

Workgroup: Web Authorization Protocol
Internet-Draft: draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-12
Published: 29 December 2022
Intended Status: Standards Track
Expires: 2 July 2023

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OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer (DPOP)

Abstract

This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0 tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level. This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access and refresh tokens.

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Table of Contents

- [1. Introduction](#)
- [1.1. Conventions and Terminology](#)
- [2. Objectives](#)
- [3. Concept](#)
- [4. DPoP Proof JWTs](#)
 - [4.1. The DPoP HTTP Header](#)
 - [4.2. DPoP Proof JWT Syntax](#)
 - [4.3. Checking DPoP Proofs](#)
- [5. DPoP Access Token Request](#)
 - [5.1. Authorization Server Metadata](#)
 - [5.2. Client Registration Metadata](#)
- [6. Public Key Confirmation](#)
 - [6.1. JWK Thumbprint Confirmation Method](#)
 - [6.2. JWK Thumbprint Confirmation Method in Token Introspection](#)
- [7. Protected Resource Access](#)
 - [7.1. The DPoP Authentication Scheme](#)
 - [7.2. Compatibility with the Bearer Authentication Scheme](#)
 - [7.3. Client Considerations](#)
- [8. Authorization Server-Provided Nonce](#)
 - [8.1. Providing a New Nonce Value](#)
- [9. Resource Server-Provided Nonce](#)
- [10. Authorization Code Binding to DPoP Key](#)
 - [10.1. DPoP with Pushed Authorization Requests](#)
- [11. Security Considerations](#)
 - [11.1. DPoP Proof Replay](#)
 - [11.2. DPoP Proof Pre-Generation](#)
 - [11.3. DPoP Nonce Downgrade](#)
 - [11.4. Untrusted Code in the Client Context](#)
 - [11.5. Signed JWT Swapping](#)
 - [11.6. Signature Algorithms](#)
 - [11.7. Request Integrity](#)
 - [11.8. Access Token and Public Key Binding](#)
 - [11.9. Authorization Code and Public Key Binding](#)
 - [11.10. Hash Algorithm Agility](#)
- [12. IANA Considerations](#)
 - [12.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration](#)
 - [12.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration](#)
 - [12.3. OAuth Parameters Registration](#)
 - [12.4. HTTP Authentication Scheme Registration](#)
 - [12.5. Media Type Registration](#)
 - [12.6. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration](#)
 - [12.7. JSON Web Token Claims Registration](#)
 - [12.7.1. "nonce" Registry Update](#)
 - [12.8. HTTP Message Header Field Names Registration](#)
 - [12.9. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration](#)
 - [12.10. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata](#)
- [13. Normative References](#)
- [14. Informative References](#)
- [Appendix A. Acknowledgements](#)
- [Appendix B. Document History](#)
- [Authors' Addresses](#)

1. Introduction

DPoP (for Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer) is an application-level mechanism for sender-constraining

OAuth access and refresh tokens. It enables a client to prove the possession of a public/private key pair by including a DPoP header in an HTTP request. The value of the header is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] that enables the authorization server to bind issued tokens to the public part of a client's key pair. Recipients of such tokens are then able to verify the binding of the token to the key pair that the client has demonstrated that it holds via the DPoP header, thereby providing some assurance that the client presenting the token also possesses the private key. In other words, the legitimate presenter of the token is constrained to be the sender that holds and can prove possession of the private part of the key pair.

The mechanism described herein can be used in cases where other methods of sender-constraining tokens that utilize elements of the underlying secure transport layer, such as [RFC8705] or [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding], are not available or desirable. For example, due to a sub-par user experience of TLS client authentication in user agents and a lack of support for HTTP token binding, neither mechanism can be used if an OAuth client is a Single Page Application (SPA) running in a web browser. Native applications installed and run on a user's device are another example well positioned to benefit from DPoP-bound tokens to guard against misuse of tokens by a compromised or malicious resource. Such applications often have dedicated protected storage for cryptographic keys.

DPoP can be used to sender-constrain access tokens regardless of the client authentication method employed, but DPoP itself is not used for client authentication. DPoP can also be used to sender-constrain refresh tokens issued to public clients (those without authentication credentials associated with the `client_id`).

1.1. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [RFC5234].

This specification uses the terms "access token", "refresh token", "authorization server", "resource server", "authorization endpoint", "authorization request", "authorization response", "token endpoint", "grant type", "access token request", "access token response", "client", "public client", and "confidential client" defined by The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749].

The terms "request", "response", "header field", and "target URI" are imported from [RFC9110].

The terms "JOSE" and "JOSE header" are imported from [RFC7515].

2. Objectives

The primary aim of DPoP is to prevent unauthorized or illegitimate parties from using leaked or stolen access tokens, by binding a token to a public key upon issuance and requiring that the client proves possession of the corresponding private key when using the token. This constrains the legitimate sender of the token to only the party with access to the private key and gives the server receiving the token added assurances that the sender is legitimately authorized to use it.

Access tokens that are sender-constrained via DPoP thus stand in contrast to the typical bearer token, which can be used by any party in possession of such a token. Although protections generally exist to prevent unintended disclosure of bearer tokens, unforeseen vectors for leakage have occurred due to vulnerabilities and implementation issues in other layers in the protocol or software stack (CRIME [[CRIME](#)], BREACH [[BREACH](#)], Heartbleed [[Heartbleed](#)], and the Cloudflare parser bug [[Cloudbleed](#)] are some examples). There have also been numerous published token theft attacks on OAuth implementations themselves ([[GitHub.Tokens](#)] as just one high profile example). DPoP provides a general defense in depth against the impact of unanticipated token leakage. DPoP is not, however, a substitute for a secure transport and MUST always be used in conjunction with HTTPS.

The very nature of the typical OAuth protocol interaction necessitates that the client discloses the access token to the protected resources that it accesses. The attacker model in [[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics](#)] describes cases where a protected resource might be counterfeit, malicious or compromised and plays received tokens against other protected resources to gain unauthorized access. Properly audience restricting access tokens can prevent such misuse, however, doing so in practice has proven to be prohibitively cumbersome for many deployments (even despite extensions such as [[RFC8707](#)]). Sender-constraining access tokens is a more robust and straightforward mechanism to prevent such token replay at a different endpoint and DPoP is an accessible application layer means of doing so.

Due to the potential for cross-site scripting (XSS), browser-based OAuth clients bring to bear added considerations with respect to protecting tokens. The most straightforward XSS-based attack is for an attacker to exfiltrate a token and use it themselves completely independent of the legitimate client. A stolen access token is used for protected resource access and a stolen refresh token is used for obtaining new access tokens. If the private key is non-extractable (as is possible with [[W3C.WebCryptoAPI](#)]), DPoP renders exfiltrated tokens alone unusable.

XSS vulnerabilities also allow an attacker to execute code in the context of the browser-based client application and maliciously use a token indirectly through the client. That execution context has access to utilize the signing key and thus can produce DPoP proofs to use in conjunction with the token. At this application layer there is most likely no feasible defense against this threat except generally preventing XSS, therefore it is considered out of scope for DPoP.

Malicious XSS code executed in the context of the browser-based client application is also in a position to create DPoP proofs with timestamp values in the future and exfiltrate them in conjunction with a token. These stolen artifacts can later be used together independent of the client application to access protected resources. To prevent this, servers can optionally require clients to include a server-chosen value into the proof that cannot be predicted by an attacker (nonce). In the absence of the optional nonce, the impact of pre-computed DPoP proofs is limited somewhat by the proof being bound to an access token on protected resource access. Because a proof covering an access token that does not yet exist cannot feasibly be created, access tokens obtained with an exfiltrated refresh token and pre-computed proofs will be unusable.

Additional security considerations are discussed in [Section 11](#).

3. Concept

The main data structure introduced by this specification is a DPoP proof JWT, described in detail below, which is sent as a header in an HTTP request. A client uses a DPoP proof JWT to prove the possession of a private key corresponding to a certain public key.

Roughly speaking, a DPoP proof is a signature over some data of the HTTP request to which it is attached, a timestamp, a unique identifier, an optional server-provided nonce, and a hash of the associated access token when an access token is present within the request.




Figure 1: Basic DPoP Flow

The basic steps of an OAuth flow with DPoP (without the optional nonce) are shown in [Figure 1](#):

- * (A) In the Token Request, the client sends an authorization grant (e.g., an authorization code, refresh token, etc.) to the authorization server in order to obtain an access token (and potentially a refresh token). The client attaches a DPoP proof to the request in an HTTP header.
- * (B) The authorization server binds (sender-constrains) the access token to the public key claimed by the client in the DPoP proof;

that is, the access token cannot be used without proving possession of the respective private key. If a refresh token is issued to a public client, it too is bound to the public key of the DPoP proof.

*(C) To use the access token, the client has to prove possession of the private key by, again, adding a header to the request that carries a DPoP proof for that request. The resource server needs to receive information about the public key to which the access token is bound. This information may be encoded directly into the access token (for JWT structured access tokens) or provided via token introspection endpoint (not shown). The resource server verifies that the public key to which the access token is bound matches the public key of the DPoP proof. It also verifies that the access token hash in the DPoP proof matches the access token presented in the request.

*(D) The resource server refuses to serve the request if the signature check fails or the data in the DPoP proof is wrong, e.g., the target URI does not match the URI claim in the DPoP proof JWT. The access token itself, of course, must also be valid in all other respects.

The DPoP mechanism presented herein is not a client authentication method. In fact, a primary use case of DPoP is for public clients (e.g., single page applications and native applications) that do not use client authentication. Nonetheless, DPoP is designed such that it is compatible with `private_key_jwt` and all other client authentication methods.

DPoP does not directly ensure message integrity but relies on the TLS layer for that purpose. See [Section 11](#) for details.

4. DPoP Proof JWTs

DPoP introduces the concept of a DPoP proof, which is a JWT created by the client and sent with an HTTP request using the DPoP header field. Each HTTP request requires a unique DPoP proof.

A valid DPoP proof demonstrates to the server that the client holds the private key that was used to sign the DPoP proof JWT. This enables authorization servers to bind issued tokens to the corresponding public key (as described in [Section 5](#)) and for resource servers to verify the key-binding of tokens that it receives (see [Section 7.1](#)), which prevents said tokens from being used by any entity that does not have access to the private key.

The DPoP proof demonstrates possession of a key and, by itself, is not an authentication or access control mechanism. When presented in conjunction with a key-bound access token as described in [Section 7.1](#), the DPoP proof provides additional assurance about the legitimacy of the client to present the access token. However, a valid DPoP proof JWT is not sufficient alone to make access control decisions.

4.1. The DPoP HTTP Header

A DPoP proof is included in an HTTP request using the following request header field.

DPoP A JWT that adheres to the structure and syntax of [Section 4.2](#).

[Figure 2](#) shows an example DPoP HTTP header field (line breaks and extra whitespace for display purposes only).

```
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIiImFsZyI6IktVMjU2IiwiaWVudCI6IjE6IiwiaWF0Ij0iOjE2fQ.2-GxA6T8lP4vfrg8v-FdWP0A0zdrj8igiMLvqRMUvwnQg4PtFLbdLXi0SsX0x7NVY-FNyJK70nfbv37xRZT3Lg
```

Figure 2: Example DPoP header

Note that per [\[RFC9110\]](#) header field names are case-insensitive; so DPoP, DPOP, dpop, etc., are all valid and equivalent header field names. Case is significant in the header field value, however.

4.2. DPoP Proof JWT Syntax

A DPoP proof is a JWT ([\[RFC7519\]](#)) that is signed (using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [\[RFC7515\]](#)) with a private key chosen by the client (see below). The JOSE header of a DPoP JWT MUST contain at least the following parameters:

- *typ: with value dpop+jwt, which explicitly types the DPoP proof JWT as recommended in [Section 3.11](#) of [\[RFC8725\]](#).
- *alg: an identifier for a JWS asymmetric digital signature algorithm from [\[IANA.JOSE.ALGS\]](#). MUST NOT be none or an identifier for a symmetric algorithm (MAC).
- *jwk: representing the public key chosen by the client, in JSON Web Key (JWK) [\[RFC7517\]](#) format, as defined in [Section 4.1.3](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#). MUST NOT contain a private key.

The payload of a DPoP proof MUST contain at least the following claims:

- *jti: Unique identifier for the DPoP proof JWT. The value MUST be assigned such that there is a negligible probability that the same value will be assigned to any other DPoP proof used in the same context during the time window of validity. Such uniqueness can be accomplished by encoding (base64url or any other suitable encoding) at least 96 bits of pseudorandom data or by using a version 4 UUID string according to [\[RFC4122\]](#). The jti can be used by the server for replay detection and prevention, see [Section 11.1](#).
- *htm: The value of the HTTP method ([Section 9.1](#) of [\[RFC9110\]](#)) of the request to which the JWT is attached.
- *htu: The HTTP target URI ([Section 7.1](#) of [\[RFC9110\]](#)), without query and fragment parts, of the request to which the JWT is attached.
- *iat: Creation timestamp of the JWT ([Section 4.1.6](#) of [\[RFC7519\]](#)).

When the DPoP proof is used in conjunction with the presentation of an access token in protected resource access, see [Section 7](#), the DPoP proof MUST also contain the following claim:

*ath: hash of the access token. The value MUST be the result of a base64url encoding (as defined in [Section 2](#) of [[RFC7515](#)]) the SHA-256 [[SHS](#)] hash of the ASCII encoding of the associated access token's value.

When the authentication server or resource server provides a DPoP-Nonce HTTP header in a response (see [Section 8](#), [Section 9](#)), the DPoP proof MUST also contain the following claim:

*nonce: A recent nonce provided via the DPoP-Nonce HTTP header.

A DPoP proof MAY contain other JOSE header parameters or claims as defined by extension, profile, or deployment specific requirements.

[Figure 3](#) is a conceptual example showing the decoded content of the DPoP proof in [Figure 2](#). The JSON of the JWT header and payload are shown, but the signature part is omitted. As usual, line breaks and extra whitespace are included for formatting and readability.

```
{
  "typ": "dpop+jwt",
  "alg": "ES256",
  "jwk": {
    "kty": "EC",
    "x": "l8tFrhx-34tV3hRICRDY9zCkDlpBhF42UQUfWVAWBFs",
    "y": "9VE4jf_ok_o64zbTTlcuNJajHmt6v9TDVrU0CdvGRDA",
    "crv": "P-256"
  }
}
.
{
  "jti": "-BwC3ESc6acc2lTc",
  "htm": "POST",
  "htu": "https://server.example.com/token",
  "iat": 1562262616
}
```

Figure 3: Example JWT content of a DPoP proof

Of the HTTP request, only the HTTP method and URI are included in the DPoP JWT, and therefore only these two message parts are covered by the DPoP proof. The idea is sign just enough of the HTTP data to provide reasonable proof-of-possession with respect to the HTTP request. This design approach of using only a minimal subset of the HTTP header data is to avoid the substantial difficulties inherent in attempting to normalize HTTP messages. Nonetheless, DPoP proofs can be extended to contain other information of the HTTP request (see also [Section 11.7](#)).

4.3. Checking DPoP Proofs

To validate a DPoP proof, the receiving server MUST ensure that

- *that there is not more than one DPoP HTTP request header field,
- *the DPoP HTTP request header field value is a well-formed JWT,
- *all required claims per [Section 4.2](#) are contained in the JWT,
- *the typ JOSE header parameter has the value dpop+jwt,
- *the alg JOSE header parameter indicates a registered asymmetric digital signature algorithm [[IANA.JOSE.ALGS](#)], is not none, is supported by the application, and is acceptable per local policy,
- *the JWT signature verifies with the public key contained in the jwk JOSE header parameter,
- *the jwk JOSE header parameter does not contain a private key,
- *the htm claim matches the HTTP method of the current request,
- *the htu claim matches the HTTPS URI value for the HTTP request in which the JWT was received, ignoring any query and fragment parts,
- *if the server provided a nonce value to the client, the nonce claim matches the server-provided nonce value,
- *the creation time of the JWT, as determined by either the iat claim or a server managed timestamp via the nonce claim, is within an acceptable window (see [Section 11.1](#)),
- *if presented to a protected resource in conjunction with an access token,

- ensure that the value of the ath claim equals the hash of that access token,
- confirm that the public key to which the access token is bound matches the public key from the DPoP proof.

To reduce the likelihood of false negatives, servers SHOULD employ Syntax-Based Normalization ([Section 6.2.2](#) of [[RFC3986](#)]) and Scheme-Based Normalization ([Section 6.2.3](#) of [[RFC3986](#)]) before comparing the htu claim.

5. DPoP Access Token Request

To request an access token that is bound to a public key using DPoP, the client MUST provide a valid DPoP proof JWT in a DPoP header when making an access token request to the authorization server's token endpoint. This is applicable for all access token requests regardless of grant type (including, for example, the common authorization_code and refresh_token grant types but also extension grants such as the JWT authorization grant [[RFC7523](#)]). The HTTP request shown in [Figure 4](#) illustrates such an access token request using an authorization code grant with a DPoP proof JWT in the DPoP header (extra line breaks and whitespace for display purposes only).

5.1. Authorization Server Metadata

This document introduces the following authorization server metadata [[RFC8414](#)] parameter to signal support for DPoP in general and the specific JWS alg values the authorization server supports for DPoP proof JWTs.

dpop_signing_alg_values_supported A JSON array containing a list of the JWS alg values (from the [[IANA.JOSE.ALGS](#)] registry) supported by the authorization server for DPoP proof JWTs.

5.2. Client Registration Metadata

The Dynamic Client Registration Protocol [[RFC7591](#)] defines an API for dynamically registering OAuth 2.0 client metadata with authorization servers. The metadata defined by [[RFC7591](#)], and registered extensions to it, also imply a general data model for clients that is useful for authorization server implementations even when the Dynamic Client Registration Protocol isn't in play. Such implementations will typically have some sort of user interface available for managing client configuration.

This document introduces the following client registration metadata [[RFC7591](#)] parameter to indicate that the client always uses DPoP when requesting tokens from the authorization server.

dpop_bound_access_tokens Boolean value specifying whether the client always uses DPoP for token requests. If omitted, the default value is false.

If true, the authorization server MUST reject token requests from this client that do not contain the DPoP header.

6. Public Key Confirmation

Resource servers MUST be able to reliably identify whether an access token is DPoP-bound and ascertain sufficient information to verify the binding to the public key of the DPoP proof (see [Section 7.1](#)). Such a binding is accomplished by associating the public key with the token in a way that can be accessed by the protected resource, such as embedding the JWK hash in the issued access token directly, using the syntax described in [Section 6.1](#), or through token introspection as described in [Section 6.2](#). Other methods of associating a public key with an access token are possible, per agreement by the authorization server and the protected resource, but are beyond the scope of this specification.

Resource servers supporting DPoP MUST ensure that the public key from the DPoP proof matches the one bound to the access token.

6.1. JWK Thumbprint Confirmation Method

When access tokens are represented as JSON Web Tokens (JWT) [[RFC7519](#)], the public key information is represented using the jkt confirmation method member defined herein. To convey the hash of a public key in a JWT, this specification introduces the following JWT Confirmation Method [[RFC7800](#)] member for use under the cnf claim.

The example introspection request in [Figure 9](#) and corresponding response in [Figure 10](#) illustrate an introspection exchange for the example DPoP-bound access token that was issued in [Figure 5](#).

```
POST /as/introspect.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic cnM6cnM6TWt1LTZnX2xDektJZH0ZnNON2tZY3lhK1Rp

token=Kz~8mXK1EalYznwH-LC-1fBAo.4Ljp~zsPE_Ne0.gxU
```

Figure 9: Example Introspection Request

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "active": true,
  "sub": "someone@example.com",
  "iss": "https://server.example.com",
  "nbf": 1562262611,
  "exp": 1562266216,
  "cnf":
  {
    "jkt": "0ZcOCORZNYy-DWpqq30jZyJGHTN0d2Hg1BV3uiguA4I"
  }
}
```

Figure 10: Example Introspection Response for a DPoP-Bound Access Token

7. Protected Resource Access

Protected resource requests with a DPoP-bound access token MUST include both a DPoP proof as per [Section 4](#) and the access token as described in [Section 7.1](#). The DPoP proof MUST include the ath claim with a valid hash of the associated access token.

Binding the token value to the proof in this way prevents a proof to be used with multiple different access token values across different requests. For example, if a client holds tokens bound to two different resource owners, AT1 and AT2, and uses the same key when talking to the AS, it's possible that these tokens could be swapped. Without the ath field to bind it, a captured signature applied to AT1 could be replayed with AT2 instead, changing the rights and access of the intended request. This same substitution prevention remains for rotated access tokens within the same combination of client and resource owner -- a rotated token value would require the calculation of a new proof. This binding additionally ensures that a proof intended for use with the access token is not usable without an access token, or vice-versa.

The resource server is required to calculate the hash of the token value presented and verify that it is the same as the hash value in the ath field as described in [Section 4.3](#). Since the ath field value is covered by the DPoP proof's signature, its inclusion binds the


```

{
  "typ": "dpop+jwt",
  "alg": "ES256",
  "jwk": {
    "kty": "EC",
    "x": "18tFrhx-34tV3hRICRDY9zCkDlpBhF42UQUfWVAWBFs",
    "y": "9VE4jf_0k_o64zbTTlCuNJajHmt6v9TDVrU0CdvGRDA",
    "crv": "P-256"
  }
}
.
{
  "jti": "e1j3V_bKic8-LAEB",
  "htm": "GET",
  "htu": "https://resource.example.org/protectedresource",
  "iat": 1562262618,
  "ath": "fUHy02r2Z3DZ53EsNrWBb0xWXoaNy59IiKCAqksmQEo"
}

```

Figure 13: Decoded Content of the DPoP Proof JWT in [Figure 12]

Upon receipt of a request to a protected resource within the protection space requiring DPoP authentication, if the request does not include valid credentials or does not contain an access token sufficient for access, the server can respond with a challenge to the client to provide DPoP authentication information. Such a challenge is made using the 401 (Unauthorized) response status code ([RFC9110], Section 15.5.2) and the WWW-Authenticate header field ([RFC9110], Section 11.6.1). The server MAY include the WWW-Authenticate header in response to other conditions as well.

In such challenges:

- *The scheme name is DPoP.
- *The authentication parameter realm MAY be included to indicate the scope of protection in the manner described in [RFC9110], Section 11.5.
- *A scope authentication parameter MAY be included as defined in [RFC6750], Section 3.
- *An error parameter ([RFC6750], Section 3) SHOULD be included to indicate the reason why the request was declined, if the request included an access token but failed authentication. The error parameter values described in Section 3.1 of [RFC6750] are suitable as are any appropriate values defined by extension. The value use_dpop_nonce can be used as described in Section 9 to signal that a nonce is needed in the DPoP proof of subsequent request(s). And invalid_dpop_proof is used to indicate that the DPoP proof itself was deemed invalid based on the criteria of Section 4.3.
- *An error_description parameter ([RFC6750], Section 3) MAY be included along with the error parameter to provide developers a human-readable explanation that is not meant to be displayed to end-users.
- *An alg parameter SHOULD be included to signal to the client the JWS algorithms that are acceptable for the DPoP proof JWT. The value of the parameter is a space-delimited list of JWS alg (Algorithm) header values ([RFC7515], Section 4.1.1).

*Additional authentication parameters MAY be used and unknown parameters MUST be ignored by recipients.

For example, in response to a protected resource request without authentication:

```
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: DPoP algs="ES256 PS256"
```

Figure 14: HTTP 401 Response to a Protected Resource Request without Authentication

And in response to a protected resource request that was rejected because the confirmation of the DPoP binding in the access token failed:

```
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: DPoP error="invalid_token",
  error_description="Invalid DPoP key binding", algs="ES256"
```

Figure 15: HTTP 401 Response to a Protected Resource Request with an Invalid Token

Note that browser-based client applications using CORS [[WHATWG.Fetch](#)] only have access to CORS-safelisted response HTTP headers by default. In order for the application to obtain and use the WWW-Authenticate HTTP response header value, the server needs to make it available to the application by including WWW-Authenticate in the Access-Control-Expose-Headers response header list value.

This authentication scheme is for origin-server authentication only. Therefore, this authentication scheme MUST NOT be used with the Proxy-Authenticate or Proxy-Authorization header fields.

Note that the syntax of the Authorization header field for this authentication scheme follows the usage of the Bearer scheme defined in Section 2.1 of [[RFC6750](#)]. While not the preferred credential syntax of [[RFC9110](#)], it is compatible with the general authentication framework therein and was used for consistency and familiarity with the Bearer scheme.

7.2. Compatibility with the Bearer Authentication Scheme

Protected resources simultaneously supporting both the DPoP and Bearer schemes need to update how evaluation of bearer tokens is performed to prevent downgraded usage of a DPoP-bound access token. Specifically, such a protected resource MUST reject a DPoP-bound access token received as a bearer token per [[RFC6750](#)].

Section 11.6.1 of [[RFC9110](#)] allows a protected resource to indicate support for multiple authentication schemes (i.e., Bearer and DPoP) with the WWW-Authenticate header field of a 401 (Unauthorized) response.

A protected resource that supports only [[RFC6750](#)] and is unaware of DPoP would most presumably accept a DPoP-bound access token as a

bearer token (JWT [RFC7519] says to ignore unrecognized claims, Introspection [RFC7662] says that other parameters might be present while placing no functional requirements on their presence, and [RFC6750] is effectively silent on the content of the access token as it relates to validity). As such, a client can send a DPoP-bound access token using the Bearer scheme upon receipt of a WWW-Authenticate: Bearer challenge from a protected resource (or if it has prior such knowledge about the capabilities of the protected resource). The effect of this likely simplifies the logistics of phased upgrades to protected resources in their support DPoP or even prolonged deployments of protected resources with mixed token type support.

If a protected resource supporting both Bearer and DPoP schemes elects to respond with multiple WWW-Authenticate challenges, attention should be paid to which challenge(s) should deliver the actual error information. It is RECOMMENDED that the following rules be adhered to:

- *If no authentication information has been included with the request, then the challenges SHOULD NOT include an error code or other error information, as per [RFC6750], Section 3.1 (Figure 16).
- *If the mechanism used to attempt authentication could be established unambiguously, then the corresponding challenge SHOULD be used to deliver error information (Figure 17).
- *Otherwise, both Bearer and DPoP challenged MAY be used to deliver error information (Figure 18).

```
GET /protectedresource HTTP/1.1
Host: resource.example.org

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer, DPoP algs="ES256 PS256"
```

Figure 16: HTTP 401 Response to a Protected Resource Request without Authentication

```
GET /protectedresource HTTP/1.1
Host: resource.example.org
Authorization: Bearer INVALID_TOKEN

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="invalid_token",
  error_description="Invalid token", DPoP algs="ES256 PS256"
```

Figure 17: HTTP 401 Response to a Protected Resource Request with Invalid Authentication

```
GET /protectedresource HTTP/1.1
Host: resource.example.org
Authorization: Bearer Kz~8mXK1EalYznwH-LC-1fBAo.4Ljp~zsPE_NeO.gxU
Authorization: DPoP Kz~8mXK1EalYznwH-LC-1fBAo.4Ljp~zsPE_NeO.gxU
```

```
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="invalid_request",
  error_description="Multiple methods used to include access token",
  DPoP algs="ES256 PS256", error="invalid_request",
  error_description="Multiple methods used to include access token"
```

Figure 18: HTTP 400 Response to a Protected Resource Request with Ambiguous Authentication

7.3. Client Considerations

Authorization including a DPoP proof may not be idempotent (depending on server enforcement of `jti`, `iat` and `nonce` claims). Consequently, all previously idempotent requests for protected resources that were previously idempotent may no longer be idempotent. It is RECOMMENDED that clients generate a unique DPoP proof even when retrying idempotent requests in response to HTTP errors generally understood as transient.

Clients that encounter frequent network errors may experience additional challenges when interacting with servers with more strict nonce validation implementations.

8. Authorization Server-Provided Nonce

This section specifies a mechanism using opaque nonces provided by the server that can be used to limit the lifetime of DPoP proofs. Without employing such a mechanism, a malicious party controlling the client (including potentially the end-user) can create DPoP proofs for use arbitrarily far in the future.

Including a nonce value contributed by the authorization server in the DPoP proof MAY be used by authorization servers to limit the lifetime of DPoP proofs. The server determines when and if to issue a new DPoP nonce challenge thereby requiring the use of the nonce value in subsequent DPoP proofs. The logic through which the server makes that determination is out of scope of this document.

An authorization server MAY supply a nonce value to be included by the client in DPoP proofs sent. In this case, the authorization server responds to requests not including a nonce with an HTTP 400 (Bad Request) error response per Section 5.2 of [RFC6749] using `use_dpop_nonce` as the error code value. The authorization server includes a DPoP-Nonce HTTP header in the response supplying a nonce value to be used when sending the subsequent request. This same error code is used when supplying a new nonce value when there was a nonce mismatch. The client will typically retry the request with the new nonce value supplied upon receiving a `use_dpop_nonce` error with an accompanying nonce value.

For example, in response to a token request without a nonce when the authorization server requires one, the authorization server can

respond with a DPoP-Nonce value such as the following to provide a nonce value to include in the DPoP proof:

```
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
DPoP-Nonce: eyJ7S_zG.eyJH0-Z.HX4w-7v
```

```
{
  "error": "use_dpop_nonce"
  "error_description":
    "Authorization server requires nonce in DPoP proof"
}
```

Figure 19: HTTP 400 Response to a Token Request without a Nonce

Other HTTP headers and JSON fields MAY also be included in the error response, but there MUST NOT be more than one DPoP-Nonce header.

Upon receiving the nonce, the client is expected to retry its token request using a DPoP proof including the supplied nonce value in the nonce claim of the DPoP proof. An example unencoded JWT Payload of such a DPoP proof including a nonce is:

```
{
  "jti": "-BwC3ESc6acc2lTc",
  "htm": "POST",
  "htu": "https://server.example.com/token",
  "iat": 1562262616,
  "nonce": "eyJ7S_zG.eyJH0-Z.HX4w-7v"
}
```

Figure 20: DPoP Proof Payload Including a Nonce Value

The nonce syntax in ABNF as used by [\[RFC6749\]](#) (which is the same as the scope-token syntax) is:

```
nonce = 1*NQCHAR
```

Figure 21: Nonce ABNF

The nonce is opaque to the client.

If the nonce claim in the DPoP proof does not exactly match a nonce recently supplied by the authorization server to the client, the authorization server MUST reject the request. The rejection response MAY include a DPoP-Nonce HTTP header providing a new nonce value to use for subsequent requests.

The intent is that clients need to keep only one nonce value and servers keep a window of recent nonces. That said, transient circumstances may arise in which the server's and client's stored nonce values differ. However, this situation is self-correcting; with any rejection message, the server can send the client the nonce value that the server wants it to use and the client can store that nonce value and retry the request with it. Even if the client and/or server discard their stored nonce values, that situation is also

self-correcting because new nonce values can be communicated when responding to or retrying failed requests.

Note that browser-based client applications using CORS [[WHATWG.Fetch](#)] only have access to CORS-safelisted response HTTP headers by default. In order for the application to obtain and use the DPoP-Nonce HTTP response header value, the server needs to make it available to the application by including DPoP-Nonce in the Access-Control-Expose-Headers response header list value.

8.1. Providing a New Nonce Value

It is up to the authorization server when to supply a new nonce value for the client to use. The client is expected to use the existing supplied nonce in DPoP proofs until the server supplies a new nonce value.

The authorization server MAY supply the new nonce in the same way that the initial one was supplied: by using a DPoP-Nonce HTTP header in the response. Of course, each time this happens it requires an extra protocol round trip.

A more efficient manner of supplying a new nonce value is also defined -- by including a DPoP-Nonce HTTP header in the HTTP 200 (OK) response from the previous request. The client MUST use the new nonce value supplied for the next token request, and for all subsequent token requests until the authorization server supplies a new nonce.

Responses that include the DPoP-Nonce HTTP header should be uncacheable (e.g., using Cache-Control: no-store in response to a GET request) to prevent the response being used to serve a subsequent request and a stale nonce value being used as a result.

An example 200 OK response providing a new nonce value is:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store
DPoP-Nonce: eyJ7S_zG.eyJbYu3.xQmBj-1
```

Figure 22: HTTP 200 Response Providing the Next Nonce Value

9. Resource Server-Provided Nonce

Resource servers can also choose to provide a nonce value to be included in DPoP proofs sent to them. They provide the nonce using the DPoP-Nonce header in the same way that authorization servers do as described in [Section 8](#) and [Section 8.1](#). The error signaling is performed as described in [Section 7.1](#). Resource servers use an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) error code with an accompanying WWW-Authenticate: DPoP value and DPoP-Nonce value to accomplish this.

For example, in response to a resource request without a nonce when the resource server requires one, the resource server can respond with a DPoP-Nonce value such as the following to provide a nonce value to include in the DPoP proof:

```
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: DPoP error="use_dpop_nonce",
  error_description="Resource server requires nonce in DPoP proof"
DPoP-Nonce: eyJ7S_zG.eyJH0-Z.HX4w-7v
```

Figure 23: HTTP 401 Response to a Resource Request without a Nonce

Note that the nonces provided by an authorization server and a resource server are different and should not be confused with one another, since nonces will be only accepted by the server that issued them. Likewise, should a client use multiple authorization servers and/or resource servers, a nonce issued by any of them should be used only at the issuing server. Developers should also take care to not confuse DPoP nonces with the OpenID Connect [\[OpenID.Core\]](#) ID Token nonce.

10. Authorization Code Binding to DPoP Key

Binding the authorization code issued to the client's proof-of-possession key can enable end-to-end binding of the entire authorization flow. This specification defines the `dpop_jkt` authorization request parameter for this purpose. The value of the `dpop_jkt` authorization request parameter is the JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint [\[RFC7638\]](#) of the proof-of-possession public key using the SHA-256 hash function - the same value as used for the `jkt` confirmation method defined in [Section 6.1](#).

When a token request is received, the authorization server computes the JWK thumbprint of the proof-of-possession public key in the DPoP proof and verifies that it matches the `dpop_jkt` parameter value in the authorization request. If they do not match, it MUST reject the request.

An example authorization request using the `dpop_jkt` authorization request parameter is:

```
GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=xyz
  &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
  &code_challenge=E9Melhoa20wvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM
  &code_challenge_method=S256
  &dpop_jkt=NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWZFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
```

Figure 24: Authorization Request using the `dpop_jkt` Parameter

Use of the `dpop_jkt` authorization request parameter is OPTIONAL. Note that the `dpop_jkt` authorization request parameter MAY also be used in combination with PKCE [\[RFC7636\]](#), which is recommended by [\[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics\]](#) as a countermeasure to authorization code injection. The `dpop_jkt` authorization request parameter only provides similar protections when a unique DPoP key is used for each authorization request.

10.1. DPoP with Pushed Authorization Requests

When Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR, [RFC9126]) are used in conjunction with DPoP, there are two ways in which the DPoP key can be communicated in the PAR request:

*The `dpop_jkt` parameter can be used as described in [Section 10](#) to bind the issued authorization code to a specific key. In this case, `dpop_jkt` MUST be included alongside other authorization request parameters in the POST body of the PAR request.

*Alternatively, the DPoP header can be added to the PAR request. In this case, the authorization server MUST check the provided DPoP proof JWT as defined in [Section 4.3](#). It MUST further behave as if the contained public key's thumbprint was provided using `dpop_jkt`, i.e., reject the subsequent token request unless a DPoP proof for the same key is provided. This can help to simplify the implementation of the client, as it can "blindly" attach the DPoP header to all requests to the authorization server regardless of the type of request. Additionally, it provides a stronger binding, as the DPoP header contains a proof of possession of the private key.

Both mechanisms MUST be supported by an authorization server that supports PAR and DPoP. If both mechanisms are used at the same time, the authorization server MUST reject the request if the JWK Thumbprint in `dpop_jkt` does not match the public key in the DPoP header.

Allowing both mechanisms ensures that clients that use `dpop_jkt` do not need to distinguish between front-channel and pushed authorization requests, and at the same time, clients that only have one code path for protecting all calls to authorization server endpoints do not need to distinguish between requests to the PAR endpoint and the token endpoint.

11. Security Considerations

In DPoP, the prevention of token replay at a different endpoint (see [Section 2](#)) is achieved through authentication of the server per [RFC6125] and binding of the DPoP proof to a certain URI and HTTP method. DPoP, however, has a somewhat different nature of protection than TLS-based methods such as OAuth Mutual TLS [RFC8705] or OAuth Token Binding [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding] (see also [Section 11.1](#) and [Section 11.7](#)). TLS-based mechanisms can leverage a tight integration between the TLS layer and the application layer to achieve strong message integrity, authenticity, and replay protection.

11.1. DPoP Proof Replay

If an adversary is able to get hold of a DPoP proof JWT, the adversary could replay that token at the same endpoint (the HTTP endpoint and method are enforced via the respective claims in the JWTs). To limit this, servers MUST only accept DPoP proofs for a limited time after their creation (preferably only for a relatively brief period on the order of seconds or minutes).

To prevent multiple uses of the same DPoP proof, servers can store, in the context of the target URI, the jti value of each DPoP proof for the time window in which the respective DPoP proof JWT would be accepted. HTTP requests to the same URI for which the jti value has been seen before would be declined. Such a single-use check, when strictly enforced, provides a very strong protection against DPoP proof replay, but may not always be feasible in practice, e.g., when multiple servers behind a single endpoint have no shared state.

In order to guard against memory exhaustion attacks, a server that is tracking jti values should reject DPoP proof JWTs with unnecessarily large jti values or store only a hash thereof.

Note: To accommodate for clock offsets, the server MAY accept DPoP proofs that carry an iat time in the reasonably near future (on the order of seconds or minutes). Because clock skews between servers and clients may be large, servers MAY limit DPoP proof lifetimes by using server-provided nonce values containing the time at the server rather than comparing the client-supplied iat time to the time at the server. Nonces created in this way yield the same result even in the face of arbitrarily large clock skews.

Server-provided nonces are an effective means for further reducing the chances for successful DPoP proof replay. Unlike cryptographic nonces, it is acceptable for clients to use the same nonce multiple times, and for the server to accept the same nonce multiple times. As long as the jti value is tracked and duplicates rejected for the lifetime of the nonce, there is no additional risk of token replay.

11.2. DPoP Proof Pre-Generation

An attacker in control of the client can pre-generate DPoP proofs for specific endpoints arbitrarily far into the future by choosing the iat value in the DPoP proof to be signed by the proof-of-possession key. Note that one such attacker is the person who is the legitimate user of the client. The user may pre-generate DPoP proofs to exfiltrate from the machine possessing the proof-of-possession key upon which they were generated and copy them to another machine that does not possess the key. For instance, a bank employee might pre-generate DPoP proofs on a bank computer and then copy them to another machine for use in the future, thereby bypassing bank audit controls. When DPoP proofs can be pre-generated and exfiltrated, all that is actually being proved in DPoP protocol interactions is possession of a DPoP proof -- not of the proof-of-possession key.

Use of server-provided nonce values that are not predictable by attackers can prevent this attack. By providing new nonce values at times of its choosing, the server can limit the lifetime of DPoP proofs, preventing pre-generated DPoP proofs from being used. When server-provided nonces are used, possession of the proof-of-possession key is being demonstrated -- not just possession of a DPoP proof.

The ath claim limits the use of pre-generated DPoP proofs to the lifetime of the access token. Deployments that do not utilize the nonce mechanism SHOULD NOT issue long-lived DPoP constrained access tokens, preferring instead to use short-lived access tokens and refresh tokens. Whilst an attacker could pre-generate DPoP proofs to

use the refresh token to obtain a new access token, they would be unable to realistically pre-generate DPoP proofs to use a newly issued access token.

11.3. DPoP Nonce Downgrade

A server MUST NOT accept any DPoP proofs without the nonce claim when a DPoP nonce has been provided to the client.

11.4. Untrusted Code in the Client Context

If an adversary is able to run code in the client's execution context, the security of DPoP is no longer guaranteed. Common issues in web applications leading to the execution of untrusted code are cross-site scripting and remote code inclusion attacks.

If the private key used for DPoP is stored in such a way that it cannot be exported, e.g., in a hardware or software security module, the adversary cannot exfiltrate the key and use it to create arbitrary DPoP proofs. The adversary can, however, create new DPoP proofs as long as the client is online, and use these proofs (together with the respective tokens) either on the victim's device or on a device under the attacker's control to send arbitrary requests that will be accepted by servers.

To send requests even when the client is offline, an adversary can try to pre-compute DPoP proofs using timestamps in the future and exfiltrate these together with the access or refresh token.

An adversary might further try to associate tokens issued from the token endpoint with a key pair under the adversary's control. One way to achieve this is to modify existing code, e.g., by replacing cryptographic APIs. Another way is to launch a new authorization grant between the client and the authorization server in an iframe. This grant needs to be "silent", i.e., not require interaction with the user. With code running in the client's origin, the adversary has access to the resulting authorization code and can use it to associate their own DPoP keys with the tokens returned from the token endpoint. The adversary is then able to use the resulting tokens on their own device even if the client is offline.

Therefore, protecting clients against the execution of untrusted code is extremely important even if DPoP is used. Besides secure coding practices, Content Security Policy [[W3C.CSP](#)] can be used as a second layer of defense against cross-site scripting.

11.5. Signed JWT Swapping

Servers accepting signed DPoP proof JWTs MUST verify that the typ field is dpop+jwt in the headers of the JWTs to ensure that adversaries cannot use JWTs created for other purposes.

11.6. Signature Algorithms

Implementers MUST ensure that only asymmetric digital signature algorithms (such as ES256) that are deemed secure can be used for signing DPoP proofs. In particular, the algorithm none MUST NOT be allowed.

11.7. Request Integrity

DPOP does not ensure the integrity of the payload or headers of requests. The DPOP proof only contains claims for the HTTP URI and method, but not, for example, the message body or general request headers.

This is an intentional design decision intended to keep DPOP simple to use, but as described, makes DPOP potentially susceptible to replay attacks where an attacker is able to modify message contents and headers. In many setups, the message integrity and confidentiality provided by TLS is sufficient to provide a good level of protection.

Note: While signatures covering other parts of requests are out of the scope of this specification, additional information to be signed can be added into DPOP proofs.

11.8. Access Token and Public Key Binding

The binding of the access token to the DPOP public key, which is specified in [Section 6](#), uses a cryptographic hash of the JWK representation of the public key. It relies on the hash function having sufficient second-preimage resistance so as to make it computationally infeasible to find or create another key that produces to the same hash output value. The SHA-256 hash function was used because it meets the aforementioned requirement while being widely available.

Similarly, the binding of the DPOP proof to the access token uses a hash of that access token as the value of the ath claim in the DPOP proof (see [Section 4.2](#)). This relies on the value of the hash being sufficiently unique so as to reliably identify the access token. The collision resistance of SHA-256 meets that requirement.

11.9. Authorization Code and Public Key Binding

Cryptographic binding of the authorization code to the DPOP public key, is specified in [Section 10](#). This binding prevents attacks in which the attacker captures the authorization code and creates a DPOP proof using a proof-of-possession key other than that held by the client and redeems the authorization code using that DPOP proof. By ensuring end-to-end that only the client's DPOP key can be used, this prevents captured authorization codes from being exfiltrated and used at locations other than the one to which the authorization code was issued.

Authorization codes can, for instance, be harvested by attackers from places that the HTTP messages containing them are logged. Even when efforts are made to make authorization codes one-time-use, in practice, there is often a time window during which attackers can replay them. For instance, when authorization servers are implemented as scalable replicated services, some replicas may temporarily not yet have the information needed to prevent replay. DPOP binding of the authorization code solves these problems.

If an authorization server does not (or cannot) strictly enforce the single-use limitation for authorization codes and an attacker can

access the authorization code (and if PKCE is used, the code_verifier), the attacker can create a forged token request, binding the resulting token to an attacker-controlled key. For example, using cross-site scripting, attackers might obtain access to the authorization code and PKCE parameters. Use of the dpop_jkt parameter prevents this attack.

The binding of the authorization code to the DPoP public key uses a JWK Thumbprint of the public key, just as the access token binding does. The same JWK Thumbprint considerations apply.

11.10. Hash Algorithm Agility

The jkt confirmation method member, the ath JWT claim, and the dpop_jkt authorization request parameter defined herein all use the output of the SHA-256 hash function as their value. The use of a single hash function by this specification was intentional and aimed at simplicity and avoidance of potential security and interoperability issues arising from common mistakes implementing and deploying parameterized algorithm agility schemes. The use of a different hash function is not precluded, however, if future circumstances change making SHA-256 insufficient for the requirements of this specification. Should that need arise, it is expected that a short specification be produced that updates this one. That specification will likely define, using the output of a then appropriate hash function as the value, a new confirmation method member, a new JWT claim, and a new authorization request parameter. These items will be used in place of, or alongside, their respective counterparts in the same message structures and flows of the larger protocol defined by this specification.

12. IANA Considerations

12.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration

This specification requests registration of the following access token type in the "OAuth Access Token Types" registry [[IANA.OAuth.Params](#)] established by [[RFC6749](#)].

*Type name: DPoP
*Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters: (none)
*HTTP Authentication Scheme(s): DPoP
*Change controller: IETF
*Specification document(s): [[this specification]]

12.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration

This specification requests registration of the following error values in the "OAuth Extensions Error" registry [[IANA.OAuth.Params](#)] established by [[RFC6749](#)].

Invalid DPoP proof:

*Name: invalid_dpop_proof
*Usage Location: token error response, resource error response
*Protocol Extension: Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)
*Change controller: IETF
*Specification document(s): [[this specification]]

Use DPoP nonce:

- *Name: use_dpop_nonce
- *Usage Location: token error response, resource error response
- *Protocol Extension: Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)
- *Change controller: IETF
- *Specification document(s): [[this specification]]

12.3. OAuth Parameters Registration

This specification requests registration of the following authorization request parameter in the "OAuth Parameters" registry [[IANA.OAuth.Params](#)] established by [[RFC6749](#)].

- *Name: dpop_jkt
- *Parameter Usage Location: authorization request
- *Change Controller: IETF
- *Reference: [[[Section 10](#) of this specification]]

12.4. HTTP Authentication Scheme Registration

This specification requests registration of the following scheme in the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme Registry" [[RFC9110](#)][[IANA.HTTP.AuthSchemes](#)]:

- *Authentication Scheme Name: DPoP
- *Reference: [[[Section 7.1](#) of this specification]]

12.5. Media Type Registration

This section registers the application/dpop+jwt media type [[RFC2046](#)] in the IANA "Media Types" registry [[IANA.MediaTypes](#)] in the manner described in [[RFC6838](#)], which is used to indicate that the content is a DPoP JWT.

- *Type name: application
- *Subtype name: dpop+jwt
- *Required parameters: n/a
- *Optional parameters: n/a
- *Encoding considerations: binary; A DPoP JWT is a JWT; JWT values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') characters.
- *Security considerations: See [Section 11](#) of [[this specification]]
- *Interoperability considerations: n/a
- *Published specification: [[this specification]]
- *Applications that use this media type: Applications using [[this specification]] for application-level proof of possession
- *Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
- *Additional information:
 - File extension(s): n/a
 - Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
- *Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
- *Intended usage: COMMON
- *Restrictions on usage: none

*Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
*Change controller: IETF
*Provisional registration? No

12.6. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration

This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods" registry [[IANA.JWT](#)] for JWT cnf member values established by [[RFC7800](#)].

*Confirmation Method Value: jkt
*Confirmation Method Description: JWK SHA-256 Thumbprint
*Change Controller: IETF
*Specification Document(s): [[[Section 6](#) of this specification]]

12.7. JSON Web Token Claims Registration

This specification requests registration of the following Claims in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [[IANA.JWT](#)] established by [[RFC7519](#)].

HTTP method:

*Claim Name: htm
*Claim Description: The HTTP method of the request
*Change Controller: IETF
*Specification Document(s): [[[Section 4.2](#) of this specification]]

HTTP URI:

*Claim Name: htu
*Claim Description: The HTTP URI of the request (without query and fragment parts)
*Change Controller: IETF
*Specification Document(s): [[[Section 4.2](#) of this specification]]

Access token hash:

*Claim Name: ath
*Claim Description: The base64url encoded SHA-256 hash of the ASCII encoding of the associated access token's value
*Change Controller: IETF
*Specification Document(s): [[[Section 4.2](#) of this specification]]

12.7.1. "nonce" Registry Update

The Internet Security Glossary [[RFC4949](#)] provides a useful definition of nonce as a random or non-repeating value that is included in data exchanged by a protocol, usually for the purpose of guaranteeing liveness and thus detecting and protecting against replay attacks.

However, the initial registration of the nonce claim by [[OpenID.Core](#)] used language that was contextually specific to that

application, which was potentially limiting to its general applicability.

This specification therefore requests that the entry for nonce in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [[IANA.JWT](#)] be updated as follows to reflect that the claim can be used appropriately in other contexts.

- *Claim Name: nonce
- *Claim Description: Value used to associate a Client session with an ID Token (MAY also be used for nonce values in other applications of JWTs)
- *Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
- *Specification Document(s): [Section 2](#) of [[OpenID.Core](#)] and [[this specification]]

12.8. HTTP Message Header Field Names Registration

This document specifies the following HTTP header fields, registration of which is requested in the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" registry [[RFC9110](#)] [[IANA.HTTP.Fields](#)]:

- *Field name: DPoP
- *Status: permanent
- *Specification document: [[this specification]]

- *Field name: DPoP-Nonce
- *Status: permanent
- *Specification document: [[this specification]]

12.9. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration

This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry [[IANA.OAuth.Parameters](#)] established by [[RFC8414](#)].

- *Metadata Name: dpop_signing_alg_values_supported
- *Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWS algorithms supported for DPoP proof JWTs
- *Change Controller: IETF
- *Specification Document(s): [[[Section 5.1](#) of this specification]]

12.10. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata

This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata" registry [[IANA.OAuth.Parameters](#)] established by [[RFC7591](#)].

- *Metadata Name: dpop_bound_access_tokens

*Metadata Description: Boolean value specifying whether the client always uses DPOP for token requests
*Change Controller: IETF
*Specification Document(s): [[[Section 5.2](#) of this specification]]

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Appendix A. Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Annabelle Backman, Spencer Balogh, Dominick Baier, Vittorio Bertocci, Jeff Corrigan, Domingos Creado, Andrii Deinega, William Denniss, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Mike Engan, Nikos Fotiou, Mark Haine, Dick Hardt, Joseph Heenan, Bjorn Hjelm, Jacob Ideskog, Jared Jennings, Benjamin Kaduk, Pieter Kasselmann, Steinar Noem, Neil Madden, Rohan Mahy, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen, Nicolas Mora, Rob Otto, Aaron Parecki, Michael Peck, Roberto Polli, Paul Querna, Justin Richer, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef, Filip Skokan, Dmitry Telegin, Dave Tonge, Jim Willeke, Philippe De Ryck, and others (please let us know, if you've been mistakenly omitted) for their valuable input, feedback and general support of this work.

This document originated from discussions at the 4th OAuth Security Workshop in Stuttgart, Germany. We thank the organizers of this workshop (Ralf Kusters, Guido Schmitz).

Appendix B. Document History

[[To be removed from the final specification]]

-12

- *Updates from Roman Danyliw's AD review
- *DPoP-Nonce now included in HTTP header field registration request
- *Fixed section reference to URI Scheme-Based Normalization
- *Attempt to better describe the rationale for SHA-256 only and expectations for how hash algorithm agility would be achieved if needed in the future
- *Elaborate on the use of multiple WWW-Authenticate challenges by protected resources
- *Fix access token request examples that were missing a client_id

-11

- *Updates addressing outstanding shepherd review comments per side meeting discussions at IETF 114
- *Added more explanation of the PAR considerations
- *Added parenthetical remark "(such as ES256)" to Signature Algorithms subsection
- *Added more explanation for ath
- *Added a reference to RFC8725 in mention of explicit JWT typing

-10

- *Updates addressing some shepherd review comments
- *Update HTTP references as RFCs 723x have been superseded by RFC 9110
- *Editorial fixes
- *Added some clarifications, etc. around nonce
- *Added client considerations subsection
- *Use bullets rather than numbers in Checking DPoP Proofs so as not to imply specific order
- *Added notes/reminders about browser-based client applications using CORS needing access to response headers
- *Added a JWT claims registry update request for "nonce" to (better) allow for more general use in other contexts

-09

- *Add note/reminder about browser-based client applications using CORS needing access to response headers.
- *Fixed typo

-08

- *Lots of editorial updates from WGLC feedback
- *Further clarify that either iat or nonce can be used alone in validating the timeliness of the proof and somewhat de-emphasize jti tracking

-07

- *Registered the application/dpop+jwt media type.
- *Editorial updates/clarifications based on review feedback.
- *Added "(on the order of seconds or minutes)" to somewhat qualify "relatively brief period" and "reasonably near future" and give a general idea of expected timeframe without being overly prescriptive.
- *Added a step to [Section 4.3](#) to reiterate that the jwk header cannot have a private key.

-06

- *Editorial updates and fixes
- *Changed name of client metadata parameter to dpop_bound_access_tokens

-05

- *Added Authorization Code binding via the dpop_jkt parameter.
- *Described the authorization code reuse attack and how dpop_jkt mitigates it.
- *Enhanced description of DPoP proof expiration checking.
- *Described nonce storage requirements and how nonce mismatches and missing nonces are self-correcting.
- *Specified the use of the use_dpop_nonce error for missing and mismatched nonce values.
- *Specified that authorization servers use 400 (Bad Request) errors to supply nonces and resource servers use 401 (Unauthorized) errors to do so.
- *Added a bit more about ath and pre-generated proofs to the security considerations.
- *Mentioned confirming the DPoP binding of the access token in the list in [Section 4.3](#).
- *Added the always_uses_dpop client registration metadata parameter.
- *Described the relationship between DPoP and Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR).
- *Updated references for drafts that are now RFCs.

-04

- *Added the option for a server-provided nonce in the DPoP proof.
- *Registered the invalid_dpop_proof and use_dpop_nonce error codes.
- *Removed fictitious uses of realm from the examples, as they added no value.
- *State that if the introspection response has a token_type, it has to be DPoP.
- *Mention that RFC7235 allows multiple authentication schemes in WWW-Authenticate with a 401.
- *Editorial fixes.

-03

- *Add an access token hash (ath) claim to the DPoP proof when used in conjunction with the presentation of an access token for protected resource access

- *add Untrusted Code in the Client Context section to security considerations
- *Editorial updates and fixes

-02

- *Lots of editorial updates and additions including expanding on the objectives, better defining the key confirmation representations, example updates and additions, better describing mixed bearer/dpop token type deployments, clarify RT binding only being done for public clients and why, more clearly allow for a bound RT but with bearer AT, explain/justify the choice of SHA-256 for key binding, and more
- *Require that a protected resource supporting bearer and DPoP at the same time must reject an access token received as bearer, if that token is DPoP-bound
- *Remove the case-insensitive qualification on the htm claim check
- *Relax the jti tracking requirements a bit and qualify it by URI

-01

- *Editorial updates
- *Attempt to more formally define the DPoP Authorization header scheme
- *Define the 401/WWW-Authenticate challenge
- *Added invalid_dpop_proof error code for DPoP errors in token request
- *Fixed up and added to the IANA section
- *Added dpop_signing_alg_values_supported authorization server metadata
- *Moved the Acknowledgements into an Appendix and added a bunch of names (best effort)

-00 [[Working Group Draft]]

- *Working group draft

-04

- *Update OAuth MTLs reference to RFC 8705
- *Use the newish RFC v3 XML and HTML format

-03

- *rework the text around uniqueness requirements on the jti claim in the DPoP proof JWT
- *make tokens a bit smaller by using htm, htu, and jkt rather than http_method, http_uri, and jkt#S256 respectively
- *more explicit recommendation to use mTLS if that is available
- *added David Waite as co-author
- *editorial updates

-02

- *added normalization rules for URIs
- *removed distinction between proof and binding
- *"jwk" header again used instead of "cnf" claim in DPoP proof
- *renamed "Bearer-DPoP" token type to "DPoP"

- *removed ability for key rotation
- *added security considerations on request integrity
- *explicit advice on extending DPoP proofs to sign other parts of the HTTP messages
- *only use the jkt#S256 in ATs
- *iat instead of exp in DPoP proof JWTs
- *updated guidance on token_type evaluation

-01

- *fixed inconsistencies
- *moved binding and proof messages to headers instead of parameters
- *extracted and unified definition of DPoP JWTs
- *improved description

-00

*first draft

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