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**MUD (D)TLS profiles for IoT devices**  
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**Abstract**

This memo extends Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) to incorporate (D)TLS profile parameters. This allows a network element to identify unexpected (D)TLS usage, which can indicate the presence of unauthorized software or malware on an endpoint.

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## 1. Introduction

Encryption is necessary to protect the privacy of end users using IoT devices. In a network setting, TLS [[RFC8446](#)] and DTLS [[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13](#)] are the dominant protocols providing encryption for IoT device traffic. Unfortunately, in conjunction with IoT applications' rise of encryption, malware is also using encryption which thwarts network-based analysis such as deep packet inspection (DPI). Other mechanisms are needed to notice malware is running on the IoT device.

Malware frequently uses its own libraries for its activities, and those libraries are re-used much like any other software engineering project. Research [[malware](#)] indicates there are observable differences in how malware uses encryption compared with how non-malware uses encryption. There are several interesting findings specific to DTLS and TLS which were found common to malware:

- o Older and weaker cryptographic parameters (e.g., TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_RC4\_128\_SHA).
- o TLS SNI and server certificates are composed of subjects with characteristics of a domain generation algorithm (DGA) (e.g., [www.33mhwt2j.net](#)).



- o Higher use of self-signed certificates compared with typical legitimate software.
- o Discrepancies in the server name indication (SNI) TLS extension in the ClientHello message and the DNS names in the SubjectAltName(SAN) X.509 extension in the server certificate message.
- o Discrepancies in the key exchange algorithm and the client public key length in comparison with legitimate flows. As a reminder, Client Key Exchange message has been removed from TLS 1.3.
- o Lower diversity in TLS client advertised TLS extensions compared to legitimate clients.
- o Malware using privacy enhancing technologies like Tor, Psiphon and Ultrasurf (see [[malware-tls](#)]) and, evasion techniques such as ClientHello randomization to evade detection in order to continue exploiting the end user.
- o Malware using DNS-over-HTTPS [[RFC8484](#)] to avoid detection by malware DNS filtering service ([[malware-doh](#)]). Malware agent may not use the DNS-over-HTTPS server provided by the local network.

If observable (D)TLS profile parameters are used, the following functions are possible which have a favorable impact on network security:

- o Permit intended DTLS or TLS use and block malicious DTLS or TLS use. This is superior to the layer 3 and layer 4 ACLs of Manufacturer Usage Description Specification (MUD) [[RFC8520](#)] which are not suitable for broad communication patterns.
- o Ensure TLS certificates are valid. Several TLS deployments have been vulnerable to active Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks because of the lack of certificate validation or vulnerability in the certificate validation function (see [[crypto-vulnerability](#)]). By observing (D)TLS profile parameters, a network element can detect when the TLS SNI mismatches the SubjectAltName and when the server's certificate is invalid. In TLS 1.2, the ClientHello, ServerHello and Certificate messages are all sent in clear-text, however in TLS 1.3, the Certificate message is encrypted thereby hiding the server identity from any intermediary. In TLS 1.3, the middle-box needs to act as a TLS proxy to validate the server certificate and to detect TLS SNI mismatch with the server certificate.



- o Support new communication patterns. An IoT device can learn a new capability, and the new capability can change the way the IoT device communicates with other devices located in the local network and Internet. There would be an inaccurate policy if an IoT device rapidly changes the IP addresses and domain names it communicates with while the MUD ACLs were slower to update. In such a case, observable (D)TLS profile parameters can be used to permit intended use and to block malicious behaviour from the IoT device.

This document extends MUD [[RFC8520](#)] to model observable (D)TLS profile parameters. Using these (D)TLS profile parameters, an active MUD-enforcing firewall can identify MUD non-compliant (D)TLS behavior indicating outdated cryptography or malware. This detection can prevent malware downloads, block access to malicious domains, enforce use of strong ciphers, stop data exfiltration, etc. In addition, organizations may have policies around acceptable ciphers and certificates on the websites the IoT devices connect to. Examples include no use of old and less secure versions of TLS, no use of self-signed certificates, deny-list or accept-list of Certificate Authorities, valid certificate expiration time, etc. These policies can be enforced by observing the (D)TLS profile parameters. Enterprise firewalls can use the IoT device's (D)TLS profile parameters to identify legitimate flows by observing (D)TLS sessions, and can make inferences to permit legitimate flows and to block malicious or insecure flows. The proposed technique is also suitable in deployments where decryption techniques are not ideal due to privacy concerns, non-cooperating end-points and expense.

## 2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)][[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

"(D)TLS" is used for statements that apply to both Transport Layer Security [[RFC8446](#)] and Datagram Transport Layer Security [[RFC6347](#)]. Specific terms are used for any statement that applies to either protocol alone.

'DoH/DoT' refers to DNS-over-HTTPS and/or DNS-over-TLS.



### **3. Overview of MUD (D)TLS profiles for IoT devices**

In Enterprise networks, protection and detection are typically done both on end hosts and in the network. Host agents have deep visibility on the devices where they are installed, whereas the network has broader visibility. Installing host agents may not be a viable option on IoT devices, and network-based security is an efficient means to protect such IoT devices. (D)TLS profile parameters of IoT device can be used by middle-boxes to detect and block malware communication, while at the same time preserving the privacy of legitimate uses of encryption. Middle-boxes need not proxy (D)TLS but can passively observe the parameters of (D)TLS handshakes from IoT devices and gain good visibility into TLS 1.0 to 1.2 parameters and partial visibility into TLS 1.3 parameters. Malicious agents can try to use the (D)TLS profile parameters of legitimate agents to evade detection, but it becomes a challenge to mimic the behavior of various IoT device types and IoT device models from several manufacturers. In other words, malware developers will have to develop malicious agents per IoT device type, manufacturer and model, infect the device with the tailored malware agent and will have keep up with updates to the device's (D)TLS profile parameters over time. Further, the malware's command and control server certificates need to be signed by the same certifying authorities trusted by the IoT devices. Typically, IoT devices have an infrastructure that supports a rapid deployment of updates, and malware agents will have a near-impossible task of similarly deploying updates and continuing to mimic the TLS behavior of the IoT device it has infected.

The compromised IoT devices are typically used for launching DDoS attacks ([Section 3 of \[RFC8576\]](#)). Some of the DDoS attacks like Slowloris and Transport Layer Security (TLS) re-negotiation can be detected by observing the (D)TLS profile parameters. For example, the victim's server certificate need not be signed by the same certifying authorities trusted by the IoT device.

### **4. (D)TLS 1.3 handshake**

In (D)TLS 1.3, full (D)TLS handshake inspection is not possible since all (D)TLS handshake messages excluding the ClientHello message are encrypted. (D)TLS 1.3 has introduced new extensions in the handshake record layers called Encrypted Extensions. Using these extensions handshake messages will be encrypted and network devices (such as a firewall) are incapable deciphering the handshake, thus cannot view the server certificate. However, the ClientHello and ServerHello still have some fields visible, such as the list of supported versions, named groups, cipher suites, signature algorithms and extensions in ClientHello and, chosen cipher in the ServerHello. For





instance, if the malware uses evasion techniques like ClientHello randomization, the observable list of cipher suites and extensions offered by the malware agent in the ClientHello message will not match the list of cipher suites and extensions offered by the legitimate client in the ClientHello message, and the middle-box can block malicious flows without acting as a (D)TLS 1.3 proxy.

#### **[4.1.](#) Full (D)TLS 1.3 handshake inspection**

To obtain more visibility into negotiated TLS 1.3 parameters, a middle-box can act as a (D)TLS 1.3 proxy. A middle-box can act as a (D)TLS proxy for the IoT devices owned and managed by the IT team in the Enterprise network and the (D)TLS proxy must meet the security and privacy requirements of the organization. In other words, the scope of middle-box acting as a (D)TLS proxy is restricted to Enterprise network owning and managing the IoT devices. The middle-box MUST follow the behaviour explained in [Section 9.3 of \[RFC8446\]](#) to act as a compliant (D)TLS 1.3 proxy.

To function as a (D)TLS proxy the middle-box creates a signed certificate using itself as a certificate authority. That certificate authority has to be trusted by the (D)TLS client. The IoT device needs to be configured with the middle-box's CA certificate as Explicit Trust Anchor database entry to validate the server certificate. The mechanism to configure the IoT device with the middle-box's CA certificate is out of scope. The middle-box uses the "supported\_versions" TLS extension (defined in TLS 1.3 to negotiate the supported TLS versions between client and server) to determine the TLS version. During the (D)TLS handshake, If (D)TLS version 1.3 is used, the middle-box ((D)TLS proxy) modifies the certificate provided by the server and signs it with the private key from the local CA certificate. The middle-box has visibility into further exchanges between the IoT device and server which enables it to inspect the (D)TLS 1.3 handshake, enforce the MUD (D)TLS profile and can inspect subsequent network traffic. The IoT device uses the Explicit Trust Anchor database to validate the server certificate.

#### **[4.2.](#) Encrypted SNI**

To increase privacy, encrypted SNI (ESNI, [\[I-D.ietf-tls-sni-encryption\]](#)) prevents passive observation of the TLS Server Name Indication extension. To effectively provide that privacy protection, SNI encryption needs to be used in conjunction with DNS encryption (e.g., DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [\[RFC7858\]](#) or DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [\[RFC8484\]](#)). A middle-box (e.g., firewall) passively inspecting an encrypted SNI (D)TLS handshake cannot observe the encrypted SNI nor observe the encrypted DNS traffic. If an IoT device is pre-configured to use public DoH/DoT servers, that middle-



box needs to act as a DoH/DoT proxy and replace the ECH configuration in the "echconfig" SvcParamKey (Section 6.3 of [\[I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https\]](#)) with the middle box's ECH configuration. Instead of an unappealing DoH/DoT proxy, the IoT device can be bootstrapped to discover and authenticate DoH/DoT servers provided by a local network by making use of one of the mechanisms described in Section 4 of [\[I-D.reddy-add-enterprise\]](#). The local DoH/DoT server replaces the ECH configuration in the "echconfig" SvcParamKey with the middle box's ECH configuration.

A common usage pattern for certain type of IoT devices (e.g., light bulb) is for it to "call home" to a service that resides on the public Internet, where that service is referenced through a domain name (A or AAAA record). As discussed in Manufacturer Usage Description Specification [\[RFC8520\]](#), because these devices tend to require access to very few sites, all other access should be considered suspect. If an IoT device is pre-configured to use public DoH/DoT server, the MUD policy enforcement point is moved to that public server, which cannot enforce the MUD policy based on domain names ([Section 8 of \[RFC8520\]](#)). If the DNS query is not accessible for inspection, it becomes quite difficult for the infrastructure to suspect anything. Thus the use of a public DoH/DoT server is incompatible with MUD in general. A local DoH/DoT server is necessary to allow MUD policy enforcement on the local network.

## 5. (D)TLS profile YANG module

This document specifies a YANG module for representing (D)TLS profile. The (D)TLS profile YANG module provides a method for firewall to observe the (D)TLS profile parameters in the (D)TLS handshake to permit intended use and to block malicious behavior. This module uses the common YANG types defined in [\[RFC6991\]](#), rules defined in [\[RFC8519\]](#) and cryptographic types defined in [\[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types\]](#).

The (D)TLS profiles and the parameters in each (D)TLS profile include the following:

- o Profile name
- o (D)TLS version in ClientHello.legacy\_version
- o (D)TLS versions supported by the IoT device. As a reminder, "supported\_versions" extension defined in (D)TLS 1.3 is used by the client to indicate which versions of (D)TLS it supports and a client is considered to be attempting to negotiate (D)TLS 1.3 if the ClientHello contains a "supported\_versions" extension with 0x0304 contained in its body.



- o If GREASE [[RFC8701](#)] (Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility) values are offered by the client or not.
- o List of supported symmetric encryption algorithms. TLS 1.3 defines five cipher suites (Appendix B.4 of [[RFC8446](#)]), but most clients are continuing to offer TLS 1.2 compatible cipher suites for backwards compatibility.
- o List of supported compression methods for data compression. In TLS 1.3, only the "null" compression method is allowed ([Section 4.1.2 of \[RFC8446\]](#)).
- o List of supported extension types
- o List of trust anchor certificates used by the IoT device. If the server certificate is signed by one of the trust anchors, the middle-box continues with the connection as normal. Otherwise, the middle-box will react as if the server certificate validation has failed and takes appropriate action (e.g, block the (D)TLS session). An IoT device can use a private trust anchor to validate a server's certificate (e.g., the private trust anchor can be preloaded at manufacturing time on the IoT device and the IoT device fetches the firmware image from the Firmware server whose certificate is signed by the private CA).
- o List of SPKI pin set pre-configured on the client to validate self-signed server certificates or raw public keys. A SPKI pin set is a cryptographic digest to "pin" public key information in a manner similar to HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) [[RFC7469](#)]. If SPKI pin set is present in the (D)TLS profile of a IoT device and the server certificate does not pass the PKIX certification path validation, the middle-box computes the SPKI Fingerprint for the public key found in the server's certificate (or in the raw public key, if the server provides that instead). If a computed fingerprint exactly matches one of the SPKI pin sets in the (D)TLS profile, the middle-box continues with the connection as normal. Otherwise, the middle-box will act on the SPKI validation failure and takes appropriate action.
- o Cryptographic hash algorithm used to generate the SPKI pinsets
- o List of pre-shared key exchange modes
- o List of named groups (DHE or ECDHE) supported by the client
- o List signature algorithms the client can validate in X.509 server certificates



- o List signature algorithms the client is willing to accept for CertificateVerify message ([Section 4.2.3 of \[RFC8446\]](#)). For example, a TLS client implementation can support different sets of algorithms for certificates and in TLS to signal the capabilities in "signature\_algorithms\_cert" and "signature\_algorithms" extensions.
- o List of supported application protocols (e.g., h3, h2, http/1.1 etc.)
- o List of certificate compression algorithms (defined in [\[I-D.ietf-tls-certificate-compression\]](#))
- o List of the distinguished names [\[X501\]](#) of acceptable certificate authorities, represented in DER-encoded format [\[X690\]](#) (defined in [Section 4.2.4 of \[RFC8446\]](#))
- o List of client key exchange algorithms and the client public key lengths in versions prior to (D)TLS 1.3

The (D)TLS profile parameters include the GREASE values for extension types, named groups, signature algorithms, (D)TLS versions, pre-shared key exchange modes and cipher suites, but normalized to the value 0x0a to preserve ordering information. Note that the GREASE values are random but their positions are deterministic ([Section 5 of \[RFC8701\]](#)) and peers will ignore these values and interoperate.

If the (D)TLS profile parameters are not observed in a (D)TLS session from the IoT device, the default behaviour is to block the (D)TLS session.

Note: The TLS and DTLS IANA registries are available from <https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.txt>.

### **5.1. Tree Structure**

This document augments the "ietf-mud" MUD YANG module defined in [\[RFC8520\]](#) for signaling the IoT device (D)TLS profile. This document defines the YANG module "redy-opsawg-mud-tls-profile", which has the following tree structure:





```
module: reddy-opsawg-mud-tls-profile
augment /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches:
  +--rw client-profile
    +--rw tls-profiles* [profile-name]
      +--rw profile-name          string
      +--rw protocol-version?     uint16
      +--rw supported_versions*   uint16
      +--rw grease_extension?     boolean
      +--rw encryption-algorithms* encryption-algorithm
      +--rw compression-methods*  compression-method
      +--rw extension-types*      extension-type
      +--rw acceptlist-ta-certs*   ct:trust-anchor-cert-cms
      +--rw SPKI-pin-sets*         SPKI-pin-set
      +--rw SPKI-hash-algorithm?   iha:hash-algorithm-type
      +--rw psk-key-exchange-modes* psk-key-exchange-mode
      +--rw supported-groups*      supported-group
      +--rw signature-algorithms-cert* signature-algorithm
      +--rw signature-algorithms*  signature-algorithm
      +--rw application-protocols* application-protocol
      +--rw cert-compression-algorithms* cert-compression-algorithm
      +--rw certificate_authorities* certificate_authorities
      +--rw client-public-keys
        +--rw key-exchange-algorithms* key-exchange-algorithm
        +--rw client-public-key-lengths* client-public-key-length
```

## 5.2. YANG Module

```
module reddy-opsawg-mud-tls-profile {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:redy-opsawg-mud-tls-profile";
  prefix mud-tls-profile;

  import ietf-crypto-types {
    prefix ct;
    reference "draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-01:
      Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
  }

  import iana-hash-algs {
    prefix iha;
    reference
      "RFC XXXX: Common YANG Data Types for Hash algorithms";
  }

  import ietf-access-control-list {
    prefix acl;
    reference
```



```
"RFC 8519": YANG Data Model for Network Access
    Control Lists (ACLs)";
}

organization
  "IETF Operations and Management Area Working Group Working Group";
contact
  "Editor: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
    <mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>";

description
  "This module contains YANG definition for the IoT device
    (D)TLS profile.

    Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
    authors of the code. All rights reserved.

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    Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

    This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
    the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

revision 2019-06-12 {
  description
    "Initial revision";
}

typedef compression-method {
  type uint8;
  description "Compression method";
}

typedef extension-type {
  type uint16;
  description "Extension type";
}

typedef encryption-algorithm {
  type uint16;
  description "Encryption algorithm";
}

typedef supported-group {
```



```
    type uint16;
    description "Named group (DHE or ECDHE)";
}

typedef SPKI-pin-set {
    type binary;
    description "Subject Public Key Info pin set";
}

typedef signature-algorithm {
    type uint16;
    description "Signature algorithm";
}

typedef key-exchange-algorithm {
    type uint8;
    description "key exchange algorithm";
}

typedef psk-key-exchange-mode {
    type uint8;
    description "pre-shared key exchange mode";
}

typedef client-public-key-length {
    type uint8;
    description "client public key length";
}

typedef application-protocol {
    type string;
    description "application protocol";
}

typedef cert-compression-algorithm {
    type uint8;
    description "certificate compression algorithm";
}

typedef certificate_authority {
    type binary;
    description "Distinguished Name of Certificate authority";
}

grouping client-profile {
    description
        "A grouping for (D)TLS profiles.";
    container client-profile {
```



```
list tls-profiles {
  key "profile-name";
  description
    "A list of (D)TLS version profiles supported by the client.";
  leaf profile-name {
    type string {
      length "1..64";
    }
    description
      "The name of (D)TLS profile; space and special
      characters are not allowed.";
  }
  leaf protocol-version {
    type uint16;
    description "(D)TLS version in ClientHello.legacy_version";
  }
  leaf-list supported_versions {
    type uint16;
    description
      "TLS versions supported by the client indicated
      in the supported_versions extension in (D)TLS 1.3.";
  }
  leaf grease_extension {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If set to 'true', Grease extension values are offered by
      the client.";
  }
  leaf-list encryption-algorithms {
    type encryption-algorithm;
    description "Encryption algorithms";
  }
  leaf-list compression-methods {
    type compression-method;
    description "Compression methods";
  }
  leaf-list extension-types {
    type extension-type;
    description "Extension Types";
  }
  leaf-list acceptlist-ta-certs {
    type ct:trust-anchor-cert-cms;
    description
      "A list of trust anchor certificates used by the client.";
  }
  leaf-list SPKI-pin-sets {
    type SPKI-pin-set;
    description
```





```
        "A list of SPKI pin sets pre-configured on the client
        to validate self-signed server certificate or
        raw public key.";
    }
    leaf SPKI-hash-algorithm {
        type iha:hash-algorithm-type;
        description
            "cryptographic hash algorithm used to generate the
            SPKI pinset.";
    }
    leaf-list psk-key-exchange-modes {
        type psk-key-exchange-mode;
        description
            "pre-shared key exchange modes";
    }
    leaf-list supported-groups {
        type supported-group;
        description
            "A list of named groups supported by the client.";
    }
    leaf-list signature-algorithms-cert {
        type signature-algorithm;
        description
            "A list signature algorithms the client can validate
            in X.509 certificates.";
    }
    leaf-list signature-algorithms {
        type signature-algorithm;
        description
            "A list signature algorithms the client can validate
            in the CertificateVerify message.";
    }
    leaf-list application-protocols {
        type application-protocol;
        description
            "A list application protocols supported by the client";
    }
    leaf-list cert-compression-algorithms {
        type cert-compression-algorithm;
        description
            "A list certificate compression algorithms
            supported by the client";
    }
    leaf-list certificate_authorities {
        type certificate_authority;
        description
            "A list of the distinguished names of certificate authorities
            acceptable to the client";
```



```

    }
    container client-public-keys {
      leaf-list key-exchange-algorithms {
        type key-exchange-algorithm;
        description
          "Key exchange algorithms supported by the client";
      }
      leaf-list client-public-key-lengths {
        type client-public-key-length;
        description
          "client public key lengths";
      }
    }
  }
}
}
}
augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches" {
  description
    "MUD (D)TLS specific matches.";
  uses client-profile;
}
}

```

## 6. MUD File Example

This example below contains (D)TLS profile parameters for a IoT device used to reach servers listening on port 443 using TCP transport. JSON encoding of YANG modelled data [[RFC7951](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7951)] is used to illustrate the example.

```

{
  "ietf-mud:mud": {
    "mud-version": 1,
    "mud-url": "https://example.com/IoTDevice",
    "last-update": "2019-18-06T03:56:40.105+10:00",
    "cache-validity": 100,
    "is-supported": true,
    "systeminfo": "IoT device name",
    "from-device-policy": {
      "access-lists": {
        "access-list": [
          {
            "name": "mud-7500-profile"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    "ietf-access-control-list:acls": {

```



```

    "acl": [
      {
        "name": "mud-7500-profile",
        "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
        "aces": {
          "ace": [
            {
              "name": "cl0-frdev",
              "matches": {
                "ipv6": {
                  "protocol": 6
                },
                "tcp": {
                  "ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device",
                  "destination-port": {
                    "operator": "eq",
                    "port": 443
                  }
                }
              },
              "reddy-opsawg-mud-tls-profile:client-profile" : {
                "tls-profiles" : [
                  {
                    "protocol-version" : 771,
                    "supported_versions_ext" : "FALSE",
                    "encryption-algorithms" :
                      [31354, 4865, 4866, 4867],
                    "extension-types" : [10],
                    "supported-groups" : [29]
                  }
                ]
              },
              "actions": {
                "forwarding": "accept"
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

```



## **7. Security Considerations**

Security considerations in [[RFC8520](#)] need to be taken into consideration. Although it is challenging for a malware to mimic the TLS behavior of various IoT device types and IoT device models from several manufacturers, malicious agents have a very low probability of using the same (D)TLS profile parameters as legitimate agents on the IoT device to evade detection. Network security services should also rely on contextual network data to detect false negatives. In order to detect such malicious flows, anomaly detection (deep learning techniques on network data) can be used to detect malicious agents using the same (D)TLS profile parameters as legitimate agent on the IoT device. In anomaly detection, the main idea is to maintain rigorous learning of "normal" behavior and where an "anomaly" (or an attack) is identified and categorized based on the knowledge about the normal behavior and a deviation from this normal behavior.

## **8. Privacy Considerations**

The middle-box acting as a (D)TLS proxy must immediately delete the decrypted data upon completing any necessary inspection functions. TLS proxy potentially has access to a user's PII (Personally identifiable information) and PHI (Protected Health Information). The TLS proxy must not store, process or modify PII data. For example, IT administrator can configure firewall to bypass payload inspection for a connection destined to a specific service due to privacy compliance requirements.

## **9. IANA Considerations**

This document requests IANA to register the following URIs in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [[RFC3688](#)]:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:redy-opsawg-mud-tls-profile  
Registrant Contact: The IESG.  
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

## **10. Acknowledgments**

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