OAuth Working Group Internet-Draft

Intended status: Standards Track

Expires: June 14, 2016

M. Jones
A. Nadalin
Microsoft
B. Campbell
J. Bradley
Ping Identity
C. Mortimore
Salesforce
December 12, 2015

OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange: An STS for the REST of Us draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange-03

Abstract

This specification defines a protocol for a lightweight HTTP- and JSON- based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of $\underline{\mathsf{BCP}}$ 78 and $\underline{\mathsf{BCP}}$ 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on June 14, 2016.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

$\underline{1}$. Introduction	2
$\underline{\textbf{1.1}}$. Delegation vs. Impersonation Semantics	4
1.2. Requirements Notation and Conventions	<u>5</u>
<u>1.3</u> . Terminology	<u>5</u>
2. Token Exchange Request and Response	<u>5</u>
<u>2.1</u> . Request	<u>5</u>
<u>2.2</u> . Response	8
2.3. Example Token Exchange	9
3. Token Type Identifiers	11
4. JSON Web Token Claims	12
<u>4.1</u> . "act" (Actor) Claim	<u>12</u>
<u>4.2</u> . "scp" (Scopes) Claim	<u>14</u>
4.3. "may_act" (May Act For) Claim	<u> 15</u>
5. IANA Considerations	<u>16</u>
<u>5.1</u> . OAuth URI Registration	<u> 16</u>
<u>5.2</u> . OAuth Parameters Registration	<u> 16</u>
5.3. OAuth Access Token Type Registration	<u> 18</u>
<u>5.4</u> . JSON Web Token Claims Registration	<u> 18</u>
6. Security Considerations	<u> 18</u>
<u>7</u> . References	<u> 19</u>
7.1. Normative References	<u> 19</u>
7.2. Informative References	<u> 19</u>
Appendix A. Additional Token Exchange Examples	20
A.1. Impersonation Token Exchange Example	<u>20</u>
A.2. Delegation Token Exchange Example	22
Appendix B. Acknowledgements	<u>25</u>
Appendix C. Open Issues	<u>25</u>
Appendix D. Document History	<u> 26</u>
Authors' Addresses	28

1. Introduction

A security token is a set of information that facilitates the sharing of identity and security information in heterogeneous environments or across security domains. Examples of security tokens include JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [JWT] and SAML Assertions [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]. Security tokens are typically signed to achieve integrity and sometimes also encrypted to achieve confidentiality. Security tokens are also sometimes described as Assertions, such as in [RFC7521].

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 2]

A Security Token Service (STS) is a service capable of validating and issuing security tokens, which enables clients to obtain appropriate access credentials for resources in heterogeneous environments or across security domains. Web Service clients have used WS-Trust [WS-Trust] as the protocol to interact with an STS for token exchange, however WS-Trust is a fairly heavyweight protocol, which uses XML, SOAP, etc. Whereas, the trend in modern Web development has been towards lightweight services utilizing RESTful patterns and JSON. The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] and OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens [RFC6750] have emerged as popular standards for authorizing and securing access to HTTP and RESTful resources but do not provide everything necessary to facilitate token exchange interactions.

This specification defines a lightweight protocol extending OAuth 2.0 that enables clients to request and obtain security tokens from authorization servers acting in the role of an STS. Similar to OAuth 2.0, this specification focuses on client developer simplicity and requires only an HTTP client and JSON parser, which are nearly universally available in modern development environments. The STS protocol defined in this specification is not itself RESTful (an STS doesn't lend itself particularly well to a REST approach) but does utilize communication patterns and data formats that should be familiar to developers accustomed to working with RESTful systems.

A new grant type for a token exchange request and the associated specific parameters for such a request to the token endpoint are defined by this specification. A token exchange response is a normal OAuth 2.0 response from the token endpoint with a few additional parameters defined herein to provide information to the client.

The entity that makes the request to exchange tokens is considered the client in the context of the token exchange interaction. However, that does not restrict usage of this profile to traditional OAuth clients. An OAuth resource server, for example, might assume the role of the client during token exchange in order to trade an access token, which it received in a protected resource request, for a new token that is appropriate to include in a call to a backend service. The new token might be an access token that is more narrowly scoped for the downstream service or it could be an entirely different kind of token.

The scope of this specification is limited to the definition of a basic request and response protocol for an STS-style token exchange utilizing OAuth 2.0. Although a few new JWT claims are defined that enable delegation semantics to be expressed, the specific syntax, semantics and security characteristics of the tokens themselves (both those presented to the AS and those obtained by the client) are

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 3]

explicitly out of scope and no requirements are placed on the trust model in which an implementation might be deployed. Additional profiles may provide more detailed requirements around the specific nature of the parties and trust involved, such as whether signing and/or encryption of tokens is required; however, such details will often be policy decisions made with respect to the specific needs of individual deployments and will be configured or implemented accordingly.

The security tokens obtained could be used in a number of contexts, the specifics of which are also beyond the scope of this specification.

1.1. Delegation vs. Impersonation Semantics

When principal A impersonates principal B, A is given all the rights that B has within some defined rights context and is indistinguishable from B in that context. Thus, when principal A impersonates principal B, then in so far as any entity receiving such a token is concerned, they are actually dealing with B. It is true that some members of the identity system might have awareness that impersonation is going on, but it is not a requirement. For all intents and purposes, when A is impersonating B, A is B.

Delegation semantics are different than impersonation semantics, though the two are closely related. With delegation semantics, principal A still has its own identity separate from B and it is explicitly understood that while B may have delegated some of its rights to A, any actions taken are being taken by A representing B. In a sense, A is an agent for B.

Delegation and impersonation are not inclusive of all situations. When a principal is acting directly on its own behalf, for example, neither delegation nor impersonation are in play. They are, however, the more common semantics operating for token exchange and, as such, are given more direct treatment in this specification.

Delegation semantics are typically expressed in a token by including information about both the primary subject of the token as well as the actor to whom that subject has delegated some of its rights. Such a token is sometimes referred to as a composite token because it is composed of information about multiple subjects. A client can indicate the desire for a composite token by including a "want_composite" parameter in the request with the value "true". Typically, in the request, the "subject_token" represents the identity of the party on behalf of whom the token is being requested while the "actor_token" represents the identity of the party to whom the access rights of the issued token are being delegated. A

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 4]

composite token issued by the authorization server will contain information about both parties.

The specifics of representing a composite token and even whether or not such a token will be issued depend on the details of the implementation and the kind of token. The representations of composite tokens that are not JWTs are beyond the scope of this specification. The <u>Section 4.1</u> request parameter, however, does provide a means for providing information about the desired actor though the representation of a chain of delegation using the JWT "act" claim.

1.2. Requirements Notation and Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="https://recommendedcolor.org

1.3. Terminology

This specification uses the terms "access token type", "authorization server", "client", "client identifier", "resource server", "token endpoint", "token request", and "token response" defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], and the terms "Claim" and "JWT Claims Set" defined by JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT].

2. Token Exchange Request and Response

2.1. Request

A client requests a security token by making a token request to the authorization server's token endpoint using the extension grant type mechanism defined in Section 4.5 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].

Client authentication to the authorization server is done using the normal mechanisms provided by OAuth 2.0. Section 2.3.1 of The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] defines password-based authentication of the client, however, client authentication is extensible and other mechanisms are possible. For example, [RFC7523] defines client authentication using JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [JWT]. The supported methods of client authentication and whether or not to allow unauthenticated or unidentified clients are deployment decisions that are at the discretion of the authorization server.

The client makes a token exchange request to the token endpoint with an extension grant type by including the following parameters using

the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format with a character encoding of UTF-8 in the HTTP request entity-body:

grant_type

REQUIRED. The value "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange" indicates that a token exchange is being performed.

resource

OPTIONAL. Indicates the physical location of the target service or resource where the client intends to use the requested security token. This enables the authorization server to apply policy as appropriate for the target, such as determining the type and content of the token to be issued or if and how the token is to be encrypted. In many cases, a client will not have knowledge of the logical organization of the systems with which it interacts and will only know the location of the service where it intends to use the token. The "resource" parameter allows the client to indicate to the authorization server where it intends to use the issued token by providing the location, typically as an https URL, in the token exchange request in the same form that will be used to access that resource. The authorization server will typically have the capability to map from a resource URI value to an appropriate policy. The value of the "resource" parameter MUST be an absolute URI, as specified by Section 4.3 of [RFC3986], which MAY include a query component and MUST NOT include a fragment component. Multiple "resource" parameters may be used to indicate that the issued token is intended to be used at the multiple resources listed.

audience

OPTIONAL. The logical name of the target service where the client intends to use the requested security token. This serves a purpose similar to the "resource" parameter, but with the client providing a logical name rather than a physical location. Interpretation of the name requires that the value be something that both the client and the authorization server understand. An OAuth client identifier, a SAML entity identifier [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os], an OpenID Connect Issuer Identifier [OpenID.Core], or a URI are examples of things that might be used as "audience" parameter values. Multiple "audience" parameters may be used to indicate that the issued token is intended to be used at the multiple audiences listed.

scope

OPTIONAL. A list of space-delimited, case-sensitive strings that allow the client to specify the desired scope of the requested security token in the context of the service or resource where the token will be used.

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 6]

requested_token_type

OPTIONAL. An identifier, as described in <u>Section 3</u>, for the type of the requested security token. For example, a JWT can be requested with the identifier "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt". If the requested type is unspecified, the issued token type is at the discretion of the authorization server and may be dictated by knowledge of the requirements of the service or resource indicated by the "resource" or "audience" parameter.

subject_token

REQUIRED. A security token that represents the identity of the party on behalf of whom the request is being made. Typically the subject of this token will be the subject of the security token issued in response to this request.

subject_token_type

REQUIRED. An identifier, as described in <u>Section 3</u>, that indicates the type of the security token in the "subject_token" parameter. For example, a value of "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt", would indicate that the token is a JWT and a value of "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token" would indicate that the token is an OAuth access token.

actor_token

OPTIONAL. A security token that represents the identity of the party that is authorized to use the requested security token and act on behalf of the subject.

actor_token_type

An identifier, as described in <u>Section 3</u>, that indicates the type of the security token in the "actor_token" parameter. This is REQUIRED when the "actor_token" parameter is present in the request but MUST NOT be included otherwise.

want_composite

OPTIONAL. When the value of this parameter is "true", it indicates the client's desire for a composite security token to be issued, which contains claims about both the main subject of the token as well as about the party who is authorized to act on behalf of that subject. Note that this parameter only provides a means for the client to indicate its preference. The authorization server is not required to honor the stated preference and the nature of the tokens it issues are ultimately at its discretion.

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 7]

2.2. Response

The authorization server responds to a token exchange request with a normal OAuth 2.0 response from the token endpoint, as specified in Section 5 of [RFC6749]. Additional details and explanation are provided in the following subsections.

2.2.1. Successful Response

If the request is valid and meets all policy and other criteria of the authorization server, a successful token response is constructed by adding the following parameters to the entity-body of the HTTP response using the "application/json" media type, as specified by [RFC7159], and an HTTP 200 status code. The parameters are serialized into a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) structure by adding each parameter at the top level. Parameter names and string values are included as JSON strings. Numerical values are included as JSON numbers. The order of parameters does not matter and can vary.

access_token

REQUIRED. The security token issued by the authorization server in response to the token exchange request. The "access_token" parameter from Section 5.1 of [RFC6749] is used here to carry the requested token, which allows this token exchange protocol to use the existing OAuth 2.0 request and response constructs defined for the token endpoint. The identifier "access_token" is used for historical reasons and the issued token need not be an OAuth access token.

issued_token_type

REQUIRED. An identifier, as described in <u>Section 3</u>, for the representation of the issued security token. For example, a value of "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token" indicates that the issued token is an access token and a value of "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt" indicates that it is a JWT.

token_type

REQUIRED. A case-insensitive value specifying the method of using of the access token issued, as specified in <u>Section 7.1 of [RFC6749]</u>. It provides the client with information about how to utilize the access token to access protected resources. For example, a value of "Bearer", as specified in [RFC6750], indicates that the security token is a bearer token and the client can simply present it as is without any additional proof of eligibility beyond the contents of the token itself. Note that the meaning of this parameter is different from the meaning of the "issued_token_type" parameter, which declares the representation

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 8]

of the issued security token; the term "token type" is typically used with this meaning, as it is in all "*_token_type" parameters in this specification. If the issued token is not an access token or usable as an access token, then the "token_type" value "N_A" is used to indicate that an OAuth 2.0 "token_type" identifier is not applicable in that context.

expires_in

RECOMMENDED. The validity lifetime, in seconds, of the token issued by the authorization server. Oftentimes the client will not have the inclination or capability to inspect the content of the token and this parameter provides a consistent and token type agnostic indication of how long the token can be expected to be valid. For example, the value 1800 denotes that the token will expire in thirty minutes from the time the response was generated.

scope

OPTIONAL, if the scope of the issued security token is identical to the scope requested by the client; otherwise, REQUIRED.

refresh_token

NOT RECOMMENDED. Refresh tokens will typically not be issued in response to "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange" grant type requests. Profiles or deployments of this specification that do issue refresh tokens SHOULD clearly document the conditions and reasons for doing so.

2.2.2. Error Response

If either the "subject_token" or "actor_token" are invalid for any reason, or are unacceptable based on policy, the authorization server MUST construct an error response, as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC6749]. The value of the "error" parameter MUST be the "invalid_request" error code. The authorization server MAY include additional information regarding the reasons for the error using the "error_description" and/or "error_uri" parameters. Other error codes may also be used, as appropriate.

2.3. Example Token Exchange

The following example demonstrates a hypothetical token exchange in which an OAuth resource server assumes the role of the client during token exchange in order to trade an access token that it received in a request for a token that it will use to call to a backend service (extra line breaks and indentation in the examples are for display purposes only).

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 9]

The resource server receives the following request containing an OAuth access token in the Authorization request header, as specified in <u>Section 2.1 of [RFC6750]</u>.

GET /resource HTTP/1.1 Host: frontend.example.com

Authorization: Bearer accVkjcJyb4BWCxGsndESCJQbdFMogUC5PbRDqceLTC

Figure 1: Protected Resource Request

The resource server assumes the role of the client for the token exchange and the access token from the request above is sent to the authorization server using a request as specified in Section 2.1. The value of the "subject_token" parameter carries the access token and the value of the "subject_token_type" parameter indicates that it is an OAuth 2.0 access token. The resource server, acting as the client, uses its identifier and secret to authenticate to the authorization server using the HTTP Basic authentication scheme. The "resource" parameter indicates the location of the backend service, https://backend.example.com/api, where the issued token will be used.

POST /as/token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1

Host: as.example.com

Authorization: Basic cnMwODpsb25nLXNlY3VyZS1yYW5kb20tc2VjcmV0

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Atoken-exchange
&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fbackend.example.com%2Fapi%20
&subject_token=accVkjcJyb4BWCxGsndESCJQbdFMogUC5PbRDqceLTC
&subject_token_type=
 urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Aaccess_token

Figure 2: Token Exchange Request

The authorization server validates the client credentials and the "subject_token" presented in the token exchange request. From the "resource" parameter, the authorization server is able to determine the appropriate policy to apply to the request and issues a token suitable for use at https://backend.example.com. The "access_token" parameter of the response contains the new token, which is itself a bearer OAuth access token that is valid for one minute. The token happens to be a JWT; however, its structure and format are opaque to the client so the "issued_token_type" indicates only that it is an access token.

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 10]

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store

{
    "access_token":"eyJhbGciOiJFUZI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjllciJ9.eyJhdWQiOiJo
    dHRwczovL2JhY2tlbmQuZXhhbXBsZS5jb2OiLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2FzLmV
    4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiZXhwIjoxNDQxOTE3NTkzLCJpYXQiOjEONDE5MTc1MzMsIm
    F6cCI6InJzMDgiLCJzdWIiOiJiYOBleGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsInNjcCI6WyJhcGkiX
    X0.vHJKtJ-zFIN75Tk7qGlmQsWPlvnChb2uSaGwPLvlWl64ts7-vvfwYDaVoXIQ
    e_HkTVdljIzavVlPT60_b_9pDQ",
    "issued_token_type":
        "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token",
    "token_type":"Bearer",
    "expires_in":60
}
```

Figure 3: Token Exchange Response

The resource server can then use the newly acquired access token in making a request to the backend server.

```
GET /api HTTP/1.1
Host: backend.example.com
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjllciJ9.eyJhdWQ
   iOiJodHRwczovL2JhY2tlbmQuZXhhbXBsZS5jb2OiLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2
   FzLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiZXhwIjoxNDQxOTE3NTkzLCJpYXQiOjE0NDE5MTc1M
   zMsImF6cCI6InJzMDgiLCJzdWIiOiJiY0BleGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsInNjcCI6WyJh
   cGkiXXO.vHJKtJ-zFIN75Tk7qGlmQsWPlvnChb2uSaGwPLvlWl64ts7-vvfwYDa
   VoXIQe_HkTVdljIzavVlPT60_b_9pDQ
```

Figure 4: Backend Protected Resource Request

Additional examples can be found in Appendix A.

3. Token Type Identifiers

Several parameters in this specification utilize an identifier as the value to describe the type of token in question. Specifically, they are the "requested_token_type", "subject_token_type", "actor_token_type" parameters of the request and the "issued_token_type" member of the response. Token type identifiers are URIs.

```
This specification defines the token type identifiers
"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token" and
"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:refresh_token" to indicate that the
token is an OAuth 2.0 access token or refresh token, respectively.
```

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 11]

The value "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt" defined in Section 9 of $[\underline{JWT}]$ indicates that the token is a JWT. Other URIs to indicate other token types MAY be used.

4. JSON Web Token Claims

It is useful to have defined mechanisms to express delegation within a token as well as to express authorization to delegate or impersonate. Although the token exchange protocol described herein can be used with any type of token, this section defines claims to express such semantics specifically for JWTs. Similar definitions for other types of tokens are possible but beyond the scope of this specification.

4.1. "act" (Actor) Claim

The "act" (actor) claim provides a means within a JWT to express that delegation has occurred and identify the acting party to whom authority has been delegated. The "act" claim value is a JSON object and members in the JSON object are claims that identify the actor. The claims that make up the "act" claim identify and possibly provide additional information about the actor. For example, the combination of the two claims "iss" and "sub" might be necessary to uniquely identify an actor.

However, claims within the "act" claim pertain only to the identity of the actor and are not relevant to the validity of the containing JWT in the same manner as the top-level claims. Consequently, claims such as "exp", "nbf", and "aud" are not meaningful when used within an "act" claim, and therefore should not be used.

The following example illustrates the "act" (actor) claim within a JWT Claims Set. The claims of the token itself are about user@example.com while the "act" claim indicates that admin@example.com is the current actor.

```
{
  "aud":"https://consumer.example.com",
  "iss":"https://issuer.example.com",
  "exp":1443904177,
  "nbf":1443904077,
  "sub":"user@example.com",
  "act":
  {
     "sub":"admin@example.com"
  }
}
```

Figure 5: Actor Claim

A chain of delegation can be expressed by nesting one "act" claim within another. The outermost "act" claim represents the current actor while nested "act" claims represent prior actors. The least recent actor is the most deeply nested.

The following example illustrates nested "act" (actor) claims within a JWT Claims Set. The claims of the token itself are about user@example.com while the "act" claim indicates that the system consumer.example.com-web-application is the current actor and admin@example.com was a prior actor. Such a token might come about as the result of the web application receiving a token like the one in the previous example and exchanging it for a new token that lists it as the current actor and that can be used at https://backend.example.com.

```
{
  "aud":"https://backend.example.com",
  "iss":"https://issuer.example.com",
  "exp":1443904100,
  "nbf":1443904000,
  "sub":"user@example.com",
  "act":
  {
     "sub":"consumer.example.com-web-application",
     "iss":"https://issuer.example.net",
     "act":
     {
          "sub":"admin@example.com"
     }
  }
}
```

Figure 6: Nested Actor Claim

4.2. "scp" (Scopes) Claim

The "scp" claim is an array of strings, each of which represents an OAuth scope granted for the issued security token. Each array entry of the claim value is a scope-token, as defined in Section 3.3 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].

The following example illustrates the "scp" claim within a JWT Claims Set with four scope-tokens.

```
{
  "aud":"https://consumer.example.com",
  "iss":"https://issuer.example.com",
  "exp":1443904177,
  "nbf":1443904077,
  "sub":"dgaf4mvfs75Fci_FL3heQA",
  "scp":["email","address","profile","phone"]
}
```

Figure 7: Scopes Claim

4.3. "may_act" (May Act For) Claim

The "may_act" claim makes a statement that one party is authorized to become the actor and act on behalf of another party. The claim value is a JSON object and members in the JSON object are claims that identify the party that is asserted as being eligible to act for the party identified by the JWT containing the claim. The claims that make up the "may_act" claim identify and possibly provide additional information about the authorized actor. For example, the combination of the two claims "iss" and "sub" are sometimes necessary to uniquely identify an authorized actor, while the "email" claim might be used to provide additional useful information about that party.

However, claims within the "may_act" claim pertain only to the identity of that party and are not relevant to the validity of the containing JWT in the same manner as top level claims. Consequently, claims such as "exp", "nbf", and "aud" are not meaningful when used within a "may_act" claim, and therefore should not be used.

The following example illustrates the "may_act" claim within a JWT Claims Set. The claims of the token itself are about user@example.com while the "may_act" claim indicates that admin@example.com is authorized to act on behalf of user@example.com.

```
{
  "aud":"https://consumer.example.com",
  "iss":"https://issuer.example.com",
  "exp":1443904177,
  "nbf":1443904077,
  "sub":"user@example.com",
  "may_act":
  {
     "sub":"admin@example.com"
  }
}
```

Figure 8: May Act For Claim

5. IANA Considerations

5.1. OAuth URI Registration

This specification registers the following values in the IANA "OAuth URI" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC6755].

5.1.1. Registry Contents

```
O URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange
O Common Name: Token exchange grant type for OAuth 2.0
O Change controller: IESG
O Specification Document: Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]
O URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token
O Common Name: Token type URI for an OAuth 2.0 access token
O Change controller: IESG
O Specification Document: Section 3 of [[this specification]]
O URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:refresh_token
O Common Name: Token Type URI for an OAuth 2.0 refresh token
O Change controller: IESG
O Specification Document: Section 3 of [[this specification]]
```

5.2. OAuth Parameters Registration

This specification registers the following values in the IANA "OAuth Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC6749].

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 16]

5.2.1. Registry Contents

```
o Parameter name: resource
o Parameter usage location: token request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): <a href="Section 2.1">Section 2.1</a> of [[ this specification ]]
o Parameter name: audience
o Parameter usage location: token request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): <u>Section 2.1</u> of [[ this specification ]]
o Parameter name: requested_token_type
o Parameter usage location: token request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): <u>Section 2.1</u> of [[ this specification ]]
o Parameter name: subject_token
o Parameter usage location: token request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]
o Parameter name: subject_token_type
o Parameter usage location: token request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]
o Parameter name: actor_token
o Parameter usage location: token request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): <u>Section 2.1</u> of [[ this specification ]]
o Parameter name: actor_token_type
o Parameter usage location: token request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): <u>Section 2.1</u> of [[ this specification ]]
o Parameter name: want_composite
o Parameter usage location: token request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): <u>Section 2.1</u> of [[ this specification ]]
o Parameter name: issued_token_type
o Parameter usage location: token response
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): Section 2.2.1 of [[ this specification
   ]]
```

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 17]

5.3. OAuth Access Token Type Registration

This specification registers the following access token type in the IANA "OAuth Access Token Types" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC6749].

5.3.1. Registry Contents

- o Type name: N_A
- o Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters: (none)
- o HTTP Authentication Scheme(s): (none)
- o Change controller: IESG
- o Specification document(s): Section 2.2.1 of [[this specification
]]

5.4. JSON Web Token Claims Registration

This specification registers the following Claims in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [$\underline{IANA.JWT.Claims}$] established by [\underline{JWT}].

5.4.1. Registry Contents

- o Claim Name: "act"
- o Claim Description: Actor
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): <u>Section 4.1</u> of [[this specification]]
- o Claim Name: "scp"
- o Claim Description: Scope Values
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): <u>Section 4.2</u> of [[this specification]]
- o Claim Name: "may_act"
- o Claim Description: May Act For
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): Section 4.3 of [[this specification]]

6. Security Considerations

All of the normal security issues that are discussed in $[\underline{JWT}]$, especially in relationship to comparing URIs and dealing with unrecognized values, also apply here.

In addition, both delegation and impersonation introduce unique security issues. Any time one principal is delegated the rights of another principal, the potential for abuse is a concern. The use of the "scp" claim is suggested to mitigate potential for such abuse, as

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 18]

it restricts the contexts in which the delegated rights can be exercised.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[IANA.JWT.Claims] IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims", <http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.

- [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] IANA, "OAuth Parameters", http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
- [JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519>.
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
- Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986">..
- Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
- [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.

7.2. Informative References

[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]

Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-2.0-os, March 2005.

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 19]

[OpenID.Core]

Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014, http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html.

- [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012, http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750.
- [RFC6755] Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth", RFC 6755, DOI 10.17487/RFC6755, October 2012, http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6755.
- [RFC7521] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
 "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
 and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,
 May 2015, http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521.

[WS-Trust]

Nadalin, A., Goodner, M., Gudgin, M., Barbir, A., and H. Granqvist, "WS-Trust 1.4", February 2012, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/v1.4/
ws-trust.html>.

Appendix A. Additional Token Exchange Examples

Two example token exchanges are provided in the following sections illustrating impersonation and delegation, respectively (with extra line breaks and indentation for display purposes only).

A.1. Impersonation Token Exchange Example

A.1.1. Token Exchange Request

In the following token exchange request, an anonymous client is requesting a token with impersonation semantics. The client tells the authorization server that it needs a token for use at the target service with the logical name "urn:example:cooperation-context".

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 20]

```
POST /as/token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
```

grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Atoken-exchange
&audience=urn%3Aexample%3Acooperation-context

&subject_token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjE2In0.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwc
zovL2FzLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9jbGllbnQuZXhhbXBsZS5
uZXQiLCJleHAiOjE0NDE5MTA2MDAsIm5iZiI6MTQ0MTkwOTAwMCwic3ViIjoiYmNAZ
XhhbXBsZS5uZXQiLCJzY3AiOlsib3JkZXJzIiwicHJvZmlsZSIsImhpc3RvcnkiXX0
.F1EZzN9j3LwyrLkDD8pjR7fzHqdYl1ly-jEILfmgKY_0hNuT3_fmUChu9oQdBNjHj
wu58iLSmaqZl-5_9-ilzw

&subject_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Ajwt

Figure 9: Token Exchange Request

A.1.2. Subject Token Claims

The "subject_token" in the prior request is a JWT and the decoded JWT Claims Set is shown here. The JWT is intended for consumption by the authorization server within a specific time window. The subject of the JWT ("bc@example.net") is the party on behalf of whom the new token is being requested.

```
{
  "aud":"https://as.example.com",
  "iss":"https://client.example.net",
  "exp":1441910600,
  "nbf":1441909000,
  "sub":"bc@example.net",
  "scp":["orders","profile","history"]
}
```

Figure 10: Subject Token Claims

A.1.3. Token Exchange Response

The "access_token" parameter of the token exchange response shown below contains the new token that the client requested. The other parameters of the response indicate that the token is a JWT that expires in an hour and that the access token type is not applicable since the issued token is not an access token.

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 21]

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store

{
    "access_token":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjcyIn0.eyJhdWQiOiJ1cm4
    6ZXhhbXBsZTpjb29wZXJhdGlvbi1jb250ZXh0IiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9hcy51
    eGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsImV4cCI6MTQ0MTkxMzYxMCwic3ViIjoiYmNAZXhhbXBsZS5uZ
    XQiLCJzY3AiOlsib3JkZXJzIiwiaGlzdG9yeSIsInByb2ZpbGUiXX0.YQHuLmI1YD
    TugbfEvgGY2gaGBmMyj9BepZSECCBE9j9ogqZv2qx6VQQPrbT1k7vBYGLNMOkkpmm
    JkxZDS0YV7g",
    "issued_token_type":"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt",
    "token_type":"N_A",
    "expires_in":3600
}
```

Figure 11: Token Exchange Response

A.1.4. Issued Token Claims

The decoded JWT Claims Set of the issued token is shown below. The new JWT is issued by the authorization server and intended for consumption by a system entity known by the logical name "urn:example:cooperation-context" any time before its expiration. The subject ("sub") of the JWT is the same as the subject the token used to make the request, which effectively enables the client to impersonate that subject at the system entity known by the logical name of "urn:example:cooperation-context" by using the token.

```
{
  "aud":"urn:example:cooperation-context",
  "iss":"https://as.example.com",
  "exp":1441913610,
  "sub":"bc@example.net",
  "scp":["orders","history","profile"]
}
```

Figure 12: Issued Token Claims

A.2. Delegation Token Exchange Example

A.2.1. Token Exchange Request

In the following token exchange request, an anonymous client is requesting a token with delegation semantics, which is indicated by the inclusion of the "want_composite" parameter. The client tells the authorization server that it needs a token for use at the target service with the logical name "urn:example:cooperation-context".

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 22]

```
POST /as/token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
```

grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Atoken-exchange &audience=urn%3Aexample%3Acooperation-context

&want_composite=true

&subject_token=eyJhbGci0iJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjE2In0.eyJhdWQi0iJodHRwc
zovL2FzLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9jbGllbnQuZXhhbXBsZS5
uZXQiLCJleHAi0jE0NDE5MTAwNjAsInNjcCI6WyJzdGF0dXMiLCJmZWVkIl0sInN1Y
iI6InVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQiLCJtYXlfYWN0Ijp7InN1YiI6ImFkbWluQGV4YW1
wbGUubmV0In19.cklRpQMYzs9AYoJ3DMht10nMhAF_0YeQgV35rp7J7ErkvnPm1gr_
0eQD1wTbnbburbyC7nwKdK5Jrn31aQPxUg

&subject_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Ajwt
&actor_token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjE2In0.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwczo
vL2FzLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9jbGllbnQuZXhhbXBsZS5uZ
XQiLCJleHAiOjE0NDE5MTAwNjAsInN1YiI6ImFkbWluQGV4YW1wbGUubmV0In0.X15
8zUs055Fo0humOUCUCy582BQRAWbMsIKbxT1mJRrQrk2cpU6r6CWeI4ukQoQRe6RTr
Esk4wX21Mf8sELxaA

&actor_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Ajwt

Figure 13: Token Exchange Request

A.2.2. Subject Token Claims

The "subject_token" in the prior request is a JWT and the decoded JWT Claims Set is shown here. The JWT is intended for consumption by the authorization server before a specific expiration time. The subject of the JWT ("user@example.net") is the party on behalf of whom the new token is being requested.

```
{
  "aud":"https://as.example.com",
  "iss":"https://client.example.net",
  "exp":1441910060,
  "scp":["status","feed"],
  "sub":"user@example.net",
  "may_act":
  {
     "sub":"admin@example.net"
  }
}
```

Figure 14: Subject Token Claims

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 23]

A.2.3. Actor Token Claims

The "actor_token" in the prior request is a JWT and the decoded JWT Claims Set is shown here. This JWT is also intended for consumption by the authorization server before a specific expiration time. The subject of the JWT ("admin@example.net") is the actor that will wield the security token being requested.

```
{
  "aud":"https://as.example.com",
  "iss":"https://client.example.net",
  "exp":1441910060,
  "sub":"admin@example.net"
}
```

Figure 15: Actor Token Claims

A.2.4. Token Exchange Response

The "access_token" parameter of the token exchange response shown below contains the new token that the client requested. The other parameters of the response indicate that the token is a JWT that expires in an hour and that the access token type is not applicable since the issued token is not an access token.

```
HTTP/1.1 200 0K
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store

{
    "access_token":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjcyIn0.eyJhdWQiOiJ1cm4
    6ZXhhbXBsZTpjb29wZXJhdGlvbi1jb250ZXh0IiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9hcy51
    eGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsImV4cCI6MTQ0MTkxMzYxMCwic2NwIjpbInN0YXR1cyIsImZlZ
    WQiXSwic3ViIjoidXNlckBleGFtcGxlLm5ldCIsImFjdCI6eyJzdWIi0iJhZG1pbk
    BleGFtcGxlLm5ldCJ9fQ._qjM7Ij_HcrC78omT4jiZTFJOuzsAj1wPo31ymQS-Suq
    r64S1jCp6pfQR-in_OOAosAGamEg4jyPsht6kMAiYA",
    "issued_token_type":"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt",
    "token_type":"N_A",
    "expires_in":3600
}
```

Figure 16: Token Exchange Response

A.2.5. Issued Token Claims

The decoded JWT Claims Set of the issued token is shown below. The new JWT is issued by the authorization server and intended for consumption by a system entity known by the logical name

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 24]

"urn:example:cooperation-context" any time before its expiration. The subject ("sub") of the JWT is the same as the subject of the "subject_token" used to make the request. The actor ("act") of the JWT is the same as the subject of the "actor_token" used to make the request. This indicates delegation and identifies "admin@example.net" as the current actor to whom authority has been delegated to act on behalf of "user@example.net".

```
{
  "aud":"urn:example:cooperation-context",
  "iss":"https://as.example.com",
  "exp":1441913610,
  "scp":["status","feed"],
  "sub":"user@example.net",
  "act":
  {
     "sub":"admin@example.net"
  }
}
```

Figure 17: Issued Token Claims

Appendix B. Acknowledgements

This specification was developed within the OAuth Working Group, which includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. It was produced under the chairmanship of Hannes Tschofenig and Derek Atkins with Kathleen Moriarty and Stephen Farrell serving as Security Area Directors. The following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording to this specification:

Caleb Baker, William Denniss, Phil Hunt, Jason Keglovitz, Matt Miller, Matthew Perry, Justin Richer, Scott Tomilson, and Hannes Tschofenig.

Appendix C. Open Issues

The following decisions need to be made and updates to this spec performed:

o Should there be a way to use short names for some common token type identifiers? URIs are necessary in the general case for extensibility and vendor/deployment specific types. But short names like "access_token" and "jwt" are aesthetically appealing and slightly more efficient in terms of bytes on the wire and urlencoding. There seemed to be rough consensus in Prague ('No objection to use the proposed mechanism for a default prefix' from https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/93/minutes/minutes-93-oauth) for

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 25]

supporting a shorthand for commonly used types - i.e. when the value does not contain a ":" character, the value would be treated as though "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:" were prepended to it. So, for example, the value "jwt" for "requested_token_type" would be semantically equivalent to "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt" and the value "access_token" would be equivalent to "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token". However, it was a fairly brief discussion in Prague and it has since been suggested that making participants handle both syntaxes will unnecessarily complicate the supporting code.

- o Provide a way to include supplementary claims or information in the request that would/could potentially be included in the issued token. There are real use cases for this but we would need to work through what it would look like.
- o Understand and define exactly how the presentation of PoP/non-bearer tokens works. Of course, the specifications defining these kinds of tokens need to do so first before there is much we can do in this specification in this regard.
- o It seems there may be cases in which it would be desirable for the authenticated client to be somehow represented in the issued token, sometimes in addition to the actor, which can already be represented using the "act" claim. Perhaps with a "client_id" claim?

Appendix D. Document History

[[to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC]]

- o Updated the document editors (adding Campbell, Bradley, and Mortimore).
- o Added to the title.
- o Added to the abstract and introduction.
- o Updated the format of the request to use application/x-www-form-urlencoded request parameters and the response to use the existing token endpoint JSON parameters defined in OAuth 2.0.
- o Changed the grant type identifier to urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange.
- o Added <u>RFC 6755</u> registration requests for urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:refresh_token, urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token, and urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange.
- o Added <u>RFC 6749</u> registration requests for request/response parameters.

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 26]

- o Removed the Implementation Considerations and the requirement to support JWTs.
- o Clarified many aspects of the text.
- o Changed "on_behalf_of" to "subject_token", "on_behalf_of_token_type" to "subject_token_type", "act_as" to "actor_token", and "act_as_token_type" to "actor_token_type".
- o Added an "audience" request parameter used to indicate the logical names of the target services at which the client intends to use the requested security token.
- o Added a "want_composite" request parameter used to indicate the desire for a composite token rather than trying to infer it from the presence/absence of token(s) in the request.
- o Added a "resource" request parameter used to indicate the URLs of resources at which the client intends to use the requested security token.
- o Specified that multiple "audience" and "resource" request parameter values may be used.
- o Defined the JWT claim "act" (actor) to express the current actor or delegation principal.
- o Defined the JWT claim "may_act" to express that one party is authorized to act on behalf of another party.
- o Defined the JWT claim "scp" (scopes) to express OAuth 2.0 scopetoken values.
- o Added the "N_A" (not applicable) OAuth Access Token Type definition for use in contexts in which the token exchange syntax requires a "token_type" value, but in which the token being issued is not an access token.
- o Added examples.

-02

- o Enabled use of Security Token types other than JWTs for "act_as" and "on_behalf_of" request values.
- o Referenced the JWT and OAuth Assertions RFCs.

-01

o Updated references.

-00

o Created initial working group draft from draft-jones-oauth-tokenexchange-01.

Jones, et al. Expires June 14, 2016 [Page 27]

Authors' Addresses

Michael B. Jones Microsoft

Email: mbj@microsoft.com

URI: http://self-issued.info/

Anthony Nadalin Microsoft

Email: tonynad@microsoft.com

Brian Campbell Ping Identity

Email: brian.d.campbell@gmail.com

John Bradley Ping Identity

Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com

Chuck Mortimore Salesforce

Email: cmortimore@salesforce.com