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**Parallel NFS (pNFS) Flexible File Layout
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Abstract

The Parallel Network File System (pNFS) allows a separation between the metadata (onto a metadata server) and data (onto a storage device) for a file. The flexible file layout type is defined in this document as an extension to pNFS which allows the use of storage devices in a fashion such that they require only a quite limited degree of interaction with the metadata server, using already existing protocols. Client-side mirroring is also added to provide replication of files.

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[1.](#) Introduction

In the parallel Network File System (pNFS), the metadata server returns layout type structures that describe where file data is located. There are different layout types for different storage systems and methods of arranging data on storage devices. This document defines the flexible file layout type used with file-based data servers that are accessed using the Network File System (NFS) protocols: NFSv3 [[RFC1813](#)], NFSv4.0 [[RFC7530](#)], NFSv4.1 [[RFC5661](#)], and NFSv4.2 [[RFC7862](#)].

To provide a global state model equivalent to that of the files layout type, a back-end control protocol might be implemented between the metadata server and NFSv4.1+ storage devices. This document does not provide a standard track control protocol. An implementation can either define its own mechanism or it could define a control protocol in a standard's track document. The requirements for a control protocol are specified in [[RFC5661](#)] and clarified in [[pNFSLayouts](#)].

The control protocol described in this document is based on NFS. The storage devices are configured such that the metadata server has full access rights to the data file system and then the metadata server uses synthetic ids to control client access to individual files.

In traditional mirroring of data, the server is responsible for replicating, validating, and repairing copies of the data file. With client-side mirroring, the metadata server provides a layout which presents the available mirrors to the client. It is then the client which picks a mirror to read from and ensures that all writes go to

all mirrors. Only if all mirrors are successfully updated, does the client consider the write transaction to have succeeded. In case of error, the client can use the LAYOUTERROR operation to inform the metadata server, which is then responsible for the repairing of the mirrored copies of the file.

1.1. Definitions

control communication requirements: are for a layout type the details regarding information on layouts, stateids, file metadata, and file data which must be communicated between the metadata server and the storage devices.

control protocol: is the particular mechanism that an implementation of a layout type would use to meet the control communication requirement for that layout type. This need not be a protocol as normally understood. In some cases the same protocol may be used as a control protocol and storage protocol.

client-side mirroring: is a feature in which the client and not the server is responsible for updating all of the mirrored copies of a layout segment.

(file) data: is that part of the file system object which contains the content.

data server (DS): is another term for storage device.

fencing: is the process by which the metadata server prevents the storage devices from processing I/O from a specific client to a specific file.

file layout type: is a layout type in which the storage devices are accessed via the NFS protocol (see [Section 13 of \[RFC5661\]](#)).

gid: is the group id, a numeric value which identifies to which group a file belongs.

layout: is the information a client uses to access file data on a storage device. This information will include specification of the protocol (layout type) and the identity of the storage devices to be used.

layout iomode: is a grant of either read or read/write I/O to the client.

layout segment: is a sub-division of a layout. That sub-division might be by the layout iomode (see Sections [3.3.20](#) and [12.2.9](#) of

[[RFC5661](#)]), a striping pattern (see [Section 13.3 of \[RFC5661\]](#)), or requested byte range.

layout stateid: is a 128-bit quantity returned by a server that uniquely defines the layout state provided by the server for a specific layout that describes a layout type and file (see [Section 12.5.2 of \[RFC5661\]](#)). Further, [Section 12.5.3](#) describes differences in handling between layout stateids and other stateid types.

layout type: is a specification of both the storage protocol used to access the data and the aggregation scheme used to lay out the file data on the underlying storage devices.

loose coupling: is when the control protocol is a storage protocol.

(file) metadata: is that part of the file system object which describes the object and not the content. E.g., it could be the time since last modification, access, etc.

metadata server (MDS): is the pNFS server which provides metadata information for a file system object. It also is responsible for generating, recalling, and revoking layouts for file system objects, for performing directory operations, and for performing I/O operations to regular files when the clients direct these to the metadata server itself.

mirror: is a copy of a layout segment. Note that if one copy of the mirror is updated, then all copies must be updated.

recalling a layout: is when the metadata server uses a back channel to inform the client that the layout is to be returned in a graceful manner. Note that the client has the opportunity to flush any writes, etc., before replying to the metadata server.

revoking a layout: is when the metadata server invalidates the layout such that neither the metadata server nor any storage device will accept any access from the client with that layout.

resilvering: is the act of rebuilding a mirrored copy of a layout segment from a known good copy of the layout segment. Note that this can also be done to create a new mirrored copy of the layout segment.

rsize: is the data transfer buffer size used for reads.

stateid: is a 128-bit quantity returned by a server that uniquely defines the open and locking states provided by the server for a

specific open-owner or lock-owner/open-owner pair for a specific file and type of lock.

storage device: is the target to which clients may direct I/O requests when they hold an appropriate layout. See Section 2.1 of [[pNFSLayouts](#)] for further discussion of the difference between a data store and a storage device.

storage protocol: is the protocol used by clients to do I/O operations to the storage device. Each layout type specifies the set of storage protocols.

tight coupling: is an arrangement in which the control protocol is one designed specifically for that purpose. It may be either a proprietary protocol, adapted specifically to a particular metadata server, or one based on a standards-track document.

uid: is the used id, a numeric value which identifies which user owns a file.

wsiz: is the data transfer buffer size used for writes.

[1.2.](#) Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

[2.](#) Coupling of Storage Devices

A server implementation may choose either a loose or tight coupling model between the metadata server and the storage devices. [[pNFSLayouts](#)] describes the general problems facing pNFS implementations. This document details how the new Flexible File Layout Type addresses these issues. To implement the tight coupling model, a control protocol has to be defined. As the flex file layout imposes no special requirements on the client, the control protocol will need to provide:

- (1) for the management of both security and LAYOUTCOMMITs, and,
- (2) a global stateid model and management of these stateids.

When implementing the loose coupling model, the only control protocol will be a version of NFS, with no ability to provide a global stateid model or to prevent clients from using layouts inappropriately. To enable client use in that environment, this document will specify how security, state, and locking are to be managed.

2.1. LAYOUTCOMMIT

Regardless of the coupling model, the metadata server has the responsibility, upon receiving a LAYOUTCOMMIT (see [Section 18.42 of \[RFC5661\]](#)), of ensuring that the semantics of pNFS are respected (see Section 3.1 of [\[pNFSLayouts\]](#)). These do include a requirement that data written to data storage device be stable before the occurrence of the LAYOUTCOMMIT.

It is the responsibility of the client to make sure the data file is stable before the metadata server begins to query the storage devices about the changes to the file. If any WRITE to a storage device did not result with stable_how equal to FILE_SYNC, a LAYOUTCOMMIT to the metadata server MUST be preceded by a COMMIT to the storage devices written to. Note that if the client has not done a COMMIT to the storage device, then the LAYOUTCOMMIT might not be synchronized to the last WRITE operation to the storage device.

2.2. Fencing Clients from the Storage Device

With loosely coupled storage devices, the metadata server uses synthetic uids (user ids) and gids (group ids) for the data file, where the uid owner of the data file is allowed read/write access and the gid owner is allowed read only access. As part of the layout (see `ffds_user` and `ffds_group` in [Section 5.1](#)), the client is provided with the user and group to be used in the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) [\[RFC5531\]](#) credentials needed to access the data file. Fencing off of clients is achieved by the metadata server changing the synthetic uid and/or gid owners of the data file on the storage device to implicitly revoke the outstanding RPC credentials. A client presenting the wrong credential for the desired access will get a NFS4ERR_ACCESS error.

With this loosely coupled model, the metadata server is not able to fence off a single client, it is forced to fence off all clients. However, as the other clients react to the fencing, returning their layouts and trying to get new ones, the metadata server can hand out a new uid and gid to allow access.

It is RECOMMENDED to implement common access control methods at the storage device filesystem to allow only the metadata server root (super user) access to the storage device, and to set the owner of all directories holding data files to the root user. This approach provides a practical model to enforce access control and fence off cooperative clients, but it can not protect against malicious clients; hence it provides a level of security equivalent to AUTH_SYS. It is RECOMMENDED that the communication between the metadata server and storage device be secure from eavesdroppers and

man-in-the-middle protocol tampering. The security measure could be due to physical security (e.g., the servers are co-located in a physically secure area), from encrypted communications, or some other technique.

With tightly coupled storage devices, the metadata server sets the user and group owners, mode bits, and ACL of the data file to be the same as the metadata file. And the client must authenticate with the storage device and go through the same authorization process it would go through via the metadata server. In the case of tight coupling, fencing is the responsibility of the control protocol and is not described in detail here. However, implementations of the tight coupling locking model (see [Section 2.3](#)), will need a way to prevent access by certain clients to specific files by invalidating the corresponding stateids on the storage device. In such a scenario, the client will be given an error of NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID.

The client need not know the model used between the metadata server and the storage device. It need only react consistently to any errors in interacting with the storage device. It should both return the layout and error to the metadata server and ask for a new layout. At that point, the metadata server can either hand out a new layout, hand out no layout (forcing the I/O through it), or deny the client further access to the file.

2.2.1. Implementation Notes for Synthetic uids/gids

The selection method for the synthetic uids and gids to be used for fencing in loosely coupled storage devices is strictly an implementation issue. I.e., an administrator might restrict a range of such ids available to the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) 'uid' field [[RFC4519](#)]. She might also be able to choose an id that would never be used to grant access. Then when the metadata server had a request to access a file, a SETATTR would be sent to the storage device to set the owner and group of the data file. The user and group might be selected in a round robin fashion from the range of available ids.

Those ids would be sent back as `ffds_user` and `ffds_group` to the client. And it would present them as the RPC credentials to the storage device. When the client was done accessing the file and the metadata server knew that no other client was accessing the file, it could reset the owner and group to restrict access to the data file.

When the metadata server wanted to fence off a client, it would change the synthetic uid and/or gid to the restricted ids. Note that using a restricted id ensures that there is a change of owner and at least one id available that never gets allowed access.

Under an AUTH_SYS security model, synthetic uids and gids of 0 SHOULD be avoided. These typically either grant super access to files on a storage device or are mapped to an anonymous id. In the first case, even if the data file is fenced, the client might still be able to access the file. In the second case, multiple ids might be mapped to the anonymous ids.

2.2.2. Example of using Synthetic uids/gids

The user loghyr creates a file "ompha.c" on the metadata server and it creates a corresponding data file on the storage device.

The metadata server entry may look like:

```
-rw-r--r--    1 loghyr  staff    1697 Dec  4 11:31 ompha.c
```

On the storage device, it may be assigned some unpredictable synthetic uid/gid to deny access:

```
-rw-r-----    1 19452   28418    1697 Dec  4 11:31 data_ompha.c
```

When the file is opened on a client and accessed, it will try to get a layout for the data file. Since the layout knows nothing about the user (and does not care), whether the user loghyr or garbo opens the file does not matter. The client has to present an uid of 19452 to get write permission. If it presents any other value for the uid, then it must give a gid of 28418 to get read access.

Further, if the metadata server decides to fence the file, it should change the uid and/or gid such that these values neither match earlier values for that file nor match a predictable change based on an earlier fencing.

```
-rw-r-----    1 19453   28419    1697 Dec  4 11:31 data_ompha.c
```

The set of synthetic gids on the storage device should be selected such that there is no mapping in any of the name services used by the storage device. I.e., each group should have no members.

If the layout segment has an iomode of LAYOUTIOMODE4_READ, then the metadata server should return a synthetic uid that is not set on the storage device. Only the synthetic gid would be valid.

The client is thus solely responsible for enforcing file permissions in a loosely coupled model. To allow loghyr write access, it will send an RPC to the storage device with a credential of 1066:1067. To allow garbo read access, it will send an RPC to the storage device with a credential of 1067:1067. The value of the uid does not matter

as long as it is not the synthetic uid granted it when getting the layout.

While pushing the enforcement of permission checking onto the client may seem to weaken security, the client may already be responsible for enforcing permissions before modifications are sent to a server. With cached writes, the client is always responsible for tracking who is modifying a file and making sure to not coalesce requests from multiple users into one request.

2.3. State and Locking Models

An implementation can always be deployed as a loosely coupled model. There is however no way for a storage device to indicate over a NFS protocol that it can definitively participate in a tightly coupled model:

- o Storage devices implementing the NFSv3 and NFSv4.0 protocols are always treated as loosely coupled.
- o NFSv4.1+ storage devices that do not return the EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS flag set to EXCHANGE_ID are indicating that they are to be treated as loosely coupled. From the locking viewpoint they are treated in the same way as NFSv4.0 storage devices.
- o NFSv4.1+ storage devices that do identify themselves with the EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS flag set to EXCHANGE_ID can potentially be tightly coupled. They would use a back-end control protocol to implement the global stateid model as described in [[RFC5661](#)].

A storage device would have to either be discovered or advertised over the control protocol to enable a tight coupling model.

2.3.1. Loosely Coupled Locking Model

When locking-related operations are requested, they are primarily dealt with by the metadata server, which generates the appropriate stateids. When an NFSv4 version is used as the data access protocol, the metadata server may make stateid-related requests of the storage devices. However, it is not required to do so and the resulting stateids are known only to the metadata server and the storage device.

Given this basic structure, locking-related operations are handled as follows:

- o OPENS are dealt with by the metadata server. Stateids are selected by the metadata server and associated with the client id describing the client's connection to the metadata server. The metadata server may need to interact with the storage device to locate the file to be opened, but no locking-related functionality need be used on the storage device.

OPEN_DOWNGRADE and CLOSE only require local execution on the metadata server.

- o Advisory byte-range locks can be implemented locally on the metadata server. As in the case of OPENS, the stateids associated with byte-range locks are assigned by the metadata server and only used on the metadata server.
- o Delegations are assigned by the metadata server which initiates recalls when conflicting OPENS are processed. No storage device involvement is required.
- o TEST_STATEID and FREE_STATEID are processed locally on the metadata server, without storage device involvement.

All I/O operations to the storage device are done using the anonymous stateid. Thus the storage device has no information about the openowner and lockowner responsible for issuing a particular I/O operation. As a result:

- o Mandatory byte-range locking cannot be supported because the storage device has no way of distinguishing I/O done on behalf of the lock owner from those done by others.
- o Enforcement of share reservations is the responsibility of the client. Even though I/O is done using the anonymous stateid, the client must ensure that it has a valid stateid associated with the openowner, that allows the I/O being done before issuing the I/O.

In the event that a stateid is revoked, the metadata server is responsible for preventing client access, since it has no way of being sure that the client is aware that the stateid in question has been revoked.

As the client never receives a stateid generated by a storage device, there is no client lease on the storage device and no prospect of lease expiration, even when access is via NFSv4 protocols. Clients will have leases on the metadata server. In dealing with lease expiration, the metadata server may need to use fencing to prevent revoked stateids from being relied upon by a client unaware of the fact that they have been revoked.

2.3.2. Tightly Coupled Locking Model

When locking-related operations are requested, they are primarily dealt with by the metadata server, which generates the appropriate stateids. These stateids must be made known to the storage device using control protocol facilities, the details of which are not discussed in this document.

Given this basic structure, locking-related operations are handled as follows:

- o OPENS are dealt with primarily on the metadata server. Stateids are selected by the metadata server and associated with the client id describing the client's connection to the metadata server. The metadata server needs to interact with the storage device to locate the file to be opened, and to make the storage device aware of the association between the metadata-server-chosen stateid and the client and openowner that it represents.

OPEN_DOWNGRADE and CLOSE are executed initially on the metadata server but the state change made must be propagated to the storage device.

- o Advisory byte-range locks can be implemented locally on the metadata server. As in the case of OPENS, the stateids associated with byte-range locks, are assigned by the metadata server and are available for use on the metadata server. Because I/O operations are allowed to present lock stateids, the metadata server needs the ability to make the storage device aware of the association between the metadata-server-chosen stateid and the corresponding open stateid it is associated with.
- o Mandatory byte-range locks can be supported when both the metadata server and the storage devices have the appropriate support. As in the case of advisory byte-range locks, these are assigned by the metadata server and are available for use on the metadata server. To enable mandatory lock enforcement on the storage device, the metadata server needs the ability to make the storage device aware of the association between the metadata-server-chosen stateid and the client, openowner, and lock (i.e., lockowner, byte-range, lock-type) that it represents. Because I/O operations are allowed to present lock stateids, this information needs to be propagated to all storage devices to which I/O might be directed rather than only to storage device that contain the locked region.
- o Delegations are assigned by the metadata server which initiates recalls when conflicting OPENS are processed. Because I/O operations are allowed to present delegation stateids, the

metadata server requires the ability to make the storage device aware of the association between the metadata-server-chosen stateid and the filehandle and delegation type it represents, and to break such an association.

- o TEST_STATEID is processed locally on the metadata server, without storage device involvement.
- o FREE_STATEID is processed on the metadata server but the metadata server requires the ability to propagate the request to the corresponding storage devices.

Because the client will possess and use stateids valid on the storage device, there will be a client lease on the storage device and the possibility of lease expiration does exist. The best approach for the storage device is to retain these locks as a courtesy. However, if it does not do so, control protocol facilities need to provide the means to synchronize lock state between the metadata server and storage device.

Clients will also have leases on the metadata server, which are subject to expiration. In dealing with lease expiration, the metadata server would be expected to use control protocol facilities enabling it to invalidate revoked stateids on the storage device. In the event the client is not responsive, the metadata server may need to use fencing to prevent revoked stateids from being acted upon by the storage device.

3. XDR Description of the Flexible File Layout Type

This document contains the external data representation (XDR) [\[RFC4506\]](#) description of the flexible file layout type. The XDR description is embedded in this document in a way that makes it simple for the reader to extract into a ready-to-compile form. The reader can feed this document into the following shell script to produce the machine readable XDR description of the flexible file layout type:

<CODE BEGINS>

```
#!/bin/sh
grep '^ *///' $* | sed 's?^ */// ??' | sed 's?^ *///$??'
```

<CODE ENDS>

That is, if the above script is stored in a file called "extract.sh", and this document is in a file called "spec.txt", then the reader can do:


```
sh extract.sh < spec.txt > flex_files_prot.x
```

The effect of the script is to remove leading white space from each line, plus a sentinel sequence of "///".

The embedded XDR file header follows. Subsequent XDR descriptions, with the sentinel sequence are embedded throughout the document.

Note that the XDR code contained in this document depends on types from the NFSv4.1 `nfs4_prot.x` file [[RFC5662](#)]. This includes both nfs types that end with a 4, such as `offset4`, `length4`, etc., as well as more generic types such as `uint32_t` and `uint64_t`.

3.1. Code Components Licensing Notice

Both the XDR description and the scripts used for extracting the XDR description are Code Components as described in [Section 4](#) of "Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents" [[LEGAL](#)]. These Code Components are licensed according to the terms of that document.

<CODE BEGINS>

```
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/// *   LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
/// *   OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
/// *   IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
/// *   ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
/// *
/// * This code was derived from RFCTBD10.
/// * Please reproduce this note if possible.
/// */
///
/// /*
///  * flex_files_prot.x
///  */
///
/// /*
///  * The following include statements are for example only.
///  * The actual XDR definition files are generated separately
///  * and independently and are likely to have a different name.
///  * %#include <nfsv42.x>
///  * %#include <rpc_prot.x>
///  */
///
<CODE ENDS>
```

4. Device Addressing and Discovery

Data operations to a storage device require the client to know the network address of the storage device. The NFSv4.1+ GETDEVICEINFO operation ([Section 18.40 of \[RFC5661\]](#)) is used by the client to retrieve that information.

4.1. ff_device_addr4

The ff_device_addr4 data structure is returned by the server as the layout type specific opaque field da_addr_body in the device_addr4 structure by a successful GETDEVICEINFO operation.

<CODE BEGINS>


```
/// struct ff_device_versions4 {  
///     uint32_t      ffdv_version;  
///     uint32_t      ffdv_minorversion;  
///     uint32_t      ffdv_rsize;  
///     uint32_t      ffdv_wsize;  
///     bool          ffdv_tightly_coupled;  
/// };  
///  
/// struct ff_device_addr4 {  
///     multipath_list4  ffda_netaddrs;  
///     ff_device_versions4 ffda_versions<>;  
/// };  
///
```

<CODE ENDS>

The `ffda_netaddrs` field is used to locate the storage device. It MUST be set by the server to a list holding one or more of the device network addresses.

The `ffda_versions` array allows the metadata server to present choices as to NFS version, minor version, and coupling strength to the client. The `ffdv_version` and `ffdv_minorversion` represent the NFS protocol to be used to access the storage device. This layout specification defines the semantics for `ffdv_versions` 3 and 4. If `ffdv_version` equals 3 then the server MUST set `ffdv_minorversion` to 0 and `ffdv_tightly_coupled` to false. The client MUST then access the storage device using the NFSv3 protocol [[RFC1813](#)]. If `ffdv_version` equals 4 then the server MUST set `ffdv_minorversion` to one of the NFSv4 minor version numbers and the client MUST access the storage device using NFSv4 with the specified minor version.

Note that while the client might determine that it cannot use any of the configured combinations of `ffdv_version`, `ffdv_minorversion`, and `ffdv_tightly_coupled`, when it gets the device list from the metadata server, there is no way to indicate to the metadata server as to which device it is version incompatible. If however, the client waits until it retrieves the layout from the metadata server, it can at that time clearly identify the storage device in question (see [Section 5.4](#)).

The `ffdv_rsize` and `ffdv_wsize` are used to communicate the maximum `rsize` and `wsize` supported by the storage device. As the storage device can have a different `rsize` or `wsize` than the metadata server, the `ffdv_rsize` and `ffdv_wsize` allow the metadata server to communicate that information on behalf of the storage device.

`ffdv_tightly_coupled` informs the client as to whether the metadata server is tightly coupled with the storage devices or not. Note that even if the data protocol is at least NFSv4.1, it may still be the case that there is loose coupling in effect. If `ffdv_tightly_coupled` is not set, then the client MUST commit writes to the storage devices for the file before sending a `LAYOUTCOMMIT` to the metadata server. I.e., the writes MUST be committed by the client to stable storage via issuing `WRITES` with `stable_how == FILE_SYNC` or by issuing a `COMMIT` after `WRITES` with `stable_how != FILE_SYNC` (see [Section 3.3.7 of \[RFC1813\]](#)).

4.2. Storage Device Multipathing

The flexible file layout type supports multipathing to multiple storage device addresses. Storage device level multipathing is used for bandwidth scaling via trunking and for higher availability of use in the event of a storage device failure. Multipathing allows the client to switch to another storage device address which may be that of another storage device that is exporting the same data stripe unit, without having to contact the metadata server for a new layout.

To support storage device multipathing, `ffda_netaddrs` contains an array of one or more storage device network addresses. This array (data type `multipath_list4`) represents a list of storage devices (each identified by a network address), with the possibility that some storage device will appear in the list multiple times.

The client is free to use any of the network addresses as a destination to send storage device requests. If some network addresses are less desirable paths to the data than others, then the metadata server SHOULD NOT include those network addresses in `ffda_netaddrs`. If less desirable network addresses exist to provide failover, the RECOMMENDED method to offer the addresses is to provide them in a replacement device-ID-to-device-address mapping, or a replacement device ID. When a client finds no response from the storage device using all addresses available in `ffda_netaddrs`, it SHOULD send a `GETDEVICEINFO` to attempt to replace the existing device-ID-to-device-address mappings. If the metadata server detects that all network paths represented by `ffda_netaddrs` are unavailable, the metadata server SHOULD send a `CB_NOTIFY_DEVICEID` (if the client has indicated it wants device ID notifications for changed device IDs) to change the device-ID-to-device-address mappings to the available addresses. If the device ID itself will be replaced, the metadata server SHOULD recall all layouts with the device ID, and thus force the client to get new layouts and device ID mappings via `LAYOUTGET` and `GETDEVICEINFO`.

Generally, if two network addresses appear in `ffda_netaddrs`, they will designate the same storage device. When the storage device is accessed over NFSv4.1 or a higher minor version, the two storage device addresses will support the implementation of client ID or session trunking (the latter is RECOMMENDED) as defined in [\[RFC5661\]](#). The two storage device addresses will share the same server owner or major ID of the server owner. It is not always necessary for the two storage device addresses to designate the same storage device with trunking being used. For example, the data could be read-only, and the data consist of exact replicas.

5. Flexible File Layout Type

The `layout4` type is defined in [\[RFC5662\]](#) as follows:

<CODE BEGINS>

```
enum layouttype4 {
    LAYOUT4_NFSV4_1_FILES    = 1,
    LAYOUT4_OSD2_OBJECTS     = 2,
    LAYOUT4_BLOCK_VOLUME     = 3,
    LAYOUT4_FLEX_FILES       = 4
[[RFC Editor: please modify the LAYOUT4_FLEX_FILES
to be the layouttype assigned by IANA]]
};

struct layout_content4 {
    layouttype4      loc_type;
    opaque           loc_body<>;
};

struct layout4 {
    offset4          lo_offset;
    length4          lo_length;
    layoutiomode4     lo_iomode;
    layout_content4  lo_content;
};
```

<CODE ENDS>

This document defines structures associated with the `layouttype4` value `LAYOUT4_FLEX_FILES`. [\[RFC5661\]](#) specifies the `loc_body` structure as an XDR type "opaque". The opaque layout is uninterpreted by the generic pNFS client layers, but is interpreted by the flexible file layout type implementation. This section defines the structure of this otherwise opaque value, `ff_layout4`.

5.1. ff_layout4

<CODE BEGINS>

```

/// const FF_FLAGS_NO_LAYOUTCOMMIT    = 0x00000001;
/// const FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS     = 0x00000002;
/// const FF_FLAGS_NO_READ_IO         = 0x00000004;
/// const FF_FLAGS_WRITE_ONE_MIRROR   = 0x00000008;

/// typedef uint32_t                  ff_flags4;
///

/// struct ff_data_server4 {
///     deviceid4                      ffds_deviceid;
///     uint32_t                        ffds_efficiency;
///     stateid4                        ffds_stateid;
///     nfs_fh4                         ffds_fh_vers<>;
///     fattr4_owner                    ffds_user;
///     fattr4_owner_group              ffds_group;
/// };
///

/// struct ff_mirror4 {
///     ff_data_server4                ffm_data_servers<>;
/// };
///

/// struct ff_layout4 {
///     length4                         ffl_stripe_unit;
///     ff_mirror4                      ffl_mirrors<>;
///     ff_flags4                       ffl_flags;
///     uint32_t                        ffl_stats_collect_hint;
/// };
///

```

<CODE ENDS>

The `ff_layout4` structure specifies a layout in that portion of the data file described in the current layout segment. It is either a single instance or a set of mirrored copies of that portion of the data file. When mirroring is in effect, it protects against loss of data in layout segments. Note that while not explicitly shown in the above XDR, each `layout4` element returned in the `logr_layout` array of `LAYOUTGET4res` (see [Section 18.43.1 of \[RFC5661\]](#)) describes a layout segment. Hence each `ff_layout4` also describes a layout segment.

It is possible that the file is concatenated from more than one layout segment. Each layout segment MAY represent different striping

parameters, applying respectively only to the layout segment byte range.

The `ffl_stripe_unit` field is the stripe unit size in use for the current layout segment. The number of stripes is given inside each mirror by the number of elements in `ffm_data_servers`. If the number of stripes is one, then the value for `ffl_stripe_unit` MUST default to zero. The only supported mapping scheme is sparse and is detailed in [Section 6](#). Note that there is an assumption here that both the stripe unit size and the number of stripes is the same across all mirrors.

The `ffl_mirrors` field is the array of mirrored storage devices which provide the storage for the current stripe, see Figure 1.

The `ffl_stats_collect_hint` field provides a hint to the client on how often the server wants it to report LAYOUTSTATS for a file. The time is in seconds.




Figure 1

The `ffs_mirrors` field represents an array of state information for each mirrored copy of the current layout segment. Each element is described by a `ff_mirror4` type.

`ffds_deviceid` provides the deviceid of the storage device holding the data file.

`ffds_fh_vers` is an array of filehandles of the data file matching to the available NFS versions on the given storage device. There MUST be exactly as many elements in `ffds_fh_vers` as there are in `ffda_versions`. Each element of the array corresponds to a particular combination of `ffdv_version`, `ffdv_minorversion`, and `ffdv_tightly_coupled` provided for the device. The array allows for server implementations which have different filehandles for different combinations of version, minor version, and coupling strength. See [Section 5.4](#) for how to handle versioning issues between the client and storage devices.

For tight coupling, `ffds_stateid` provides the stateid to be used by the client to access the file. For loose coupling and a NFSv4 storage device, the client will have to use an anonymous stateid to perform I/O on the storage device. With no control protocol, the metadata server stateid can not be used to provide a global stateid model. Thus the server MUST set the `ffds_stateid` to be the anonymous stateid.

This specification of the `ffds_stateid` restricts both models for NFSv4.x storage protocols:

loosely couple: the stateid has to be an anonymous stateid,

tightly couple: the stateid has to be a global stateid.

A number of issues stem from a mismatch between the fact that `ffds_stateid` is defined as a single item while `ffds_fh_vers` is defined as an array. It is possible for each open file on the storage device to require its own open stateid. Because there are established loosely coupled implementations of the version of the protocol described in this document, such potential issues have not been addressed here. It is possible for future layout types to be defined that address these issues, should it become important to provide multiple stateids for the same underlying file.

For loosely coupled storage devices, `ffds_user` and `ffds_group` provide the synthetic user and group to be used in the RPC credentials that the client presents to the storage device to access the data files. For tightly coupled storage devices, the user and group on the storage device will be the same as on the metadata server. I.e., if `ffdv_tightly_coupled` (see [Section 4.1](#)) is set, then the client MUST ignore both `ffds_user` and `ffds_group`.

The allowed values for both `ffds_user` and `ffds_group` are specified in [Section 5.9 of \[RFC5661\]](#). For NFSv3 compatibility, user and group strings that consist of decimal numeric values with no leading zeros can be given a special interpretation by clients and servers that

choose to provide such support. The receiver may treat such a user or group string as representing the same user as would be represented by an NFSv3 uid or gid having the corresponding numeric value. Note that if using Kerberos for security, the expectation is that these values will be a name@domain string.

ffds_efficiency describes the metadata server's evaluation as to the effectiveness of each mirror. Note that this is per layout and not per device as the metric may change due to perceived load, availability to the metadata server, etc. Higher values denote higher perceived utility. The way the client can select the best mirror to access is discussed in [Section 8.1](#).

ffl_flags is a bitmap that allows the metadata server to inform the client of particular conditions that may result from the more or less tight coupling of the storage devices.

FF_FLAGS_NO_LAYOUTCOMMIT: can be set to indicate that the client is not required to send LAYOUTCOMMIT to the metadata server.

F_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS: can be set to indicate that the client should not send I/O operations to the metadata server. I.e., even if the client could determine that there was a network disconnect to a storage device, the client should not try to proxy the I/O through the metadata server.

FF_FLAGS_NO_READ_IO: can be set to indicate that the client should not send READ requests with the layouts of iomode LAYOUTIOMODE4_RW. Instead, it should request a layout of iomode LAYOUTIOMODE4_READ from the metadata server.

FF_FLAGS_WRITE_ONE_MIRROR: can be set to indicate that the client only needs to update one of the mirrors (see [Section 8.2](#)).

[5.1.1](#). Error Codes from LAYOUTGET

[RFC5661] provides little guidance as to how the client is to proceed with a LAYOUTGET which returns an error of either NFS4ERR_LAYOUTTRYLATER, NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE, and NFS4ERR_DELAY. Within the context of this document:

NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE: there is no layout available and the I/O is to go to the metadata server. Note that it is possible to have had a layout before a recall and not after.

NFS4ERR_LAYOUTTRYLATER: there is some issue preventing the layout from being granted. If the client already has an appropriate layout, it should continue with I/O to the storage devices.

NFS4ERR_DELAY: there is some issue preventing the layout from being granted. If the client already has an appropriate layout, it should not continue with I/O to the storage devices.

5.1.2. Client Interactions with FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS

Even if the metadata server provides the FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS, flag, the client can still perform I/O to the metadata server. The flag functions as a hint. The flag indicates to the client that the metadata server prefers to separate the metadata I/O from the data I/O, most likely for performance reasons.

5.2. LAYOUTCOMMIT

The flex file layout does not use lou_body. If lou_type is LAYOUT4_FLEX_FILES, the lou_body field MUST have a zero length.

5.3. Interactions Between Devices and Layouts

In [\[RFC5661\]](#), the file layout type is defined such that the relationship between multipathing and filehandles can result in either 0, 1, or N filehandles (see [Section 13.3](#)). Some rationales for this are clustered servers which share the same filehandle or allowing for multiple read-only copies of the file on the same storage device. In the flexible file layout type, while there is an array of filehandles, they are independent of the multipathing being used. If the metadata server wants to provide multiple read-only copies of the same file on the same storage device, then it should provide multiple ff_device_addr4, each as a mirror. The client can then determine that since the ffdv_fh_vers are different, then there are multiple copies of the file for the current layout segment available.

5.4. Handling Version Errors

When the metadata server provides the ffda_versions array in the ff_device_addr4 (see [Section 4.1](#)), the client is able to determine if it can not access a storage device with any of the supplied combinations of ffdv_version, ffdv_minorversion, and ffdv_tightly_coupled. However, due to the limitations of reporting errors in GETDEVICEINFO (see [Section 18.40 in \[RFC5661\]](#), the client is not able to specify which specific device it can not communicate with over one of the provided ffdv_version and ffdv_minorversion combinations. Using ff_ioerr4 (see [Section 9.1.1](#) inside either the LAYOUTRETURN (see [Section 18.44 of \[RFC5661\]](#)) or the LAYOUTERROR (see [Section 15.6 of \[RFC7862\]](#) and [Section 10](#) of this document), the client can isolate the problematic storage device.

The error code to return for LAYOUTRETURN and/or LAYOUTERROR is NFS4ERR_MINOR_VERS_MISMATCH. It does not matter whether the mismatch is a major version (e.g., client can use NFSv3 but not NFSv4) or minor version (e.g., client can use NFSv4.1 but not NFSv4.2), the error indicates that for all the supplied combinations for ffdv_version and ffdv_minversion, the client can not communicate with the storage device. The client can retry the GETDEVICEINFO to see if the metadata server can provide a different combination or it can fall back to doing the I/O through the metadata server.

6. Striping via Sparse Mapping

While other layout types support both dense and sparse mapping of logical offsets to physical offsets within a file (see for example [Section 13.4 of \[RFC5661\]](#)), the flexible file layout type only supports a sparse mapping.

With sparse mappings, the logical offset within a file (L) is also the physical offset on the storage device. As detailed in [Section 13.4.4 of \[RFC5661\]](#), this results in holes across each storage device which does not contain the current stripe index.

L: logical offset into the file

W: stripe width

W = number of elements in ffm_data_servers

S: number of bytes in a stripe

S = W * ffl_stripe_unit

N: stripe number

N = L / S

7. Recovering from Client I/O Errors

The pNFS client may encounter errors when directly accessing the storage devices. However, it is the responsibility of the metadata server to recover from the I/O errors. When the LAYOUT4_FLEX_FILES layout type is used, the client MUST report the I/O errors to the server at LAYOUTRETURN time using the ff_ioerr4 structure (see [Section 9.1.1](#)).

The metadata server analyzes the error and determines the required recovery operations such as recovering media failures or reconstructing missing data files.

The metadata server MUST recall any outstanding layouts to allow it exclusive write access to the stripes being recovered and to prevent

other clients from hitting the same error condition. In these cases, the server **MUST** complete recovery before handing out any new layouts to the affected byte ranges.

Although the client implementation has the option to propagate a corresponding error to the application that initiated the I/O operation and drop any unwritten data, the client should attempt to retry the original I/O operation by either requesting a new layout or sending the I/O via regular NFSv4.1+ READ or WRITE operations to the metadata server. The client **SHOULD** attempt to retrieve a new layout and retry the I/O operation using the storage device first and only if the error persists, retry the I/O operation via the metadata server.

8. Mirroring

The flexible file layout type has a simple model in place for the mirroring of the file data constrained by a layout segment. There is no assumption that each copy of the mirror is stored identically on the storage devices. For example, one device might employ compression or deduplication on the data. However, the over the wire transfer of the file contents **MUST** appear identical. Note, this is a constraint of the selected XDR representation in which each mirrored copy of the layout segment has the same striping pattern (see Figure 1).

The metadata server is responsible for determining the number of mirrored copies and the location of each mirror. While the client may provide a hint to how many copies it wants (see [Section 12](#)), the metadata server can ignore that hint and in any event, the client has no means to dictate either the storage device (which also means the coupling and/or protocol levels to access the layout segments) or the location of said storage device.

The updating of mirrored layout segments is done via client-side mirroring. With this approach, the client is responsible for making sure modifications are made on all copies of the layout segments it is informed of via the layout. If a layout segment is being resilvered to a storage device, that mirrored copy will not be in the layout. Thus the metadata server **MUST** update that copy until the client is presented it in a layout. If the `FF_FLAGS_WRITE_ONE_MIRROR` is set in `ffl_flags`, the client need only update one of the mirrors (see [Section 8.2](#)). If the client is writing to the layout segments via the metadata server, then the metadata server **MUST** update all copies of the mirror. As seen in [Section 8.3](#), during the resilvering, the layout is recalled, and the client has to make modifications via the metadata server.

8.1. Selecting a Mirror

When the metadata server grants a layout to a client, it MAY let the client know how fast it expects each mirror to be once the request arrives at the storage devices via the `ffds_efficiency` member. While the algorithms to calculate that value are left to the metadata server implementations, factors that could contribute to that calculation include speed of the storage device, physical memory available to the device, operating system version, current load, etc.

However, what should not be involved in that calculation is a perceived network distance between the client and the storage device. The client is better situated for making that determination based on past interaction with the storage device over the different available network interfaces between the two. I.e., the metadata server might not know about a transient outage between the client and storage device because it has no presence on the given subnet.

As such, it is the client which decides which mirror to access for reading the file. The requirements for writing to mirrored layout segments are presented below.

8.2. Writing to Mirrors

8.2.1. Single Storage Device Updates Mirrors

If the `FF_FLAGS_WRITE_ONE_MIRROR` flag in `ffl_flags` is set, the client only needs to update one of the copies of the layout segment. For this case, the storage device MUST ensure that all copies of the mirror are updated when any one of the mirrors is updated. If the storage device gets an error when updating one of the mirrors, then it MUST inform the client that the original WRITE had an error. The client then MUST inform the metadata server (see [Section 8.2.3](#)). The client's responsibility with respect to COMMIT is explained in [Section 8.2.4](#). The client may choose any one of the mirrors and may use `ffds_efficiency` in the same manner as for reading when making this choice.

8.2.2. Client Updates All Mirrors

If the `FF_FLAGS_WRITE_ONE_MIRROR` flag in `ffl_flags` is not set, the client is responsible for updating all mirrored copies of the layout segments that it is given in the layout. A single failed update is sufficient to fail the entire operation. If all but one copy is updated successfully and the last one provides an error, then the client needs to inform the metadata server about the error via either `LAYOUTRETURN` or `LAYOUTERROR` that the update failed to that storage device. If the client is updating the mirrors serially, then it

SHOULD stop at the first error encountered and report that to the metadata server. If the client is updating the mirrors in parallel, then it SHOULD wait until all storage devices respond such that it can report all errors encountered during the update.

8.2.3. Handling Write Errors

When the client reports a write error to the metadata server, the metadata server is responsible for determining if it wants to remove the errant mirror from the layout, if the mirror has recovered from some transient error, etc. When the client tries to get a new layout, the metadata server informs it of the decision by the contents of the layout. The client MUST NOT make any assumptions that the contents of the previous layout will match those of the new one. If it has updates that were not committed to all mirrors, then it MUST resend those updates to all mirrors.

There is no provision in the protocol for the metadata server to directly determine that the client has or has not recovered from an error. I.e., assume that the storage device was network partitioned from the client and all of the copies are successfully updated after the error was reported. There is no mechanism for the client to report that fact and the metadata server is forced to repair the file across the mirror.

If the client supports NFSv4.2, it can use LAYOUTERROR and LAYOUTRETURN to provide hints to the metadata server about the recovery efforts. A LAYOUTERROR on a file is for a non-fatal error. A subsequent LAYOUTRETURN without a `ff_ioerr4` indicates that the client successfully replayed the I/O to all mirrors. Any LAYOUTRETURN with a `ff_ioerr4` is an error that the metadata server needs to repair. The client MUST be prepared for the LAYOUTERROR to trigger a CB_LAYOUTRECALL if the metadata server determines it needs to start repairing the file.

8.2.4. Handling Write COMMITS

When stable writes are done to the metadata server or to a single replica (if allowed by the use of `FF_FLAGS_WRITE_ONE_MIRROR`), it is the responsibility of the receiving node to propagate the written data stably, before replying to the client.

In the corresponding cases in which unstable writes are done, the receiving node does not have any such obligation, although it may choose to asynchronously propagate the updates. However, once a COMMIT is replied to, all replicas must reflect the writes that have been done, and this data must have been committed to stable storage on all replicas.

In order to avoid situations in which stale data is read from replicas to which writes have not been propagated:

- o A client which has outstanding unstable writes made to single node (metadata server or storage device) MUST do all reads from that same node.
- o When writes are flushed to the server, for example to implement, close-to-open semantics, a COMMIT must be done by the client to ensure that up-to-date written data will be available irrespective of the particular replica read.

8.3. Metadata Server Resilvering of the File

The metadata server may elect to create a new mirror of the layout segments at any time. This might be to resilver a copy on a storage device which was down for servicing, to provide a copy of the layout segments on storage with different storage performance characteristics, etc. As the client will not be aware of the new mirror and the metadata server will not be aware of updates that the client is making to the layout segments, the metadata server MUST recall the writable layout segment(s) that it is resilvering. If the client issues a LAYOUTGET for a writable layout segment which is in the process of being resilvered, then the metadata server can deny that request with a NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE. The client would then have to perform the I/O through the metadata server.

9. Flexible Files Layout Type Return

layoutreturn_file4 is used in the LAYOUTRETURN operation to convey layout-type specific information to the server. It is defined in [Section 18.44.1 of \[RFC5661\]](#) as follows:

<CODE BEGINS>

```
/* Constants used for LAYOUTRETURN and CB_LAYOUTRECALL */
const LAYOUT4_RET_REC_FILE      = 1;
const LAYOUT4_RET_REC_FSID      = 2;
const LAYOUT4_RET_REC_ALL       = 3;

enum layoutreturn_type4 {
    LAYOUTRETURN4_FILE = LAYOUT4_RET_REC_FILE,
    LAYOUTRETURN4_FSID = LAYOUT4_RET_REC_FSID,
    LAYOUTRETURN4_ALL  = LAYOUT4_RET_REC_ALL
};
```



```
struct layoutreturn_file4 {
    offset4      lrf_offset;
    length4      lrf_length;
    stateid4     lrf_stateid;
    /* layouttype4 specific data */
    opaque       lrf_body<>;
};

union layoutreturn4 switch(layoutreturn_type4 lr_returntype) {
    case LAYOUTRETURN4_FILE:
        layoutreturn_file4      lr_layout;
    default:
        void;
};

struct LAYOUTRETURN4args {
    /* CURRENT_FH: file */
    bool          lora_reclaim;
    layoutreturn_stateid4  lora_recallstateid;
    layouttype4   lora_layout_type;
    layoutiomode4 lora_iomode;
    layoutreturn4 lora_layoutreturn;
};
```

<CODE ENDS>

If the `lora_layout_type` layout type is `LAYOUT4_FLEX_FILES` and the `lr_returntype` is `LAYOUTRETURN4_FILE`, then the `lrf_body` opaque value is defined by `ff_layoutreturn4` (See [Section 9.3](#)). It allows the client to report I/O error information or layout usage statistics back to the metadata server as defined below. Note that while the data structures are built on concepts introduced in NFSv4.2, the effective discriminated union (`lora_layout_type` combined with `ff_layoutreturn4`) allows for a NFSv4.1 metadata server to utilize the data.

[9.1.](#) I/O Error Reporting

[9.1.1.](#) `ff_ioerr4`

<CODE BEGINS>


```
/// struct ff_ioerr4 {  
///     offset4      ffie_offset;  
///     length4      ffie_length;  
///     stateid4     ffie_stateid;  
///     device_error4 ffie_errors<>;  
/// };  
///
```

<CODE ENDS>

Recall that [\[RFC7862\]](#) defines device_error4 as:

<CODE BEGINS>

```
struct device_error4 {  
    deviceid4    de_deviceid;  
    nfsstat4     de_status;  
    nfs_opnum4   de_opnum;  
};
```

<CODE ENDS>

The ff_ioerr4 structure is used to return error indications for data files that generated errors during data transfers. These are hints to the metadata server that there are problems with that file. For each error, ffie_errors.de_deviceid, ffie_offset, and ffie_length represent the storage device and byte range within the file in which the error occurred; ffie_errors represents the operation and type of error. The use of device_error4 is described in [Section 15.6 of \[RFC7862\]](#).

Even though the storage device might be accessed via NFSv3 and reports back NFSv3 errors to the client, the client is responsible for mapping these to appropriate NFSv4 status codes as de_status. Likewise, the NFSv3 operations need to be mapped to equivalent NFSv4 operations.

[9.2.](#) Layout Usage Statistics

[9.2.1.](#) ff_io_latency4

<CODE BEGINS>


```
/// struct ff_io_latency4 {  
///     uint64_t      ffil_ops_requested;  
///     uint64_t      ffil_bytes_requested;  
///     uint64_t      ffil_ops_completed;  
///     uint64_t      ffil_bytes_completed;  
///     uint64_t      ffil_bytes_not_delivered;  
///     nfstime4      ffil_total_busy_time;  
///     nfstime4      ffil_aggregate_completion_time;  
/// };  
///
```

<CODE ENDS>

Both operation counts and bytes transferred are kept in the `ff_io_latency4`. As seen in `ff_layoutupdate4` (See [Section 9.2.2](#)) read and write operations are aggregated separately. READ operations are used for the `ff_io_latency4` `ffl_read`. Both WRITE and COMMIT operations are used for the `ff_io_latency4` `ffl_write`. "Requested" counters track what the client is attempting to do and "completed" counters track what was done. There is no requirement that the client only report completed results that have matching requested results from the reported period.

`ffil_bytes_not_delivered` is used to track the aggregate number of bytes requested by not fulfilled due to error conditions. `ffil_total_busy_time` is the aggregate time spent with outstanding RPC calls. `ffil_aggregate_completion_time` is the sum of all round trip times for completed RPC calls.

In [Section 3.3.1 of \[RFC5661\]](#), the `nfstime4` is defined as the number of seconds and nanoseconds since midnight or zero hour January 1, 1970 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The use of `nfstime4` in `ff_io_latency4` is to store time since the start of the first I/O from the client after receiving the layout. In other words, these are to be decoded as duration and not as a date and time.

Note that LAYOUTSTATS are cumulative, i.e., not reset each time the operation is sent. If two LAYOUTSTATS ops for the same file, layout stateid, and originating from the same NFS client are processed at the same time by the metadata server, then the one containing the larger values contains the most recent time series data.

9.2.2. `ff_layoutupdate4`

<CODE BEGINS>


```
/// struct ff_layoutupdate4 {  
///     netaddr4      ffl_addr;  
///     nfs_fh4       ffl_fhandle;  
///     ff_io_latency4 ffl_read;  
///     ff_io_latency4 ffl_write;  
///     nfstime4      ffl_duration;  
///     bool          ffl_local;  
/// };  
///
```

<CODE ENDS>

ffl_addr differentiates which network address the client connected to on the storage device. In the case of multipathing, ffl_fhandle indicates which read-only copy was selected. ffl_read and ffl_write convey the latencies respectively for both read and write operations. ffl_duration is used to indicate the time period over which the statistics were collected. ffl_local if true indicates that the I/O was serviced by the client's cache. This flag allows the client to inform the metadata server about "hot" access to a file it would not normally be allowed to report on.

9.2.3. ff_iostats4

<CODE BEGINS>

```
/// struct ff_iostats4 {  
///     offset4      ffis_offset;  
///     length4      ffis_length;  
///     stateid4     ffis_stateid;  
///     io_info4     ffis_read;  
///     io_info4     ffis_write;  
///     deviceid4    ffis_deviceid;  
///     ff_layoutupdate4 ffis_layoutupdate;  
/// };  
///
```

<CODE ENDS>

Recall that [[RFC7862](#)] defines io_info4 as:

<CODE BEGINS>

```
struct io_info4 {  
    uint64_t    ii_count;  
    uint64_t    ii_bytes;  
};
```


<CODE ENDS>

With pNFS, data transfers are performed directly between the pNFS client and the storage devices. Therefore, the metadata server has no direct knowledge to the I/O operations being done and thus can not create on its own statistical information about client I/O to optimize data storage location. `ff_iostats4` MAY be used by the client to report I/O statistics back to the metadata server upon returning the layout.

Since it is not feasible for the client to report every I/O that used the layout, the client MAY identify "hot" byte ranges for which to report I/O statistics. The definition and/or configuration mechanism of what is considered "hot" and the size of the reported byte range is out of the scope of this document. It is suggested for client implementation to provide reasonable default values and an optional run-time management interface to control these parameters. For example, a client can define the default byte range resolution to be 1 MB in size and the thresholds for reporting to be 1 MB/second or 10 I/O operations per second.

For each byte range, `ffis_offset` and `ffis_length` represent the starting offset of the range and the range length in bytes. `ffis_read.ii_count`, `ffis_read.ii_bytes`, `ffis_write.ii_count`, and `ffis_write.ii_bytes` represent, respectively, the number of contiguous read and write I/Os and the respective aggregate number of bytes transferred within the reported byte range.

The combination of `ffis_deviceid` and `ffl_addr` uniquely identifies both the storage path and the network route to it. Finally, the `ffl_fhandle` allows the metadata server to differentiate between multiple read-only copies of the file on the same storage device.

9.3. `ff_layoutreturn4`

<CODE BEGINS>

```
/// struct ff_layoutreturn4 {  
///     ff_ioerr4      fflr_ioerr_report<>;  
///     ff_iostats4    fflr_iostats_report<>;  
/// };  
///
```

<CODE ENDS>

When data file I/O operations fail, `fflr_ioerr_report<>` is used to report these errors to the metadata server as an array of elements of type `ff_ioerr4`. Each element in the array represents an error that

occurred on the data file identified by `ffie_errors.de_deviceid`. If no errors are to be reported, the size of the `fflr_ioerr_report<>` array is set to zero. The client MAY also use `fflr_iostats_report<>` to report a list of I/O statistics as an array of elements of type `ff_iostats4`. Each element in the array represents statistics for a particular byte range. Byte ranges are not guaranteed to be disjoint and MAY repeat or intersect.

10. Flexible Files Layout Type LAYOUTERROR

If the client is using NFSv4.2 to communicate with the metadata server, then instead of waiting for a `LAYOUTRETURN` to send error information to the metadata server (see [Section 9.1](#)), it MAY use `LAYOUTERROR` (see [Section 15.6 of \[RFC7862\]](#)) to communicate that information. For the flexible files layout type, this means that `LAYOUTERROR4args` is treated the same as `ff_ioerr4`.

11. Flexible Files Layout Type LAYOUTSTATS

If the client is using NFSv4.2 to communicate with the metadata server, then instead of waiting for a `LAYOUTRETURN` to send I/O statistics to the metadata server (see [Section 9.2](#)), it MAY use `LAYOUTSTATS` (see [Section 15.7 of \[RFC7862\]](#)) to communicate that information. For the flexible files layout type, this means that `LAYOUTSTATS4args.lsa_layoutupdate` is overloaded with the same contents as in `ffis_layoutupdate`.

12. Flexible File Layout Type Creation Hint

The `layouthint4` type is defined in the [\[RFC5661\]](#) as follows:

<CODE BEGINS>

```
struct layouthint4 {
    layouttype4      loh_type;
    opaque           loh_body<>;
};
```

<CODE ENDS>

The `layouthint4` structure is used by the client to pass a hint about the type of layout it would like created for a particular file. If the `loh_type` layout type is `LAYOUT4_FLEX_FILES`, then the `loh_body` opaque value is defined by the `ff_layouthint4` type.

12.1. ff_layouthint4

<CODE BEGINS>

```
/// union ff_mirrors_hint switch (bool ffmc_valid) {  
///     case TRUE:  
///         uint32_t    ffmc_mirrors;  
///     case FALSE:  
///         void;  
/// };  
///  
  
/// struct ff_layouthint4 {  
///     ff_mirrors_hint    fflh_mirrors_hint;  
/// };  
///
```

<CODE ENDS>

This type conveys hints for the desired data map. All parameters are optional so the client can give values for only the parameter it cares about.

13. Recalling a Layout

While [Section 12.5.5 of \[RFC5661\]](#) discusses layout type independent reasons for recalling a layout, the flexible file layout type metadata server should recall outstanding layouts in the following cases:

- o When the file's security policy changes, i.e., Access Control Lists (ACLs) or permission mode bits are set.
- o When the file's layout changes, rendering outstanding layouts invalid.
- o When existing layouts are inconsistent with the need to enforce locking constraints.
- o When existing layouts are inconsistent with the requirements regarding resilvering as described in [Section 8.3](#).

13.1. CB_RECALL_ANY

The metadata server can use the CB_RECALL_ANY callback operation to notify the client to return some or all of its layouts. [Section 22.3 of \[RFC5661\]](#) defines the allowed types of the "NFSv4 Recallable Object Types Registry".

<CODE BEGINS>

```
/// const RCA4_TYPE_MASK_FF_LAYOUT_MIN    = 16;
/// const RCA4_TYPE_MASK_FF_LAYOUT_MAX    = 17;
[[RFC Editor: please insert assigned constants]]
///
```

```
struct CB_RECALL_ANY4args {
    uint32_t      craa_layouts_to_keep;
    bitmap4       craa_type_mask;
};
```

<CODE ENDS>

Typically, CB_RECALL_ANY will be used to recall client state when the server needs to reclaim resources. The `craa_type_mask` bitmap specifies the type of resources that are recalled and the `craa_layouts_to_keep` value specifies how many of the recalled flexible file layouts the client is allowed to keep. The flexible file layout type mask flags are defined as follows:

<CODE BEGINS>

```
/// enum ff_cb_recall_any_mask {
///     FF_RCA4_TYPE_MASK_READ = -2,
///     FF_RCA4_TYPE_MASK_RW   = -1
[[RFC Editor: please insert assigned constants]]
/// };
///
```

<CODE ENDS>

They represent the iomode of the recalled layouts. In response, the client SHOULD return layouts of the recalled iomode that it needs the least, keeping at most `craa_layouts_to_keep` Flexible File Layouts.

The PNFS_FF_RCA4_TYPE_MASK_READ flag notifies the client to return layouts of iomode LAYOUTIOMODE4_READ. Similarly, the PNFS_FF_RCA4_TYPE_MASK_RW flag notifies the client to return layouts of iomode LAYOUTIOMODE4_RW. When both mask flags are set, the client is notified to return layouts of either iomode.

14. Client Fencing

In cases where clients are uncommunicative and their lease has expired or when clients fail to return recalled layouts within a lease period, the server MAY revoke client layouts and reassign these resources to other clients (see [Section 12.5.5 in \[RFC5661\]](#)). To

avoid data corruption, the metadata server MUST fence off the revoked clients from the respective data files as described in [Section 2.2](#).

15. Security Considerations

The pNFS feature partitions the NFSv4.1+ file system protocol into two parts, the control path and the data path (storage protocol). The control path contains all the new operations described by this feature; all existing NFSv4 security mechanisms and features apply to the control path (see Sections [1.7.1](#) and [2.2.1](#) of [\[RFC5661\]](#)). The combination of components in a pNFS system is required to preserve the security properties of NFSv4.1+ with respect to an entity accessing data via a client, including security countermeasures to defend against threats that NFSv4.1+ provides defenses for in environments where these threats are considered significant.

The metadata server is primarily responsible for securing the data path. It has to authenticate the client access and provide appropriate credentials to the client to access data files on the storage device. Finally, it is responsible for revoking access for a client to the storage device.

The metadata server enforces the file access-control policy at LAYOUTGET time. The client should use RPC authorization credentials for getting the layout for the requested iomode (READ or RW) and the server verifies the permissions and ACL for these credentials, possibly returning NFS4ERR_ACCESS if the client is not allowed the requested iomode. If the LAYOUTGET operation succeeds the client receives, as part of the layout, a set of credentials allowing it I/O access to the specified data files corresponding to the requested iomode. When the client acts on I/O operations on behalf of its local users, it MUST authenticate and authorize the user by issuing respective OPEN and ACCESS calls to the metadata server, similar to having NFSv4 data delegations.

The combination of file handle, synthetic uid, and gid in the layout are the way that the metadata server enforces access control to the data server. The directory namespace on the storage device SHOULD only be accessible to the metadata server and not the clients. In that case, the client only has access to file handles of file objects and not directory objects. Thus, given a file handle in a layout, it is not possible to guess the parent directory file handle. Further, as the data file permissions only allow the given synthetic uid read/write permission and the given synthetic gid read permission, knowing the synthetic ids of one file does not necessarily allow access to any other data file on the storage device.

The metadata server can also deny access at any time by fencing the data file, which means changing the synthetic ids. In turn, that forces the client to return its current layout and get a new layout if it wants to continue IO to the data file.

If the configuration of the storage device is such that clients can access the directory namespace, then the access control degrades to that of a typical NFS server with exports with a security flavor of AUTH_SYS. Any client which is allowed access can forge credentials to access any data file. The caveat is that the rogue client might have no knowledge of the data file's type or position in the metadata directory namespace.

If access is allowed, the client uses the corresponding (READ or RW) credentials to perform the I/O operations at the data file's storage devices. When the metadata server receives a request to change a file's permissions or ACL, it SHOULD recall all layouts for that file and then MUST fence off any clients still holding outstanding layouts for the respective files by implicitly invalidating the previously distributed credential on all data file comprising the file in question. It is REQUIRED that this be done before committing to the new permissions and/or ACL. By requesting new layouts, the clients will reauthorize access against the modified access control metadata. Recalling the layouts in this case is intended to prevent clients from getting an error on I/Os done after the client was fenced off.

15.1. RPCSEC_GSS and Security Services

Because of the special use of principals within the loose coupling model, the issues are different depending on the coupling model.

15.1.1. Loosely Coupled

RPCSEC_GSS version 3 (RPCSEC_GSSv3) [[RFC7861](#)] contains facilities that would allow it to be used to authorize the client to the storage device on behalf of the metadata server. Doing so would require that each of the metadata server, storage device, and client would need to implement RPCSEC_GSSv3 using an RPC-application-defined structured privilege assertion in a manner described in [Section 4.9.1 of \[RFC7862\]](#). The specifics necessary to do so are not described in this document. This is principally because any such specification would require extensive implementation work on a wide range of storage devices, which would be unlikely to result in a widely usable specification for a considerable time.

As a result, the layout type described in this document will not provide support for use of RPCSEC_GSS together with the loosely coupled model. However, future layout types could be specified which

would allow such support, either through the use of `RPCSEC_GSSv3`, or in other ways.

15.1.2. Tightly Coupled

With tight coupling, the principal used to access the metadata file is exactly the same as used to access the data file. The storage device can use the control protocol to validate any RPC credentials. As a result there are no security issues related to using `RPCSEC_GSS` with a tightly coupled system. For example, if Kerberos V5 GSS-API [[RFC4121](#)] is used as the security mechanism, then the storage device could use a control protocol to validate the RPC credentials to the metadata server.

16. IANA Considerations

[RFC5661] introduced a registry for "pNFS Layout Types Registry" and as such, new layout type numbers need to be assigned by IANA. This document defines the protocol associated with the existing layout type number, `LAYOUT4_FLEX_FILES` (see Table 1).

Layout Type Name	Value	RFC	How	Minor Versions
<code>LAYOUT4_FLEX_FILES</code>	<code>0x4</code>	<code>RFCTBD10</code>	L	1

Table 1: Layout Type Assignments

[RFC5661] also introduced a registry called "NFSv4 Recallable Object Types Registry". This document defines new recallable objects for `RCA4_TYPE_MASK_FF_LAYOUT_MIN` and `RCA4_TYPE_MASK_FF_LAYOUT_MAX` (see Table 2).

Recallable Object Type Name	Value	RFC	How	Minor Versions
<code>RCA4_TYPE_MASK_FF_LAYOUT_MIN</code>	16	<code>RFCTBD10</code>	L	1
<code>RCA4_TYPE_MASK_FF_LAYOUT_MAX</code>	17	<code>RFCTBD10</code>	L	1

Table 2: Recallable Object Type Assignments

Note, [[RFC5661](#)] should have also defined (see Table 3):

Recallable Object Type Name	Value	RFC	How	Minor Versions
RCA4_TYPE_MASK_OTHER_LAYOUT_M IN	12	[RFC5661]	L	1
RCA4_TYPE_MASK_OTHER_LAYOUT_M AX	15	[RFC5661]	L	1

Table 3: Recallable Object Type Assignments

17. References

17.1. Normative References

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[RFC7861] Adamson, W. and N. Williams, "Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Security Version 3", November 2016.

[RFC7862] Haynes, T., "NFS Version 4 Minor Version 2", [RFC 7862](#), November 2016.

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Haynes, T., "Requirements for pNFS Layout Types", [draft-ietf-nfsv4-layout-types-07](#) (Work In Progress), August 2017.

[17.2.](#) Informative References

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[Appendix A.](#) Acknowledgments

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Benjamin Kaduk and Olga Kornievskaja also helped provide concrete scenarios for loosely coupled security mechanisms. And in the end, Olga proved that as defined, the loosely coupled model would not work with RPCSEC_GSS.

Tigran Mkrtchyan provided the use case for not allowing the client to proxy the I/O through the data server.

Rick Macklem provided the use case for only writing to a single mirror.

Appendix B. RFC Editor Notes

[RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publishing this document as an RFC]

[RFC Editor: prior to publishing this document as an RFC, please replace all occurrences of RFCTBD10 with RFCxxxx where xxxx is the RFC number of this document]

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