Section 4 of RFC 4254,
         the SSH client SHOULD send an SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
         message with a purposely nonexistent 'request name'
         value (e.g., keepalive@ietf.org) and the 'want reply'
         value set to '1'.";
      reference
        "RFC 4254: The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol";
      leaf max-wait {
        type uint16 {
          range "1..max";
        }
        units "seconds";
        default "30";
        description
          "Sets the amount of time in seconds after which if
           no data has been received from the SSH server, a
           TLS-level message will be sent to test the
           aliveness of the SSH server.";
      }
      leaf max-attempts {
        type uint8;
        default "3";
        description
          "Sets the maximum number of sequential keep-alive
           messages that can fail to obtain a response from
           the SSH server before assuming the SSH server is
           no longer alive.";
      }
    } // container keepalives
  } // grouping ssh-client-grouping
} // module ietf-ssh-client
```

```
   <CODE ENDS>
```

4. The "ietf-ssh-server" Module

4.1. Data Model Overview

4.1.1. Features

The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in
the "ietf-ssh-server" module:

```
Features:
  +-- ssh-server-transport-params-config
  +-- ssh-server-keepalives
  +-- client-auth-config-supported
  +-- client-auth-publickey
  +-- client-auth-password
  +-- client-auth-hostbased
  +-- client-auth-none
```

4.1.2. Groupings

The following diagram lists all the "grouping" statements defined in
the "ietf-ssh-server" module:

```
Groupings:
  +-- ssh-server-grouping
```

Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.

4.1.2.1. The "ssh-server-grouping" Grouping

The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "ssh-server-
grouping" grouping:

```
============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===============

   grouping ssh-server-grouping
     +-- server-identity
     |  +-- host-key* [name]
     |     +-- name?                  string
     |     +-- (host-key-type)
     |        +--:(public-key)
     |        |  +-- public-key
     |        |     +---u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
     |        +--:(certificate)
     |           +-- certificate {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
     |              +---u ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-k\
ey-grouping
     +-- client-authentication
     |  +-- supported-authentication-methods
     |  |  +-- publickey?   empty
     |  |  +-- password?    empty {client-auth-password}?
     |  |  +-- hostbased?   empty {client-auth-hostbased}?
     |  |  +-- none?        empty {client-auth-none}?
     |  +-- users {client-auth-config-supported}?
     |  |  +-- user* [name]
     |  |     +-- name?          string
     |  |     +-- public-keys! {client-auth-publickey}?
     |  |     |  +---u ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping
     |  |     +-- password?      ianach:crypt-hash
     |  |     |       {client-auth-password}?
     |  |     +-- hostbased! {client-auth-hostbased}?
     |  |     |  +---u ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping
     |  |     +-- none?          empty {client-auth-none}?
     |  +-- ca-certs!
     |  |       {client-auth-config-supported,sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
     |  |  +---u ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping
     |  +-- ee-certs!
     |          {client-auth-config-supported,sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
     |     +---u ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping
     +-- transport-params {ssh-server-transport-params-config}?
     |  +---u sshcmn:transport-params-grouping
     +-- keepalives! {ssh-server-keepalives}?
        +-- max-wait?       uint16
        +-- max-attempts?   uint8

   Comments:

     *The "server-identity" node configures identity credentials. The
      ability to use a certificate is enabled by a "feature".
```

*The "client-authentication" node configures trust anchors for authenticating the SSH client, with each option enabled by a "feature" statement.

*The "transport-params" node, which must be enabled by a feature, configures parameters for the SSH sessions established by this configuration.

*The "keepalives" node, which must be enabled by a feature, configures a "presence" container for testing the aliveness of the SSH client. The aliveness-test occurs at the SSH protocol layer.

*For the referenced grouping statement(s):

   -The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.4 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
   -The "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.6 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
   -The "local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].
   -The "local-or-truststore-certs-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].
   -The "transport-params-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.1 in this document.

4.2. Example Usage

This section presents two examples showing the "ssh-server-grouping" grouping populated with some data. These examples are effectively the same except the first configures the server identity using a local key while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both examples are consistent with the examples presented in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].

The following configuration example uses local-definitions for the server identity and client authentication:

```
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

<ssh-server
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server"
  xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"
  xmlns:algs="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common">

  <!-- the host-key this SSH server will present -->
  <server-identity>
    <host-key>
      <name>my-pubkey-based-host-key</name>
      <public-key>
        <local-definition>
          <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format</public-key-fo\
rmat>
          <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
          <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key\
-format>
          <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
        </local-definition>
      </public-key>
    </host-key>
    <host-key>
      <name>my-cert-based-host-key</name>
      <certificate>
        <local-definition>
          <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</publ\
ic-key-format>
          <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
          <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key\
-format>
          <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
          <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
        </local-definition>
      </certificate>
    </host-key>
  </server-identity>

  <!-- the client credentials this SSH server will trust -->
  <client-authentication>
    <supported-authentication-methods>
      <publickey/>
    </supported-authentication-methods>
    <users>
      <user>
        <name>mary</name>
        <password>$0$secret</password>
        <public-keys>
          <local-definition>
```

```
              <!--<ssh-public-key>-->
              <public-key>
                <name>User A</name>
                <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format</public-ke\
y-format>
                <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
                <!--</ssh-public-key>
              <ssh-public-key>-->
              </public-key>
              <public-key>
                <name>User B</name>
                <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format</public-ke\
y-format>
                <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
              </public-key>
              <!--</ssh-public-key>-->
            </local-definition>
          </public-keys>
        </user>
      </users>
      <ca-certs>
        <local-definition>
          <certificate>
            <name>Identity Cert Issuer #1</name>
            <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
          </certificate>
          <certificate>
            <name>Identity Cert Issuer #2</name>
            <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
          </certificate>
        </local-definition>
      </ca-certs>
      <ee-certs>
        <local-definition>
          <certificate>
            <name>Application #1</name>
            <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
          </certificate>
          <certificate>
            <name>Application #2</name>
            <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
          </certificate>
        </local-definition>
      </ee-certs>
    </client-authentication>

    <keepalives>
      <max-wait>30</max-wait>
      <max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
```

```
      </keepalives>

   </ssh-server>
```

The following configuration example uses keystore-references for the
server identity and truststore-references for client authentication:
from the keystore:

```
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

<ssh-server
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server"
  xmlns:algs="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common">

  <!-- the host-key this SSH server will present -->
  <server-identity>
    <host-key>
      <name>my-pubkey-based-host-key</name>
      <public-key>
        <keystore-reference>ssh-rsa-key</keystore-reference>
      </public-key>
    </host-key>
    <host-key>
      <name>my-cert-based-host-key</name>
      <certificate>
        <keystore-reference>
          <asymmetric-key>ssh-rsa-key-with-cert</asymmetric-key>
          <certificate>ex-rsa-cert2</certificate>
        </keystore-reference>
      </certificate>
    </host-key>
  </server-identity>

  <!-- the client credentials this SSH server will trust -->
  <client-authentication>
    <supported-authentication-methods>
      <publickey/>
    </supported-authentication-methods>
    <users>
      <user>
        <name>mary</name>
        <password>$0$secret</password>
        <public-keys>
          <truststore-reference>SSH Public Keys for Application A</t\
ruststore-reference>
        </public-keys>
      </user>
    </users>
    <ca-certs>
      <truststore-reference>trusted-client-ca-certs</truststore-refe\
rence>
    </ca-certs>
    <ee-certs>
      <truststore-reference>trusted-client-ee-certs</truststore-refe\
rence>
    </ee-certs>
  </client-authentication>
```

```
    <keepalives>
      <max-wait>30</max-wait>
      <max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
    </keepalives>

</ssh-server>
```

4.3. YANG Module

This YANG module has normative references to [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] and informative references to [RFC4253] and [RFC7317].

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ssh-server@2020-07-08.yang"

```
module ietf-ssh-server {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server";
  prefix sshs;

  import iana-crypt-hash {
    prefix ianach;
    reference
      "RFC 7317: A YANG Data Model for System Management";
  }

  import ietf-netconf-acm {
    prefix nacm;
    reference
      "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
  }

  import ietf-crypto-types {
    prefix ct;
    reference
      "RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
  }

  import ietf-truststore {
    prefix ts;
    reference
      "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
  }

  import ietf-keystore {
    prefix ks;
    reference
      "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
  }

  import ietf-ssh-common {
    prefix sshcmn;
    revision-date 2020-07-08; // stable grouping definitions
    reference
      "RFC EEEE: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
  }

  organization
    "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

  contact
    "WG Web:   <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
     WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
     Author:   Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
     Author:   Gary Wu <mailto:garywu@cisco.com>";
```

```
description
  "This module defines reusable groupings for SSH servers that
   can be used as a basis for specific SSH server instances.

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified
   as authors of the code. All rights reserved.

   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
   or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
   subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
   BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
   Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

   This version of this YANG module is part of RFC EEEE
   (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcEEEE); see the RFC
   itself for full legal notices.;

   The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
   'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
   'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
   are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
   (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.";

revision 2020-07-08 {
  description
    "Initial version";
  reference
    "RFC EEEE: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
}

// Features

feature ssh-server-transport-params-config {
  description
    "SSH transport layer parameters are configurable on an SSH
     server.";
}

feature ssh-server-keepalives {
  description
    "Per socket SSH keepalive parameters are configurable for
     SSH servers on the server implementing this feature.";
}

feature client-auth-config-supported {
  description
    "Indicates that the configuration for how to authenticate
```

```
      clients can be configured herein, as opposed to in an
      application specific location.  That is, to support the
      consuming data models that prefer to place client
      authentication with client definitions, rather then
      in a data model principally concerned with configuring
      the transport.";
}

feature client-auth-publickey {
  description
    "Indicates that the 'publickey' authentication type
     is supported.

     The 'publickey' authentication type is required by
     RFC 4252, but common implementations enable it to
     be disabled.";
  reference
    "RFC 4252:
      The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol";
}

feature client-auth-password {
  description
    "Indicates that the 'password' authentication type
     is supported.";
}

feature client-auth-hostbased {
  description
    "Indicates that the 'hostbased' authentication type
     is supported.";
}

feature client-auth-none {
  description
    "Indicates that the 'none' authentication type is
     supported.";
}

// Groupings

grouping ssh-server-grouping {
  description
    "A reusable grouping for configuring a SSH server without
     any consideration for how underlying TCP sessions are
     established.

     Note that this grouping uses fairly typical descendent
     node names such that a stack of 'uses' statements will
     have name conflicts.  It is intended that the consuming
```

```
       data model will resolve the issue (e.g., by wrapping
       the 'uses' statement in a container called
       'ssh-server-parameters').  This model purposely does
       not do this itself so as to provide maximum flexibility
       to consuming models.";

  container server-identity {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    description
      "The list of host keys the SSH server will present when
       establishing a SSH connection.";
    list host-key {
      key "name";
      min-elements 1;
      ordered-by user;
      description
        "An ordered list of host keys the SSH server will use to
         construct its ordered list of algorithms, when sending
         its SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message, as defined in Section 7.1
         of RFC 4253.";
      reference
        "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
                   Protocol";
      leaf name {
        type string;
        description
          "An arbitrary name for this host key";
      }
      choice host-key-type {
        mandatory true;
        description
          "The type of host key being specified";
        container public-key {
          description
            "A locally-defined or referenced asymmetric key pair
             to be used for the SSH server's host key.";
          reference
            "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
          uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
            refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
              must
                'public-key-format = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
            }
            refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/"
                   + "keystore-reference" {
              must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
                   + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
            }
          }
```

```
      }
      container certificate {
        if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
        description
          "A locally-defined or referenced end-entity
           certificate to be used for the SSH server's
           host key.";
        reference
          "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
        uses
        ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping {
          refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
            must
              'public-key-format'
              + ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
          }
          refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/keystore-reference"
                 + "/asymmetric-key" {
            must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
                 + ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
} // container server-identity

container client-authentication {
  nacm:default-deny-write;
  description
    "Specifies how the SSH server can authenticate SSH clients.";
  container supported-authentication-methods {
    description
      "Indicates which authentication methods the server
       supports.";
    leaf publickey {
      type empty;
      description
        "Indicates that the 'publickey' method is supported.
         Note that RFC 6187 X.509v3 Certificates for SSH uses
         the 'publickey' method name.";
      reference
        "RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication
                   Protocol.
         RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
                   Authentication.";
    }
    leaf password {
      if-feature client-auth-password;
```

```
        type empty;
        description
          "Indicates that the 'password' method is supported.";
        reference
          "RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication
                     Protocol.";
      }
      leaf hostbased {
        if-feature client-auth-hostbased;
        type empty;
        description
          "Indicates that the 'hostbased' method is supported.";
        reference
          "RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication
                     Protocol.";
      }
      leaf none {
        if-feature client-auth-none;
        type empty;
        description
          "Indicates that the 'none' method is supported.";
        reference
          "RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication
                     Protocol.";
      }
    }

    container users {
      if-feature "client-auth-config-supported";
      description
        "A list of locally configured users.";
      list user {
        key name;
        description
          "The list of local users configured on this device.";
        leaf name {
          type string;
          description
           "The user name string identifying this entry.";
        }
        container public-keys {
          if-feature client-auth-publickey;
          presence
            "Indicates that the server can authenticate this
             user using any of the configured SSH public keys.";
          description
            "A set of SSH public keys may be used by the SSH
             server to authenticate this user.  A user is
             authenticated if its public key is an exact
```

```
          match to a configured public key.";
        reference
          "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
        uses ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping {
          refine "local-or-truststore/local/local-definition"
                + "/public-key" {
            must 'public-key-format'
                + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
          }
          refine "local-or-truststore/truststore/"
                + "truststore-reference" {
            must 'deref(.)/../*/ts:public-key-format'
                + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
          }
        }
      }
      leaf password {
        if-feature client-auth-password;
        type ianach:crypt-hash;
        description
          "The password for this user.";
      }

      container hostbased {
        if-feature client-auth-hostbased;
        presence
          "Indicates that the server can authenticate this
           user's 'host' using any of the configured SSH
           host keys.";
        description
          "A set of SSH host keys may be used by the SSH
           server to authenticate this user's host.  A
           user's host is authenticated if its host key
           is an exact match to a configured host key.";
        reference
          "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
           RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
        uses ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping {
          refine "local-or-truststore/local/local-definition"
                + "/public-key" {
            must 'public-key-format'
                + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
          }
          refine "local-or-truststore/truststore"
                + "/truststore-reference" {
            must 'deref(.)/../*/ts:public-key-format'
                + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
          }
        }
```

```
        }
        leaf none {
          if-feature client-auth-none;
          type empty;
          description
            "Indicates that the 'none' method is supported.";
          reference
            "RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication
                       Protocol.";
        }
      }
    }
    container ca-certs {
      if-feature "client-auth-config-supported";
      if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
      presence
        "Indicates that the SSH server can authenticate SSH
         clients using configured certificate authority (CA)
         certificates.";
      description
        "A set of certificate authority (CA) certificates used by
         the SSH server to authenticate SSH client certificates.
         A client certificate is authenticated if it has a valid
         chain of trust to a configured CA certificate.";
      reference
        "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
      uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
    }
    container ee-certs {
      if-feature "client-auth-config-supported";
      if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
      presence
        "Indicates that the SSH server can authenticate SSH
         clients using configured end-entity certificates.";
      description
        "A set of client certificates (i.e., end entity
         certificates) used by the SSH server to authenticate
         the certificates presented by SSH clients.  A client
         certificate is authenticated if it is an exact match
         to a configured end-entity certificate.";
      reference
        "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
      uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
    }
  } // container client-authentication

  container transport-params {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    if-feature "ssh-server-transport-params-config";
```

```
      description
        "Configurable parameters of the SSH transport layer.";
      uses sshcmn:transport-params-grouping;
    } // container transport-params

    container keepalives {
      nacm:default-deny-write;
      if-feature "ssh-server-keepalives";
      presence
        "Indicates that the SSH server proactively tests the
         aliveness of the remote SSH client.";
      description
        "Configures the keep-alive policy, to proactively test
         the aliveness of the SSL client.  An unresponsive SSL
         client is dropped after approximately max-wait *
         max-attempts seconds.  Per Section 4 of RFC 4254,
         the SSH server SHOULD send an SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
         message with a purposely nonexistent 'request name'
         value (e.g., keepalive@ietf.org) and the 'want reply'
         value set to '1'.";
      reference
        "RFC 4254: The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol";
      leaf max-wait {
        type uint16 {
          range "1..max";
        }
        units "seconds";
        default "30";
        description
          "Sets the amount of time in seconds after which
           if no data has been received from the SSL client,
           a SSL-level message will be sent to test the
           aliveness of the SSL client.";
      }
      leaf max-attempts {
        type uint8;
        default "3";
        description
          "Sets the maximum number of sequential keep-alive
           messages that can fail to obtain a response from
           the SSL client before assuming the SSL client is
           no longer alive.";
      }
    }
  } // grouping ssh-server-grouping
} // module ietf-ssh-server
```

<CODE ENDS>

5. Security Considerations

5.1. The "ietf-ssh-common" YANG Module

    The "ietf-ssh-common" YANG module defines "grouping" statements that
    are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols,
    such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these
    protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g.,
    SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.

    The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means
    to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset
    of all available protocol operations and content.

    Since the module in this document only define groupings, these
    considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that
    use these groupings.

    None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are
    considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM
    "default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes
    defined in this module.

    None of the writable data nodes defined in this YANG module are
    considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM
    "default-deny-write" extension has not been set for any data nodes
    defined in this module.

    This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and
    thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.

5.2. The "ietf-ssh-client" YANG Module

    The "ietf-ssh-client" YANG module defines "grouping" statements that
    are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols,
    such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these
    protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g.,
    SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.

    The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means
    to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset
    of all available protocol operations and content.

    Since the module in this document only define groupings, these
    considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that
    use these groupings.

One readable data node defined in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. This node is
as follows:

   *The "client-identity/password" node:

      The cleartext "password" node defined in the "ssh-client-
      grouping" grouping is additionally sensitive to read
      operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never be
      returned to a client. For this reason, the NACM extension
      "default-deny-all" has been applied to it.

Please be aware that this module uses the "key" and "private-key"
nodes from the "ietf-crypto-types" module [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-
types], where said nodes have the NACM extension "default-deny-all"
set, thus preventing unrestricted read-access to the cleartext key
values.

All of the writable data nodes defined by this module may be
considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. For
instance, any modification to a key or reference to a key may
dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason,
the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for all data
nodes defined in this module.

This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and
thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.

5.3. The "ietf-ssh-server" YANG Module

The "ietf-ssh-server" YANG module defines "grouping" statements that
are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols,
such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these
protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g.,
SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.

The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means
to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset
of all available protocol operations and content.

Since the module in this document only define groupings, these
considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that
use these groupings.

None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are
considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM
"default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes
defined in this module.

Please be aware that this module uses the "key" and "private-key" nodes from the "ietf-crypto-types" module [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], where said nodes have the NACM extension "default-deny-all" set, thus preventing unrestricted read-access to the cleartext key values.

All of the writable data nodes defined by this module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. For instance, the addition or removal of references to keys, certificates, trusted anchors, etc., or even the modification of transport or keepalive parameters can dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for all data nodes defined in this module.

This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.

6. IANA Considerations

6.1. The IETF XML Registry

This document registers three URIs in the "ns" subregistry of the IETF XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registrations are requested:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-client
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

6.2. The YANG Module Names Registry

This document registers three YANG modules in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the following registrations are requested:

```
name:          ietf-ssh-common
namespace:     urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common
prefix:        sshcmn
reference:     RFC EEEE

name:          ietf-ssh-client
namespace:     urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-client
prefix:        sshc
reference:     RFC EEEE

name:          ietf-ssh-server
namespace:     urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server
prefix:        sshs
reference:     RFC EEEE
```

7. References

7.1. Normative References

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Appendix A. Change Log

This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

A.1. 00 to 01

*Noted that '0.0.0.0' and '::' might have special meanings.

*Renamed "keychain" to "keystore".

A.2. 01 to 02

*Removed the groupings 'listening-ssh-client-grouping' and
 'listening-ssh-server-grouping'. Now modules only contain the
 transport-independent groupings.

*Simplified the "client-auth" part in the ietf-ssh-client module.
 It now inlines what it used to point to keystore for.

*Added cipher suites for various algorithms into new 'ietf-ssh-
　　　 common' module.

A.3.　02 to 03

　　　*Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from 'password' leaf type.

　　　*Added a 'must' statement to container 'server-auth' asserting
　　　 that at least one of the various auth mechanisms must be
　　　 specified.

　　　*Fixed description statement for leaf 'trusted-ca-certs'.

A.4.　03 to 04

　　　*Change title to "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers"

　　　*Added reference to RFC 6668

　　　*Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section.

　　　*Enhanced description statement for ietf-ssh-server's "trusted-ca-
　　　 certs" leaf.

　　　*Added mandatory true to ietf-ssh-client's "client-auth" 'choice'
　　　 statement.

　　　*Changed the YANG prefix for module ietf-ssh-common from 'sshcom'
　　　 to 'sshcmn'.

　　　*Removed the compression algorithms as they are not commonly
　　　 configurable in vendors' implementations.

　　　*Updating descriptions in transport-params-grouping and the
　　　 servers's usage of it.

　　　*Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams

　　　*Updated YANG to use typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore
　　　 paths

　　　*Now inlines key and certificates (no longer a leafref to
　　　 keystore)

A.5.　04 to 05

　　　*Merged changes from co-author.

A.6. 05 to 06

*Updated to use trust anchors from trust-anchors draft (was
 keystore draft)

*Now uses new keystore grouping enabling asymmetric key to be
 either locally defined or a reference to the keystore.

A.7. 06 to 07

*factored the ssh-[client|server]-groupings into more reusable
 groupings.

*added if-feature statements for the new "ssh-host-keys" and
 "x509-certificates" features defined in draft-ietf-netconf-trust-
 anchors.

A.8. 07 to 08

*Added a number of compatibility matrices to Section 5 (thanks
 Frank!)

*Clarified that any configured "host-key-alg" values need to be
 compatible with the configured private key.

A.9. 08 to 09

*Updated examples to reflect update to groupings defined in the
 keystore -09 draft.

*Add SSH keepalives features and groupings.

*Prefixed top-level SSH grouping nodes with 'ssh-' and support
 mashups.

*Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, and
 folding algorithm.

A.10. 09 to 10

*Reformatted the YANG modules.

A.11. 10 to 11

*Reformatted lines causing folding to occur.

A.12. 11 to 12

*Collapsed all the inner groupings into the top-level grouping.

*Added a top-level "demux container" inside the top-level
 grouping.

*Added NACM statements and updated the Security Considerations
 section.

*Added "presence" statements on the "keepalive" containers, as was
 needed to address a validation error that appeared after adding
 the "must" statements into the NETCONF/RESTCONF client/server
 modules.

*Updated the boilerplate text in module-level "description"
 statement to match copyeditor convention.

A.13. 12 to 13

*Removed the "demux containers", floating the nacm:default-deny-
 write to each descendent node, and adding a note to model
 designers regarding the potential need to add their own demux
 containers.

*Fixed a couple references (section 2 --> section 3)

*In the server model, replaced <client-cert-auth> with <client-
 authentication> and introduced 'local-or-external' choice.

A.14. 13 to 14

*Updated to reflect changes in trust-anchors drafts (e.g., s/
 trust-anchors/truststore/g + s/pinned.//)

A.15. 14 to 15

*Updated examples to reflect ietf-crypto-types change (e.g.,
 identities --> enumerations)

*Updated "server-authentication" and "client-authentication" nodes
 from being a leaf of type "ts:host-keys-ref" or "ts:certificates-
 ref" to a container that uses "ts:local-or-truststore-host-keys-
 grouping" or "ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping".

A.16. 15 to 16

*Removed unnecessary if-feature statements in the -client and -
 server modules.

*Cleaned up some description statements in the -client and -server
 modules.

*Fixed a canonical ordering issue in ietf-ssh-common detected by new pyang.

A.17. 16 to 17

*Removed choice local-or-external by removing the 'external' case and flattening the 'local' case and adding a "client-auth-config-supported" feature.

Updated examples to include the "-key-format" nodes.

*Augmented-in "must" expressions ensuring that locally-defined public-key-format are "ct:ssh-public-key-format" (must expr for ref'ed keys are TBD).

A.18. 17 to 18

*Removed leaf-list 'other' from ietf-ssh-server.

*Removed unused 'external-client-auth-supported' feature.

*Added features client-auth-password, client-auth-hostbased, and client-auth-none.

*Renamed 'host-key' to 'public-key' for when refering to 'publickey' based auth.

*Added new feature-protected 'hostbased' and 'none' to the 'user' node's config.

*Added new feature-protected 'hostbased' and 'none' to the 'client-identity' node's config.

*Updated examples to reflect new "bag" addition to truststore.

*Refined truststore/keystore groupings to ensure the key formats "must" be particular values.

*Switched to using truststore's new "public-key" bag (instead of separate "ssh-public-key" and "raw-public-key" bags.

*Updated client/server examples to cover ALL cases (local/ref x cert/raw-key/psk).

A.19. 18 to 19

*Updated the "keepalives" containers to address Michal Vasko's request to align with RFC 8071.

*Removed algorithm-mapping tables from the "SSH Common Model"
     section

    *Removed 'algorithm' node from examples.

    *Added feature "client-identity-publickey"

    *Removed "choice auth-type", as auth-types aren't exclusive.

    *Renamed both "client-certs" and "server-certs" to "ee-certs"

    *Switch "must" to assert the public-key-format is "subject-public-
     key-info-format" when certificates are used.

    *Added a "Note to Reviewers" note to first page.

A.20. 19 to 20

    *Added a "must 'public-key or password or hostbased or none or
     certificate'" statement to the "user" node in ietf-ssh-client

    *Expanded "Data Model Overview section(s) [remove "wall" of tree
     diagrams].

    *Moved the "ietf-ssh-common" module section to proceed the other
     two module sections.

    *Updated the Security Considerations section.

Acknowledgements

Authors' Addresses

    Kent Watsen
    Watsen Networks

    Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net

    Gary Wu
    Cisco Systems

    Email: garywu@cisco.com