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Port Randomization in the Network Time Protocol Version 4  
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## Abstract

The Network Time Protocol can operate in several modes. Some of these modes are based on the receipt of unsolicited packets, and therefore require the use of a service/well-known port as the local port number. However, in the case of NTP modes where the use of a service/well-known port is not required, employing such well-known/service port unnecessarily increases the ability of attackers to perform blind/off-path attacks. This document formally updates [RFC5905](#), recommending the use of port randomization for those modes where use of the NTP service port is not required.

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## [1.](#) Introduction

The Network Time Protocol (NTP) is one of the oldest Internet protocols, and currently specified in [[RFC5905](#)]. Since its original implementation, standardization, and deployment, a number of vulnerabilities have been found both in the NTP specification and in some of its implementations [[NTP-VULN](#)]. Some of these vulnerabilities allow for off-path/blind attacks, where an attacker can send forged packets to one or both NTP peers for achieving Denial of Service (DoS), time-shifts, or other undesirable outcomes. Many of these attacks require the attacker to guess or know at least a target NTP association, typically identified by the tuple {srcaddr, srcport, dstaddr, dstport, keyid}. Some of these parameters may be easily known or guessed.

NTP can operate in several modes. Some of these modes rely on the

ability of nodes to receive unsolicited packets, and therefore require the use of a service/well-known port number (123). However, for modes where the use of a service/well-known port is not required, employing the well-known/service port improves the ability of an attacker to perform blind/off-path attacks (since knowledge of the

port numbers is typically required for such attacks). A recent study [[NIST-NTP](#)] that analyzes the port numbers employed by NTP clients suggests that a considerable number of NTP clients employ the NTP service/well-known port as their local port, or select predictable ephemeral port numbers, thus improving the ability of attackers to perform blind/off-path attacks against NTP.

[BCP 156](#) [[RFC6056](#)] already recommends the randomization of transport-protocol ephemeral ports. This document aligns NTP with the recommendation in [BCP 156](#) [[RFC6056](#)], by formally updating [[RFC5905](#)] such that port randomization is employed for those NTP modes for which the use of the NTP service port is not needed.

## [2.](#) Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

## [3.](#) Considerations About Port Randomization in NTP

The following subsections analyze a number of considerations about transport-protocol port randomization when applied to NTP.

### [3.1.](#) Mitigation Against Off-path Attacks

There has been a fair share of work in the area of off-path/blind attacks against transport protocols and upper-layer protocols, such as [[RFC5927](#)] and [[RFC4953](#)]. Whether the target of the attack is a transport protocol instance (e.g., TCP connection) or an upper-layer protocol instance (e.g., an application protocol instance), the attacker is required to know or guess the five-tuple {Protocol, IP Source Address, IP Destination Address, Source Port, Destination Port} that identifies the target transport protocol instance or the transport protocol instance employed by the target upper-layer protocol instance. Therefore, increasing the difficulty of guessing

this five-tuple helps mitigate blind/off-path attacks.

As a result of this considerations, [BCP 156 \[RFC6056\]](#) recommends the randomization of transport-protocol ephemeral ports. Thus, this document aims to bring the NTP specification [[RFC5905](#)] in line with the aforementioned recommendation.

We note that the use of port randomization is a transport-layer mitigation against off-path/blind attacks, and does not preclude (nor is it precluded by) other possible mitigations for off-path attacks that might be implemented by an application protocol (e.g. [[I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization](#)]). For instance, some of the

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aforementioned mitigations may be ineffective against some off-path attacks [[NTP-FRAG](#)] or may benefit from the additional entropy provided by port randomization [[NTP-security](#)].

### [3.2.](#) Effects on Path Selection

Intermediate systems implementing the Equal-Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) algorithm may select the outgoing link by computing a hash over a number of values, that include the transport-protocol source port. Thus, as discussed in [[NTP-CHLNG](#)], the selected client port may have an influence on the measured offset and delay.

If the source port is changed with each request, packets in different exchanges will be more likely to take different paths, which could cause the measurements to be less stable and have a negative impact on the stability of the clock.

Network paths to/from a given server are less likely to change between requests if port randomization is applied on a per-association basis. This approach minimizes the impact on the stability of NTP measurements, but may cause different clients in the same network synchronized to the same NTP server to have a significant stable offset between their clocks due to their NTP exchanges consistently taking different paths with different asymmetry in the network delay.

[Section 4](#) recommends NTP implementations to randomize the ephemeral port number of client/server associations. The choice of whether to randomize the port number on a per-association or a per-request basis

is left to the implementation.

### [3.3.](#) Filtering of NTP traffic

In a number of scenarios (such as when mitigating DDoS attacks), a network operator may want to differentiate between NTP requests sent by clients, and NTP responses sent by NTP servers. If an implementation employs the NTP service port for the client port number, requests/responses cannot be readily differentiated by inspecting the source and destination port numbers. Implementation of port randomization for non-symmetrical modes allows for simple differentiation of NTP requests and responses, and for the enforcement of security policies that may be valuable for the mitigation of DDoS attacks, when all NTP clients in a given network employ port randomization.

### [3.4.](#) Effect on NAT devices

Some NAT devices will not translate the source port of a packet when a privileged port number is employed. In networks where such NAT devices are employed, use of the NTP service port for the client port will essentially limit the number of hosts that may successfully employ NTP client implementations.

In the case of NAT devices that will translate the source port even when a privileged port is employed, packets reaching the external realm of the NAT will not employ the NTP service port as the local port, since the local port will normally be translated by the NAT device possibly, but not necessarily, with a random port.

### [3.5.](#) Relation to Other Mitigations for Off-Path Attacks

Ephemeral Port Randomization is a best current practice ([BCP 156](#)) that helps mitigate off-path attacks at the transport-layer. It is orthogonal to other possible mitigations for off-path attacks that may be implemented at other layers (such as the use of timestamps in NTP) which may or may not be effective against some off-path attacks (see e.g. [\[NTP-FRAG\]](#)). This document aligns NTP with the existing

best current practice on ephemeral port selection, irrespective of other techniques that may (and should) be implemented for mitigating off-path attacks.

#### 4. Update to [RFC5905](#)

The following text from [Section 9.1](#) ("Peer Process Variables") of [\[RFC5905\]](#):

dstport: UDP port number of the client, ordinarily the NTP port number PORT (123) assigned by the IANA. This becomes the source port number in packets sent from this association.

is replaced with:

dstport: UDP port number of the client. In the case of broadcast server mode (5) and symmetric modes (1 and 2), it SHOULD contain the NTP port number PORT (123) assigned by the IANA. In the client mode (3), it SHOULD contain a randomized port number, as specified in [\[RFC6056\]](#). The value in this variable becomes the source port number of packets sent from this association. The randomized port number SHOULD NOT be shared with other associations.

If a client implementation performs port randomization on a per-request basis, it SHOULD close the corresponding socket/port after

each request/response exchange. In order to prevent duplicate or delayed server packets from eliciting ICMP port unreachable error messages at the client, the client MAY wait for more responses from the server for a specific period of time (e.g. 3 seconds) before closing the UDP socket/port.

#### NOTES:

The choice of whether to randomize the port number on a per-request or a per-association basis is left to the implementation, and should consider, among others, the considerations discussed in [Section 3.2](#).

On most current operating systems, which implement ephemeral

port randomization [[RFC6056](#)], an NTP client may normally rely on the operating system to perform port randomization. For example, NTP implementations using POSIX sockets may achieve port randomization by *not* binding the socket with the `bind()` function, or binding it to port 0, which has a special meaning of "any port". `connect()`ing the socket will make the port inaccessible by other systems (that is, only packets from the specified remote socket will be received by the application).

## 5. Implementation Status

[RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication of this document as an RFC.]

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [[RFC7942](#)]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

### OpenNTPD:

[[OpenNTPD](#)] has never explicitly set the local port of NTP clients, and thus employs the ephemeral port selection algorithm implemented by the operating system. Thus, on all operating systems that implement port randomization (such as current

versions of OpenBSD, Linux, and FreeBSD), OpenNTPD will employ port randomization for client ports.

### chrony:

[[chrony](#)] by default does not set the local client port, and thus employs the ephemeral port selection algorithm implemented by the operating system. Thus, on all operating systems that implement port randomization (such as current versions of OpenBSD, Linux,

and FreeBSD), chrony will employ port randomization for client ports.

nwttime.org's sntp client:

sntp does not explicitly set the local port, and thus employs the ephemeral port selection algorithm implemented by the operating system. Thus, on all operating systems that implement port randomization (such as current versions of OpenBSD, Linux, and FreeBSD), it will employ port randomization for client ports.

## 6. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA registries within this document. The RFC-Editor can remove this section before publication of this document as an RFC.

## 7. Security Considerations

The security implications of predictable numeric identifiers [[I-D.irtf-pearg-numeric-ids-generation](#)] (and of predictable transport-protocol port numbers [[RFC6056](#)] in particular) have been known for a long time now. However, the NTP specification has traditionally followed a pattern of employing common settings and code even when not strictly necessary, which at times has resulted in negative security and privacy implications (see e.g. [[I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization](#)]). The use of the NTP service port (123) for the srcport and dstport variables is not required for all operating modes, and such unnecessary usage comes at the expense of reducing the amount of work required for an attacker to successfully perform off-path/blind attacks against NTP. Therefore, this document formally updates [[RFC5905](#)], recommending the use of transport-protocol port randomization when use of the NTP service port is not required.

This issue has been tracked by US-CERT with VU#597821, and has been assigned CVE-2019-11331.

## 8. Acknowledgments



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Watson Ladd raised the problem of DDoS mitigation when the NTP service port is employed as the client port (discussed in [Section 3.3](#) of this document).

The authors would like to thank Harlan Stenn for answering questions about nwttime.org's NTP implementation.

Fernando would like to thank Nelida Garcia and Jorge Oscar Gont, for their love and support.

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