Abstract

This document defines three YANG modules: the first defines groupings for a generic SSH client, the second defines groupings for a generic SSH server, and the third defines common identities and groupings used by both the client and the server. It is intended that these groupings will be used by applications using the SSH protocol.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.

Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in progress. Please apply the following replacements:

* "AAAA" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types
* "BBBB" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors
* "CCCC" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-keystore
* "DDDD" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server
* "EEEE" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft

Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:

* "2021-02-10" --> the publication date of this draft

The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:

* Appendix_A. Change Log
Internet-Draft    Groupings for SSH Clients and Servers    February 2021

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

This document defines three YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] modules: the first defines a grouping for a generic SSH client, the second defines a grouping for a generic SSH server, and the third defines identities and groupings common to both the client and the server. It is intended that these groupings will be used by applications using the SSH protocol [RFC4252], [RFC4253], and [RFC4254]. For instance, these groupings could be used to help define the data model for an OpenSSH [OPENSSH] server or a NETCONF over SSH [RFC6242] based server.

The client and server YANG modules in this document each define one grouping, which is focused on just SSH-specific configuration, and specifically avoids any transport-level configuration, such as what ports to listen on or connect to. This affords applications the opportunity to define their own strategy for how the underlying TCP connection is established. For instance, applications supporting NETCONF Call Home [RFC8071] could use the "ssh-server-grouping" grouping for the SSH parts it provides, while adding data nodes for the TCP-level call-home configuration.

The modules defined in this document use groupings defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] enabling keys to be either locally defined or a reference to globally configured values.

The modules defined in this document optionally support [RFC6187] enabling X.509v3 certificate based host keys and public keys.
1.1. Relation to other RFCs

This document presents one or more YANG modules [RFC7950] that are part of a collection of RFCs that work together to, ultimately, enable the configuration of the clients and servers of both the NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040] protocols.

The modules have been defined in a modular fashion to enable their use by other efforts, some of which are known to be in progress at the time of this writing, with many more expected to be defined in time.

The normative dependency relationship between the various RFCs in the collection is presented in the below diagram. The labels in the diagram represent the primary purpose provided by each RFC. Hyperlinks to each RFC are provided below the diagram.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label in Diagram</th>
<th>Originating RFC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>crypto-types</td>
<td>[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>truststore</td>
<td>[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keystore</td>
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<td>tcp-client-server</td>
<td>[I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server]</td>
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<td>[I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>[I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>netconf-client-server</td>
<td>[I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restconf-client-server</td>
<td>[I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Label to RFC Mapping

Internet-Draft    Groupings for SSH Clients and Servers    February 2021

1.2. Specification Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.3. Adherence to the NMDA

This document in compliant with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, as described in [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore], trust anchors and keys installed during manufacturing are expected to appear in <operational>.
2. The "ietf-ssh-common" Module

The SSH common model presented in this section contains identities and groupings common to both SSH clients and SSH servers. The "transport-params-grouping" grouping can be used to configure the list of SSH transport algorithms permitted by the SSH client or SSH server. The lists of algorithms are ordered such that, if multiple algorithms are permitted by the client, the algorithm that appears first in its list that is also permitted by the server is used for the SSH transport layer connection. The ability to restrict the algorithms allowed is provided in this grouping for SSH clients and SSH servers that are capable of doing so and may serve to make SSH clients and SSH servers compliant with security policies.

Features are defined for algorithms that are OPTIONAL or are not widely supported by popular implementations. Note that the list of algorithms is not exhaustive. As well, some algorithms that are REQUIRED by [RFC4253] are missing, notably "ssh-dss" and "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" due to their weak security and there being alternatives that are widely supported.

2.1. Data Model Overview

This section provides an overview of the "ietf-ssh-common" module in terms of its features, identities, and groupings.

2.1.1. Features

The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in the "ietf-ssh-common" module:

Features:
  ++-- ssh-ecc
  ++-- ssh-x509-certs
  ++-- ssh-dh-group-exchange
  ++-- ssh-ctr
  ++-- ssh-sha2

| The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not
2.1.2. Identities

The following diagram illustrates the relationship amongst the "identity" statements defined in the "ietf-ssh-common" module:

Identities:
--- public-key-alg-base
  | --- ssh-dss
  | --- ssh-rsa
  | --- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
  | --- ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
  | --- ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
  | --- x509v3-ssh-rsa
  | --- x509v3-rsa2048-sha256
  | --- x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
  | --- x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
  | --- x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
--- key-exchange-alg-base
  | --- diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
  | --- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
  | --- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
  | --- ecdh-sha2-nistp256
  | --- ecdh-sha2-nistp384
  | --- ecdh-sha2-nistp521
--- encryption-alg-base
  | --- triple-des-cbc
  | --- aes128-cbc
  | --- aes192-cbc
  | --- aes256-cbc
  | --- aes128-ctr
  | --- aes192-ctr
  | --- aes256-ctr
--- mac-alg-base
  | --- hmac-sha1
  | --- hmac-sha2-256
  | --- hmac-sha2-512
defined in [RFC8340].

Comments:

* The diagram shows that there are four base identities.
* These identities are used by this module to define algorithms for public-key, key-exchange, encryption, and MACs.
* These base identities are "abstract", in the object oriented programming sense, in that they only define a "class" of algorithms, rather than a specific algorithm.

2.1.3. Groupings

The "ietf-ssh-common" module defines the following "grouping" statement:

* transport-params-grouping

This grouping is presented in the following subsection.

2.1.3.1. The "transport-params-grouping" Grouping

The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "transport-params-grouping" grouping:

```
grouping transport-params-grouping
  +-- host-key
  |  +-- host-key-alg*  identityref
  +-- key-exchange
  |  +-- key-exchange-alg*  identityref
  +-- encryption
  |  +-- encryption-alg*  identityref
  +-- mac
  |  +-- mac-alg*  identityref
```

Comments:

* This grouping is used by both the "ssh-client-grouping" and the "ssh-server-grouping" groupings defined in Section 3.1.2.1 and Section 4.1.2.1, respectively.
* This grouping enables client and server configurations to specify the algorithms that are to be used when establishing SSH sessions.
* Each list is "ordered-by user".
2.1.4. Protocol-accessible Nodes

The "ietf-ssh-common" module does not contain any protocol-accessible nodes, but the module needs to be "implemented", as described in Section 5.6.5 of [RFC7950], in order for the identities in Section 2.1.2 to be defined.

2.2. Example Usage

This following example illustrates how the "transport-params-grouping' grouping appears when populated with some data.

<transport-params
   xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common"
   <host-key>
     <host-key-alg>algs:x509v3-rsa2048-sha256</host-key-alg>
     <host-key-alg>algs:ssh-rsa</host-key-alg>
   </host-key>
   <key-exchange>
     <key-exchange-alg>
       algs:diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
     </key-exchange-alg>
   </key-exchange>
   <encryption>
     <encryption-alg>algs:aes256-ctr</encryption-alg>
     <encryption-alg>algs:aes192-ctr</encryption-alg>
     <encryption-alg>algs:aes128-ctr</encryption-alg>
     <encryption-alg>algs:aes256-cbc</encryption-alg>
     <encryption-alg>algs:aes192-cbc</encryption-alg>
     <encryption-alg>algs:aes128-cbc</encryption-alg>
   </encryption>
   <mac>
     <mac-alg>algs:hmac-sha2-256</mac-alg>
     <mac-alg>algs:hmac-sha2-512</mac-alg>
   </mac>
</transport-params>

2.3. YANG Module

This YANG module has normative references to [RFC4253], [RFC4344], [RFC4419], [RFC5656], [RFC6187], and [RFC6668].

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ssh-common@2021-02-10.yang"
module ietf-ssh-common {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-common";
  prefix sshcmn;

  organization
    "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

  contact
    "WG Web:  <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
    WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
    Author:   Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
    Author:   Gary Wu <mailto:garywu@cisco.com>"

  description
    "This module defines a common features, identities, and
     groupings for Secure Shell (SSH).

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  BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
  Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

  This version of this YANG module is part of RFC EEEE
  (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcEEEE); see the RFC
  itself for full legal notices.;

  The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
  'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
  'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
  are to be interpreted as described in BCP_14 (RFC 2119)
  (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
  capitals, as shown here.";
feature ssh-ecc {
    description
        "Elliptic Curve Cryptography is supported for SSH.";
    reference
        "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}

feature ssh-x509-certs {
    description
        "X.509v3 certificates are supported for SSH per RFC 6187.";
    reference
        "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell Authentication";
}

feature ssh-dh-group-exchange {
    description
        "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange is supported for SSH.";
    reference
}

feature ssh-ctr {
    description
        "SDCTR encryption mode is supported for SSH.";
    reference
        "RFC 4344: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes";
}
feature ssh-sha2 {
  description "The SHA2 family of cryptographic hash functions is supported for SSH."
  reference "FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)"
}

// Identities

identity public-key-alg-base {
  description "Base identity used to identify public key algorithms."
}

identity ssh-dss {
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description "Digital Signature Algorithm using SHA-1 as the hashing algorithm."
  reference "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
}

identity ssh-rsa {
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme using SHA-1 as the hashing algorithm."
  reference "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
}

identity ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2"
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using the nistp256 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms."
}
reference

"RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer";

}

identity ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using the nistp384 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms."
  reference
    "RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}

identity ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using the nistp521 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms."
  reference
}

identity x509v3-ssh-rsa {
  if-feature "ssh-x509-certs";
  base public-key-alg-base;
  description
    "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme using a public key stored in an X.509v3 certificate and using SHA-1 as the hashing algorithm."
  reference
    "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell Authentication";
}

identity x509v3-rsa2048-sha256 {
  if-feature "ssh-x509-certs and ssh-sha2";
base public-key-alg-base;
description
"RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme using a public key stored
in an X.509v3 certificate and using SHA-256 as the hashing
algorithm. RSA keys conveyed using this format MUST have a
modulus of at least 2048 bits."
reference
"RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
Authentication";
}

identity x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-x509-certs and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
description
  "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
  using the nistp256 curve with a public key stored in
  an X.509v3 certificate and using the SHA2 family of
  hashing algorithms."
reference
  "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
  Authentication";
}

identity x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-x509-certs and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
description
  "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
  using the nistp384 curve with a public key stored in
  an X.509v3 certificate and using the SHA2 family of
  hashing algorithms."
reference
  "RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
  Authentication";
}

identity x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-x509-certs and ssh-sha2";
  base public-key-alg-base;
description
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using the nistp521 curve with a public key stored in an X.509v3 certificate and using the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms.

reference
"RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell Authentication"

identity key-exchange-alg-base {
  description
  "Base identity used to identify key exchange algorithms."
}

identity diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 {
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
  "Diffie-Hellman key exchange with SHA-1 as HASH and Oakley Group 14 (2048-bit MODP Group)."
  reference
  "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
}

identity diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 {
  if-feature "ssh-dh-group-exchange";
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
  "Diffie-Hellman Group and Key Exchange with SHA-1 as HASH."
  reference
  "RFC 4419: Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
}

identity diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 {
  if-feature "ssh-dh-group-exchange and ssh-sha2";
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
  "Diffie-Hellman Group and Key Exchange with SHA-256 as HASH."
  reference
identity ecdh-sha2-nistp256 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange using the
    nistp256 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms."
  reference
    RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
    Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}

identity ecdh-sha2-nistp384 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange using the
    nistp384 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms."
  reference
    RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
    Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}

identity ecdh-sha2-nistp521 {
  if-feature "ssh-ecc and ssh-sha2";
  base key-exchange-alg-base;
  description
    "Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange using the
    nistp521 curve and the SHA2 family of hashing algorithms."
  reference
    RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
    Secure Shell Transport Layer";
}

identity encryption-alg-base {
  description
    "Base identity used to identify encryption algorithms.";
}

identity triple-des-cbc {
  base encryption-alg-base;
  description
    "Three-key 3DES in CBC mode.";
reference
    "RFC 4253": The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}

identity aes128-cbc {
    base encryption-alg-base;
    description
    "AES in CBC mode, with a 128-bit key."
    reference
    "RFC 4253": The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}

identity aes192-cbc {
    base encryption-alg-base;
    description
    "AES in CBC mode, with a 192-bit key."
    reference
    "RFC 4253": The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}

identity aes256-cbc {
    base encryption-alg-base;
    description
    "AES in CBC mode, with a 256-bit key."
    reference
    "RFC 4253": The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}

identity aes128-ctr {
    if-feature "ssh-ctr";
    base encryption-alg-base;
    description
    "AES in SDCTR mode, with 128-bit key."
    reference
    "RFC 4344": The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes";
}

identity aes192-ctr {
    if-feature "ssh-ctr";
    base encryption-alg-base;
    description
    "AES in SDCTR mode, with 192-bit key."
    reference
    "RFC 4344": The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes";
}
identity aes256-ctr {
  if-feature "ssh-ctr";
  base encryption-alg-base;
  description
    "AES in SDCTR mode, with 256-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC 4344: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes";
}

identity mac-alg-base {
  description
    "Base identity used to identify message authentication code (MAC) algorithms."
}

identity hmac-sha1 {
  base mac-alg-base;
  description
    "HMAC-SHA1";
  reference
    "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}

identity hmac-sha2-256 {
  if-feature "ssh-sha2";
  base mac-alg-base;
  description
    "HMAC-SHA2-256";
  reference
    "RFC 6668: SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}

identity hmac-sha2-512 {
  if-feature "ssh-sha2";
  base mac-alg-base;
  description
    "HMAC-SHA2-512";
  reference
"**RFC 6668**: SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol;"

}

// Groupings

grouping transport-params-grouping {
  description
  
  "A reusable grouping for SSH transport parameters."
  reference
  "**RFC 4253**: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
  container host-key {
    description
    "Parameters regarding host key."
    leaf-list host-key-alg {
      type identityref {
        base public-key-alg-base;
      }
      ordered-by user;
      description
      "Acceptable host key algorithms in order of descending preference. The configured host key algorithms should be compatible with the algorithm used by the configured private key. Please see Section 5 of RFC EEEE for valid combinations.

      If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements) the acceptable host key algorithms are implementation-defined."
      reference
      "RFC EEEE: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers"
    }
  }
  container key-exchange {
    description
    "Parameters regarding key exchange."
    leaf-list key-exchange-alg {
      type identityref {
        base key-exchange-alg-base;
      }
      ordered-by user;
    }
  }
}
description
"Acceptable key exchange algorithms in order of descending preference.

If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements) the acceptable key exchange algorithms are implementation defined."
}
}
container encryption {
  description
  "Parameters regarding encryption."
  leaf-list encryption-alg {
    type identityref {
      base encryption-alg-base;
    }
  }
  ordered-by user;
  description
  "Acceptable encryption algorithms in order of descending preference.

If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements) the acceptable encryption algorithms are implementation defined.";
}
}

container mac {
  description
  "Parameters regarding message authentication code (MAC)."
  leaf-list mac-alg {
    type identityref {
      base mac-alg-base;
    }
  }
  ordered-by user;
  description
  "Acceptable MAC algorithms in order of descending preference.

If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements) the acceptable MAC algorithms are implementation defined.";
3. The "ietf-ssh-client" Module

This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf-ssh-client". A high-level overview of the module is provided in Section 3.1. Examples illustrating the module's use are provided in Examples (Section 3.2). The YANG module itself is defined in Section 3.3.

3.1. Data Model Overview

This section provides an overview of the "ietf-ssh-client" module in terms of its features and groupings.

3.1.1. Features

The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in the "ietf-ssh-client" module:

```
Features:
  +-- ssh-client-transport-params-config
  +-- ssh-client-keepalives
  +-- client-identity-password
  +-- client-identity-publickey
  +-- client-identity-hostbased
  +-- client-identity-none
```

The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not defined in [RFC8340].

3.1.2. Groupings

The "ietf-ssh-client" module defines the following "grouping"
statement:

* ssh-client-grouping

This grouping is presented in the following subsection.

3.1.2.1. The "ssh-client-grouping" Grouping

The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "ssh-client-grouping" grouping:

```
grouping ssh-client-grouping
  +-- client-identity
    |   +-- username? string
    |   +-- public-key! {client-identity-publickey}?
    |     |   +----u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
    |     |   +-- password! {client-identity-password}?
    |     |     |   +----u ct:password-grouping
    |     |     |   +-- hostbased! {client-identity-hostbased}?
    |     |     |     |   +----u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
    |     |     |     |   +-- none? empty {client-identity-none}?
```

======= NOTE: '\ line wrapping per RFC 8792 =======
Comments:

* The "client-identity" node configures a "username" and credentials, each enabled by a "feature" statement defined in Section 3.1.1.

* The "server-authentication" node configures trust anchors for authenticating the SSH server, with each option enabled by a "feature" statement.

* The "transport-params" node, which must be enabled by a feature, configures parameters for the SSH sessions established by this configuration.

* The "keepalives" node, which must be enabled by a feature, configures a "presence" container for testing the aliveness of the SSH server. The aliveness-test occurs at the SSH protocol layer.

* For the referenced grouping statement(s):

  - The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.4 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
  - The "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.6 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
The "local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].
- The "local-or-truststore-certs-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].
- The "transport-params-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.1 in this document.

3.2. Example Usage

This section presents two examples showing the "ssh-client-grouping" grouping populated with some data. These examples are effectively the same except the first configures the client identity using a local key while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both examples are consistent with the examples presented in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].

The following configuration example uses local-definitions for the client identity and server authentication:

============== NOTE: '\ ' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===============

```xml
<ssh-client
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-client"

  <!-- how this client will authenticate itself to the server -->
  <client-identity>
    <username>foobar</username>
    <public-key>
      <local-definition>
        <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format</public-key-format>
        <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
        <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-format>
        <cleartext-private-key>base64encodedvalue==</cleartext-private-key>
      </local-definition>
    </public-key>
  </client-identity>

</ssh-client>
```
<!-- which host keys will this client trust -->
<server-authentication>
  <ssh-host-keys>
    <local-definition>
      <public-key>
        <name>corp-fw1</name>
        <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format</public-key-format>
        <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
      </public-key>
      <public-key>
        <name>corp-fw2</name>
        <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format</public-key-format>
        <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
      </public-key>
    </local-definition>
  </ssh-host-keys>
  <ca-certs>
    <local-definition>
      <certificate>
        <name>Server Cert Issuer #1</name>
        <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
      </certificate>
      <certificate>
        <name>Server Cert Issuer #2</name>
        <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
      </certificate>
    </local-definition>
  </ca-certs>
  <ee-certs>
    <local-definition>
      <certificate>
        <name>My Application #1</name>
        <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
      </certificate>
      <certificate>
        <name>My Application #2</name>
        <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
      </certificate>
    </local-definition>
  </ee-certs>
</server-authentication>

<keepalives>
  <max-wait>30</max-wait>
  <max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
</keepalives>
The following configuration example uses keystore-references for the client identity and truststore-references for server authentication:

from the keystore:
<ssh-client
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-client"

<!-- how this client will authenticate itself to the server -->
<client-identity>
  <username>foobar</username>
  <!-- can an SSH client have more than one key? -->
  <public-key>
    <keystore-reference>ssh-rsa-key</keystore-reference>
  </public-key>
  <!-- -->
  <certificate>
    <keystore-reference>
      <asymmetric-key>ssh-rsa-key-with-cert</asymmetric-key>
      <certificate>ex-rsa-cert2</certificate>
    </keystore-reference>
  </certificate>
</client-identity>

<!-- which host-keys will this client trust -->
<server-authentication>
  <ssh-host-keys>
    <truststore-reference>trusted-ssh-public-keys</truststore-reference>
  </ssh-host-keys>
  <ca-certs>
    <truststore-reference>trusted-server-ca-certs</truststore-reference>
  </ca-certs>
  <ee-certs>
    <truststore-reference>trusted-server-ee-certs</truststore-reference>
  </ee-certs>
</server-authentication>

</ssh-client>
3.3. YANG Module

This YANG module has normative references to [I-D.ietsf-netconf-trust-anchors], and [I-D.ietsf-netconf-keystore].

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ssh-client@2021-02-10.yang"

module ietf-ssh-client {
  yang-version 1.1;
  prefix sshc;

  import ietf-netconf-acm {  
    prefix nacm;
    reference  
      "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
  }

  import ietf-crypto-types {  
    prefix ct;
    reference  
      "RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
  }

  import ietf-truststore {  
    prefix ts;
    reference  
      "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
  }

<keepalives>  
  <max-wait>30</max-wait>  
  <max-attempts>3</max-attempts>  
</keepalives>
import ietf-keystore {
    prefix ks;
    reference
        "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
}

import ietf-ssh-common {
    prefix sshcmn;
    revision-date 2021-02-10; // stable grouping definitions
    reference
        "RFC EEEE: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
}

organization
    "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

contact
    "WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>

Watsen                   Expires 14 August 2021                [Page 26]

Internet-Draft    Groupings for SSH Clients and Servers    February 2021

WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Author: Gary Wu <mailto:garywu@cisco.com>"

description
"This module defines reusable groupings for SSH clients that can be used as a basis for specific SSH client instances.

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC EEEE (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcEEEE); see the RFC itself for full legal notices.;
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

revision 2021-02-10 {
    description
        "Initial version";
    reference
        "RFC EEEE: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
}

// Features

feature ssh-client-transport-params-config {
    description
        "SSH transport layer parameters are configurable on an SSH client.";
}

feature ssh-client-keepalives {
    description
        "Per socket SSH keepalive parameters are configurable for SSH clients on the server implementing this feature.";
}

feature client-identity-password {
    description
        "Indicates that the 'password' authentication type is supported for client identification.";
}

feature client-identity-publickey {
    description
        "Indicates that the 'publickey' authentication type is supported for client identification.

        The 'publickey' authentication type is required by
RFC 4252, but common implementations enable it to be disabled.

}

feature client-identity-hostbased {
  description
    "Indicates that the 'hostbased' authentication type is supported for client identification."
}

feature client-identity-none {
  description
    "Indicates that the 'none' authentication type is supported for client identification."
}

// Groupings

grouping ssh-client-grouping {
  description
    "A reusable grouping for configuring a SSH client without any consideration for how an underlying TCP session is established.

    Note that this grouping uses fairly typical descendent node names such that a stack of 'uses' statements will have name conflicts. It is intended that the consuming data model will resolve the issue (e.g., by wrapping the 'uses' statement in a container called 'ssh-client-parameters'). This model purposely does not do this itself so as to provide maximum flexibility to consuming models."

  container client-identity {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    must
      'public-key or password or hostbased or none or certificate';
    description
      "The credentials that the client may use, pending the SSH server's requirements, by the SSH client to authenticate to the SSH server.";
leaf username {
  type string;
  description
      "The username of this user. This will be the username
       used, for instance, to log into an SSH server.";
}
container public-key {
  if-feature client-identity-publickey;
  presence
      "Indicates that publickey-based authentication
       is configured";
  description
      "A locally-defined or referenced asymmetric key
       pair to be used for client identification.";
  reference
      "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
  uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
    refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
      must 'public-key-format = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
    }
    refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/keystore-reference" {
      must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
        + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
    }
  }
}
container password {
  if-feature client-identity-password;
  presence
      "Indicates that password-based autheinication is
       configured.";
  description
      "A password to be used to authenticate the client's
       identity.";
  uses ct:password-grouping;
}
container hostbased {
  if-feature client-identity-hostbased;
  presence
      "Indicates that hostbased authentication is configured";
  description

"A locally-defined or referenced asymmetric key pair to be used for host identification."
reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"
uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
    must 'public-key-format = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
}
refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/keystore-reference" {
    must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
}
}
leaf none {
    if-feature client-identity-none;
    type empty;
description
    "Indicates that 'none' algorithm is used for client identification.";
}
container certificate {
    if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
presence
    "Indicates that certificate-based authentication is configured";
description
    "A locally-defined or referenced certificate to be used for client identification."
reference
    "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"
uses
ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping {
refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
    must 'public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/keystore-reference"
+ "/asymmetric-key" {
    must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
}
} // container client-identity

container server-authentication {

nacm:default-deny-write;
must 'ssh-host-keys or ca-certs or ee-certs';
description
"Specifies how the SSH client can authenticate SSH servers. Any combination of credentials is additive and unordered."

container ssh-host-keys {
    presence
    "Indicates that the client can authenticate servers using the configured SSH host keys."

description
"A list of SSH host keys used by the SSH client to authenticate SSH server host keys. A server host key is authenticated if it is an exact match to a configured SSH host key."

reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore"

uses ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping {
    refine
    "local-or-truststore/local/local-definition/public-key" {
        must 'public-key-format = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
    }

    refine
    "local-or-truststore/truststore/truststore-reference" {
        must 'deref(.)/../*/ts:public-key-format'
        + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
    }
}

container ca-certs {
    if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
    presence
    "Indicates that the client can authenticate servers using the configured trust anchor certificates."

    description
"A set of certificate authority (CA) certificates used by the SSH client to authenticate SSH servers. A server is authenticated if its certificate has a valid chain of trust to a configured CA certificate."

reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore"
uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
}

container ee-certs {
if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
presence
"Indicates that the client can authenticate servers using the configured end-entity certificates."

description

"A set of end-entity certificates used by the SSH client to authenticate SSH servers. A server is authenticated if its certificate is an exact match to a configured end-entity certificate.";
reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
}
} // container server-authentication

container transport-params {
  nacm:default-deny-write;
  if-feature "ssh-client-transport-params-config";
  description
  "Configurable parameters of the SSH transport layer."
  uses sshcmn:transport-params-grouping;
} // container transport-parameters

container keepalives {
  nacm:default-deny-write;
  if-feature "ssh-client-keepalives";
  presence
  "Indicates that the SSH client proactively tests the aliveness of the remote SSH server."
  description
  "Configures the keep-alive policy, to proactively test the aliveness of the SSH server. An unresponsive TLS server is dropped after approximately max-wait * max-attempts seconds. Per Section 4 of RFC 4254, the SSH client SHOULD send an SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST message with a purposely nonexistent 'request name' value (e.g., keepalive@ietf.org) and the 'want reply' value set to '1'."
  reference
  "RFC 4254: The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol"
  leaf max-wait {
}
4. The "ietf-ssh-server" Module

This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf-ssh-server". A high-level overview of the module is provided in Section 4.1. Examples illustrating the module's use are provided in Examples (Section 4.2). The YANG module itself is defined in Section 4.3.

4.1. Data Model Overview

This section provides an overview of the "ietf-ssh-server" module in terms of its features and groupings.

4.1.1. Features
The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in the "ietf-ssh-server" module:

Features:
   +- ssh-server-transport-params-config
   +- ssh-server-keepalives
   +- client-auth-config-supported
   +- client-auth-publickey
   +- client-auth-password
   +- client-auth-hostbased
   +- client-auth-none

   The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not defined in [RFC8340].

4.1.2. Groupings

The "ietf-ssh-server" module defines the following "grouping" statement:

* ssh-server-grouping

This grouping is presented in the following subsection.

4.1.2.1. The "ssh-server-grouping" Grouping

The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "ssh-server-grouping" grouping:
grouping ssh-server-grouping
  +- server-identity
    |  +- host-key* [name]
    |    +- name?                 string
    |    +- (host-key-type)
    |    |    +--:(public-key)
    |    |    |    |    +- public-key
    |    |    |    |    +- ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
    |    |    |    +-:(certificate)
    |    |    |    |    +- certificate {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
    |    |    |    |    |    +-- u ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping
    |    |    |    |    |    |    +-- client-authentication
The "server-identity" node configures identity credentials. The ability to use a certificate is enabled by a "feature".

The "client-authentication" node configures trust anchors for authenticating the SSH client, with each option enabled by a "feature" statement.

The "transport-params" node, which must be enabled by a feature, configures parameters for the SSH sessions established by this configuration.
* The "keepalives" node, which must be enabled by a feature, configures a "presence" container for testing the aliveness of the SSH client. The aliveness-test occurs at the SSH protocol layer.

* For the referenced grouping statement(s):
  - The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.4 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
  - The "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.6 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
  - The "local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].
  - The "local-or-truststore-certs-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].
  - The "transport-params-grouping" grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.1 in this document.

4.2. Example Usage

This section presents two examples showing the "ssh-server-grouping" grouping populated with some data. These examples are effectively the same except the first configures the server identity using a local key while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both examples are consistent with the examples presented in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].

The following configuration example uses local-definitions for the server identity and client authentication:

============= NOTE: '\ line wrapping per RFC 8792 ==============

<ssh-server
 xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server"

<!-- the host-key this SSH server will present -->

Watsen                   Expires 14 August 2021                [Page 36]
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<server-identity>

<!-- the host keys this SSH server will trust -->
<host-key>
  <name>my-pubkey-based-host-key</name>
  <public-key>
    <local-definition>
      <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format</public-key-format>
      <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
      <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-format>
      <cleartext-private-key>base64encodedvalue==</cleartext-private-key>
    </local-definition>
  </public-key>
</host-key>

<host-key>
  <name>my-cert-based-host-key</name>
  <certificate>
    <local-definition>
      <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key-format>
      <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
      <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-format>
      <cleartext-private-key>base64encodedvalue==</cleartext-private-key>
      <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
    </local-definition>
  </certificate>
</host-key>

<!-- the client credentials this SSH server will trust -->
<client-authentication>
  <supported-authentication-methods>
    <publickey/>
  </supported-authentication-methods>
  <users>
    <user>
      <name>mary</name>
      <password>$0$secret</password>
      <public-keys>
        <local-definition>
          <!--<ssh-public-key>--> 
          <public-key>
            <name>User A</name>
            <public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format</public-key-format>
          </public-key>
        </local-definition>
      </public-keys>
    </user>
  </users>
</client-authentication>

</server-identity>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<!--</ssh-public-key>-->
</public-key>

<y-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
</public-key>
<!--</ssh-public-key>-->
</local-definition>
</public-keys>
</user>
</users>
<ca-certs>
<local-definition>
<certificate>
  <name>Identity Cert Issuer #1</name>
  <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
<certificate>
  <name>Identity Cert Issuer #2</name>
  <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</local-definition>
</ca-certs>
<ee-certs>
<local-definition>
<certificate>
  <name>Application #1</name>
  <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
<certificate>
  <name>Application #2</name>
  <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</local-definition>
</ee-certs>
</client-authentication>

<keepalives>
  <max-wait>30</max-wait>
  <max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
</keepalives>
The following configuration example uses keystore-references for the server identity and truststore-references for client authentication:

\begin{verbatim}
<ssh-server
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server"

    <!-- the host-key this SSH server will present -->
    <server-identity>
        <host-key>
            <name>my-pubkey-based-host-key</name>
            <public-key>
                <keystore-reference>ssh-rsa-key</keystore-reference>
            </public-key>
        </host-key>
        <host-key>
            <name>my-cert-based-host-key</name>
            <certificate>
                <keystore-reference>
                    <asymmetric-key>ssh-rsa-key-with-cert</asymmetric-key>
                    <certificate>ex-rsa-cert2</certificate>
                </keystore-reference>
            </certificate>
        </host-key>
    </server-identity>

    <!-- the client credentials this SSH server will trust -->
    <client-authentication>
        <supported-authentication-methods>
            <publickey/>
        </supported-authentication-methods>
        <users>
            <user>
                <name>mary</name>
                <password>$0$secret</password>
                <public-keys>
            </user>
        </users>
    </client-authentication>
\end{verbatim}
4.3. YANG Module

This YANG module has normative references to [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] and informative references to [RFC4253] and [RFC7317].

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ssh-server@2021-02-10.yang"

module ietf-ssh-server {
    yang-version 1.1;
    namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server";
    prefix sshs;

    import iana-crypt-hash {
        prefix ianach;
        reference
            "RFC 7317: A YANG Data Model for System Management";
    }

    <truststore-reference>SSH Public Keys for Application A</truststore-reference>
    <truststore-reference>
        <public-keys>
        </public-keys>
        </truststore-reference>
    </user>
    </users>
    <ca-certs>
        <truststore-reference>trusted-client-ca-certs</truststore-reference>
    </ca-certs>
    </client-authentication>

    <keepalives>
        <max-wait>30</max-wait>
        <max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
    </keepalives>
    </ssh-server>

</CODE ENDS>
import ietf-netconf-acm {
    prefix nacm;
    reference
        "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
}

import ietf-crypto-types {
    prefix ct;
    reference
        "RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}

import ietf-truststore {
    prefix ts;
    reference
        "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
}

import ietf-keystore {
    prefix ks;
    reference
        "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
}

import ietf-ssh-common {
    prefix sshcmn;
    revision-date 2021-02-10; // stable grouping definitions
    reference
        "RFC EEEE: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
}

organization
    "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

contact
    "WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
    WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
    Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
    Author: Gary Wu <mailto:garywu@cisco.com>";

description
"This module defines reusable groupings for SSH servers that can be used as a basis for specific SSH server instances.

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC EEEE (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcEEEE); see the RFC itself for full legal notices.

The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.;

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revision 2021-02-10 {
  description
    "Initial version";
  reference
    "RFC EEEE: YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
}

// Features

feature ssh-server-transport-params-config {
  description
    "SSH transport layer parameters are configurable on an SSH server.";
}

feature ssh-server-keepalives {
  description
    "Per socket SSH keepalive parameters are configurable for
SSH servers on the server implementing this feature.

} feature client-auth-config-supported {
    description "Indicates that the configuration for how to authenticate clients can be configured herein, as opposed to in an application specific location. That is, to support the consuming data models that prefer to place client authentication with client definitions, rather then in a data model principally concerned with configuring the transport.";
}

feature client-auth-publickey {
    description "Indicates that the 'publickey' authentication type is supported. The 'publickey' authentication type is required by RFC 4252, but common implementations enable it to be disabled."
    reference "RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol";
}

feature client-auth-password {
    description "Indicates that the 'password' authentication type is supported.";
}

feature client-auth-hostbased {
    description "Indicates that the 'hostbased' authentication type is supported.";
}

feature client-auth-none {
    description
"Indicates that the 'none' authentication type is supported."

// Groupings
grouping ssh-server-grouping {
description
  "A reusable grouping for configuring a SSH server without any consideration for how underlying TCP sessions are established.

Note that this grouping uses fairly typical descendendent node names such that a stack of 'uses' statements will have name conflicts. It is intended that the consuming data model will resolve the issue (e.g., by wrapping the 'uses' statement in a container called 'ssh-server-parameters'). This model purposely does not do this itself so as to provide maximum flexibility to consuming models."

container server-identity {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description
  "The list of host keys the SSH server will present when establishing a SSH connection."

list host-key {
  key "name";
  min-elements 1;
  ordered-by user;
description
  "An ordered list of host keys the SSH server will use to construct its ordered list of algorithms, when sending its SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message, as defined in Section 7.1 of RFC 4253.";

reference
  "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";

  leaf name {
    type string;
description
    ""}
"An arbitrary name for this host key;"
}
choice host-key-type {
  mandatory true;
  description
  "The type of host key being specified";
container public-key {
  description
  "A locally-defined or referenced asymmetric key pair
  to be used for the SSH server's host key."
  reference
  "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
  uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
    refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
      must
      'public-key-format = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
    }
    refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/"
      + "keystore-reference" {
      must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
        + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
    }
  }
}
container certificate {
  if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
  description
  "A locally-defined or referenced end-entity
  certificate to be used for the SSH server's
  host key.";
  reference
  "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
  uses
  ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping {
    refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
      must
      'public-key-format'
        + ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
    }
    refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/keystore-reference"
      + "/asymmetric-key" {
      must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
        + ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
    }
  }
}
container server-identity {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    description "Specifies how the SSH server can authenticate SSH clients.";
    container supported-authentication-methods {
        description "Indicates which authentication methods the server supports.";
        leaf publickey {
            type empty;
            description "Indicates that the 'publickey' method is supported. Note that RFC 6187 X.509v3 Certificates for SSH uses the 'publickey' method name."
RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell Authentication."
        }
        leaf password {
            if-feature client-auth-password;
            type empty;
            description "Indicates that the 'password' method is supported."
        }
        leaf hostbased {
            if-feature client-auth-hostbased;
            type empty;
            description "Indicates that the 'hostbased' method is supported."
        }
        leaf none {
            if-feature client-auth-none;
            type empty;
        }
    }
} // container server-identity

container client-authentication {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    description "Specifies how the SSH server can authenticate SSH clients.";
    container supported-authentication-methods {
        description "Indicates which authentication methods the server supports.";
        leaf publickey {
            type empty;
            description "Indicates that the 'publickey' method is supported. Note that RFC 6187 X.509v3 Certificates for SSH uses the 'publickey' method name."
RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell Authentication."
        }
        leaf password {
            if-feature client-auth-password;
            type empty;
            description "Indicates that the 'password' method is supported."
        }
        leaf hostbased {
            if-feature client-auth-hostbased;
            type empty;
            description "Indicates that the 'hostbased' method is supported."
        }
        leaf none {
            if-feature client-auth-none;
            type empty;
        }
    }
} // container client-authentication
"Indicates that the 'none' method is supported."

reference

"RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol."

container users {
  if-feature "client-auth-config-supported";
  description
    "A list of locally configured users."
  list user {
    key name;
    description
      "The list of local users configured on this device."
    leaf name {
      type string;
      description
        "The user name string identifying this entry."
    }
  }
  container public-keys {
    if-feature client-auth-publickey;
    presence
      "Indicates that the server can authenticate this user using any of the configured SSH public keys."
    description
      "A set of SSH public keys may be used by the SSH server to authenticate this user. A user is authenticated if its public key is an exact match to a configured public key."
    reference
      "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore"
    uses ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping {
      refine "local-or-truststore/local/local-definition" + "/public-key" {
        must 'public-key-format'
        + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
      }
      refine "local-or-truststore/truststore/" + "truststore-reference" {
must 'deref(.)/../*/ts:public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
}

leaf password {
  if-feature client-auth-password;
  type ianach:crypt-hash;

  description
  "The password for this user.";
}

container hostbased {
  if-feature client-auth-hostbased;
  presence
  "Indicates that the server can authenticate this user's 'host' using any of the configured SSH host keys.";
  description
  "A set of SSH host keys may be used by the SSH server to authenticate this user's host. A user's host is authenticated if its host key is an exact match to a configured host key.";
  reference
  "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer"
  RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
  uses ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping {
    refine "local-or-truststore/local/local-definition"
      + "'/public-key" {
        must 'public-key-format'
        + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
    }
    refine "local-or-truststore/truststore"
      + "'/truststore-reference" {
        must 'deref(.)/../*/ts:public-key-format'
        + ' = "ct:ssh-public-key-format"';
    }
  }
  leaf none {
    if-feature client-auth-none;
type empty;
description
  "Indicates that the 'none' method is supported."
reference
  "RFC 4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol."
}
}
}
}
}
}
container ca-certs {
  if-feature "client-auth-config-supported";
  if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
  presence
    "Indicates that the SSH server can authenticate SSH
     clients using configured certificate authority (CA)
     certificates.";
  description
    "A set of certificate authority (CA) certificates used by
     the SSH server to authenticate SSH client certificates. A
     client certificate is authenticated if it has a valid
     chain of trust to a configured CA certificate.";
  reference
    "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
  uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
}
container ee-certs {
  if-feature "client-auth-config-supported";
  if-feature "sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
  presence
    "Indicates that the SSH server can authenticate SSH
     clients using configured end-entity certificates.";
  description
    "A set of client certificates (i.e., end entity
     certificates) used by the SSH server to authenticate
     the certificates presented by SSH clients. A client
     certificate is authenticated if it is an exact match
     to a configured end-entity certificate.";
  reference
    "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
  uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
}
container transport-params {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    if-feature "ssh-server-transport-params-config";
    description
        "Configurable parameters of the SSH transport layer.";
    uses sshcmn:transport-params-grouping;
} // container transport-params

container keepalives {
    nacm:default-deny-write;
    if-feature "ssh-server-keepalives";
    presence
        "Indicates that the SSH server proactively tests the aliveness of the remote SSH client.";
    description
        "Configures the keep-alive policy, to proactively test the aliveness of the SSL client. An unresponsive SSL client is dropped after approximately max-wait * max-attempts seconds. Per Section 4 of RFC 4254, the SSH server SHOULD send an SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST message with a purposely nonexistent 'request name' value (e.g., keepalive@ietf.org) and the 'want reply' value set to '1'.";
    reference
        "RFC 4254: The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol";
    leaf max-wait {
        type uint16 {
            range "1..max";
        }
        units "seconds";
        default "30";
        description
            "Sets the amount of time in seconds after which if no data has been received from the SSL client, a SSL-level message will be sent to test the aliveness of the SSL client.";
    }
    leaf max-attempts {
        type uint8;
    }
5. Security Considerations

5.1. The "ietf-ssh-common" YANG Module

The "ietf-ssh-common" YANG module defines "grouping" statements that are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.

The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content.

Since the module in this document only define groupings, these considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that use these groupings.

None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM "default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes defined in this module.

None of the writable data nodes defined in this YANG module are considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM "default-deny-write" extension has not been set for any data nodes.
defined in this module.

This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.

5.2. The "ietf-ssh-client" YANG Module

The "ietf-ssh-client" YANG module defines "grouping" statements that are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.

The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content.

Since the module in this document only define groupings, these considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that use these groupings.

One readable data node defined in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. This node is as follows:

* The "client-identity/password" node:

  The cleartext "password" node defined in the "ssh-client-grouping" grouping is additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never be returned to a client. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all" has been applied to it.

Please be aware that this module uses the "key" and "private-key" nodes from the "ietf-crypto-types" module [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], where said nodes have the NACM extension "default-deny-all" set, thus preventing unrestricted read-access to the cleartext key values.
All of the writable data nodes defined by this module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. For instance, any modification to a key or reference to a key may dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for all data nodes defined in this module.

This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.

5.3. The "ietf-ssh-server" YANG Module

The "ietf-ssh-server" YANG module defines "grouping" statements that are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.

The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content.

Since the module in this document only define groupings, these considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that use these groupings.

None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM "default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes defined in this module.

Please be aware that this module uses the "key" and "private-key" nodes from the "ietf-crypto-types" module [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], where said nodes have the NACM extension "default-deny-all" set, thus preventing unrestricted read-access to the cleartext key values.

All of the writable data nodes defined by this module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. For instance, the addition or removal of references to keys, certificates, trusted anchors, etc., or even the modification of transport or keepalive parameters can dramatically alter the
implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for all data nodes defined in this module.

This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.

6. IANA Considerations

6.1. The "IETF XML" Registry

This document registers three URIs in the "ns" subregistry of the IETF XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registrations are requested:

Registrant Contact: The IESG
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

Registrant Contact: The IESG
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

Registrant Contact: The IESG
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

6.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry

This document registers three YANG modules in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the following registrations are requested:

name:         ietf-ssh-common
prefix:       sshcmn
reference:    RFC EEEE

name:         ietf-ssh-client
prefix:       sshc
reference:    RFC EEEE

name:         ietf-ssh-server
prefix:       sshs
reference:    RFC EEEE
7. References

7.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]

[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]

[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]


7.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server]

[I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server]
Watsen, K., "NETCONF Client and Server Models", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server-21, 20 August 2020,

[I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server]
Watsen, K., "RESTCONF Client and Server Models", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server-21, 20 August 2020,

[I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server]
Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server-22, 20 August 2020,

[I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server]
Watsen, K. and M. Scharf, "YANG Groupings for TCP Clients and TCP Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server-08, 20 August 2020,

[I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server]
Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server-22, 20 August 2020,


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Appendix A. Change Log

This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
A.1. 00 to 01
   * Noted that '0.0.0.0' and '::' might have special meanings.
   * Renamed "keychain" to "keystore".

A.2. 01 to 02
   * Removed the groupings 'listening-ssh-client-grouping' and 'listening-ssh-server-grouping'. Now modules only contain the transport-independent groupings.
   * Simplified the "client-auth" part in the ietf-ssh-client module. It now inlines what it used to point to keystore for.
   * Added cipher suites for various algorithms into new 'ietf-ssh-common' module.

A.3. 02 to 03
   * Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from 'password' leaf type.
   * Added a 'must' statement to container 'server-auth' asserting that at least one of the various auth mechanisms must be specified.
   * Fixed description statement for leaf 'trusted-ca-certs'.

A.4. 03 to 04
   * Change title to "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers"
   * Added reference to RFC 6668
   * Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section.
   * Enhanced description statement for ietf-ssh-server's "trusted-ca-certs" leaf.
   * Added mandatory true to ietf-ssh-client's "client-auth" 'choice' statement.
* Changed the YANG prefix for module ietf-ssh-common from 'sshcom' to 'sshcmn'.

* Removed the compression algorithms as they are not commonly configurable in vendors' implementations.

* Updating descriptions in transport-params-grouping and the servers's usage of it.

* Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams

* Updated YANG to use typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore paths

* Now inlines key and certificates (no longer a leafref to keystore)

**A.5.** 04 to 05

* Merged changes from co-author.

**A.6.** 05 to 06

* Updated to use trust anchors from trust-anchors draft (was keystore draft)

* Now uses new keystore grouping enabling asymmetric key to be either locally defined or a reference to the keystore.

**A.7.** 06 to 07

* factored the ssh-[client|server]-groupings into more reusable groupings.

* added if-feature statements for the new "ssh-host-keys" and "x509-certificates" features defined in draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors.

**A.8.** 07 to 08

* Added a number of compatibility matrices to Section 5 (thanks
* Clarified that any configured "host-key-alg" values need to be compatible with the configured private key.

A.9. 08 to 09

* Updated examples to reflect update to groupings defined in the keystore -09 draft.
* Add SSH keepalives features and groupings.
* Prefixed top-level SSH grouping nodes with 'ssh-' and support mashups.
* Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, and folding algorithm.

A.10. 09 to 10

* Reformatted the YANG modules.

A.11. 10 to 11

* Reformatted lines causing folding to occur.

A.12. 11 to 12

* Collapsed all the inner groupings into the top-level grouping.
* Added a top-level "demux container" inside the top-level grouping.
* Added NACM statements and updated the Security Considerations section.
* Added "presence" statements on the "keepalive" containers, as was needed to address a validation error that appeared after adding the "must" statements into the NETCONF/RESTCONF client/server modules.
* Updated the boilerplate text in module-level "description" statement to match copyeditor convention.

A.13. 12 to 13

* Removed the "demux containers", floating the nacm:default-deny-write to each descendent node, and adding a note to model designers regarding the potential need to add their own demux containers.

* Fixed a couple references (section 2 --> section 3)

* In the server model, replaced <client-cert-auth> with <client-authentication> and introduced 'local-or-external' choice.

A.14. 13 to 14

* Updated to reflect changes in trust-anchors drafts (e.g., s/trust-anchors/truststore/g + s/pinned.//)

A.15. 14 to 15

* Updated examples to reflect ietf-crypto-types change (e.g., identities --> enumerations)

* Updated "server-authentication" and "client-authentication" nodes from being a leaf of type "ts:host-keys-ref" or "ts:certificates-ref" to a container that uses "ts:local-or-truststore-host-keys-grouping" or "ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping".

A.16. 15 to 16

* Removed unnecessary if-feature statements in the -client and -server modules.

* Cleaned up some description statements in the -client and -server modules.

* Fixed a canonical ordering issue in ietf-ssh-common detected by new pyang.

A.17. 16 to 17

* Removed choice local-or-external by removing the 'external' case and flattening the 'local' case and adding a "client-auth-config-supported" feature.

* Updated examples to include the "*-key-format" nodes.
* Augmented-in "must" expressions ensuring that locally-defined public-key-format are "ct:ssh-public-key-format" (must expr for ref'ed keys are TBD).

A.18. 17 to 18

* Removed leaf-list 'other' from ietf-ssh-server.
* Removed unused 'external-client-auth-supported' feature.
* Added features client-auth-password, client-auth-hostbased, and client-auth-none.
* Renamed 'host-key' to 'public-key' for when refering to 'publickey' based auth.
* Added new feature-protected 'hostbased' and 'none' to the 'user' node's config.
* Added new feature-protected 'hostbased' and 'none' to the 'client-identity' node's config.
* Updated examples to reflect new "bag" addition to truststore.
* Refined truststore/keystore groupings to ensure the key formats "must" be particular values.
* Switched to using truststore's new "public-key" bag (instead of separate "ssh-public-key" and "raw-public-key" bags.
* Updated client/server examples to cover ALL cases (local/ref x cert/raw-key/psk).

A.19. 18 to 19

* Updated the "keepalives" containers to address Michal Vasko's request to align with RFC 8071.
* Removed algorithm-mapping tables from the "SSH Common Model" section
* Removed 'algorithm' node from examples.
* Added feature "client-identity-publickey"
* Removed "choice auth-type", as auth-types aren't exclusive.
* Renamed both "client-certs" and "server-certs" to "ee-certs"

* Switch "must" to assert the public-key-format is "subject-public-key-info-format" when certificates are used.
* Added a "Note to Reviewers" note to first page.

A.20. 19 to 20
* Added a "must 'public-key or password or hostbased or none or certificate'" statement to the "user" node in ietf-ssh-client
* Expanded "Data Model Overview section(s) [remove "wall" of tree diagrams].
* Moved the "ietf-ssh-common" module section to proceed the other two module sections.
* Updated the Security Considerations section.

A.21. 20 to 21
* Updated examples to reflect new "cleartext-" prefix in the crypto-types draft.

A.22. 21 to 22
* Cleaned up the SSH-client examples (i.e., removing FIXMEs)
* Fixed issues found by the SecDir review of the "keystore" draft.
* Updated the "ietf-ssh-client" module to use the new "password-grouping" grouping from the "crypto-types" module.

A.23. 22 to 23
* Addressed comments raised by YANG Doctor in the ct/ts/ks drafts.
Acknowledgements

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