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**NFS Version 4 Minor Version 2**  
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Abstract

This Internet-Draft describes NFS version 4 minor version two, focusing mainly on the protocol extensions made from NFS version 4 minor version 0 and NFS version 4 minor version 1. Major extensions introduced in NFS version 4 minor version two include: Server-side Copy, Application I/O Advise, Space Reservations, Sparse Files, Application Data Blocks, and Labeled NFS.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [1].

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## **1. Introduction**

### **1.1. The NFS Version 4 Minor Version 2 Protocol**

The NFS version 4 minor version 2 (NFSv4.2) protocol is the third minor version of the NFS version 4 (NFSv4) protocol. The first minor version, NFSv4.0, is described in [10] and the second minor version, NFSv4.1, is described in [2]. It follows the guidelines for minor versioning that are listed in Section 11 of [10].

As a minor version, NFSv4.2 is consistent with the overall goals for NFSv4, but extends the protocol so as to better meet those goals, based on experiences with NFSv4.1. In addition, NFSv4.2 has adopted some additional goals, which motivate some of the major extensions in NFSv4.2.

### **1.2. Scope of This Document**

This document describes the NFSv4.2 protocol. With respect to NFSv4.0 and NFSv4.1, this document does not:

- o describe the NFSv4.0 or NFSv4.1 protocols, except where needed to contrast with NFSv4.2.
- o modify the specification of the NFSv4.0 or NFSv4.1 protocols.
- o clarify the NFSv4.0 or NFSv4.1 protocols. I.e., any clarifications made here apply to NFSv4.2 and neither of the prior protocols.

The full XDR for NFSv4.2 is presented in [3].

### **1.3. NFSv4.2 Goals**

The goal of the design of NFSv4.2 is to take common local file system features and offer them remotely. These features might

- o already be available on the servers, e.g., sparse files
- o be under development as a new standard, e.g., SEEK\_HOLE and SEEK\_DATA
- o be used by clients with the servers via some proprietary means, e.g., Labeled NFS

but the clients are not able to leverage them on the server within the confines of the NFS protocol.





## **1.4. Overview of NFSv4.2 Features**

[[Comment.1: This needs fleshing out! --TH]]

### **1.4.1. Sparse Files**

Two new operations are defined to support the reading of sparse files (READ\_PLUS) and the punching of holes to remove backing storage (INITIALIZE).

### **1.4.2. Application I/O Advise**

We propose a new IO\_ADVICE operation for NFSv4.2 that clients can use to communicate expected I/O behavior to the server. By communicating future I/O behavior such as whether a file will be accessed sequentially or randomly, and whether a file will or will not be accessed in the near future, servers can optimize future I/O requests for a file by, for example, prefetching or evicting data. This operation can be used to support the posix\_fadvise function as well as other applications such as databases and video editors.

## **1.5. Differences from NFSv4.1**

In NFSv4.1, the only way to introduce new variants of an operation was to introduce a new operation. I.e., READ becomes either READ2 or READ\_PLUS. With the use of discriminated unions as parameters to such functions in NFSv4.2, it is possible to add a new arm in a subsequent minor version. And it is also possible to move such an operation from OPTIONAL/RECOMMENDED to REQUIRED. Forcing an implementation to adopt each arm of a discriminated union at such a time does not meet the spirit of the minor versioning rules. As such, new arms of a discriminated union MUST follow the same guidelines for minor versioning as operations in NFSv4.1 - i.e., they may not be made REQUIRED. To support this, a new error code, NFS4ERR\_UNION\_NOTSUPP, is introduced which allows the server to communicate to the client that the operation is supported, but the specific arm of the discriminated union is not.

## **2. NFS Server-side Copy**

### **2.1. Introduction**

The server-side copy feature provides a mechanism for the NFS client to perform a file copy on the server without the data being transmitted back and forth over the network. Without this feature, an NFS client copies data from one location to another by reading the data from the server over the network, and then writing the data back



over the network to the server. Using this server-side copy operation, the client is able to instruct the server to copy the data locally without the data being sent back and forth over the network unnecessarily.

If the source object and destination object are on different file servers, the file servers will communicate with one another to perform the copy operation. The server-to-server protocol by which this is accomplished is not defined in this document.

## **2.2. Protocol Overview**

The server-side copy offload operations support both intra-server and inter-server file copies. An intra-server copy is a copy in which the source file and destination file reside on the same server. In an inter-server copy, the source file and destination file are on different servers. In both cases, the copy may be performed synchronously or asynchronously.

Throughout the rest of this document, we refer to the NFS server containing the source file as the "source server" and the NFS server to which the file is transferred as the "destination server". In the case of an intra-server copy, the source server and destination server are the same server. Therefore in the context of an intra-server copy, the terms source server and destination server refer to the single server performing the copy.

The operations described below are designed to copy files. Other file system objects can be copied by building on these operations or using other techniques. For example if the user wishes to copy a directory, the client can synthesize a directory copy by first creating the destination directory and then copying the source directory's files to the new destination directory. If the user wishes to copy a namespace junction [[11](#)] [[12](#)], the client can use the ONC RPC Federated Filesystem protocol [[12](#)] to perform the copy. Specifically the client can determine the source junction's attributes using the FEDFS\_LOOKUP\_FSN procedure and create a duplicate junction using the FEDFS\_CREATE\_JUNCTION procedure.

For the inter-server copy, the operations are defined to be compatible with the traditional copy authentication approach. The client and user are authorized at the source for reading. Then they are authorized at the destination for writing.

### **2.2.1. Overview of Copy Operations**



COPY\_NOTIFY: For inter-server copies, the client sends this operation to the source server to notify it of a future file copy from a given destination server for the given user. ([Section 13.3](#))

COPY\_REVOKE: Also for inter-server copies, the client sends this operation to the source server to revoke permission to copy a file for the given user. ([Section 13.4](#))

COPY: Used by the client to request a file copy. ([Section 13.1](#))

COPY\_ABORT: Used by the client to abort an asynchronous file copy. ([Section 13.2](#))

COPY\_STATUS: Used by the client to poll the status of an asynchronous file copy. ([Section 13.5](#))

CB\_COPY: Used by the destination server to report the results of an asynchronous file copy to the client. ([Section 14.2](#))

**2.2.2. Intra-Server Copy**

To copy a file on a single server, the client uses a COPY operation. The server may respond to the copy operation with the final results of the copy or it may perform the copy asynchronously and deliver the results using a CB\_COPY operation callback. If the copy is performed asynchronously, the client may poll the status of the copy using COPY\_STATUS or cancel the copy using COPY\_ABORT.

A synchronous intra-server copy is shown in Figure 1. In this example, the NFS server chooses to perform the copy synchronously. The copy operation is completed, either successfully or unsuccessfully, before the server replies to the client's request. The server's reply contains the final result of the operation.



Figure 1: A synchronous intra-server copy.

An asynchronous intra-server copy is shown in Figure 2. In this example, the NFS server performs the copy asynchronously. The server's reply to the copy request indicates that the copy operation



was initiated and the final result will be delivered at a later time. The server's reply also contains a copy stateid. The client may use this copy stateid to poll for status information (as shown) or to cancel the copy using a COPY\_ABORT. When the server completes the copy, the server performs a callback to the client and reports the results.




Figure 2: An asynchronous intra-server copy.

### 2.2.3. Inter-Server Copy

A copy may also be performed between two servers. The copy protocol is designed to accommodate a variety of network topologies. As shown in Figure 3, the client and servers may be connected by multiple networks. In particular, the servers may be connected by a specialized, high speed network (network 192.168.33.0/24 in the diagram) that does not include the client. The protocol allows the client to setup the copy between the servers (over network 10.11.78.0/24 in the diagram) and for the servers to communicate on the high speed network if they choose to do so.








Figure 3: An example inter-server network topology.

For an inter-server copy, the client notifies the source server that a file will be copied by the destination server using a COPY\_NOTIFY operation. The client then initiates the copy by sending the COPY operation to the destination server. The destination server may perform the copy synchronously or asynchronously.

A synchronous inter-server copy is shown in Figure 4. In this case, the destination server chooses to perform the copy before responding to the client's COPY request.

An asynchronous copy is shown in Figure 5. In this case, the destination server chooses to respond to the client's COPY request immediately and then perform the copy asynchronously.






Figure 4: A synchronous inter-server copy.






Figure 5: An asynchronous inter-server copy.

### 2.2.4. Server-to-Server Copy Protocol

The source server and destination server are not required to use a specific protocol to transfer the file data. The choice of what protocol to use is ultimately the destination server's decision.

#### 2.2.4.1. Using NFSv4.x as a Server-to-Server Copy Protocol

The destination server MAY use standard NFSv4.x (where x >= 1) to read the data from the source server. If NFSv4.x is used for the server-to-server copy protocol, the destination server can use the filehandle contained in the COPY request with standard NFSv4.x operations to read data from the source server. Specifically, the destination server may use the NFSv4.x OPEN operation's CLAIM\_FH



facility to open the file being copied and obtain an open stateid. Using the stateid, the destination server may then use NFSv4.x READ operations to read the file.

#### **2.2.4.2. Using an alternative Server-to-Server Copy Protocol**

In a homogeneous environment, the source and destination servers might be able to perform the file copy extremely efficiently using specialized protocols. For example the source and destination servers might be two nodes sharing a common file system format for the source and destination file systems. Thus the source and destination are in an ideal position to efficiently render the image of the source file to the destination file by replicating the file system formats at the block level. Another possibility is that the source and destination might be two nodes sharing a common storage area network, and thus there is no need to copy any data at all, and instead ownership of the file and its contents might simply be re-assigned to the destination. To allow for these possibilities, the destination server is allowed to use a server-to-server copy protocol of its choice.

In a heterogeneous environment, using a protocol other than NFSv4.x (e.g., HTTP [13] or FTP [14]) presents some challenges. In particular, the destination server is presented with the challenge of accessing the source file given only an NFSv4.x filehandle.

One option for protocols that identify source files with path names is to use an ASCII hexadecimal representation of the source filehandle as the file name.

Another option for the source server is to use URLs to direct the destination server to a specialized service. For example, the response to COPY\_NOTIFY could include the URL [ftp://s1.example.com:9999/\\_FH/0x12345](ftp://s1.example.com:9999/_FH/0x12345), where 0x12345 is the ASCII hexadecimal representation of the source filehandle. When the destination server receives the source server's URL, it would use "\_FH/0x12345" as the file name to pass to the FTP server listening on port 9999 of s1.example.com. On port 9999 there would be a special instance of the FTP service that understands how to convert NFS filehandles to an open file descriptor (in many operating systems, this would require a new system call, one which is the inverse of the makefh() function that the pre-NFSv4 MOUNT service needs).

Authenticating and identifying the destination server to the source server is also a challenge. Recommendations for how to accomplish this are given in [Section 2.4.1.2.4](#) and [Section 2.4.1.4](#).





### **2.3. Requirements for Operations**

The implementation of server-side copy is OPTIONAL by the client and the server. However, in order to successfully copy a file, some operations MUST be supported by the client and/or server.

If a client desires an intra-server file copy, then it MUST support the COPY and CB\_COPY operations. If COPY returns a stateid, then the client MAY use the COPY\_ABORT and COPY\_STATUS operations.

If a client desires an inter-server file copy, then it MUST support the COPY, COPY\_NOTICE, and CB\_COPY operations, and MAY use the COPY\_REVOKE operation. If COPY returns a stateid, then the client MAY use the COPY\_ABORT and COPY\_STATUS operations.

If a server supports intra-server copy, then the server MUST support the COPY operation. If a server's COPY operation returns a stateid, then the server MUST also support these operations: CB\_COPY, COPY\_ABORT, and COPY\_STATUS.

If a source server supports inter-server copy, then the source server MUST support all these operations: COPY\_NOTIFY and COPY\_REVOKE. If a destination server supports inter-server copy, then the destination server MUST support the COPY operation. If a destination server's COPY operation returns a stateid, then the destination server MUST also support these operations: CB\_COPY, COPY\_ABORT, COPY\_NOTIFY, COPY\_REVOKE, and COPY\_STATUS.

Each operation is performed in the context of the user identified by the ONC RPC credential of its containing COMPOUND or CB\_COMPOUND request. For example, a COPY\_ABORT operation issued by a given user indicates that a specified COPY operation initiated by the same user be canceled. Therefore a COPY\_ABORT MUST NOT interfere with a copy of the same file initiated by another user.

An NFS server MAY allow an administrative user to monitor or cancel copy operations using an implementation specific interface.

#### **2.3.1. netloc4 - Network Locations**

The server-side copy operations specify network locations using the netloc4 data type shown below:



```
enum netloc_type4 {
    NL4_NAME      = 0,
    NL4_URL       = 1,
    NL4_NETADDR   = 2
};
union netloc4 switch (netloc_type4 nl_type) {
    case NL4_NAME:      utf8str_cis nl_name;
    case NL4_URL:       utf8str_cis nl_url;
    case NL4_NETADDR:   netaddr4    nl_addr;
};
```

If the netloc4 is of type NL4\_NAME, the nl\_name field MUST be specified as a UTF-8 string. The nl\_name is expected to be resolved to a network address via DNS, LDAP, NIS, /etc/hosts, or some other means. If the netloc4 is of type NL4\_URL, a server URL [4] appropriate for the server-to-server copy operation is specified as a UTF-8 string. If the netloc4 is of type NL4\_NETADDR, the nl\_addr field MUST contain a valid netaddr4 as defined in Section 3.3.9 of [2].

When netloc4 values are used for an inter-server copy as shown in Figure 3, their values may be evaluated on the source server, destination server, and client. The network environment in which these systems operate should be configured so that the netloc4 values are interpreted as intended on each system.

### 2.3.2. Copy Offload Stateids

A server may perform a copy offload operation asynchronously. An asynchronous copy is tracked using a copy offload stateid. Copy offload stateids are included in the COPY, COPY\_ABORT, COPY\_STATUS, and CB\_COPY operations.

Section 8.2.4 of [2] specifies that stateids are valid until either (A) the client or server restart or (B) the client returns the resource.

A copy offload stateid will be valid until either (A) the client or server restarts or (B) the client returns the resource by issuing a COPY\_ABORT operation or the client replies to a CB\_COPY operation.

A copy offload stateid's seqid MUST NOT be 0. In the context of a copy offload operation, it is ambiguous to indicate the most recent copy offload operation using a stateid with seqid of 0. Therefore a copy offload stateid with seqid of 0 MUST be considered invalid.



## **2.4. Security Considerations**

The security considerations pertaining to NFSv4 [10] apply to this chapter.

The standard security mechanisms provide by NFSv4 [10] may be used to secure the protocol described in this chapter.

NFSv4 clients and servers supporting the inter-server copy operations described in this chapter are REQUIRED to implement [5], including the RPCSEC\_GSSv3 privileges `copy_from_auth` and `copy_to_auth`. If the server-to-server copy protocol is ONC RPC based, the servers are also REQUIRED to implement the RPCSEC\_GSSv3 privilege `copy_confirm_auth`. These requirements to implement are not requirements to use. NFSv4 clients and servers are RECOMMENDED to use [5] to secure server-side copy operations.

### **2.4.1. Inter-Server Copy Security**

#### **2.4.1.1. Requirements for Secure Inter-Server Copy**

Inter-server copy is driven by several requirements:

- o The specification MUST NOT mandate an inter-server copy protocol. There are many ways to copy data. Some will be more optimal than others depending on the identities of the source server and destination server. For example the source and destination servers might be two nodes sharing a common file system format for the source and destination file systems. Thus the source and destination are in an ideal position to efficiently render the image of the source file to the destination file by replicating the file system formats at the block level. In other cases, the source and destination might be two nodes sharing a common storage area network, and thus there is no need to copy any data at all, and instead ownership of the file and its contents simply gets re-assigned to the destination.
- o The specification MUST provide guidance for using NFSv4.x as a copy protocol. For those source and destination servers willing to use NFSv4.x there are specific security considerations that this specification can and does address.
- o The specification MUST NOT mandate pre-configuration between the source and destination server. Requiring that the source and destination first have a "copying relationship" increases the administrative burden. However the specification MUST NOT preclude implementations that require pre-configuration.



- o The specification MUST NOT mandate a trust relationship between the source and destination server. The NFSv4 security model requires mutual authentication between a principal on an NFS client and a principal on an NFS server. This model MUST continue with the introduction of COPY.

#### **2.4.1.2. Inter-Server Copy with RPCSEC\_GSSv3**

When the client sends a COPY\_NOTIFY to the source server to expect the destination to attempt to copy data from the source server, it is expected that this copy is being done on behalf of the principal (called the "user principal") that sent the RPC request that encloses the COMPOUND procedure that contains the COPY\_NOTIFY operation. The user principal is identified by the RPC credentials. A mechanism that allows the user principal to authorize the destination server to perform the copy in a manner that lets the source server properly authenticate the destination's copy, and without allowing the destination to exceed its authorization is necessary.

An approach that sends delegated credentials of the client's user principal to the destination server is not used for the following reasons. If the client's user delegated its credentials, the destination would authenticate as the user principal. If the destination were using the NFSv4 protocol to perform the copy, then the source server would authenticate the destination server as the user principal, and the file copy would securely proceed. However, this approach would allow the destination server to copy other files. The user principal would have to trust the destination server to not do so. This is counter to the requirements, and therefore is not considered. Instead an approach using RPCSEC\_GSSv3 [5] privileges is proposed.

One of the stated applications of the proposed RPCSEC\_GSSv3 protocol is compound client host and user authentication [+ privilege assertion]. For inter-server file copy, we require compound NFS server host and user authentication [+ privilege assertion]. The distinction between the two is one without meaning.

RPCSEC\_GSSv3 introduces the notion of privileges. We define three privileges:

copy\_from\_auth: A user principal is authorizing a source principal ("nfs@<source>") to allow a destination principal ("nfs@<destination>") to copy a file from the source to the destination. This privilege is established on the source server before the user principal sends a COPY\_NOTIFY operation to the source server.





```
struct copy_from_auth_priv {
    secret4          cfap_shared_secret;
    netloc4          cfap_destination;
    /* the NFSv4 user name that the user principal maps to */
    utf8str_mixed    cfap_username;
    /* equal to seq_num of rpc_gss_cred_vers_3_t */
    unsigned int     cfap_seq_num;
};
```

cfp\_shared\_secret is a secret value the user principal generates.

copy\_to\_auth: A user principal is authorizing a destination principal ("nfs@<destination>") to allow it to copy a file from the source to the destination. This privilege is established on the destination server before the user principal sends a COPY operation to the destination server.

```
struct copy_to_auth_priv {
    /* equal to cfap_shared_secret */
    secret4          ctap_shared_secret;
    netloc4          ctap_source;
    /* the NFSv4 user name that the user principal maps to */
    utf8str_mixed    ctap_username;
    /* equal to seq_num of rpc_gss_cred_vers_3_t */
    unsigned int     ctap_seq_num;
};
```

ctap\_shared\_secret is a secret value the user principal generated and was used to establish the copy\_from\_auth privilege with the source principal.

copy\_confirm\_auth: A destination principal is confirming with the source principal that it is authorized to copy data from the source on behalf of the user principal. When the inter-server copy protocol is NFSv4, or for that matter, any protocol capable of being secured via RPCSEC\_GSSv3 (i.e., any ONC RPC protocol), this privilege is established before the file is copied from the source to the destination.



```

struct copy_confirm_auth_priv {
    /* equal to GSS_GetMIC() of cfap_shared_secret */
    opaque          ccap_shared_secret_mic<>;
    /* the NFSv4 user name that the user principal maps to */
    utf8str_mixed   ccap_username;
    /* equal to seq_num of rpc_gss_cred_vers_3_t */
    unsigned int    ccap_seq_num;
};

```

#### **2.4.1.2.1. Establishing a Security Context**

When the user principal wants to COPY a file between two servers, if it has not established copy\_from\_auth and copy\_to\_auth privileges on the servers, it establishes them:

- o The user principal generates a secret it will share with the two servers. This shared secret will be placed in the cfap\_shared\_secret and ctap\_shared\_secret fields of the appropriate privilege data types, copy\_from\_auth\_priv and copy\_to\_auth\_priv.
- o An instance of copy\_from\_auth\_priv is filled in with the shared secret, the destination server, and the NFSv4 user id of the user principal. It will be sent with an RPCSEC\_GSS3\_CREATE procedure, and so cfap\_seq\_num is set to the seq\_num of the credential of the RPCSEC\_GSS3\_CREATE procedure. Because cfap\_shared\_secret is a secret, after XDR encoding copy\_from\_auth\_priv, GSS\_Wrap() (with privacy) is invoked on copy\_from\_auth\_priv. The RPCSEC\_GSS3\_CREATE procedure's arguments are:

```

struct {
    rpc_gss3_gss_binding    *compound_binding;
    rpc_gss3_chan_binding  *chan_binding_mic;
    rpc_gss3_assertion     assertions<>;
    rpc_gss3_extension     extensions<>;
} rpc_gss3_create_args;

```

The string "copy\_from\_auth" is placed in assertions[0].privs. The output of GSS\_Wrap() is placed in extensions[0].data. The field extensions[0].critical is set to TRUE. The source server calls GSS\_Unwrap() on the privilege, and verifies that the seq\_num matches the credential. It then verifies that the NFSv4 user id being asserted matches the source server's mapping of the user principal. If it does, the privilege is established on the source server as: <"copy\_from\_auth", user id, destination>. The successful reply to RPCSEC\_GSS3\_CREATE has:



```

struct {
    opaque                handle<>;
    rpc_gss3_chan_binding *chan_binding_mic;
    rpc_gss3_assertion    granted_assertions<>;
    rpc_gss3_assertion    server_assertions<>;
    rpc_gss3_extension    extensions<>;
} rpc_gss3_create_res;

```

The field "handle" is the RPCSEC\_GSSv3 handle that the client will use on COPY\_NOTIFY requests involving the source and destination server. granted\_assertions[0].privs will be equal to "copy\_from\_auth". The server will return a GSS\_Wrap() of copy\_to\_auth\_priv.

- o An instance of copy\_to\_auth\_priv is filled in with the shared secret, the source server, and the NFSv4 user id. It will be sent with an RPCSEC\_GSS3\_CREATE procedure, and so ctap\_seq\_num is set to the seq\_num of the credential of the RPCSEC\_GSS3\_CREATE procedure. Because ctap\_shared\_secret is a secret, after XDR encoding copy\_to\_auth\_priv, GSS\_Wrap() is invoked on copy\_to\_auth\_priv. The RPCSEC\_GSS3\_CREATE procedure's arguments are:

```

struct {
    rpc_gss3_gss_binding    *compound_binding;
    rpc_gss3_chan_binding    *chan_binding_mic;
    rpc_gss3_assertion      assertions<>;
    rpc_gss3_extension      extensions<>;
} rpc_gss3_create_args;

```

The string "copy\_to\_auth" is placed in assertions[0].privs. The output of GSS\_Wrap() is placed in extensions[0].data. The field extensions[0].critical is set to TRUE. After unwrapping, verifying the seq\_num, and the user principal to NFSv4 user ID mapping, the destination establishes a privilege of <"copy\_to\_auth", user id, source>. The successful reply to RPCSEC\_GSS3\_CREATE has:

```

struct {
    opaque                handle<>;
    rpc_gss3_chan_binding *chan_binding_mic;
    rpc_gss3_assertion    granted_assertions<>;
    rpc_gss3_assertion    server_assertions<>;
    rpc_gss3_extension    extensions<>;
}

```



```
} rpc_gss3_create_res;
```

The field "handle" is the RPCSEC\_GSSv3 handle that the client will use on COPY requests involving the source and destination server. The field granted\_assertions[0].privs will be equal to "copy\_to\_auth". The server will return a GSS\_Wrap() of copy\_to\_auth\_priv.

#### **2.4.1.2.2. Starting a Secure Inter-Server Copy**

When the client sends a COPY\_NOTIFY request to the source server, it uses the privileged "copy\_from\_auth" RPCSEC\_GSSv3 handle. cna\_destination\_server in COPY\_NOTIFY MUST be the same as the name of the destination server specified in copy\_from\_auth\_priv. Otherwise, COPY\_NOTIFY will fail with NFS4ERR\_ACCESS. The source server verifies that the privilege <"copy\_from\_auth", user id, destination> exists, and annotates it with the source filehandle, if the user principal has read access to the source file, and if administrative policies give the user principal and the NFS client read access to the source file (i.e., if the ACCESS operation would grant read access). Otherwise, COPY\_NOTIFY will fail with NFS4ERR\_ACCESS.

When the client sends a COPY request to the destination server, it uses the privileged "copy\_to\_auth" RPCSEC\_GSSv3 handle. ca\_source\_server in COPY MUST be the same as the name of the source server specified in copy\_to\_auth\_priv. Otherwise, COPY will fail with NFS4ERR\_ACCESS. The destination server verifies that the privilege <"copy\_to\_auth", user id, source> exists, and annotates it with the source and destination filehandles. If the client has failed to establish the "copy\_to\_auth" policy it will reject the request with NFS4ERR\_PARTNER\_NO\_AUTH.

If the client sends a COPY\_REVOKE to the source server to rescind the destination server's copy privilege, it uses the privileged "copy\_from\_auth" RPCSEC\_GSSv3 handle and the cra\_destination\_server in COPY\_REVOKE MUST be the same as the name of the destination server specified in copy\_from\_auth\_priv. The source server will then delete the <"copy\_from\_auth", user id, destination> privilege and fail any subsequent copy requests sent under the auspices of this privilege from the destination server.

#### **2.4.1.2.3. Securing ONC RPC Server-to-Server Copy Protocols**

After a destination server has a "copy\_to\_auth" privilege established on it, and it receives a COPY request, if it knows it will use an ONC RPC protocol to copy data, it will establish a "copy\_confirm\_auth" privilege on the source server, using nfs@<destination> as the





initiator principal, and `nfs@<source>` as the target principal.

The value of the field `ccap_shared_secret_mic` is a `GSS_VerifyMIC()` of the shared secret passed in the `copy_to_auth` privilege. The field `ccap_username` is the mapping of the user principal to an NFSv4 user name ("user"@domain" form), and MUST be the same as `ctap_username` and `cfap_username`. The field `ccap_seq_num` is the `seq_num` of the RPCSEC\_GSSv3 credential used for the RPCSEC\_GSS3\_CREATE procedure the destination will send to the source server to establish the privilege.

The source server verifies the privilege, and establishes a `<"copy_confirm_auth", user id, destination>` privilege. If the source server fails to verify the privilege, the COPY operation will be rejected with `NFS4ERR_PARTNER_NO_AUTH`. All subsequent ONC RPC requests sent from the destination to copy data from the source to the destination will use the RPCSEC\_GSSv3 handle returned by the source's RPCSEC\_GSS3\_CREATE response.

Note that the use of the "copy\_confirm\_auth" privilege accomplishes the following:

- o if a protocol like NFS is being used, with export policies, export policies can be overridden in case the destination server as-an-NFS-client is not authorized
- o manual configuration to allow a copy relationship between the source and destination is not needed.

If the attempt to establish a "copy\_confirm\_auth" privilege fails, then when the user principal sends a COPY request to destination, the destination server will reject it with `NFS4ERR_PARTNER_NO_AUTH`.

#### **2.4.1.2.4. Securing Non ONC RPC Server-to-Server Copy Protocols**

If the destination won't be using ONC RPC to copy the data, then the source and destination are using an unspecified copy protocol. The destination could use the shared secret and the NFSv4 user id to prove to the source server that the user principal has authorized the copy.

For protocols that authenticate user names with passwords (e.g., HTTP [13] and FTP [14]), the `nfsv4` user id could be used as the user name, and an ASCII hexadecimal representation of the RPCSEC\_GSSv3 shared secret could be used as the user password or as input into non-password authentication methods like CHAP [15].



### **2.4.1.3. Inter-Server Copy via ONC RPC but without RPCSEC\_GSSv3**

ONC RPC security flavors other than RPCSEC\_GSSv3 MAY be used with the server-side copy offload operations described in this chapter. In particular, host-based ONC RPC security flavors such as AUTH\_NONE and AUTH\_SYS MAY be used. If a host-based security flavor is used, a minimal level of protection for the server-to-server copy protocol is possible.

In the absence of strong security mechanisms such as RPCSEC\_GSSv3, the challenge is how the source server and destination server identify themselves to each other, especially in the presence of multi-homed source and destination servers. In a multi-homed environment, the destination server might not contact the source server from the same network address specified by the client in the COPY\_NOTIFY. This can be overcome using the procedure described below.

When the client sends the source server the COPY\_NOTIFY operation, the source server may reply to the client with a list of target addresses, names, and/or URLs and assign them to the unique quadruple: <random number, source fh, user ID, destination address Y>. If the destination uses one of these target netlocs to contact the source server, the source server will be able to uniquely identify the destination server, even if the destination server does not connect from the address specified by the client in COPY\_NOTIFY. The level of assurance in this identification depends on the unpredictability, strength and secrecy of the random number.

For example, suppose the network topology is as shown in Figure 3. If the source filehandle is 0x12345, the source server may respond to a COPY\_NOTIFY for destination 10.11.78.56 with the URLs:

```
nfs://10.11.78.18//_COPY/FvhH10Kbu8VrxvV1erdjvR7N/10.11.78.56/_FH/0x12345
```

```
nfs://192.168.33.18//_COPY/FvhH10Kbu8VrxvV1erdjvR7N/10.11.78.56/_FH/0x12345
```

The name component after \_COPY is 24 characters of base 64, more than enough to encode a 128 bit random number.

The client will then send these URLs to the destination server in the COPY operation. Suppose that the 192.168.33.0/24 network is a high speed network and the destination server decides to transfer the file over this network. If the destination contacts the source server from 192.168.33.56 over this network using NFSv4.1, it does the following:



```
COMPOUND { PUTROOTFH, LOOKUP "_COPY" ; LOOKUP
  "FvhH1OKbu8VrxvV1erdjvR7N" ; LOOKUP "10.11.78.56"; LOOKUP "_FH" ;
  OPEN "0x12345" ; GETFH }
```

Provided that the random number is unpredictable and has been kept secret by the parties involved, the source server will therefore know that these NFSv4.x operations are being issued by the destination server identified in the COPY\_NOTIFY. This random number technique only provides initial authentication of the destination server, and cannot defend against man-in-the-middle attacks after authentication or an eavesdropper that observes the random number on the wire. Other secure communication techniques (e.g., IPsec) are necessary to block these attacks.

#### **2.4.1.4. Inter-Server Copy without ONC RPC and RPCSEC\_GSSv3**

The same techniques as [Section 2.4.1.3](#), using unique URLs for each destination server, can be used for other protocols (e.g., HTTP [[13](#)] and FTP [[14](#)]) as well.

### **3. Support for Application IO Hints**

Applications can issue client I/O hints via `posix_fadvise()` [[6](#)] to the NFS client. While this can help the NFS client optimize I/O and caching for a file, it does not allow the NFS server and its exported file system to do likewise. We add an IO\_ADVICE procedure ([Section 13.8](#)) to communicate the client file access patterns to the NFS server. The NFS server upon receiving a IO\_ADVICE operation MAY choose to alter its I/O and caching behavior, but is under no obligation to do so.

Application specific NFS clients such as those used by hypervisors and databases can also leverage application hints to communicate their specialized requirements.

### **4. Sparse Files**

#### **4.1. Introduction**

A sparse file is a common way of representing a large file without having to utilize all of the disk space for it. Consequently, a sparse file uses less physical space than its size indicates. This means the file contains 'holes', byte ranges within the file that contain no data. Most modern file systems support sparse files, including most UNIX file systems and NTFS, but notably not Apple's HFS+. Common examples of sparse files include Virtual Machine (VM)



OS/disk images, database files, log files, and even checkpoint recovery files most commonly used by the HPC community.

If an application reads a hole in a sparse file, the file system must return all zeros to the application. For local data access there is little penalty, but with NFS these zeroes must be transferred back to the client. If an application uses the NFS client to read data into memory, this wastes time and bandwidth as the application waits for the zeroes to be transferred.

A sparse file is typically created by initializing the file to be all zeros - nothing is written to the data in the file, instead the hole is recorded in the metadata for the file. So a 8G disk image might be represented initially by a couple hundred bits in the inode and nothing on the disk. If the VM then writes 100M to a file in the middle of the image, there would now be two holes represented in the metadata and 100M in the data.

Two new operations INITIALIZE ([Section 13.7](#)) and READ\_PLUS ([Section 13.10](#)) are introduced. INITIALIZE allows for the creation of a sparse file and for hole punching. An application might want to zero out a range of the file. READ\_PLUS supports all the features of READ but includes an extension to support sparse pattern files ([Section 6.1.2](#)). READ\_PLUS is guaranteed to perform no worse than READ, and can dramatically improve performance with sparse files. READ\_PLUS does not depend on pNFS protocol features, but can be used by pNFS to support sparse files.

## **[4.2.](#) Terminology**

Regular file: An object of file type NF4REG or NF4NAMEDATTR.

Sparse file: A Regular file that contains one or more Holes.

Hole: A byte range within a Sparse file that contains regions of all zeroes. For block-based file systems, this could also be an unallocated region of the file.

Hole Threshold: The minimum length of a Hole as determined by the server. If a server chooses to define a Hole Threshold, then it would not return hole information about holes with a length shorter than the Hole Threshold.

## **[5.](#) Space Reservation**





## [5.1.](#) Introduction

This section describes a set of operations that allow applications such as hypervisors to reserve space for a file, report the amount of actual disk space a file occupies and freeup the backing space of a file when it is not required. In virtualized environments, virtual disk files are often stored on NFS mounted volumes. Since virtual disk files represent the hard disks of virtual machines, hypervisors often have to guarantee certain properties for the file.

One such example is space reservation. When a hypervisor creates a virtual disk file, it often tries to preallocate the space for the file so that there are no future allocation related errors during the operation of the virtual machine. Such errors prevent a virtual machine from continuing execution and result in downtime.

Currently, in order to achieve such a guarantee, applications zero the entire file. The initial zeroing allocates the backing blocks and all subsequent writes are overwrites of already allocated blocks. This approach is not only inefficient in terms of the amount of I/O done, it is also not guaranteed to work on file systems that are log structured or deduplicated. An efficient way of guaranteeing space reservation would be beneficial to such applications.

If the `space_reserved` attribute (see [Section 11.2.3](#)) is set on a file, it is guaranteed that writes that do not grow the file will not fail with `NFSERR_NOСПC`.

Another useful feature would be the ability to report the number of blocks that would be freed when a file is deleted. Currently, NFS reports two size attributes:

`size` The logical file size of the file.

`space_used` The size in bytes that the file occupies on disk

While these attributes are sufficient for space accounting in traditional file systems, they prove to be inadequate in modern file systems that support block sharing. In such file systems, multiple inodes can point to a single block with a block reference count to guard against premature freeing. Having a way to tell the number of blocks that would be freed if the file was deleted would be useful to applications that wish to migrate files when a volume is low on space.

Since virtual disks represent a hard drive in a virtual machine, a virtual disk can be viewed as a file system within a file. Since not all blocks within a file system are in use, there is an opportunity



to reclaim blocks that are no longer in use. A call to deallocate blocks could result in better space efficiency. Lesser space MAY be consumed for backups after block deallocation.

The following operations and attributes can be used to resolve this issues:

`space_reserved` This attribute specifies whether the blocks backing the file have been preallocated.

`space_freed` This attribute specifies the space freed when a file is deleted, taking block sharing into consideration.

`INITIALIZE` This operation zeroes and/or deallocates the blocks backing a region of the file.

If `space_used` of a file is interpreted to mean the size in bytes of all disk blocks pointed to by the inode of the file, then shared blocks get double counted, over-reporting the space utilization. This also has the adverse effect that the deletion of a file with shared blocks frees up less than `space_used` bytes.

On the other hand, if `space_used` is interpreted to mean the size in bytes of those disk blocks unique to the inode of the file, then shared blocks are not counted in any file, resulting in under-reporting of the space utilization.

For example, two files A and B have 10 blocks each. Let 6 of these blocks be shared between them. Thus, the combined space utilized by the two files is  $14 * \text{BLOCK\_SIZE}$  bytes. In the former case, the combined space utilization of the two files would be reported as  $20 * \text{BLOCK\_SIZE}$ . However, deleting either would only result in  $4 * \text{BLOCK\_SIZE}$  being freed. Conversely, the latter interpretation would report that the space utilization is only  $8 * \text{BLOCK\_SIZE}$ .

Adding another size attribute, `space_freed` (see [Section 11.2.4](#)), is helpful in solving this problem. `space_freed` is the number of blocks that are allocated to the given file that would be freed on its deletion. In the example, both A and B would report `space_freed` as  $4 * \text{BLOCK\_SIZE}$  and `space_used` as  $10 * \text{BLOCK\_SIZE}$ . If A is deleted, B will report `space_freed` as  $10 * \text{BLOCK\_SIZE}$  as the deletion of B would result in the deallocation of all 10 blocks.

The addition of this problem doesn't solve the problem of space being over-reported. However, over-reporting is better than under-reporting.



## 6. Application Data Block Support

At the OS level, files are contained on disk blocks. Applications are also free to impose structure on the data contained in a file and we can define an Application Data Block (ADB) to be such a structure. From the application's viewpoint, it only wants to handle ADBs and not raw bytes (see [16]). An ADB is typically comprised of two sections: a header and data. The header describes the characteristics of the block and can provide a means to detect corruption in the data payload. The data section is typically initialized to all zeros.

The format of the header is application specific, but there are two main components typically encountered:

1. An ADB Number (ADBN), which allows the application to determine which data block is being referenced. The ADBN is a logical block number and is useful when the client is not storing the blocks in contiguous memory.
2. Fields to describe the state of the ADB and a means to detect block corruption. For both pieces of data, a useful property is that allowed values be unique in that if passed across the network, corruption due to translation between big and little endian architectures are detectable. For example, 0xF0DEDEF0 has the same bit pattern in both architectures.

Applications already impose structures on files [16] and detect corruption in data blocks [17]. What they are not able to do is efficiently transfer and store ADBs. To initialize a file with ADBs, the client must send the full ADB to the server and that must be stored on the server. When the application is initializing a file to have the ADB structure, it could compress the ADBs to just the information to necessary to later reconstruct the header portion of the ADB when the contents are read back. Using sparse file techniques, the disk blocks described by would not be allocated. Unlike sparse file techniques, there would be a small cost to store the compressed header data.

In this section, we are going to define a generic framework for an ADB, present one approach to detecting corruption in a given ADB implementation, and describe the model for how the client and server can support efficient initialization of ADBs, reading of ADB holes, punching holes in ADBs, and space reservation.



## **6.1. Generic Framework**

We want the representation of the ADB to be flexible enough to support many different applications. The most basic approach is no imposition of a block at all, which means we are working with the raw bytes. Such an approach would be useful for storing holes, punching holes, etc. In more complex deployments, a server might be supporting multiple applications, each with their own definition of the ADB. One might store the ADBN at the start of the block and then have a guard pattern to detect corruption [18]. The next might store the ADBN at an offset of 100 bytes within the block and have no guard pattern at all. I.e., existing applications might already have well defined formats for their data blocks.

The guard pattern can be used to represent the state of the block, to protect against corruption, or both. Again, it needs to be able to be placed anywhere within the ADB.

We need to be able to represent the starting offset of the block and the size of the block. Note that nothing prevents the application from defining different sized blocks in a file.

### **6.1.1. Data Block Representation**

```
struct app_data_block4 {
    offset4      adb_offset;
    length4     adb_block_size;
    length4     adb_block_count;
    length4     adb_reloff_blocknum;
    count4      adb_block_num;
    length4     adb_reloff_pattern;
    opaque      adb_pattern<>;
};
```

The `app_data_block4` structure captures the abstraction presented for the ADB. The additional fields present are to allow the transmission of `adb_block_count` ADBs at one time. We also use `adb_block_num` to convey the ADBN of the first block in the sequence. Each ADB will contain the same `adb_pattern` string.

As both `adb_block_num` and `adb_pattern` are optional, if either `adb_reloff_pattern` or `adb_reloff_blocknum` is set to `NFS4_UINT64_MAX`, then the corresponding field is not set in any of the ADB.





### **6.1.2. Data Content**

```
/*
 * Use an enum such that we can extend new types.
 */
enum data_content4 {
    NFS4_CONTENT_DATA = 0,
    NFS4_CONTENT_APP_BLOCK = 1,
    NFS4_CONTENT_HOLE = 2
};
```

New operations might need to differentiate between wanting to access data versus an ADB. Also, future minor versions might want to introduce new data formats. This enumeration allows that to occur.

### **6.2. pNFS Considerations**

While this document does not mandate how sparse ADBs are recorded on the server, it does make the assumption that such information is not in the file. I.e., the information is metadata. As such, the INITIALIZE operation is defined to be not supported by the DS - it must be issued to the MDS. But since the client must not assume a priori whether a read is sparse or not, the READ\_PLUS operation MUST be supported by both the DS and the MDS. I.e., the client might impose on the MDS to asynchronously read the data from the DS.

Furthermore, each DS MUST not report to a client a sparse ADB which belongs to another DS. One implication of this requirement is that the `app_data_block4`'s `adb_block_size` MUST be either be the stripe width or the stripe width must be an even multiple of it. The second implication here is that the DS must be able to use the Control Protocol to determine from the MDS where the sparse ADBs occur.

### **6.3. An Example of Detecting Corruption**

In this section, we define an ADB format in which corruption can be detected. Note that this is just one possible format and means to detect corruption.

Consider a very basic implementation of an operating system's disk blocks. A block is either data or it is an indirect block which allows for files to be larger than one block. It is desired to be able to initialize a block. Lastly, to quickly unlink a file, a block can be marked invalid. The contents remain intact - which would enable this OS application to undelete a file.

The application defines 4k sized data blocks, with an 8 byte block counter occurring at offset 0 in the block, and with the guard



pattern occurring at offset 8 inside the block. Furthermore, the guard pattern can take one of four states:

0xfeedface - This is the FREE state and indicates that the ADB format has been applied.

0xcafedead - This is the DATA state and indicates that real data has been written to this block.

0xe4e5c001 - This is the INDIRECT state and indicates that the block contains block counter numbers that are chained off of this block.

0xba1ed4a3 - This is the INVALID state and indicates that the block contains data whose contents are garbage.

Finally, it also defines an 8 byte checksum [19] starting at byte 16 which applies to the remaining contents of the block. If the state is FREE, then that checksum is trivially zero. As such, the application has no need to transfer the checksum implicitly inside the ADB - it need not make the transfer layer aware of the fact that there is a checksum (see [17] for an example of checksums used to detect corruption in application data blocks).

Corruption in each ADB can be detected thusly:

- o If the guard pattern is anything other than one of the allowed values, including all zeros.
- o If the guard pattern is FREE and any other byte in the remainder of the ADB is anything other than zero.
- o If the guard pattern is anything other than FREE, then if the stored checksum does not match the computed checksum.
- o If the guard pattern is INDIRECT and one of the stored indirect block numbers has a value greater than the number of ADBs in the file.
- o If the guard pattern is INDIRECT and one of the stored indirect block numbers is a duplicate of another stored indirect block number.

As can be seen, the application can detect errors based on the combination of the guard pattern state and the checksum. But also, the application can detect corruption based on the state and the contents of the ADB. This last point is important in validating the minimum amount of data we incorporated into our generic framework.



I.e., the guard pattern is sufficient in allowing applications to design their own corruption detection.

Finally, it is important to note that none of these corruption checks occur in the transport layer. The server and client components are totally unaware of the file format and might report everything as being transferred correctly even in the case the application detects corruption.

#### **6.4. Example of READ\_PLUS**

The hypothetical application presented in [Section 6.3](#) can be used to illustrate how READ\_PLUS would return an array of results. A file is created and initialized with 100 4k ADBs in the FREE state:

```
INITIALIZE {0, 4k, 100, 0, 0, 8, 0xfeedface}
```

Further, assume the application writes a single ADB at 16k, changing the guard pattern to 0xcafedead, we would then have in memory:

```
0 -> (16k - 1) : 4k, 4, 0, 0, 8, 0xfeedface
16k -> (20k - 1) : 00 00 00 05 ca fe de ad XX XX ... XX XX
20k -> 400k      : 4k, 95, 0, 6, 0xfeedface
```

And when the client did a READ\_PLUS of 64k at the start of the file, it would get back a result of an ADB, some data, and a final ADB:

```
ADB {0, 4, 0, 0, 8, 0xfeedface}
data 4k
ADB {20k, 4k, 59, 0, 6, 0xfeedface}
```

#### **6.5. Zero Filled Holes**

As applications are free to define the structure of an ADB, it is trivial to define an ADB which supports zero filled holes. Such a case would encompass the traditional definitions of a sparse file and hole punching. For example, to punch a 64k hole, starting at 100M, into an existing file which has no ADB structure:

```
INITIALIZE {100M, 64k, 1, NFS4_UINT64_MAX,
            0, NFS4_UINT64_MAX, 0x0}
```

## **7. Labeled NFS**



## [7.1.](#) Introduction

Access control models such as Unix permissions or Access Control Lists are commonly referred to as Discretionary Access Control (DAC) models. These systems base their access decisions on user identity and resource ownership. In contrast Mandatory Access Control (MAC) models base their access control decisions on the label on the subject (usually a process) and the object it wishes to access [7]. These labels may contain user identity information but usually contain additional information. In DAC systems users are free to specify the access rules for resources that they own. MAC models base their security decisions on a system wide policy established by an administrator or organization which the users do not have the ability to override. In this section, we add a MAC model to NFSv4.2.

The first change necessary is to devise a method for transporting and storing security label data on NFSv4 file objects. Security labels have several semantics that are met by NFSv4 recommended attributes such as the ability to set the label value upon object creation. Access control on these attributes are done through a combination of two mechanisms. As with other recommended attributes on file objects the usual DAC checks (ACLs and permission bits) will be performed to ensure that proper file ownership is enforced. In addition a MAC system MAY be employed on the client, server, or both to enforce additional policy on what subjects may modify security label information.

The second change is to provide a method for the server to notify the client that the attribute changed on an open file on the server. If the file is closed, then during the open attempt, the client will gather the new attribute value. The server MUST not communicate the new value of the attribute, the client MUST query it. This requirement stems from the need for the client to provide sufficient access rights to the attribute.

The final change necessary is a modification to the RPC layer used in NFSv4 in the form of a new version of the RPCSEC\_GSS [8] framework. In order for an NFSv4 server to apply MAC checks it must obtain additional information from the client. Several methods were explored for performing this and it was decided that the best approach was to incorporate the ability to make security attribute assertions through the RPC mechanism. RPCSECGSSv3 [5] outlines a method to assert additional security information such as security labels on gss context creation and have that data bound to all RPC requests that make use of that context.





## **7.2. Definitions**

Label Format Specifier (LFS): is an identifier used by the client to establish the syntactic format of the security label and the semantic meaning of its components. These specifiers exist in a registry associated with documents describing the format and semantics of the label.

Label Format Registry: is the IANA registry containing all registered LFS along with references to the documents that describe the syntactic format and semantics of the security label.

Policy Identifier (PI): is an optional part of the definition of a Label Format Specifier which allows for clients and server to identify specific security policies.

Object: is a passive resource within the system that we wish to be protected. Objects can be entities such as files, directories, pipes, sockets, and many other system resources relevant to the protection of the system state.

Subject: is an active entity usually a process which is requesting access to an object.

MAC-Aware: is a server which can transmit and store object labels.

MAC-Functional: is a client or server which is Labeled NFS enabled. Such a system can interpret labels and apply policies based on the security system.

Multi-Level Security (MLS): is a traditional model where objects are given a sensitivity level (Unclassified, Secret, Top Secret, etc) and a category set [[20](#)].

## **7.3. MAC Security Attribute**

MAC models base access decisions on security attributes bound to subjects and objects. This information can range from a user identity for an identity based MAC model, sensitivity levels for Multi-level security, or a type for Type Enforcement. These models base their decisions on different criteria but the semantics of the security attribute remain the same. The semantics required by the security attributes are listed below:

- o MUST provide flexibility with respect to the MAC model.
- o MUST provide the ability to atomically set security information upon object creation.



- o MUST provide the ability to enforce access control decisions both on the client and the server.
- o MUST not expose an object to either the client or server name space before its security information has been bound to it.

NFSv4 implements the security attribute as a recommended attribute. These attributes have a fixed format and semantics, which conflicts with the flexible nature of the security attribute. To resolve this the security attribute consists of two components. The first component is a LFS as defined in [21] to allow for interoperability between MAC mechanisms. The second component is an opaque field which is the actual security attribute data. To allow for various MAC models, NFSv4 should be used solely as a transport mechanism for the security attribute. It is the responsibility of the endpoints to consume the security attribute and make access decisions based on their respective models. In addition, creation of objects through OPEN and CREATE allows for the security attribute to be specified upon creation. By providing an atomic create and set operation for the security attribute it is possible to enforce the second and fourth requirements. The recommended attribute FATTR4\_SEC\_LABEL (see [Section 11.2.2](#)) will be used to satisfy this requirement.

### **[7.3.1.](#) Delegations**

In the event that a security attribute is changed on the server while a client holds a delegation on the file, both the server and the client MUST follow the NFSv4.1 protocol (see Chapter 10 of [2]) with respect to attribute changes. It SHOULD flush all changes back to the server and relinquish the delegation.

### **[7.3.2.](#) Permission Checking**

It is not feasible to enumerate all possible MAC models and even levels of protection within a subset of these models. This means that the NFSv4 client and servers cannot be expected to directly make access control decisions based on the security attribute. Instead NFSv4 should defer permission checking on this attribute to the host system. These checks are performed in addition to existing DAC and ACL checks outlined in the NFSv4 protocol. [Section 7.6](#) gives a specific example of how the security attribute is handled under a particular MAC model.

### **[7.3.3.](#) Object Creation**

When creating files in NFSv4 the OPEN and CREATE operations are used. One of the parameters to these operations is an `fatrr4` structure containing the attributes the file is to be created with. This



allows NFSv4 to atomically set the security attribute of files upon creation. When a client is MAC-Functional it must always provide the initial security attribute upon file creation. In the event that the server is MAC-Functional as well, it should determine by policy whether it will accept the attribute from the client or instead make the determination itself. If the client is not MAC-Functional, then the MAC-Functional server must decide on a default label. A more in depth explanation can be found in [Section 7.6](#).

#### **[7.3.4.](#) Existing Objects**

Note that under the MAC model, all objects must have labels. Therefore, if an existing server is upgraded to include Labeled NFS support, then it is the responsibility of the security system to define the behavior for existing objects.

#### **[7.3.5.](#) Label Changes**

As per the requirements, when a file's security label is modified, the server must notify all clients which have the file opened of the change in label. It does so with CB\_ATTR\_CHANGED. There are preconditions to making an attribute change imposed by NFSv4 and the security system might want to impose others. In the process of meeting these preconditions, the server may chose to either serve the request in whole or return NFS4ERR\_DELAY to the SETATTR operation.

If there are open delegations on the file belonging to client other than the one making the label change, then the process described in [Section 7.3.1](#) must be followed.

As the server is always presented with the subject label from the client, it does not necessarily need to communicate the fact that the label has changed to the client. In the cases where the change outright denies the client access, the client will be able to quickly determine that there is a new label in effect. It is in cases where the client may share the same object between multiple subjects or a security system which is not strictly hierarchical that the CB\_ATTR\_CHANGED callback is very useful. It allows the server to inform the clients that the cached security attribute is now stale.

Consider a system in which the clients enforce MAC checks and and the server has a very simple security system which just stores the labels. In this system, the MAC label check always allows access, regardless of the subject label.

The way in which MAC labels are enforced is by the client. So if client A changes a security label on a file, then the server MUST inform all clients that have the file opened that the label has



changed via CB\_ATTR\_CHANGED. Then the clients MUST retrieve the new label and MUST enforce access via the new attribute values.

#### **7.4. pNFS Considerations**

This section examines the issues in deploying Labeled NFS in a pNFS community of servers.

##### **7.4.1. MAC Label Checks**

The new FATTR4\_SEC\_LABEL attribute is metadata information and as such the DS is not aware of the value contained on the MDS. Fortunately, the NFSv4.1 protocol [2] already has provisions for doing access level checks from the DS to the MDS. In order for the DS to validate the subject label presented by the client, it SHOULD utilize this mechanism.

If a file's FATTR4\_SEC\_LABEL is changed, then the MDS should utilize CB\_ATTR\_CHANGED to inform the client of that fact. If the MDS is maintaining [[Comment.2: Houston, we seem to have a problem! --TH]]

#### **7.5. Discovery of Server Labeled NFS Support**

The server can easily determine that a client supports Labeled NFS when it queries for the FATTR4\_SEC\_LABEL label for an object. Note that it cannot assume that the presence of RPCSEC\_GSSv3 indicates Labeled NFS support. The client might need to discover which LFS the server supports.

A server which supports Labeled NFS MUST allow a client with any subject label to retrieve the FATTR4\_SEC\_LABEL attribute for the root filehandle, ROOTFH. The following compound must always succeed as far as a MAC label check is concerned:

```
PUTROOTFH, GETATTR {FATTR4_SEC_LABEL}
```

Note that the server might have imposed a security flavor on the root that precludes such access. I.e., if the server requires kerberized access and the client presents a compound with AUTH\_SYS, then the server is allowed to return NFS4ERR\_WRONGSEC in this case. But if the client presents a correct security flavor, then the server MUST return the FATTR4\_SEC\_LABEL attribute with the supported LFS filled in.

#### **7.6. MAC Security NFS Modes of Operation**

A system using Labeled NFS may operate in two modes. The first mode provides the most protection and is called "full mode". In this mode





both the client and server implement a MAC model allowing each end to make an access control decision. The remaining mode is called the "guest mode" and in this mode one end of the connection is not implementing a MAC model and thus offers less protection than full mode.

#### **7.6.1. Full Mode**

Full mode environments consist of MAC-Functional NFSv4 servers and clients and may be composed of mixed MAC models and policies. The system requires that both the client and server have an opportunity to perform an access control check based on all relevant information within the network. The file object security attribute is provided using the mechanism described in [Section 7.3](#). The security attribute of the subject making the request is transported at the RPC layer using the mechanism described in RPCSECSSv3 [5].

##### **7.6.1.1. Initial Labeling and Translation**

The ability to create a file is an action that a MAC model may wish to mediate. The client is given the responsibility to determine the initial security attribute to be placed on a file. This allows the client to make a decision as to the acceptable security attributes to create a file with before sending the request to the server. Once the server receives the creation request from the client it may choose to evaluate if the security attribute is acceptable.

Security attributes on the client and server may vary based on MAC model and policy. To handle this the security attribute field has an LFS component. This component is a mechanism for the host to identify the format and meaning of the opaque portion of the security attribute. A full mode environment may contain hosts operating in several different LFSs. In this case a mechanism for translating the opaque portion of the security attribute is needed. The actual translation function will vary based on MAC model and policy and is out of the scope of this document. If a translation is unavailable for a given LFS then the request MUST be denied. Another recourse is to allow the host to provide a fallback mapping for unknown security attributes.

##### **7.6.1.2. Policy Enforcement**

In full mode access control decisions are made by both the clients and servers. When a client makes a request it takes the security attribute from the requesting process and makes an access control decision based on that attribute and the security attribute of the object it is trying to access. If the client denies that access an RPC call to the server is never made. If however the access is



allowed the client will make a call to the NFS server.

When the server receives the request from the client it extracts the security attribute conveyed in the RPC request. The server then uses this security attribute and the attribute of the object the client is trying to access to make an access control decision. If the server's policy allows this access it will fulfill the client's request, otherwise it will return NFS4ERR\_ACCESS.

Implementations MAY validate security attributes supplied over the network to ensure that they are within a set of attributes permitted from a specific peer, and if not, reject them. Note that a system may permit a different set of attributes to be accepted from each peer.

#### **7.6.1.3. Limited Server**

A Limited Server mode (see Section 3.5.2 of [7]) consists of a server which is label aware, but does not enforce policies. Such a server will store and retrieve all object labels presented by clients, notify the clients of any label changes via CB\_ATTR\_CHANGED, but will not restrict access via the subject label. Instead, it will expect the clients to enforce all such access locally.

#### **7.6.2. Guest Mode**

Guest mode implies that either the client or the server does not handle labels. If the client is not Labeled NFS aware, then it will not offer subject labels to the server. The server is the only entity enforcing policy, and may selectively provide standard NFS services to clients based on their authentication credentials and/or associated network attributes (e.g., IP address, network interface). The level of trust and access extended to a client in this mode is configuration-specific. If the server is not Labeled NFS aware, then it will not return object labels to the client. Clients in this environment are may consist of groups implementing different MAC model policies. The system requires that all clients in the environment be responsible for access control checks.

### **7.7. Security Considerations**

This entire chapter deals with security issues.

Depending on the level of protection the MAC system offers there may be a requirement to tightly bind the security attribute to the data.

When only one of the client or server enforces labels, it is important to realize that the other side is not enforcing MAC



protections. Alternate methods might be in use to handle the lack of MAC support and care should be taken to identify and mitigate threats from possible tampering outside of these methods.

An example of this is that a server that modifies REaddir or LOOKUP results based on the client's subject label might want to always construct the same subject label for a client which does not present one. This will prevent a non-labeled NFS client from mixing entries in the directory cache.

## **8. Sharing change attribute implementation details with NFSv4 clients**

### **8.1. Introduction**

Although both the NFSv4 [10] and NFSv4.1 protocol [2], define the change attribute as being mandatory to implement, there is little in the way of guidance. The only mandated feature is that the value must change whenever the file data or metadata change.

While this allows for a wide range of implementations, it also leaves the client with a conundrum: how does it determine which is the most recent value for the change attribute in a case where several RPC calls have been issued in parallel? In other words if two COMPOUNDS, both containing WRITE and GETATTR requests for the same file, have been issued in parallel, how does the client determine which of the two change attribute values returned in the replies to the GETATTR requests correspond to the most recent state of the file? In some cases, the only recourse may be to send another COMPOUND containing a third GETATTR that is fully serialised with the first two.

NFSv4.2 avoids this kind of inefficiency by allowing the server to share details about how the change attribute is expected to evolve, so that the client may immediately determine which, out of the several change attribute values returned by the server, is the most recent. `change_attr_type` is defined as a new recommended attribute (see [Section 11.2.1](#)), and is per file system.

## **9. Security Considerations**

## **10. Error Values**

NFS error numbers are assigned to failed operations within a Compound (COMPOUND or CB\_COMPOUND) request. A Compound request contains a number of NFS operations that have their results encoded in sequence in a Compound reply. The results of successful operations will



consist of an NFS4\_OK status followed by the encoded results of the operation. If an NFS operation fails, an error status will be entered in the reply and the Compound request will be terminated.

**10.1. Error Definitions**

Protocol Error Definitions

Error	Number	Description
NFS4ERR_BADLABEL	10093	<a href="#">Section 10.1.3.1</a>
NFS4ERR_METADATA_NOTSUPP	10090	<a href="#">Section 10.1.2.1</a>
NFS4ERR_OFFLOAD_DENIED	10091	<a href="#">Section 10.1.2.2</a>
NFS4ERR_PARTNER_NO_AUTH	10089	<a href="#">Section 10.1.2.3</a>
NFS4ERR_PARTNER_NOTSUPP	10088	<a href="#">Section 10.1.2.4</a>
NFS4ERR_UNION_NOTSUPP	10094	<a href="#">Section 10.1.1.1</a>
NFS4ERR_WRONG_LFS	10092	<a href="#">Section 10.1.3.2</a>

Table 1

**10.1.1. General Errors**

This section deals with errors that are applicable to a broad set of different purposes.

**10.1.1.1. NFS4ERR\_UNION\_NOTSUPP (Error Code 10094)**

One of the arguments to the operation is a discriminated union and while the server supports the given operation, it does not support the selected arm of the discriminated union. For an example, see READ\_PLUS ([Section 13.10](#)).

**10.1.2. Server to Server Copy Errors**

These errors deal with the interaction between server to server copies.

**10.1.2.1. NFS4ERR\_METADATA\_NOTSUPP (Error Code 10090)**

The destination file cannot support the same metadata as the source file.

**10.1.2.2. NFS4ERR\_OFFLOAD\_DENIED (Error Code 10091)**

The copy offload operation is supported by both the source and the destination, but the destination is not allowing it for this file.





If the client sees this error, it should fall back to the normal copy semantics.

#### **10.1.2.3. NFS4ERR\_PARTNER\_NO\_AUTH (Error Code 10089)**

The source server does not authorize a server-to-server copy offload operation. This may be due to the client's failure to send the COPY\_NOTIFY operation to the source server, the source server receiving a server-to-server copy offload request after the copy lease time expired, or for some other permission problem.

#### **10.1.2.4. NFS4ERR\_PARTNER\_NOTSUPP (Error Code 10088)**

The remote server does not support the server-to-server copy offload protocol.

### **10.1.3. Labeled NFS Errors**

These errors are used in Labeled NFS.

#### **10.1.3.1. NFS4ERR\_BADLABEL (Error Code 10093)**

The label specified is invalid in some manner.

#### **10.1.3.2. NFS4ERR\_WRONG\_LFS (Error Code 10092)**

The LFS specified in the subject label is not compatible with the LFS in the object label.

## **11. New File Attributes**

### **11.1. New RECOMMENDED Attributes - List and Definition References**

The list of new RECOMMENDED attributes appears in Table 2. The meaning of the columns of the table are:

Name: The name of the attribute.

Id: The number assigned to the attribute. In the event of conflicts between the assigned number and [3], the latter is likely authoritative, but should be resolved with Errata to this document and/or [3]. See [22] for the Errata process.

Data Type: The XDR data type of the attribute.



Acc: Access allowed to the attribute.

R means read-only (GETATTR may retrieve, SETATTR may not set).

W means write-only (SETATTR may set, GETATTR may not retrieve).

R W means read/write (GETATTR may retrieve, SETATTR may set).

Defined in: The section of this specification that describes the attribute.

Name	Id	Data Type	Acc	Defined in
change_attr_type	79	change_attr_type4	R	<a href="#">Section 11.2.1</a>
sec_label	80	sec_label4	R W	<a href="#">Section 11.2.2</a>
space_reserved	77	boolean	R W	<a href="#">Section 11.2.3</a>
space_freed	78	length4	R	<a href="#">Section 11.2.4</a>

Table 2

## 11.2. Attribute Definitions

### 11.2.1. Attribute 79: change\_attr\_type

```
enum change_attr_type4 {
    NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_MONOTONIC_INCR          = 0,
    NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_VERSION_COUNTER         = 1,
    NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_VERSION_COUNTER_NOPNFS = 2,
    NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_TIME_METADATA           = 3,
    NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_UNDEFINED               = 4
};
```

change\_attr\_type is a per file system attribute which enables the NFSv4.2 server to provide additional information about how it expects the change attribute value to evolve after the file data, or metadata has changed. While Section 5.4 of [2] discusses per file system attributes, it is expected that the value of change\_attr\_type not depend on the value of "homogeneous" and only changes in the event of a migration.

NFS4\_CHANGE\_TYPE\_IS\_UNDEFINED: The change attribute does not take values that fit into any of these categories.



`NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_MONOTONIC_INCR`: The change attribute value MUST monotonically increase for every atomic change to the file attributes, data, or directory contents.

`NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_VERSION_COUNTER`: The change attribute value MUST be incremented by one unit for every atomic change to the file attributes, data, or directory contents. This property is preserved when writing to pNFS data servers.

`NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_VERSION_COUNTER_NOPNFS`: The change attribute value MUST be incremented by one unit for every atomic change to the file attributes, data, or directory contents. In the case where the client is writing to pNFS data servers, the number of increments is not guaranteed to exactly match the number of writes.

`NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_TIME_METADATA`: The change attribute is implemented as suggested in the NFSv4 spec [10] in terms of the `time_metadata` attribute.

If either `NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_MONOTONIC_INCR`, `NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_VERSION_COUNTER`, or `NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_TIME_METADATA` are set, then the client knows at the very least that the change attribute is monotonically increasing, which is sufficient to resolve the question of which value is the most recent.

If the client sees the value `NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_TIME_METADATA`, then by inspecting the value of the `'time_delta'` attribute it additionally has the option of detecting rogue server implementations that use `time_metadata` in violation of the spec.

If the client sees `NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_VERSION_COUNTER`, it has the ability to predict what the resulting change attribute value should be after a `COMPOUND` containing a `SETATTR`, `WRITE`, or `CREATE`. This again allows it to detect changes made in parallel by another client. The value `NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_VERSION_COUNTER_NOPNFS` permits the same, but only if the client is not doing pNFS `WRITES`.

Finally, if the server does not support `change_attr_type` or if `NFS4_CHANGE_TYPE_IS_UNDEFINED` is set, then the server SHOULD make an effort to implement the change attribute in terms of the `time_metadata` attribute.

### **11.2.2. Attribute 80: `sec_label`**

```
typedef uint32_t policy4;
```



```
struct labelformat_spec4 {
    policy4 lfs_lfs;
    policy4 lfs_pi;
};

struct sec_label4 {
    labelformat_spec4    slai_lfs;
    opaque               slai_data<>;
};
```

The FATTR4\_SEC\_LABEL contains an array of two components with the first component being an LFS. It serves to provide the receiving end with the information necessary to translate the security attribute into a form that is usable by the endpoint. Label Formats assigned an LFS may optionally choose to include a Policy Identifier field to allow for complex policy deployments. The LFS and Label Format Registry are described in detail in [21]. The translation used to interpret the security attribute is not specified as part of the protocol as it may depend on various factors. The second component is an opaque section which contains the data of the attribute. This component is dependent on the MAC model to interpret and enforce.

In particular, it is the responsibility of the LFS specification to define a maximum size for the opaque section, `slai_data<>`. When creating or modifying a label for an object, the client needs to be guaranteed that the server will accept a label that is sized correctly. By both client and server being part of a specific MAC model, the client will be aware of the size.

### **11.2.3. Attribute 77: `space_reserved`**

The `space_reserve` attribute is a read/write attribute of type boolean. It is a per file attribute. When the `space_reserved` attribute is set via SETATTR, the server must ensure that there is disk space to accommodate every byte in the file before it can return success. If the server cannot guarantee this, it must return NFS4ERR\_NOСПC.

If the client tries to grow a file which has the `space_reserved` attribute set, the server must guarantee that there is disk space to accommodate every byte in the file with the new size before it can return success. If the server cannot guarantee this, it must return NFS4ERR\_NOСПC.

It is not required that the server allocate the space to the file before returning success. The allocation can be deferred, however, it must be guaranteed that it will not fail for lack of space.





The value of `space_reserved` can be obtained at any time through `GETATTR`.

In order to avoid ambiguity, the `space_reserve` bit cannot be set along with the `size` bit in `SETATTR`. Increasing the size of a file with `space_reserve` set will fail if space reservation cannot be guaranteed for the new size. If the file size is decreased, space reservation is only guaranteed for the new size and the extra blocks backing the file can be released.

#### **11.2.4. Attribute 78: `space_freed`**

`space_freed` gives the number of bytes freed if the file is deleted. This attribute is read only and is of type `length4`. It is a per file attribute.

### **12. Operations: REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED, or OPTIONAL**

The following tables summarize the operations of the NFSv4.2 protocol and the corresponding designation of REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED, and OPTIONAL to implement or either OBSOLETE if implemented or MUST NOT implement. The designation of OBSOLETE if implemented is reserved for those operations which are defined in either NFSv4.0 or NFSV4.1, can be implemented in NFSv4.2, and are intended to be MUST NOT be implemented in NFSv4.3. The designation of MUST NOT implement is reserved for those operations that were defined in either NFSv4.0 or NFSV4.1 and MUST NOT be implemented in NFSv4.2.

For the most part, the REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED, or OPTIONAL designation for operations sent by the client is for the server implementation. The client is generally required to implement the operations needed for the operating environment for which it serves. For example, a read-only NFSv4.2 client would have no need to implement the `WRITE` operation and is not required to do so.

The REQUIRED or OPTIONAL designation for callback operations sent by the server is for both the client and server. Generally, the client has the option of creating the backchannel and sending the operations on the fore channel that will be a catalyst for the server sending callback operations. A partial exception is `CB_RECALL_SLOT`; the only way the client can avoid supporting this operation is by not creating a backchannel.

Since this is a summary of the operations and their designation, there are subtleties that are not presented here. Therefore, if there is a question of the requirements of implementation, the operation descriptions themselves must be consulted along with other



relevant explanatory text within this either specification or that of NFSv4.1 [2].

The abbreviations used in the second and third columns of the table are defined as follows.

REQ REQUIRED to implement

REC RECOMMEND to implement

OPT OPTIONAL to implement

OBS MUST NOT implement

MNI MUST NOT implement

For the NFSv4.2 features that are OPTIONAL, the operations that support those features are OPTIONAL, and the server would return NFS4ERR\_NOTSUPP in response to the client's use of those operations. If an OPTIONAL feature is supported, it is possible that a set of operations related to the feature become REQUIRED to implement. The third column of the table designates the feature(s) and if the operation is REQUIRED or OPTIONAL in the presence of support for the feature.

The OPTIONAL features identified and their abbreviations are as follows:

pNFS Parallel NFS

FDELG File Delegations

DDELG Directory Delegations

COPY Server Side Copy

ADB Application Data Blocks

Operations

Operation	REQ, REC, OPT, or MNI	Feature (REQ, REC, or OPT)
ACCESS	REQ	
BACKCHANNEL_CTL	REQ	
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION	REQ	
CLOSE	REQ	



COMMIT	REQ	
COPY	OPT	COPY (REQ)
COPY_ABORT	OPT	COPY (REQ)
COPY_NOTIFY	OPT	COPY (REQ)
COPY_REVOKE	OPT	COPY (REQ)
COPY_STATUS	OPT	COPY (REQ)
CREATE	REQ	
CREATE_SESSION	REQ	
DELEGPURGE	OPT	FDELG (REQ)
DELEGRETURN	OPT	FDELG, DDELG, pNFS (REQ)
DESTROY_CLIENTID	REQ	
DESTROY_SESSION	REQ	
EXCHANGE_ID	REQ	
FREE_STATEID	REQ	
GETATTR	REQ	
GETDEVICEINFO	OPT	pNFS (REQ)
GETDEVICELIST	OPT	pNFS (OPT)
GETFH	REQ	
INITIALIZE	OPT	ADB (REQ)
GET_DIR_DELEGATION	OPT	DDELG (REQ)
LAYOUTCOMMIT	OPT	pNFS (REQ)
LAYOUTGET	OPT	pNFS (REQ)
LAYOUTRETURN	OPT	pNFS (REQ)
LINK	OPT	
LOCK	REQ	
LOCKT	REQ	
LOCKU	REQ	
LOOKUP	REQ	
LOOKUPP	REQ	
NVERIFY	REQ	
OPEN	REQ	
OPENATTR	OPT	
OPEN_CONFIRM	MNI	
OPEN_DOWNGRADE	REQ	
PUTFH	REQ	
PUTPUBFH	REQ	
PUTROOTFH	REQ	
READ	OBS	
READDIR	REQ	
READLINK	OPT	
READ_PLUS	OPT	ADB (REQ)
RECLAIM_COMPLETE	REQ	
RELEASE_LOCKOWNER	MNI	
REMOVE	REQ	
RENAME	REQ	
RENEW	MNI	
RESTOREFH	REQ	



SAVEFH	REQ		
SECINFO	REQ		
SECINFO_NO_NAME	REC	pNFS file layout	
		(REQ)	
SEQUENCE	REQ		
SETATTR	REQ		
SETCLIENTID	MNI		
SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM	MNI		
SET_SSV	REQ		
TEST_STATEID	REQ		
VERIFY	REQ		
WANT_DELEGATION	OPT	FDELG (OPT)	
WRITE	REQ		
+-----+			

Callback Operations

Operation	REQ, REC, OPT, or	Feature (REQ, REC,	
	MNI	or OPT)	
+-----+			
CB_COPY	OPT	COPY (REQ)	
CB_GETATTR	OPT	FDELG (REQ)	
CB_LAYOUTRECALL	OPT	pNFS (REQ)	
CB_NOTIFY	OPT	DDELG (REQ)	
CB_NOTIFY_DEVICEID	OPT	pNFS (OPT)	
CB_NOTIFY_LOCK	OPT		
CB_PUSH_DELEG	OPT	FDELG (OPT)	
CB_RECALL	OPT	FDELG, DDELG, pNFS	
		(REQ)	
CB_RECALL_ANY	OPT	FDELG, DDELG, pNFS	
		(REQ)	
CB_RECALL_SLOT	REQ		
CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL	OPT	DDELG, pNFS (REQ)	
CB_SEQUENCE	OPT	FDELG, DDELG, pNFS	
		(REQ)	
CB_WANTS_CANCELLED	OPT	FDELG, DDELG, pNFS	
		(REQ)	
+-----+			

**13. NFSv4.2 Operations**

**13.1. Operation 59: COPY - Initiate a server-side copy**





**13.1.1. ARGUMENT**

```

const COPY4_GUARDED      = 0x00000001;
const COPY4_METADATA    = 0x00000002;

struct COPY4args {
    /* SAVED_FH: source file */
    /* CURRENT_FH: destination file or */
    /*          directory          */
    offset4      ca_src_offset;
    offset4      ca_dst_offset;
    length4      ca_count;
    uint32_t     ca_flags;
    component4   ca_destination;
    netloc4      ca_source_server<>;
};

```

**13.1.2. RESULT**

```

union COPY4res switch (nfsstat4 cr_status) {
    case NFS4_OK:
        stateid4      cr_callback_id<1>;
    default:
        length4      cr_bytes_copied;
};

```

**13.1.3. DESCRIPTION**

The COPY operation is used for both intra-server and inter-server copies. In both cases, the COPY is always sent from the client to the destination server of the file copy. The COPY operation requests that a file be copied from the location specified by the SAVED\_FH value to the location specified by the combination of CURRENT\_FH and ca\_destination.

The SAVED\_FH must be a regular file. If SAVED\_FH is not a regular file, the operation MUST fail and return NFS4ERR\_WRONG\_TYPE.

In order to set SAVED\_FH to the source file handle, the compound procedure requesting the COPY will include a sub-sequence of operations such as

```

PUTFH source-fh
SAVEFH

```



If the request is for a server-to-server copy, the source-fh is a filehandle from the source server and the compound procedure is being executed on the destination server. In this case, the source-fh is a foreign filehandle on the server receiving the COPY request. If either PUTFH or SAVEFH checked the validity of the filehandle, the operation would likely fail and return NFS4ERR\_STALE.

If a server supports the server-to-server COPY feature, a PUTFH followed by a SAVEFH MUST NOT return NFS4ERR\_STALE for either operation. These restrictions do not pose substantial difficulties for servers. The CURRENT\_FH and SAVED\_FH may be validated in the context of the operation referencing them and an NFS4ERR\_STALE error returned for an invalid file handle at that point.

The CURRENT\_FH and ca\_destination together specify the destination of the copy operation. If ca\_destination is of 0 (zero) length, then CURRENT\_FH specifies the target file. In this case, CURRENT\_FH MUST be a regular file and not a directory. If ca\_destination is not of 0 (zero) length, the ca\_destination argument specifies the file name to which the data will be copied within the directory identified by CURRENT\_FH. In this case, CURRENT\_FH MUST be a directory and not a regular file.

If the file named by ca\_destination does not exist and the operation completes successfully, the file will be visible in the file system namespace. If the file does not exist and the operation fails, the file MAY be visible in the file system namespace depending on when the failure occurs and on the implementation of the NFS server receiving the COPY operation. If the ca\_destination name cannot be created in the destination file system (due to file name restrictions, such as case or length), the operation MUST fail.

The ca\_src\_offset is the offset within the source file from which the data will be read, the ca\_dst\_offset is the offset within the destination file to which the data will be written, and the ca\_count is the number of bytes that will be copied. An offset of 0 (zero) specifies the start of the file. A count of 0 (zero) requests that all bytes from ca\_src\_offset through EOF be copied to the destination. If concurrent modifications to the source file overlap with the source file region being copied, the data copied may include all, some, or none of the modifications. The client can use standard NFS operations (e.g., OPEN with OPEN4\_SHARE\_DENY\_WRITE or mandatory byte range locks) to protect against concurrent modifications if the client is concerned about this. If the source file's end of file is being modified in parallel with a copy that specifies a count of 0 (zero) bytes, the amount of data copied is implementation dependent (clients may guard against this case by specifying a non-zero count value or preventing modification of the source file as mentioned



above).

If the source offset or the source offset plus count is greater than or equal to the size of the source file, the operation will fail with NFS4ERR\_INVALID. The destination offset or destination offset plus count may be greater than the size of the destination file. This allows for the client to issue parallel copies to implement operations such as "cat file1 file2 file3 file4 > dest".

If the destination file is created as a result of this command, the destination file's size will be equal to the number of bytes successfully copied. If the destination file already existed, the destination file's size may increase as a result of this operation (e.g. if ca\_dst\_offset plus ca\_count is greater than the destination's initial size).

If the ca\_source\_server list is specified, then this is an inter-server copy operation and the source file is on a remote server. The client is expected to have previously issued a successful COPY\_NOTIFY request to the remote source server. The ca\_source\_server list MUST be the same as the COPY\_NOTIFY response's cnr\_source\_server list. If the client includes the entries from the COPY\_NOTIFY response's cnr\_source\_server list in the ca\_source\_server list, the source server can indicate a specific copy protocol for the destination server to use by returning a URL, which specifies both a protocol service and server name. Server-to-server copy protocol considerations are described in [Section 2.2.4](#) and [Section 2.4.1](#).

The ca\_flags argument allows the copy operation to be customized in the following ways using the guarded flag (COPY4\_GUARDED) and the metadata flag (COPY4\_METADATA).

If the guarded flag is set and the destination exists on the server, this operation will fail with NFS4ERR\_EXIST.

If the guarded flag is not set and the destination exists on the server, the behavior is implementation dependent.

If the metadata flag is set and the client is requesting a whole file copy (i.e., ca\_count is 0 (zero)), a subset of the destination file's attributes MUST be the same as the source file's corresponding attributes and a subset of the destination file's attributes SHOULD be the same as the source file's corresponding attributes. The attributes in the MUST and SHOULD copy subsets will be defined for each NFS version.

For NFSv4.2, Table 3 and Table 4 list the REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED attributes respectively. In the "Copy to destination file?" column,



a "MUST" indicates that the attribute is part of the MUST copy set. A "SHOULD" indicates that the attribute is part of the SHOULD copy set. A "no" indicates that the attribute MUST NOT be copied.

REQUIRED attributes

Name	Id	Copy to destination file?
supported_attrs	0	no
type	1	MUST
fh_expire_type	2	no
change	3	SHOULD
size	4	MUST
link_support	5	no
symlink_support	6	no
named_attr	7	no
fsid	8	no
unique_handles	9	no
lease_time	10	no
rdattr_error	11	no
filehandle	19	no
suppattr_exclcreat	75	no

Table 3

RECOMMENDED attributes

Name	Id	Copy to destination file?
acl	12	MUST
aclsupport	13	no
archive	14	no
cansettime	15	no
case_insensitive	16	no
case_preserving	17	no
change_attr_type	79	no
change_policy	60	no
chown_restricted	18	MUST
dacl	58	MUST
dir_notif_delay	56	no
dirent_notif_delay	57	no
fileid	20	no
files_avail	21	no
files_free	22	no
files_total	23	no





fs_charset_cap	76	no	
fs_layout_type	62	no	
fs_locations	24	no	
fs_locations_info	67	no	
fs_status	61	no	
hidden	25	MUST	
homogeneous	26	no	
layout_alignment	66	no	
layout_blksize	65	no	
layout_hint	63	no	
layout_type	64	no	
maxfilesize	27	no	
maxlink	28	no	
maxname	29	no	
maxread	30	no	
maxwrite	31	no	
mdsthreshold	68	no	
mimetype	32	MUST	
mode	33	MUST	
mode_set_masked	74	no	
mounted_on_fileid	55	no	
no_trunc	34	no	
numlinks	35	no	
owner	36	MUST	
owner_group	37	MUST	
quota_avail_hard	38	no	
quota_avail_soft	39	no	
quota_used	40	no	
rawdev	41	no	
retentevt_get	71	MUST	
retentevt_set	72	no	
retention_get	69	MUST	
retention_hold	73	MUST	
retention_set	70	no	
sacl	59	MUST	
sec_label	80	MUST	
space_avail	42	no	
space_free	43	no	
space_freed	78	no	
space_reserved	77	MUST	
space_total	44	no	
space_used	45	no	
system	46	MUST	
time_access	47	MUST	
time_access_set	48	no	
time_backup	49	no	
time_create	50	MUST	
time_delta	51	no	



time_metadata	52	SHOULD	
time_modify	53	MUST	
time_modify_set	54	no	
+-----+-----+-----+			

Table 4

[NOTE: The source file's attribute values will take precedence over any attribute values inherited by the destination file.]

In the case of an inter-server copy or an intra-server copy between file systems, the attributes supported for the source file and destination file could be different. By definition, the REQUIRED attributes will be supported in all cases. If the metadata flag is set and the source file has a RECOMMENDED attribute that is not supported for the destination file, the copy MUST fail with NFS4ERR\_ATTRNOTSUPP.

Any attribute supported by the destination server that is not set on the source file SHOULD be left unset.

Metadata attributes not exposed via the NFS protocol SHOULD be copied to the destination file where appropriate.

The destination file's named attributes are not duplicated from the source file. After the copy process completes, the client MAY attempt to duplicate named attributes using standard NFSv4 operations. However, the destination file's named attribute capabilities MAY be different from the source file's named attribute capabilities.

If the metadata flag is not set and the client is requesting a whole file copy (i.e., ca\_count is 0 (zero)), the destination file's metadata is implementation dependent.

If the client is requesting a partial file copy (i.e., ca\_count is not 0 (zero)), the client SHOULD NOT set the metadata flag and the server MUST ignore the metadata flag.

If the operation does not result in an immediate failure, the server will return NFS4\_OK, and the CURRENT\_FH will remain the destination's filehandle.

If an immediate failure does occur, cr\_bytes\_copied will be set to the number of bytes copied to the destination file before the error occurred. The cr\_bytes\_copied value indicates the number of bytes copied but not which specific bytes have been copied.



A return of NFS4\_OK indicates that either the operation is complete or the operation was initiated and a callback will be used to deliver the final status of the operation.

If the `cr_callback_id` is returned, this indicates that the operation was initiated and a CB\_COPY callback will deliver the final results of the operation. The `cr_callback_id` stateid is termed a copy stateid in this context. The server is given the option of returning the results in a callback because the data may require a relatively long period of time to copy.

If no `cr_callback_id` is returned, the operation completed synchronously and no callback will be issued by the server. The completion status of the operation is indicated by `cr_status`.

If the copy completes successfully, either synchronously or asynchronously, the data copied from the source file to the destination file MUST appear identical to the NFS client. However, the NFS server's on disk representation of the data in the source file and destination file MAY differ. For example, the NFS server might encrypt, compress, deduplicate, or otherwise represent the on disk data in the source and destination file differently.

In the event of a failure the state of the destination file is implementation dependent. The COPY operation may fail for the following reasons (this is a partial list).

- o NFS4ERR\_MOVED
- o NFS4ERR\_NOTSUPP
- o NFS4ERR\_PARTNER\_NOTSUPP
- o NFS4ERR\_OFFLOAD\_DENIED
- o NFS4ERR\_PARTNER\_NO\_AUTH
- o NFS4ERR\_FBIG
- o NFS4ERR\_NOTDIR
- o NFS4ERR\_WRONG\_TYPE
- o NFS4ERR\_ISDIR
- o NFS4ERR\_INVALID



- o NFS4ERR\_DELAY
- o NFS4ERR\_METADATA\_NOTSUPP
- o NFS4ERR\_WRONGSEC

## **13.2. Operation 60: COPY\_ABORT - Cancel a server-side copy**

### **13.2.1. ARGUMENT**

```
struct COPY_ABORT4args {
    /* CURRENT_FH: destination file */
    stateid4      caa_stateid;
};
```

### **13.2.2. RESULT**

```
struct COPY_ABORT4res {
    nfsstat4      car_status;
};
```

### **13.2.3. DESCRIPTION**

COPY\_ABORT is used for both intra- and inter-server asynchronous copies. The COPY\_ABORT operation allows the client to cancel a server-side copy operation that it initiated. This operation is sent in a COMPOUND request from the client to the destination server. This operation may be used to cancel a copy when the application that requested the copy exits before the operation is completed or for some other reason.

The request contains the filehandle and copy stateid cookies that act as the context for the previously initiated copy operation.

The result's car\_status field indicates whether the cancel was successful or not. A value of NFS4\_OK indicates that the copy operation was canceled and no callback will be issued by the server. A copy operation that is successfully canceled may result in none, some, or all of the data and/or metadata copied.

If the server supports asynchronous copies, the server is REQUIRED to support the COPY\_ABORT operation.

The COPY\_ABORT operation may fail for the following reasons (this is a partial list):





- o NFS4ERR\_NOTSUPP
- o NFS4ERR\_RETRY
- o NFS4ERR\_COMPLETE\_ALREADY
- o NFS4ERR\_SERVERFAULT

### **13.3. Operation 61: COPY\_NOTIFY - Notify a source server of a future copy**

#### **13.3.1. ARGUMENT**

```
struct COPY_NOTIFY4args {
    /* CURRENT_FH: source file */
    netloc4      cna_destination_server;
};
```

#### **13.3.2. RESULT**

```
struct COPY_NOTIFY4resok {
    nfstime4      cnr_lease_time;
    netloc4      cnr_source_server<>;
};

union COPY_NOTIFY4res switch (nfsstat4 cnr_status) {
    case NFS4_OK:
        COPY_NOTIFY4resok      resok4;
    default:
        void;
};
```

#### **13.3.3. DESCRIPTION**

This operation is used for an inter-server copy. A client sends this operation in a COMPOUND request to the source server to authorize a destination server identified by `cna_destination_server` to read the file specified by `CURRENT_FH` on behalf of the given user.

The `cna_destination_server` MUST be specified using the `netloc4` network location format. The server is not required to resolve the `cna_destination_server` address before completing this operation.

If this operation succeeds, the source server will allow the `cna_destination_server` to copy the specified file on behalf of the



given user as long as both of the following conditions are met:

- o The destination server begins reading the source file before the `cnr_lease_time` expires. If the `cnr_lease_time` expires while the destination server is still reading the source file, the destination server is allowed to finish reading the file.
- o The client has not issued a `COPY_REVOKE` for the same combination of user, filehandle, and destination server.

The `cnr_lease_time` is chosen by the source server. A `cnr_lease_time` of 0 (zero) indicates an infinite lease. To avoid the need for synchronized clocks, copy lease times are granted by the server as a time delta. To renew the copy lease time the client should resend the same copy notification request to the source server.

A successful response will also contain a list of netloc4 network location formats called `cnr_source_server`, on which the source is willing to accept connections from the destination. These might not be reachable from the client and might be located on networks to which the client has no connection.

If the client wishes to perform an inter-server copy, the client MUST send a `COPY_NOTIFY` to the source server. Therefore, the source server MUST support `COPY_NOTIFY`.

For a copy only involving one server (the source and destination are on the same server), this operation is unnecessary.

The `COPY_NOTIFY` operation may fail for the following reasons (this is a partial list):

- o `NFS4ERR_MOVED`
- o `NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP`
- o `NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC`

#### **13.4. Operation 62: `COPY_REVOKE` - Revoke a destination server's copy privileges**

##### **13.4.1. ARGUMENT**

```
struct COPY_REVOKE4args {
    /* CURRENT_FH: source file */
    netloc4      cra_destination_server;
};
```



### **13.4.2. RESULT**

```
struct COPY_REVOKE4res {  
    nfsstat4      crr_status;  
};
```

### **13.4.3. DESCRIPTION**

This operation is used for an inter-server copy. A client sends this operation in a COMPOUND request to the source server to revoke the authorization of a destination server identified by `cra_destination_server` from reading the file specified by `CURRENT_FH` on behalf of given user. If the `cra_destination_server` has already begun copying the file, a successful return from this operation indicates that further access will be prevented.

The `cra_destination_server` MUST be specified using the `netloc4` network location format. The server is not required to resolve the `cra_destination_server` address before completing this operation.

The client uses `COPY_ABORT` to inform the destination to stop the active transfer and `COPY_REVOKE` to inform the source to not allow any more copy requests from the destination. The `COPY_REVOKE` operation is also useful in situations in which the source server granted a very long or infinite lease on the destination server's ability to read the source file and all copy operations on the source file have been completed.

For a copy only involving one server (the source and destination are on the same server), this operation is unnecessary.

If the server supports `COPY_NOTIFY`, the server is REQUIRED to support the `COPY_REVOKE` operation.

The `COPY_REVOKE` operation may fail for the following reasons (this is a partial list):

- o NFS4ERR\_MOVED
- o NFS4ERR\_NOTSUPP

### **13.5. Operation 63: COPY\_STATUS - Poll for status of a server-side copy**



### **13.5.1. ARGUMENT**

```
struct COPY_STATUS4args {
    /* CURRENT_FH: destination file */
    stateid4      csa_stateid;
};
```

### **13.5.2. RESULT**

```
struct COPY_STATUS4resok {
    length4      csr_bytes_copied;
    nfsstat4     csr_complete<1>;
};

union COPY_STATUS4res switch (nfsstat4 csr_status) {
    case NFS4_OK:
        COPY_STATUS4resok      resok4;
    default:
        void;
};
```

### **13.5.3. DESCRIPTION**

COPY\_STATUS is used for both intra- and inter-server asynchronous copies. The COPY\_STATUS operation allows the client to poll the destination server to determine the status of an asynchronous copy operation.

If this operation is successful, the number of bytes copied are returned to the client in the `csr_bytes_copied` field. The `csr_bytes_copied` value indicates the number of bytes copied but not which specific bytes have been copied.

If the optional `csr_complete` field is present, the copy has completed. In this case the status value indicates the result of the asynchronous copy operation. In all cases, the server will also deliver the final results of the asynchronous copy in a CB\_COPY operation.

The failure of this operation does not indicate the result of the asynchronous copy in any way.

If the server supports asynchronous copies, the server is REQUIRED to support the COPY\_STATUS operation.





The COPY\_STATUS operation may fail for the following reasons (this is a partial list):

- o NFS4ERR\_NOTSUPP
- o NFS4ERR\_BAD\_STATEID
- o NFS4ERR\_EXPIRED

### **13.6. Modification to Operation 42: EXCHANGE\_ID - Instantiate Client ID**

#### **13.6.1. ARGUMENT**

```
/* new */  
const EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_FENCE_OPS = 0x00000004;
```

#### **13.6.2. RESULT**

Unchanged

#### **13.6.3. MOTIVATION**

Enterprise applications require guarantees that an operation has either aborted or completed. NFSv4.1 provides this guarantee as long as the session is alive: simply send a SEQUENCE operation on the same slot with a new sequence number, and the successful return of SEQUENCE indicates the previous operation has completed. However, if the session is lost, there is no way to know when any in progress operations have aborted or completed. In hindsight, the NFSv4.1 specification should have mandated that DESTROY\_SESSION either abort or complete all outstanding operations.

#### **13.6.4. DESCRIPTION**

A client SHOULD request the EXCHGID4\_FLAG\_SUPP\_FENCE\_OPS capability when it sends an EXCHANGE\_ID operation. The server SHOULD set this capability in the EXCHANGE\_ID reply whether the client requests it or not. It is the server's return that determines whether this capability is in effect. When it is in effect, the following will occur:

- o The server will not reply to any DESTROY\_SESSION invoked with the client ID until all operations in progress are completed or aborted.
- o The server will not reply to subsequent EXCHANGE\_ID invoked on the same client owner with a new verifier until all operations in progress on the client ID's session are completed or aborted.



- o The NFS server SHOULD support client ID trunking, and if it does and the EXCHGID4\_FLAG\_SUPP\_FENCE\_OPS capability is enabled, then a session ID created on one node of the storage cluster MUST be destroyable via DESTROY\_SESSION. In addition, DESTROY\_CLIENTID and an EXCHANGE\_ID with a new verifier affects all sessions regardless what node the sessions were created on.

### **13.7. Operation 64: INITIALIZE**

This operation can be used to initialize the structure imposed by an application onto a file, i.e., ADBs, and to punch a hole into a file.

#### **13.7.1. ARGUMENT**

```
/*
 * We use data_content4 in case we wish to
 * extend new types later. Note that we
 * are explicitly disallowing data.
 */
union initialize_arg4 switch (data_content4 content) {
case NFS4_CONTENT_APP_BLOCK:
    app_data_block4 ia_adb;
case NFS4_CONTENT_HOLE:
    data_info4      ia_hole;
default:
    void;
};

struct INITIALIZE4args {
    /* CURRENT_FH: file */
    stateid4      ia_stateid;
    stable_how4   ia_stable;
    initialize_arg4 ia_data<>;
};
```



### **13.7.2. RESULT**

```
struct INITIALIZE4resok {
    count4      ir_count;
    stable_how4 ir_committed;
    verifier4   ir_writeverf;
    data_content4 ir_sparse;
};

union INITIALIZE4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
    INITIALIZE4resok      resok4;
default:
    void;
};
```

### **13.7.3. DESCRIPTION**

Using the `data_content4` ([Section 6.1.2](#)), INITIALIZE can be used either to punch holes or to impose ADB structure on a file.

#### **13.7.3.1. Hole punching**

Whenever a client wishes to zero the blocks backing a particular region in the file, it calls the INITIALIZE operation with the current filehandle set to the filehandle of the file in question, and the equivalent of start offset and length in bytes of the region set in `ia_hole.di_offset` and `ia_hole.di_length` respectively. If the `ia_hole.di_allocated` is set to TRUE, then the blocks will be zeroed and if it is set to FALSE, then they will be deallocated. All further reads to this region MUST return zeros until overwritten. The filehandle specified must be that of a regular file.

Situations may arise where `di_offset` and/or `di_offset + di_length` will not be aligned to a boundary that the server does allocations/deallocations in. For most file systems, this is the block size of the file system. In such a case, the server can deallocate as many bytes as it can in the region. The blocks that cannot be deallocated MUST be zeroed. Except for the block deallocation and maximum hole punching capability, a INITIALIZE operation is to be treated similar to a write of zeroes.

The server is not required to complete deallocating the blocks specified in the operation before returning. It is acceptable to have the deallocation be deferred. In fact, INITIALIZE is merely a hint; it is valid for a server to return success without ever doing



anything towards deallocating the blocks backing the region specified. However, any future reads to the region MUST return zeroes.

If used to hole punch, INITIALIZE will result in the `space_used` attribute being decreased by the number of bytes that were deallocated. The `space_freed` attribute may or may not decrease, depending on the support and whether the blocks backing the specified range were shared or not. The size attribute will remain unchanged.

The INITIALIZE operation MUST NOT change the space reservation guarantee of the file. While the server can deallocate the blocks specified by `di_offset` and `di_length`, future writes to this region MUST NOT fail with `NFSERR_NOSPC`.

The INITIALIZE operation may fail for the following reasons (this is a partial list):

`NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP` The Hole punch operations are not supported by the NFS server receiving this request.

`NFS4ERR_DIR` The current filehandle is of type `NF4DIR`.

`NFS4ERR_SYMLINK` The current filehandle is of type `NF4LNK`.

`NFS4ERR_WRONG_TYPE` The current filehandle does not designate an ordinary file.

#### **13.7.3.2. ADBs**

If the server supports ADBs, then it MUST support the `NFS4_CONTENT_APP_BLOCK` arm of the INITIALIZE operation. The server has no concept of the structure imposed by the application. It is only when the application writes to a section of the file does order get imposed. In order to detect corruption even before the application utilizes the file, the application will want to initialize a range of ADBs using INITIALIZE.

For ADBs, when the client invokes the INITIALIZE operation, it has two desired results:

1. The structure described by the `app_data_block4` be imposed on the file.
2. The contents described by the `app_data_block4` be sparse.

If the server supports the INITIALIZE operation, it still might not support sparse files. So if it receives the INITIALIZE operation,





then it MUST populate the contents of the file with the initialized ADBs.

If the data was already initialized, there are two interesting scenarios:

1. The data blocks are allocated.
2. Initializing in the middle of an existing ADB.

If the data blocks were already allocated, then the INITIALIZE is a hole punch operation. If INITIALIZE supports sparse files, then the data blocks are to be deallocated. If not, then the data blocks are to be rewritten in the indicated ADB format.

Since the server has no knowledge of ADBs, it should not report misaligned creation of ADBs. Even while it can detect them, it cannot disallow them, as the application might be in the process of changing the size of the ADBs. Thus the server must be prepared to handle an INITIALIZE into an existing ADB.

This document does not mandate the manner in which the server stores ADBs sparsely for a file. It does assume that if ADBs are stored sparsely, then the server can detect when an INITIALIZE arrives that will force a new ADB to start inside an existing ADB. For example, assume that ADB<sub>i</sub> has a `adb_block_size` of 4k and that an INITIALIZE starts 1k inside ADB<sub>i</sub>. The server should [[Comment.3: Need to flesh this out. --TH]]

### **13.8. Operation 67: IO\_ADVISE - Application I/O access pattern hints**



### **13.8.1. ARGUMENT**

```
enum IO_ADVISE_type4 {
    IO_ADVISE4_NORMAL                = 0,
    IO_ADVISE4_SEQUENTIAL            = 1,
    IO_ADVISE4_SEQUENTIAL_BACKWARDS = 2,
    IO_ADVISE4_RANDOM                = 3,
    IO_ADVISE4_WILLNEED              = 4,
    IO_ADVISE4_WILLNEED_OPPORTUNISTIC = 5,
    IO_ADVISE4_DONTNEED              = 6,
    IO_ADVISE4_NOREUSE                = 7,
    IO_ADVISE4_READ                   = 8,
    IO_ADVISE4_WRITE                  = 9,
    IO_ADVISE4_INIT_PROXIMITY         = 10
};

struct IO_ADVISE4args {
    /* CURRENT_FH: file */
    stateid4      iar_stateid;
    offset4       iar_offset;
    length4       iar_count;
    bitmap4       iar_hints;
};
```

### **13.8.2. RESULT**

```
struct IO_ADVISE4resok {
    bitmap4 ior_hints;
};

union IO_ADVISE4res switch (nfsstat4 _status) {
case NFS4_OK:
    IO_ADVISE4resok resok4;
default:
    void;
};
```

### **13.8.3. DESCRIPTION**

The `IO_ADVISE` operation sends an I/O access pattern hint to the server for the owner of the `stateid` for a given byte range specified by `iar_offset` and `iar_count`. The byte range specified by `iar_offset` and `iar_count` need not currently exist in the file, but the `iar_hints` will apply to the byte range when it does exist. If `iar_count` is 0, all data following `iar_offset` is specified. The server MAY ignore the advice.



The following are the allowed hints for a stateid holder:

`IO_ADVISE4_NORMAL` There is no advice to give, this is the default behavior.

`IO_ADVISE4_SEQUENTIAL` Expects to access the specified data sequentially from lower offsets to higher offsets.

`IO_ADVISE4_SEQUENTIAL BACKWARDS` Expects to access the specified data sequentially from higher offsets to lower offsets.

`IO_ADVISE4_RANDOM` Expects to access the specified data in a random order.

`IO_ADVISE4_WILLNEED` Expects to access the specified data in the near future.

`IO_ADVISE4_WILLNEED_OPPORTUNISTIC` Expects to possibly access the data in the near future. This is a speculative hint, and therefore the server should prefetch data or indirect blocks only if it can be done at a marginal cost.

`IO_ADVISE_DONTNEED` Expects that it will not access the specified data in the near future.

`IO_ADVISE_NOREUSE` Expects to access the specified data once and then not reuse it thereafter.

`IO_ADVISE4_READ` Expects to read the specified data in the near future.

`IO_ADVISE4_WRITE` Expects to write the specified data in the near future.

`IO_ADVISE4_INIT_PROXIMITY` Informs the server that the data in the byte range remains important to the client.

Since `IO_ADVISE` is a hint, a server SHOULD NOT return an error and invalidate a entire Compound request if one of the sent hints in `iar_hints` is not supported by the server. Also, the server MUST NOT return an error if the client sends contradictory hints to the server, e.g., `IO_ADVISE4_SEQUENTIAL` and `IO_ADVISE4_RANDOM` in a single `IO_ADVISE` operation. In these cases, the server MUST return success and a `ior_hints` value that indicates the hint it intends to implement. This may mean simply returning `IO_ADVISE4_NORMAL`.

The `ior_hints` returned by the server is primarily for debugging purposes since the server is under no obligation to carry out the



hints that it describes in the `ior_hints` result. In addition, while the server may have intended to implement the hints returned in `ior_hints`, as time progresses, the server may need to change its handling of a given file due to several reasons including, but not limited to, memory pressure, additional `IO_ADVISE` hints sent by other clients, and heuristically detected file access patterns.

The server MAY return different advice than what the client requested. If it does, then this might be due to one of several conditions, including, but not limited to another client advising of a different I/O access pattern; a different I/O access pattern from another client that that the server has heuristically detected; or the server is not able to support the requested I/O access pattern, perhaps due to a temporary resource limitation.

Each issuance of the `IO_ADVISE` operation overrides all previous issuances of `IO_ADVISE` for a given byte range. This effectively follows a strategy of last hint wins for a given stateid and byte range.

Clients should assume that hints included in an `IO_ADVISE` operation will be forgotten once the file is closed.

#### **13.8.4. IMPLEMENTATION**

The NFS client may choose to issue an `IO_ADVISE` operation to the server in several different instances.

The most obvious is in direct response to an application's execution of `posix_fadvise()`. In this case, `IO_ADVISE4_WRITE` and `IO_ADVISE4_READ` may be set based upon the type of file access specified when the file was opened.

#### **13.8.5. IO\_ADVISE4\_INIT\_PROXIMITY**

The `IO_ADVISE4_INIT_PROXIMITY` hint is non-posix in origin and conveys that the client has recently accessed the byte range in its own cache. I.e., it has not accessed it on the server, but it has locally. When the server reaches resource exhaustion, knowing which data is more important allows the server to make better choices about which data to, for example purge from a cache, or move to secondary storage. It also informs the server which delegations are more important, since if delegations are working correctly, once delegated to a client and the client has read the content for that byte range, a server might never receive another read request for that byte range.

This hint is also useful in the case of NFS clients which are network





booting from a server. If the first client to be booted sends this hint, then it keeps the cache warm for the remaining clients.

#### **13.8.6. pNFS File Layout Data Type Considerations**

The IO\_ADVICE considerations for pNFS are very similar to the COMMIT considerations for pNFS. That is, as with COMMIT, some NFS server implementations prefer IO\_ADVICE be done on the DS, and some prefer it be done on the MDS.

So for the file's layout type, it is proposed that NFSv4.2 include an additional hint NFL42\_CARE\_IO\_ADVICE\_THRU\_MDS which is valid only on NFSv4.2 or higher. Any file's layout obtained with NFSv4.1 MUST NOT have NFL42\_UFLG\_IO\_ADVICE\_THRU\_MDS set. Any file's layout obtained with NFSv4.2 MAY have NFL42\_UFLG\_IO\_ADVICE\_THRU\_MDS set. If the client does not implement IO\_ADVICE, then it MUST ignore NFL42\_UFLG\_IO\_ADVICE\_THRU\_MDS.

If NFL42\_UFLG\_IO\_ADVICE\_THRU\_MDS is set, the client MUST send the IO\_ADVICE operation to the MDS in order for it to be honored by the DS. Once the MDS receives the IO\_ADVICE operation, it will communicate the advice to each DS.

If NFL42\_UFLG\_IO\_ADVICE\_THRU\_MDS is not set, then the client SHOULD send an IO\_ADVICE operation to the appropriate DS for the specified byte range. While the client MAY always send IO\_ADVICE to the MDS, if the server has not set NFL42\_UFLG\_IO\_ADVICE\_THRU\_MDS, the client should expect that such an IO\_ADVICE is futile. Note that a client SHOULD use the same set of arguments on each IO\_ADVICE sent to a DS for the same open file reference.

The server is not required to support different advice for different DS's with the same open file reference.

##### **13.8.6.1. Dense and Sparse Packing Considerations**

The IO\_ADVICE operation MUST use the iar\_offset and byte range as dictated by the presence or absence of NFL4\_UFLG\_DENSE.

E.g., if NFL4\_UFLG\_DENSE is present, and a READ or WRITE to the DS for iar\_offset 0 really means iar\_offset 10000 in the logical file, then an IO\_ADVICE for iar\_offset 0 means iar\_offset 10000.

E.g., if NFL4\_UFLG\_DENSE is absent, then a READ or WRITE to the DS for iar\_offset 0 really means iar\_offset 0 in the logical file, then an IO\_ADVICE for iar\_offset 0 means iar\_offset 0 in the logical file.

E.g., if NFL4\_UFLG\_DENSE is present, the stripe unit is 1000 bytes



and the stripe count is 10, and the dense DS file is serving `iar_offset 0`. A `READ` or `WRITE` to the DS for `iar_offsets 0, 1000, 2000, and 3000`, really mean `iar_offsets 10000, 20000, 30000, and 40000` (implying a stripe count of 10 and a stripe unit of 1000), then an `IO_ADVISE` sent to the same DS with an `iar_offset` of 500, and a `iar_count` of 3000 means that the `IO_ADVISE` applies to these byte ranges of the dense DS file:

- 500 to 999
- 1000 to 1999
- 2000 to 2999
- 3000 to 3499

I.e., the contiguous range 500 to 3499 as specified in `IO_ADVISE`.

It also applies to these byte ranges of the logical file:

- 10500 to 10999 (500 bytes)
- 20000 to 20999 (1000 bytes)
- 30000 to 30999 (1000 bytes)
- 40000 to 40499 (500 bytes)
- (total                    3000 bytes)

E.g., if `NFL4_UFLG_DENSE` is absent, the stripe unit is 250 bytes, the stripe count is 4, and the sparse DS file is serving `iar_offset 0`. Then a `READ` or `WRITE` to the DS for `iar_offsets 0, 1000, 2000, and 3000`, really mean `iar_offsets 0, 1000, 2000, and 3000` in the logical file, keeping in mind that on the DS file, . byte ranges 250 to 999, 1250 to 1999, 2250 to 2999, and 3250 to 3999 are not accessible. Then an `IO_ADVISE` sent to the same DS with an `iar_offset` of 500, and a `iar_count` of 3000 means that the `IO_ADVISE` applies to these byte ranges of the logical file and the sparse DS file:

- 500 to 999 (500 bytes)    - no effect
- 1000 to 1249 (250 bytes) - effective
- 1250 to 1999 (750 bytes) - no effect
- 2000 to 2249 (250 bytes) - effective
- 2250 to 2999 (750 bytes) - no effect
- 3000 to 3249 (250 bytes) - effective
- 3250 to 3499 (250 bytes) - no effect
- (subtotal            2250 bytes) - no effect
- (subtotal            750 bytes) - effective
- (grand total        3000 bytes) - no effect + effective

If neither of the flags `NFL42_UFLG_IO_ADVISE_THRU_MDS` and `NFL4_UFLG_DENSE` are set in the layout, then any `IO_ADVISE` request sent to the data server with a byte range that overlaps stripe unit that the data server does not serve MUST NOT result in the status



NFS4ERR\_PNFS\_IO\_HOLE. Instead, the response SHOULD be successful and if the server applies IO\_ADVISE hints on any stripe units that overlap with the specified range, those hints SHOULD be indicated in the response.

### **13.9. Changes to Operation 51: LAYOUTRETURN**

#### **13.9.1. Introduction**

In the pNFS description provided in [2], the client is not capable to relay an error code from the DS to the MDS. In the specification of the Objects-Based Layout protocol [9], use is made of the opaque lrf\_body field of the LAYOUTRETURN argument to do such a relaying of error codes. In this section, we define a new data structure to enable the passing of error codes back to the MDS and provide some guidelines on what both the client and MDS should expect in such circumstances.

There are two broad classes of errors, transient and persistent. The client SHOULD strive to only use this new mechanism to report persistent errors. It MUST be able to deal with transient issues by itself. Also, while the client might consider an issue to be persistent, it MUST be prepared for the MDS to consider such issues to be transient. A prime example of this is if the MDS fences off a client from either a stateid or a filehandle. The client will get an error from the DS and might relay either NFS4ERR\_ACCESS or NFS4ERR\_BAD\_STATEID back to the MDS, with the belief that this is a hard error. If the MDS is informed by the client that there is an error, it can safely ignore that. For it, the mission is accomplished in that the client has returned a layout that the MDS had most likely recalled.

The client might also need to inform the MDS that it cannot reach one or more of the DSes. While the MDS can detect the connectivity of both of these paths:

- o MDS to DS
- o MDS to client

it cannot determine if the client and DS path is working. As with the case of the DS passing errors to the client, it must be prepared for the MDS to consider such outages as being transitory.

The existing LAYOUTRETURN operation is extended by introducing a new data structure to report errors, layoutreturn\_device\_error4. Also, layoutreturn\_device\_error4 is introduced to enable an array of errors to be reported.



### **13.9.2. ARGUMENT**

The ARGUMENT specification of the LAYOUTRETURN operation in [section 18.44.1](#) of [2] is augmented by the following XDR code [23]:

```
struct layoutreturn_device_error4 {
    deviceid4      lrde_deviceid;
    nfsstat4       lrde_status;
    nfs_opnum4     lrde_opnum;
};

struct layoutreturn_error_report4 {
    layoutreturn_device_error4  lrer_errors<>;
};
```

### **13.9.3. RESULT**

The RESULT of the LAYOUTRETURN operation is unchanged; see [section 18.44.2](#) of [2].

### **13.9.4. DESCRIPTION**

The following text is added to the end of the LAYOUTRETURN operation DESCRIPTION in section 18.44.3 of [2].

When a client uses LAYOUTRETURN with a type of LAYOUTRETURN4\_FILE, then if the lrf\_body field is NULL, it indicates to the MDS that the client experienced no errors. If lrf\_body is non-NULL, then the field references error information which is layout type specific. I.e., the Objects-Based Layout protocol can continue to utilize lrf\_body as specified in [9]. For both Files-Based and Block-Based Layouts, the field references a layoutreturn\_device\_error4, which contains an array of layoutreturn\_device\_error4.

Each individual layoutreturn\_device\_error4 describes a single error associated with a DS, which is identified via lrde\_deviceid. The operation which returned the error is identified via lrde\_opnum. Finally the NFS error value (nfsstat4) encountered is provided via lrde\_status and may consist of the following error codes:

NFS4ERR\_NXIO: The client was unable to establish any communication with the DS.

NFS4ERR\_\*: The client was able to establish communication with the DS and is returning one of the allowed error codes for the operation denoted by lrde\_opnum.





### **13.9.5. IMPLEMENTATION**

The following text is added to the end of the LAYOUTRETURN operation IMPLEMENTATION in section 18.4.4 of [2].

Clients are expected to tolerate transient storage device errors, and hence clients SHOULD NOT use the LAYOUTRETURN error handling for device access problems that may be transient. The methods by which a client decides whether a device access problem is transient vs. persistent are implementation-specific, but may include retrying I/Os to a data server under appropriate conditions.

When an I/O fails to a storage device, the client SHOULD retry the failed I/O via the MDS. In this situation, before retrying the I/O, the client SHOULD return the layout, or the affected portion thereof, and SHOULD indicate which storage device or devices was problematic. The client needs to do this when the DS is being unresponsive in order to fence off any failed write attempts, and ensure that they do not end up overwriting any later data being written through the MDS. If the client does not do this, the MDS MAY issue a layout recall callback in order to perform the retried I/O.

The client needs to be cognizant that since this error handling is optional in the MDS, the MDS may silently ignore this functionality. Also, as the MDS may consider some issues the client reports to be expected (see [Section 13.9.1](#)), the client might find it difficult to detect a MDS which has not implemented error handling via LAYOUTRETURN.

If an MDS is aware that a storage device is proving problematic to a client, the MDS SHOULD NOT include that storage device in any pNFS layouts sent to that client. If the MDS is aware that a storage device is affecting many clients, then the MDS SHOULD NOT include that storage device in any pNFS layouts sent out. If a client asks for a new layout for the file from the MDS, it MUST be prepared for the MDS to return that storage device in the layout. The MDS might not have any choice in using the storage device, i.e., there might only be one possible layout for the system. Also, in the case of existing files, the MDS might have no choice in which storage devices to hand out to clients.

The MDS is not required to indefinitely retain per-client storage device error information. An MDS is also not required to automatically reinstate use of a previously problematic storage device; administrative intervention may be required instead.



### **13.10. Operation 65: READ\_PLUS**

READ\_PLUS is a new variant of the NFSv4.1 READ operation [2]. Besides being able to support all of the data semantics of READ, it can also be used by the server to return either holes or ADBs to the client. For holes, READ\_PLUS extends the response to avoid returning data for portions of the file which are either initialized and contain no backing store or if the result would appear to be so. I.e., if the result was a data block composed entirely of zeros, then it is easier to return a hole. Returning data blocks of uninitialized data wastes computational and network resources, thus reducing performance. For ADBs, READ\_PLUS is used to return the metadata describing the portions of the file which are either initialized and contain no backing store.

If the client sends a READ operation, it is explicitly stating that it is neither supporting sparse files nor ADBs. So if a READ occurs on a sparse ADB or file, then the server must expand such data to be raw bytes. If a READ occurs in the middle of a hole or ADB, the server can only send back bytes starting from that offset. In contrast, if a READ\_PLUS occurs in the middle of a hole or ADB, the server can send back a range which starts before the offset and extends past the range.

READ is inefficient for transfer of sparse sections of the file. As such, READ is marked as OBSOLETE in NFSv4.2. Instead, a client should issue READ\_PLUS. Note that as the client has no a priori knowledge of whether either an ADB or a hole is present or not, it should always use READ\_PLUS.

#### **13.10.1. ARGUMENT**

```
struct READ_PLUS4args {
    /* CURRENT_FH: file */
    stateid4      rpa_stateid;
    offset4      rpa_offset;
    count4       rpa_count;
};
```



**13.10.2. RESULT**

```

union read_plus_content switch (data_content4 content) {
case NFS4_CONTENT_DATA:
    opaque          rpc_data<>;
case NFS4_CONTENT_APP_BLOCK:
    app_data_block4 rpc_block;
case NFS4_CONTENT_HOLE:
    data_info4      rpc_hole;
default:
    void;
};

/*
 * Allow a return of an array of contents.
 */
struct read_plus_res4 {
    bool          rpr_eof;
    read_plus_content rpr_contents<>;
};

union READ_PLUS4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
    read_plus_res4 resok4;
default:
    void;
};

```

**13.10.3. DESCRIPTION**

The READ\_PLUS operation is based upon the NFSv4.1 READ operation [2] and similarly reads data from the regular file identified by the current filehandle.

The client provides a rpa\_offset of where the READ\_PLUS is to start and a rpa\_count of how many bytes are to be read. A rpa\_offset of zero means to read data starting at the beginning of the file. If rpa\_offset is greater than or equal to the size of the file, the status NFS4\_OK is returned with di\_length (the data length) set to zero and eof set to TRUE.

The READ\_PLUS result is comprised of an array of rpr\_contents, each of which describe a data\_content4 type of data (Section 6.1.2). For NFSv4.2, the allowed values are data, ADB, and hole. A server is required to support the data type, but neither ADB nor hole. Both an ADB and a hole must be returned in its entirety - clients must be



prepared to get more information than they requested.

READ\_PLUS has to support all of the errors which are returned by READ plus NFS4ERR\_UNION\_NOTSUPP. If the client asks for a hole and the server does not support that arm of the discriminated union, but does support one or more additional arms, it can signal to the client that it supports the operation, but not the arm with NFS4ERR\_UNION\_NOTSUPP.

If the data to be returned is comprised entirely of zeros, then the server may elect to return that data as a hole. The server differentiates this to the client by setting di\_allocated to TRUE in this case. Note that in such a scenario, the server is not required to determine the full extent of the "hole" - it does not need to determine where the zeros start and end.

The server may elect to return adjacent elements of the same type. For example, the guard pattern or block size of an ADB might change, which would require adjacent elements of type ADB. Likewise if the server has a range of data comprised entirely of zeros and then a hole, it might want to return two adjacent holes to the client.

If the client specifies a rpa\_count value of zero, the READ\_PLUS succeeds and returns zero bytes of data. In all situations, the server may choose to return fewer bytes than specified by the client. The client needs to check for this condition and handle the condition appropriately.

If the client specifies an rpa\_offset and rpa\_count value that is entirely contained within a hole of the file, then the di\_offset and di\_length returned must be for the entire hole. This result is considered valid until the file is changed (detected via the change attribute). The server MUST provide the same semantics for the hole as if the client read the region and received zeroes; the implied holes contents lifetime MUST be exactly the same as any other read data.

If the client specifies an rpa\_offset and rpa\_count value that begins in a non-hole of the file but extends into hole the server should return an array comprised of both data and a hole. The client MUST be prepared for the server to return a short read describing just the data. The client will then issue another READ\_PLUS for the remaining bytes, which the server will respond with information about the hole in the file.

Except when special stateids are used, the stateid value for a READ\_PLUS request represents a value returned from a previous byte-range lock or share reservation request or the stateid associated





with a delegation. The stateid identifies the associated owners if any and is used by the server to verify that the associated locks are still valid (e.g., have not been revoked).

If the read ended at the end-of-file (formally, in a correctly formed READ\_PLUS operation, if rpa\_offset + rpa\_count is equal to the size of the file), or the READ\_PLUS operation extends beyond the size of the file (if rpa\_offset + rpa\_count is greater than the size of the file), eof is returned as TRUE; otherwise, it is FALSE. A successful READ\_PLUS of an empty file will always return eof as TRUE.

If the current filehandle is not an ordinary file, an error will be returned to the client. In the case that the current filehandle represents an object of type NF4DIR, NFS4ERR\_ISDIR is returned. If the current filehandle designates a symbolic link, NFS4ERR\_SYMLINK is returned. In all other cases, NFS4ERR\_WRONG\_TYPE is returned.

For a READ\_PLUS with a stateid value of all bits equal to zero, the server MAY allow the READ\_PLUS to be serviced subject to mandatory byte-range locks or the current share deny modes for the file. For a READ\_PLUS with a stateid value of all bits equal to one, the server MAY allow READ\_PLUS operations to bypass locking checks at the server.

On success, the current filehandle retains its value.

#### **13.10.4. IMPLEMENTATION**

In general, the IMPLEMENTATION notes for READ in Section 18.22.4 of [2] also apply to READ\_PLUS. One delta is that when the owner has a locked byte range, the server MUST return an array of rpr\_contents with values inside that range.

##### **13.10.4.1. Additional pNFS Implementation Information**

With pNFS, the semantics of using READ\_PLUS remains the same. Any data server MAY return a hole or ADB result for a READ\_PLUS request that it receives. When a data server chooses to return such a result, it has the option of returning information for the data stored on that data server (as defined by the data layout), but it MUST not return results for a byte range that includes data managed by another data server.

A data server should do its best to return as much information about a hole ADB as is feasible without having to contact the metadata server. If communication with the metadata server is required, then every attempt should be taken to minimize the number of requests.



If mandatory locking is enforced, then the data server must also ensure that to return only information that is within the owner's locked byte range.

**13.10.5. READ\_PLUS with Sparse Files Example**

The following table describes a sparse file. For each byte range, the file contains either non-zero data or a hole. In addition, the server in this example uses a Hole Threshold of 32K.

Byte-Range	Contents
0-15999	Hole
16K-31999	Non-Zero
32K-255999	Hole
256K-287999	Non-Zero
288K-353999	Hole
354K-417999	Non-Zero

Table 5

Under the given circumstances, if a client was to read from the file with a max read size of 64K, the following will be the results for the given READ\_PLUS calls. This assumes the client has already opened the file, acquired a valid stateid ('s' in the example), and just needs to issue READ\_PLUS requests.

1. READ\_PLUS(s, 0, 64K) --> NFS\_OK, eof = false, <data[0,32K], hole[32K,224K]>. Since the first hole is less than the server's Hole Threshold, the first 32K of the file is returned as data and the remaining 32K is returned as a hole which actually extends to 256K.
2. READ\_PLUS(s, 32K, 64K) --> NFS\_OK, eof = false, <hole[32K,224K]> The requested range was all zeros, and the current hole begins at offset 32K and is 224K in length. Note that the client should not have followed up the previous READ\_PLUS request with this one as the hole information from the previous call extended past what the client was requesting.
3. READ\_PLUS(s, 256K, 64K) --> NFS\_OK, eof = false, <data[256K, 288K], hole[288K, 354K]>. Returns an array of the 32K data and the hole which extends to 354K.
4. READ\_PLUS(s, 354K, 64K) --> NFS\_OK, eof = true, <data[354K, 418K]>. Returns the final 64K of data and informs the client



there is no more data in the file.

### **13.11. Operation 66: SEEK**

SEEK is an operation that allows a client to determine the location of the next `data_content4` in a file. It allows an implementation of the emerging extension to `lseek(2)` to allow clients to determine `SEEK_HOLE` and `SEEK_DATA`.

#### **13.11.1. ARGUMENT**

```
struct SEEK4args {
    /* CURRENT_FH: file */
    stateid4      sa_stateid;
    offset4       sa_offset;
    data_content4 sa_what;
};
```

#### **13.11.2. RESULT**

```
union seek_content switch (data_content4 content) {
case NFS4_CONTENT_DATA:
    data_info4      sc_data;
case NFS4_CONTENT_APP_BLOCK:
    app_data_block4 sc_block;
case NFS4_CONTENT_HOLE:
    data_info4      sc_hole;
default:
    void;
};

struct seek_res4 {
    bool          sr_eof;
    seek_content  sr_contents;
};

union SEEK4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
    seek_res4      resok4;
default:
    void;
};
```



### **13.11.3. DESCRIPTION**

From the given `sa_offset`, find the next `data_content4` of type `sa_what` in the file. For either a hole or ADB, this must return the `data_content4` in its entirety. For data, it must not return the actual data.

SEEK must follow the same rules for `stateids` as `READ_PLUS` ([Section 13.10.3](#)).

If the server could not find a corresponding `sa_what`, then the status would still be `NFS4_OK`, but `sr_eof` would be `TRUE`. The `sr_contents` would contain a zero-ed out content of the appropriate type.

## **14. NFSv4.2 Callback Operations**

### **14.1. Procedure 16: CB\_ATTR\_CHANGED - Notify Client that the File's Attributes Changed**

#### **14.1.1. ARGUMENTS**

```
struct CB_ATTR_CHANGED4args {
    nfs_fh4      acca_fh;
    bitmap4     acca_critical;
    bitmap4     acca_info;
};
```

#### **14.1.2. RESULTS**

```
struct CB_ATTR_CHANGED4res {
    nfsstat4     accr_status;
};
```

#### **14.1.3. DESCRIPTION**

The `CB_ATTR_CHANGED` callback operation is used by the server to indicate to the client that the file's attributes have been modified on the server. The server does not convey how the attributes have changed, just that they have been modified. The server can inform the client about both critical and informational attribute changes in the bitmask arguments. The client SHOULD query the server about all attributes set in `acca_critical`. For all changes reflected in `acca_info`, the client can decide whether or not it wants to poll the server.

The `CB_ATTR_CHANGED` callback operation with the `FATTR4_SEC_LABEL` set





in `acca_critical` is the method used by the server to indicate that the MAC label for the file referenced by `acca_fh` has changed. In many ways, the server does not care about the result returned by the client.

## **[14.2.](#) Operation 15: CB\_COPY - Report results of a server-side copy**

### **[14.2.1.](#) ARGUMENT**

```
union copy_info4 switch (nfsstat4 cca_status) {
    case NFS4_OK:
        void;
    default:
        length4          cca_bytes_copied;
};

struct CB_COPY4args {
    nfs_fh4          cca_fh;
    stateid4         cca_stateid;
    copy_info4       cca_copy_info;
};
```

### **[14.2.2.](#) RESULT**

```
struct CB_COPY4res {
    nfsstat4          ccr_status;
};
```

### **[14.2.3.](#) DESCRIPTION**

CB\_COPY is used for both intra- and inter-server asynchronous copies. The CB\_COPY callback informs the client of the result of an asynchronous server-side copy. This operation is sent by the destination server to the client in a CB\_COMPOUND request. The copy is identified by the filehandle and stateid arguments. The result is indicated by the status field. If the copy failed, `cca_bytes_copied` contains the number of bytes copied before the failure occurred. The `cca_bytes_copied` value indicates the number of bytes copied but not which specific bytes have been copied.

If the client supports the COPY operation, the client is REQUIRED to support the CB\_COPY operation.

There is a potential race between the reply to the original COPY on the forechannel and the CB\_COPY callback on the backchannel. Sections [2.10.6.3](#) and [20.9.3](#) in [2] describes how to handle this type of issue.



The CB\_COPY operation may fail for the following reasons (this is a partial list):

NFS4ERR\_NOTSUPP: The copy offload operation is not supported by the NFS client receiving this request.

## **15. IANA Considerations**

This section uses terms that are defined in [\[24\]](#).

## **16. References**

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### [Appendix A](#). Acknowledgments

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#### **Appendix B. RFC Editor Notes**

[RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publishing this document as an RFC]

[RFC Editor: prior to publishing this document as an RFC, please replace all occurrences of RFCTBD10 with RFCxxxx where xxxx is the RFC number of this document]

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