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## **Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) (D)TLS Profiles for IoT Devices**

### **Abstract**

This memo extends the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) specification to incorporate (D)TLS profile parameters. This allows a network security service to identify unexpected (D)TLS usage, which can indicate the presence of unauthorized software or malware on an endpoint.

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## 1. Introduction

Encryption is necessary to enhance the privacy of end users using IoT devices. TLS [[RFC8446](#)] and DTLS [[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13](#)] are the dominant protocols (counting all (D)TLS versions) providing encryption for IoT device traffic. Unfortunately, in conjunction with IoT applications' rise of encryption, malware authors are also using encryption which thwarts network-based analysis such as deep packet inspection (DPI). Other mechanisms are thus needed to help detecting malware running on an IoT device.

Malware frequently uses proprietary libraries for its activities, and those libraries are reused much like any other software engineering project. [[malware](#)] indicates that there are observable differences in how malware uses encryption compared with how non-

malware uses encryption. There are several interesting findings specific to (D)TLS which were found common to malware:

- \*Older and weaker cryptographic parameters (e.g., TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_RC4\_128\_SHA).
- \*TLS server name indication (SNI) extension [[RFC6066](#)] and server certificates are composed of subjects with characteristics of a domain generation algorithm (DGA) (e.g., 'www.33mhw2j.net').
- \*Higher use of self-signed certificates compared with typical legitimate software.
- \*Discrepancies in the SNI TLS extension and the DNS names in the SubjectAltName (SAN) X.509 extension in the server certificate message.
- \*Discrepancies in the key exchange algorithm and the client public key length in comparison with legitimate flows. As a reminder, the Client Key Exchange message has been removed from TLS 1.3.
- \*Lower diversity in TLS client advertised extensions compared to legitimate clients.
- \*Using privacy enhancing technologies like Tor, Psiphon, Ultrasurf (see [[malware-tls](#)]), and evasion techniques such as ClientHello randomization.
- \*Using DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [[RFC8484](#)] to avoid detection by malware DNS filtering services [[malware-doh](#)]. Specifically, malware may not use the DoH server provided by the local network.

If observable (D)TLS profile parameters are used, the following functions are possible which have a positive impact on the local network security:

- \*Permit intended DTLS or TLS use and block malicious DTLS or TLS use. This is superior to the layers 3 and 4 ACLs of Manufacturer Usage Description Specification (MUD) [[RFC8520](#)] which are not suitable for broad communication patterns.
- \*Ensure TLS certificates are valid. Several TLS deployments have been vulnerable to active Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks because of the lack of certificate validation or vulnerability in the certificate validation function (see [[crypto-vulnerability](#)]). By observing (D)TLS profile parameters, a network element can detect when the TLS SNI mismatches the SubjectAltName and when the server's certificate is invalid. In TLS 1.2, the ClientHello, ServerHello and Certificate messages are all sent in clear-text. This check is not possible with TLS 1.3, which encrypts the

Certificate message thereby hiding the server identity from any intermediary. In TLS 1.3, the server certificate validation functions should be executed within an on-path TLS proxy, if such a proxy exists.

\*Support new communication patterns. An IoT device can learn a new capability, and the new capability can change the way the IoT device communicates with other devices located in the local network and Internet. There would be an inaccurate policy if an IoT device rapidly changes the IP addresses and domain names it communicates with while the MUD ACLs were slower to update (see [\[clear-as-mud\]](#)). In such a case, observable (D)TLS profile parameters can be used to permit intended use and to block malicious behavior from the IoT device.

The YANG module specified in [Section 5](#) of this document is an extension of YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs) [\[RFC8519\]](#) to enhance MUD [\[RFC8520\]](#) to model observable (D)TLS profile parameters. Using these (D)TLS profile parameters, an active MUD-enforcing network security service (e.g., firewall) can identify MUD non-compliant (D)TLS behavior indicating outdated cryptography or malware. This detection can prevent malware downloads, block access to malicious domains, enforce use of strong ciphers, stop data exfiltration, etc. In addition, organizations may have policies around acceptable ciphers and certificates for the websites the IoT devices connect to. Examples include no use of old and less secure versions of TLS, no use of self-signed certificates, deny-list or accept-list of Certificate Authorities, valid certificate expiration time, etc. These policies can be enforced by observing the (D)TLS profile parameters. Network security services can use the IoT device's (D)TLS profile parameters to identify legitimate flows by observing (D)TLS sessions, and can make inferences to permit legitimate flows and to block malicious or insecure flows. The proposed technique is also suitable in deployments where decryption techniques are not ideal due to privacy concerns, non-cooperating end-points, and expense.

## 2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [\[RFC2119\]](#)[\[RFC8174\]](#) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

"(D)TLS" is used for statements that apply to both Transport Layer Security [\[RFC8446\]](#) and Datagram Transport Layer Security [\[RFC6347\]](#). Specific terms are used for any statement that applies to either protocol alone.

'DoH/DoT' refers to DNS-over-HTTPS and/or DNS-over-TLS.

### 3. Overview of MUD (D)TLS profiles for IoT devices

In Enterprise networks, protection and detection are typically done both on end hosts and in the network. Host security agents have deep visibility on the devices where they are installed, whereas the network has broader visibility. Installing host security agents may not be a viable option on IoT devices, and network-based security is an efficient means to protect such IoT devices. If the IoT device supports a MUD (D)TLS profile, the (D)TLS profile parameters of the IoT device can be used by a middlebox to detect and block malware communication, while at the same time preserving the privacy of legitimate uses of encryption. The middlebox need not proxy (D)TLS but can passively observe the parameters of (D)TLS handshakes from IoT devices and gain visibility into TLS 1.2 parameters and partial visibility into TLS 1.3 parameters.

Malicious agents can try to use the (D)TLS profile parameters of legitimate agents to evade detection, but it becomes a challenge to mimic the behavior of various IoT device types and IoT device models from several manufacturers. In other words, malware developers will have to develop malicious agents per IoT device type, manufacturer and model, infect the device with the tailored malware agent and will have keep up with updates to the device's (D)TLS profile parameters over time. Furthermore, the malware's command and control server certificates need to be signed by the same certifying authorities trusted by the IoT devices. Typically, IoT devices have an infrastructure that supports a rapid deployment of updates, and malware agents will have a near-impossible task of similarly deploying updates and continuing to mimic the TLS behavior of the IoT device it has infected. However, if the IoT device has reached end-of-life and the IoT manufacturer will not issue a firmware or software update to the Thing or will not update the MUD file, the "is-supported" attribute defined in Section 3.6 of [\[RFC8520\]](#) can be used by the MUD manager to identify the IoT manufacturer no longer supports the device.

The end-of-life of a device does not necessarily mean that it is defective; rather, it denotes a need to replace and upgrade the network to next-generation devices for additional functionality. The network security service will have to rely on other techniques discussed in [Section 8](#) to identify malicious connections until the device is replaced.

Compromised IoT devices are typically used for launching DDoS attacks (Section 3 of [\[RFC8576\]](#)). For example, DDoS attacks like Slowloris and Transport Layer Security (TLS) re-negotiation can be

blocked if the victim's server certificate is not signed by the same certifying authorities trusted by the IoT device.

#### **4. (D)TLS 1.3 Handshake**

In (D)TLS 1.3, full (D)TLS handshake inspection is not possible since all (D)TLS handshake messages excluding the ClientHello message are encrypted. (D)TLS 1.3 has introduced new extensions in the handshake record layers called Encrypted Extensions. Using these extensions handshake messages will be encrypted and network security services (such as a firewall) are incapable to decipher the handshake, and thus cannot view the server certificate. However, the ClientHello and ServerHello still have some fields visible, such as the list of supported versions, named groups, cipher suites, signature algorithms and extensions in ClientHello, and chosen cipher in the ServerHello. For instance, if the malware uses evasion techniques like ClientHello randomization, the observable list of cipher suites and extensions offered by the malware agent in the ClientHello message will not match the list of cipher suites and extensions offered by the legitimate client in the ClientHello message, and the middlebox can block malicious flows without acting as a (D)TLS 1.3 proxy.

##### **4.1. Full (D)TLS 1.3 Handshake Inspection**

To obtain more visibility into negotiated TLS 1.3 parameters, a middlebox can act as a (D)TLS 1.3 proxy. A middlebox can act as a (D)TLS proxy for the IoT devices owned and managed by the IT team in the Enterprise network and the (D)TLS proxy must meet the security and privacy requirements of the organization. In other words, the scope of middlebox acting as a (D)TLS proxy is restricted to Enterprise network owning and managing the IoT devices. The middlebox would have to follow the behaviour detailed in Section 9.3 of [\[RFC8446\]](#) to act as a compliant (D)TLS 1.3 proxy.

To further increase privacy, Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) extension [\[I-D.ietf-tls-esni\]](#) prevents passive observation of the TLS Server Name Indication extension and other potentially sensitive fields, such as the ALPN [\[RFC7301\]](#). To effectively provide that privacy protection, ECH extension needs to be used in conjunction with DNSSEC or DNS encryption (e.g., DoH). A middlebox (e.g., firewall) passively inspecting ECH extension cannot observe the encrypted SNI nor observe the encrypted DNS traffic. The middlebox would have to follow the behaviour detailed in [\[I-D.ietf-tls-esni\]](#) to disable ECH or fake ECH records in the DNS response so that the client encrypts data to the middlebox or strips the ECH record from the DNS response. However, if the client performs full DNSSEC validation locally [\[RFC6698\]](#), it can detect forged DNS responses.

## 4.2. Encrypted DNS

A common usage pattern for certain type of IoT devices (e.g., light bulb) is for it to "call home" to a service that resides on the public Internet, where that service is referenced through a domain name (A or AAAA record). As discussed in Manufacturer Usage Description Specification [[RFC8520](#)], because these devices tend to require access to very few sites, all other access should be considered suspect. If an IoT device is pre-configured to use a DNS resolver not signaled by the network, the MUD policy enforcement point is moved to that resolver, which cannot enforce the MUD policy based on domain names (Section 8 of [[RFC8520](#)]). If the DNS query is not accessible for inspection, it becomes quite difficult for the infrastructure to suspect anything. Thus the use of a DNS resolver not signaled by the network is incompatible with MUD in general. A network-designated DoH/DoT server is necessary to allow MUD policy enforcement on the local network (Section 6.5 of [[I-D.ietf-opsawg-mud-iot-dns-considerations](#)]).

## 5. (D)TLS Profile of a IoT device

This document specifies a YANG module for representing (D)TLS profile. The (D)TLS profile YANG module provides a method for network security services to observe the (D)TLS profile parameters in the (D)TLS handshake to permit intended use and to block malicious behavior. This module uses the cryptographic types defined in [[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types](#)]. See [[RFC7925](#)] for (D)TLS 1.2 and [[I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile](#)] for DTLS 1.3 recommendations related to IoT devices, and [[RFC7525](#)] for additional (D)TLS 1.2 recommendations.

A companion YANG module is defined to include a collection of (D)TLS parameters and (D)TLS versions maintained by IANA: "iana-tls-profile" ([Section 5.3](#)).

The (D)TLS parameters in each (D)TLS profile include the following:

- \*Profile name

- \*(D)TLS versions supported by the IoT device.

- \*List of supported cipher suites. For (D)TLS1.2, [[RFC7925](#)] recommends AEAD ciphers for IoT devices.

- \*List of supported extension types

- \*List of trust anchor certificates used by the IoT device. If the server certificate is signed by one of the trust anchors, the middlebox continues with the connection as normal. Otherwise, the middlebox will react as if the server certificate validation has

failed and takes appropriate action (e.g, block the (D)TLS session). An IoT device can use a private trust anchor to validate a server's certificate (e.g., the private trust anchor can be preloaded at manufacturing time on the IoT device and the IoT device fetches the firmware image from the Firmware server whose certificate is signed by the private CA). This empowers the middlebox to reject TLS sessions to servers that the IoT device does not trust.

\*List of SPKI pin set pre-configured on the client to validate self-signed server certificates or raw public keys. A SPKI pin set is a cryptographic digest to "pin" public key information in a manner similar to HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) [[RFC7469](#)]. If SPKI pin set is present in the (D)TLS profile of a IoT device and the server certificate does not pass the PKIX certification path validation, the middlebox computes the SPKI Fingerprint for the public key found in the server's certificate (or in the raw public key, if the server provides that instead). If a computed fingerprint exactly matches one of the SPKI pin sets in the (D)TLS profile, the middlebox continues with the connection as normal. Otherwise, the middlebox will act on the SPKI validation failure and takes appropriate action.

\*Cryptographic hash algorithm used to generate the SPKI pinsets

\*List of pre-shared key exchange modes

\*List of named groups (DHE or ECDHE) supported by the client

\*List of signature algorithms the client can validate in X.509 server certificates

\*List of signature algorithms the client is willing to accept for CertificateVerify message (Section 4.2.3 of [[RFC8446](#)]). For example, a TLS client implementation can support different sets of algorithms for certificates and in TLS to signal the capabilities in "signature\_algorithms\_cert" and "signature\_algorithms" extensions.

\*List of supported application protocols (e.g., h3, h2, http/1.1 etc.)

\*List of certificate compression algorithms (defined in [[I-D.ietf-tls-certificate-compression](#)])

\*List of the distinguished names [[X501](#)] of acceptable certificate authorities, represented in DER-encoded format [[X690](#)] (defined in Section 4.2.4 of [[RFC8446](#)])



[GREASE](#) [[RFC8701](#)] sends random values on TLS parameters to ensure future extensibility of TLS extensions. Similar random values might be extended to other TLS parameters. Thus, the (D)TLS profile parameters defined in the YANG module by this document MUST NOT include the GREASE values for extension types, named groups, signature algorithms, (D)TLS versions, pre-shared key exchange modes, cipher suites and for any other TLS parameters defined in future RFCs.

The (D)TLS profile does not include parameters like compression methods for data compression, [[RFC7525](#)] recommends disabling TLS-level compression to prevent compression-related attacks. In TLS 1.3, only the "null" compression method is allowed (Section 4.1.2 of [[RFC8446](#)]).

### **5.1. Tree Structure of the (D)TLS profile Extension to the ACL YANG Model**

This document augments the "ietf-acl" ACL YANG module defined in [[RFC8519](#)] for signaling the IoT device (D)TLS profile. This document defines the YANG module "ietf-acl-tls", which has the following tree structure:

```

module: ietf-acl-tls
augment /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches:
  +--rw client-profile {match-on-tls-dtls}?
    +--rw client-profile
      +--rw tls-dtls-profiles* [profile-name]
        +--rw profile-name          string
        +--rw supported-tls-versions* ianatp:tls-version
        +--rw supported-dtls-versions* ianatp:dtls-version
        +--rw cipher-suites* [cipher hash]
          | +--rw cipher      ianatp:cipher-algorithm
          | +--rw hash       ianatp:hash-algorithm
        +--rw extension-types*
          | ianatp:extension-type
        +--rw acceptlist-ta-certs*
          | ct:trust-anchor-cert-cms
        +--rw spki
          | +--rw spki-pin-sets*      ianatp:spki-pin-set
          | +--rw spki-hash-algorithm? iha:hash-algorithm-type
        +--rw psk-key-exchange-modes*
          | ianatp:psk-key-exchange-mode
          | {tls-1-3 or dtls-1-3}?
        +--rw supported-groups*
          | ianatp:supported-group
        +--rw signature-algorithms-cert*
          | ianatp:signature-algorithm
          | {tls-1-3 or dtls-1-3}?
        +--rw signature-algorithms*
          | ianatp:signature-algorithm
        +--rw application-protocols*
          | ianatp:application-protocol
        +--rw cert-compression-algorithms*
          | ianatp:cert-compression-algorithm
          | {tls-1-3 or dtls-1-3}?
        +--rw certificate-authorities*
          | ianatp:certificate-authority
          | {tls-1-3 or dtls-1-3}?

```

## 5.2. The (D)TLS profile Extension to the ACL YANG Model

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-acl-tls@2020-10-07.yang"

```
module ietf-acl-tls {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acl-tls";
  prefix ietf-acl-tls;

  import iana-tls-profile {
    prefix ianatp;
    reference
      "RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) (D)TLS
        Profiles for IoT Devices";
  }
  import ietf-crypto-types {
    prefix ct;
    reference
      "RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
  }
  import iana-hash-algs {
    prefix iha;
    reference
      "RFC IIII: Common YANG Data Types for
        Hash algorithms";
  }
  import ietf-access-control-list {
    prefix acl;
    reference
      "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access
        Control Lists (ACLs)";
  }

  organization
    "IETF OPSAWG (Operations and Management Area Working Group)";
  contact
    "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/>
      WG List: opsawg@ietf.org

      Author: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
              TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com
    ";
  description
    "This YANG module defines a component that augments the
      IETF description of an access list to allow (D)TLS profile
      as matching criteria.

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      authors of the code. All rights reserved.

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```

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

```
revision 2020-11-02 {
  description
    "Initial revision";
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) (D)TLS
      Profiles for IoT Devices";
}

feature tls-1-2 {
  description
    "TLS Protocol Version 1.2 is supported.";
  reference
    "RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
      Version 1.2";
}

feature tls-1-3 {
  description
    "TLS Protocol Version 1.3 is supported.";
  reference
    "RFC 8446: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
      Version 1.3";
}

feature dtls-1-2 {
  description
    "DTLS Protocol Version 1.2 is supported.";
  reference
    "RFC 6346: Datagram Transport Layer Security
      Version 1.2";
}

feature dtls-1-3 {
  description
    "DTLS Protocol Version 1.3 is supported.";
  reference
    "draft-ietf-tls-dtls13: Datagram Transport Layer
      Security 1.3";
}
```

```

feature match-on-tls-dtls {
    description
        "The networking device can support matching on
        (D)TLS parameters.";
}

augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches" {
    if-feature "match-on-tls-dtls";
    description
        "(D)TLS specific matches.";
    container client-profile {
        description
            "A grouping for (D)TLS profiles.";
        container client-profile {
            description
                "A grouping for DTLS profiles.";
            list tls-dtls-profiles {
                key "profile-name";
                description
                    "A list of (D)TLS version profiles supported by
                    the client.";
                leaf profile-name {
                    type string {
                        length "1..64";
                    }
                    description
                        "The name of (D)TLS profile; space and special
                        characters are not allowed.";
                }
                leaf-list supported-tls-versions {
                    type ianatp:tls-version;
                    description
                        "TLS versions supported by the client.";
                }
                leaf-list supported-dtls-versions {
                    type ianatp:dtls-version;
                    description
                        "DTLS versions supported by the client.";
                }
            }
            list cipher-suites {
                key "cipher hash";
                leaf cipher {
                    type ianatp:cipher-algorithm;
                    description
                        "AEAD encryption algorithm as defined in RFC5116.";
                }
                leaf hash {
                    type ianatp:hash-algorithm;
                    description

```

```

        "Hash algorithm used with HKDF as defined in RFC5869.";
    }
    description
        "A list of Cipher Suites supported by the client.";
}
leaf-list extension-types {
    type ianatp:extension-type;
    description
        "A list of Extension Types supported by the client.";
}
leaf-list acceptlist-ta-certs {
    type ct:trust-anchor-cert-cms;
    description
        "A list of trust anchor certificates used by the client.";
}
container spki {
    description
        "A grouping for spki.";
    leaf-list spki-pin-sets {
        type ianatp:spki-pin-set;
        description
            "A list of SPKI pin sets pre-configured on the client
            to validate self-signed server certificate or
            raw public key.";
    }
    leaf spki-hash-algorithm {
        type iha:hash-algorithm-type;
        description
            "cryptographic hash algorithm used to generate the
            SPKI pinset.";
    }
}
leaf-list psk-key-exchange-modes {
    if-feature "tls-1-3 or dtls-1-3";
    type ianatp:psk-key-exchange-mode;
    description
        "pre-shared key exchange modes.";
}
leaf-list supported-groups {
    type ianatp:supported-group;
    description
        "A list of named groups supported by the client.";
}
leaf-list signature-algorithms-cert {
    if-feature "tls-1-3 or dtls-1-3";
    type ianatp:signature-algorithm;
    description
        "A list signature algorithms the client can validate
        in X.509 certificates.";
}

```





The TLS and DTLS IANA registries do not maintain (D)TLS version numbers. In (D)TLS 1.2 and below, "legacy\_version" field in the ClientHello message is used for version negotiation. However in (D)TLS 1.3, the "supported\_versions" extension is used by the client to indicate which versions of (D)TLS it supports. TLS 1.3 ClientHello messages are identified as having a "legacy\_version" of 0x0303 and a "supported\_versions" extension present with 0x0304 as the highest version. DTLS 1.3 ClientHello messages are identified as having a "legacy\_version" of 0xfefd and a "supported\_versions" extension present with 0x0304 as the highest version.

In order to ease updating the "iana-tls-profile" YANG module with future (D)TLS versions, new (D)TLS version registries are defined in [Section 10.2](#) and [Section 10.3](#). Whenever a new (D)TLS protocol version is defined, the registry will be updated using expert review; the "iana-tls-profile" YANG module will be automatically updated by IANA.

The "iana-tls-profile" YANG module is defined as follows:

```
<CODE BEGINS> file "iana-tls-profile@2020-10-07.yang"
```

```
module iana-tls-profile {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-tls-profile";
  prefix ianatp;

  organization
    "IANA";
  contact
    "      Internet Assigned Numbers Authority

    Postal: ICANN
           12025 Waterfront Drive, Suite 300
           Los Angeles, CA 90094-2536
           United States

    Tel:    +1 310 301 5800
    E-Mail: iana@iana.org>";
  description
    "This module contains YANG definition for the (D)TLS profile.

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    Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
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    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

    This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
    the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

  revision 2020-11-02 {
    description
      "Initial revision";
    reference
      "RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) (D)TLS Profiles
      for IoT Devices";
  }

  typedef extension-type {
    type uint16;
    description
      "Extension type in the TLS ExtensionType Values registry as
      defined in Section 7 of RFC8447.";
  }
```

```

typedef supported-group {
    type uint16;
    description
        "Supported Group in the TLS Supported Groups registry as
        defined in Section 9 of RFC8447.";
}

typedef spki-pin-set {
    type binary;
    description
        "Subject Public Key Info pin set as discussed in
        Section 2.4 of RFC7469.";
}

typedef signature-algorithm {
    type uint16;
    description
        "Signature algorithm in the TLS SignatureScheme registry as
        defined in Section 11 of RFC8446.";
}

typedef psk-key-exchange-mode {
    type uint8;
    description
        "Pre-shared key exchange mode in the TLS PskKeyExchangeMode
        registry as defined in Section 11 of RFC8446.";
}

typedef application-protocol {
    type string;
    description
        "Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol ID
        registry as defined in Section 6 of RFC7301.";
}

typedef cert-compression-algorithm {
    type uint16;
    description
        "Certificate compression algorithm in TLS Certificate
        Compression Algorithm IDs registry as defined in
        Section 7.3 of ietf-tls-certificate-compression";
}

typedef certificate-authority {
    type string;
    description
        "Distinguished Name of Certificate authority as discussed
        in Section 4.2.4 of RFC8446.";
}

```

```

}

typedef cipher-algorithm {
    type uint8;
    description
        "AEAD encryption algorithm in TLS Cipher Suites registry
        as discussed in Section 11 of RFC8446.";
}

typedef hash-algorithm {
    type uint8;
    description
        "Hash algorithm used with HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key
        Derivation Function (HKDF) in TLS Cipher Suites registry
        as discussed in Section 11 of RFC8446.";
}

typedef tls-version {
    type enumeration {
        enum tls-1.2 {
            value 1;
            description
                "TLS Protocol Version 1.2.

                TLS 1.2 ClientHello contains
                0x0303 in 'legacy_version'.";
            reference
                "RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
                Version 1.2";
        }
        enum tls-1.3 {
            value 2;
            description
                "TLS Protocol Version 1.3.

                TLS 1.3 ClientHello contains a
                supported_versions extension with 0x0304
                contained in its body and the ClientHello contains
                0x0303 in 'legacy_version'.";
            reference
                "RFC 8446: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
                Version 1.3";
        }
    }
    description
        "Indicates the TLS version.";
}

typedef dtls-version {

```

```

type enumeration {
  enum dtls-1.2 {
    value 1;
    description
      "DTLS Protocol Version 1.2.

      DTLS 1.2 ClientHello contains
      0xfe fd in 'legacy_version'.";
    reference
      "RFC 6346: Datagram Transport Layer Security 1.2";
  }
  enum dtls-1.3 {
    value 2;
    description
      "DTLS Protocol Version 1.3.

      DTLS 1.3 ClientHello contains a
      supported_versions extension with 0x0304
      contained in its body and the ClientHello contains
      0xfe fd in 'legacy_version'.";
    reference
      "RFC DDDD: Datagram Transport Layer Security 1.3";
  }
}
description
  "Indicates the DTLS version.";
}
}

<CODE ENDS>

```

#### 5.4. MUD (D)TLS Profile Extension

This document augments the "ietf-mud" MUD YANG module to indicate whether the device supports (D)TLS profile. If the "ietf-mud-tls" extension is supported by the device, MUD file is assumed to implement the "match-on-tls-dtls" ACL model feature defined in this specification. Furthermore, only "accept" or "drop" actions SHOULD be included with the (D)TLS profile similar to the actions allowed in Section 2 of [[RFC8520](#)].

This document defines the YANG module "ietf-mud-tls", which has the following tree structure:

```

module: ietf-mud-tls
  augment /ietf-mud:mud:
    +-rw is-tls-dtls-profile-supported?  boolean

```

The model is defined as follows:

<CODE BEGINS> file "iana-tls-mud@2020-10-20.yang"

```
module ietf-mud-tls {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-tls";
  prefix ietf-mud-tls;

  import ietf-mud {
    prefix ietf-mud;
  }

  organization
    "IETF OPSAWG (Operations and Management Area Working Group)";
  contact
    "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/>
    WG List: opsawg@ietf.org

    Author: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
            TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com

  ";
  description
    "Extension to a MUD module to indicate (D)TLS
    profile support.

    Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
    authors of the code. All rights reserved.

    Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
    without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
    to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
    set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
    Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

    This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
    the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

  revision 2020-10-19 {
    description
      "Initial revision.";
    reference
      "RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) (D)TLS
      Profiles for IoT Devices";
  }

  augment "/ietf-mud:mud" {
    description
      "This adds a extension for a manufacturer
```

```

        to indicate whether (D)TLS profile is
        is supported by a device.";
    leaf is-tls-dtls-profile-supported {
        type boolean;
        description
            "This value will equal 'true' if a device supports
            (D)TLS profile.";
    }
}
}

<CODE ENDS>

```

## 6. Processing of the MUD (D)TLS Profile

The following text outlines the rules for a network security service (e.g., firewall) to follow to process the MUD (D)TLS Profile:

\*If the (D)TLS parameter observed in a (D)TLS session is not specified in the MUD (D)TLS profile and the parameter is recognized by the firewall, it can identify unexpected (D)TLS usage, which can indicate the presence of unauthorized software or malware on an endpoint. The firewall can take several actions like block the (D)TLS session or raise an alert to quarantine and remediate the compromised device. For example, if the cipher suite TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA in the ClientHello message is not specified in the MUD (D)TLS profile and the cipher suite is recognized by the firewall, it can identify unexpected TLS usage.

\*If the (D)TLS parameter observed in a (D)TLS session is not specified in the MUD (D)TLS profile and the (D)TLS parameter is not recognized by the firewall, it can ignore the unrecognized parameter and the correct behavior is not to block the (D)TLS session. The behaviour is functionally equivalent to the compliant TLS middlebox description in Section 9.3 of [\[RFC8446\]](#) to ignore all unrecognized cipher suites, extensions, and other parameters. For example, if the cipher suite TLS\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305\_SHA256 in the ClientHello message is not specified in the MUD (D)TLS profile and the cipher suite is not recognized by the firewall, it can ignore the unrecognized cipher suite.

\*Deployments update at different rates, so an updated MUD (D)TLS profile may support newer parameters. If the firewall does not recognize the newer parameters, an alert should be triggered to the firewall vendor and the IoT device owner or administrator. A firewall must be readily updatable, so that when new parameters



in the MUD (D)TLS profile are discovered that are not recognized by the firewall, it can be updated quickly. Most importantly, if the firewall is not readily updatable, its protection efficacy to identify emerging malware will decrease with time. For example, if the cipher suite TLS\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8\_SHA256 specified in the MUD (D)TLS profile is not recognized by the firewall, an alert will be triggered. Similarly, if the (D)TLS version specified in the MUD file is not recognized by the firewall, an alert will be triggered.

## **7. MUD File Example**

The example below contains (D)TLS profile parameters for a IoT device used to reach servers listening on port 443 using TCP transport. JSON encoding of YANG modelled data [[RFC7951](#)] is used to illustrate the example.

```

{
  "ietf-mud:mud": {
    "mud-version": 1,
    "mud-url": "https://example.com/IoTDevice",
    "last-update": "2019-18-06T03:56:40.105+10:00",
    "cache-validity": 100,
    "extensions": [
      "ietf-mud-tls"
    ],
    "ietf-mud-tls:is-tls-dtls-profile-supported": "true",
    "is-supported": true,
    "systeminfo": "IoT device name",
    "from-device-policy": {
      "access-lists": {
        "access-list": [
          {
            "name": "mud-7500-profile"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    "ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
      "acl": [
        {
          "name": "mud-7500-profile",
          "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
          "aces": {
            "ace": [
              {
                "name": "cl0-frdev",
                "matches": {
                  "ipv6": {
                    "protocol": 6
                  },
                  "tcp": {
                    "ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device",
                    "destination-port": {
                      "operator": "eq",
                      "port": 443
                    }
                  }
                },
                "ietf-acl-tls:client-profile" : {
                  "tls-dtls-profiles" : [
                    {
                      "supported-tls-versions" : ["tls-1.3"],
                      "cipher-suites" : [
                        {
                          "cipher": 19,
                          "hash": 1
                        }
                      ]
                    }
                  ]
                }
              }
            ]
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

```

```
    },
    {
      "cipher": 19,
      "hash": 2
    }
  ],
  "extension-types" : [10,11,13,16,24],
  "supported-groups" : [29]
}
]
},
"actions": {
  "forwarding": "accept"
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
```

The following illustrates the example scenarios for processing the above profile:

\*If the extension type "encrypt\_then\_mac" (code point 22) [[RFC7366](#)] in the ClientHello message is recognized by the firewall, it can identify unexpected TLS usage.

\*If the extension type "token\_binding" (code point 24) [[RFC8472](#)] in the MUD (D)TLS profile is not recognized by the firewall, it can ignore the unrecognized extension. Because the extension type "token\_binding" is specified in the profile, an alert will be triggered to the firewall vendor and the IoT device owner or administrator to notify the firewall is not up to date.

## 8. Security Considerations

Security considerations in [[RFC8520](#)] need to be taken into consideration. The middlebox must adhere to the invariants discussed in Section 9.3 of [[RFC8446](#)] to act as a compliant proxy.

Although it is challenging for a malware to mimic the TLS behavior of various IoT device types and IoT device models from several manufacturers, malicious agents have a very low probability of using the same (D)TLS profile parameters as legitimate agents on the IoT device to evade detection. Network security services should also rely on contextual network data to detect false negatives. In order to detect such malicious flows, anomaly detection (deep learning techniques on network data) can be used to detect malicious agents using the same (D)TLS profile parameters as legitimate agent on the IoT device. In anomaly detection, the main idea is to maintain rigorous learning of "normal" behavior and where an "anomaly" (or an attack) is identified and categorized based on the knowledge about the normal behavior and a deviation from this normal behavior.

## 9. Privacy Considerations

Privacy considerations discussed in Section 16 of [[RFC8520](#)] to not reveal the MUD URL to an attacker need to be taken into consideration. The MUD URL can be stored in Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for secure operation, enhanced data security, and prevent exposure to unauthorized software.

Full handshake inspection ([Section 4.1](#)) requires a TLS proxy device which needs to decrypt traffic between the IoT device and its server(s). There is a tradeoff between privacy of the data carried inside TLS (especially e.g., personally identifiable information and protected health information) and efficacy of endpoint security. It is strongly RECOMMENDED to avoid a TLS proxy whenever possible. For example, an enterprise firewall administrator can configure the middlebox to bypass TLS proxy functionality or payload inspection

for connections destined to specific well-known services. Alternatively, a IoT device could be configured to reject all sessions that involve proxy servers to specific well-known services. In addition, mechanisms based on object security can be used by IoT devices to enable end-to-end security and the middlebox will not have any access to the packet data. For example, Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613] is a proposal that protects CoAP messages by wrapping them in the COSE format [RFC8152].

## 10. IANA Considerations

### 10.1. (D)TLS Profile YANG Modules

This document requests IANA to register the following URIs in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-tls-profile  
Registrant Contact: The IESG.  
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acl-tls  
Registrant Contact: The IESG.  
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-tls  
Registrant Contact: The IESG.  
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

IANA is requested to create an IANA-maintained YANG Module called "iana-tls-profile", based on the contents of [Section 5.3](#), which will allow for new (D)TLS parameters and (D)TLS versions to be added to "client-profile". The registration procedure will be Expert Review, as defined by [RFC8126].

This document requests IANA to register the following YANG modules in the "YANG Module Names" subregistry [RFC6020] within the "YANG Parameters" registry.

name: iana-tls-profile  
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-tls-profile  
maintained by IANA: Y  
prefix: ianatp  
reference: RFC XXXX

name: ietf-acl-tls  
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acl-tls  
maintained by IANA: N  
prefix: ietf-acl-tls  
reference: RFC XXXX

```
name: ietf-mud-tls
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-tls
maintained by IANA: N
prefix: ietf-mud-tls
reference: RFC XXXX
```

IANA is requested to create an the initial version of the IANA-maintained YANG Module called "iana-tls-profile", based on the contents of [Section 5.3](#), which will allow for new (D)TLS parameters and (D)TLS versions to be added. IANA is requested to add this note:

\*tls-version and dtls-version values must not be directly added to the iana-tls-profile YANG module. They must instead be respectively added to the "ACL TLS Version Codes", and "ACL DTLS Version Codes" registries.

\*(D)TLS parameters must not be directly added to the iana-tls-profile YANG module. They must instead be added to the "ACL (D)TLS Parameters" registry.

When a 'tls-version' or 'dtls-version' value is respectively added to the "ACL TLS Version Codes" or "ACL DTLS Version Codes" registry, a new "enum" statement must be added to the iana-tls-profile YANG module. The following "enum" statement, and substatements thereof, should be defined:

**"enum":** Replicates the label from the registry.

**"value":** Contains the IANA-assigned value corresponding to the 'tls-version' or 'dtls-version'.

**"description":** Replicates the description from the registry.

**"reference":** Replicates the reference from the registry and adds the title of the document.

When a (D)TLS parameter is added to "ACL (D)TLS Parameters" registry, a new "type" statement must be added to the iana-tls-profile YANG module. The following "type" statement, and substatements thereof, should be defined:

**"derived type":** Replicates the parameter name from the registry.

**"built-in type":** Contains the built-in YANG type.

**"description":** Replicates the description from the registry.

When the iana-tls-profile YANG module is updated, a new "revision" statement must be added in front of the existing revision statements.

IANA is requested to add this note to "ACL TLS Version Codes", "ACL DTLS Version Codes", and "ACL (D)TLS Parameters" registries:

When this registry is modified, the YANG module iana-tls-profile must be updated as defined in [RFCXXXX].

The registration procedure for "ietf-acl-tls" YANG module will be Specification Required, as defined by [RFC8126].

#### 10.2. ACL TLS Version registry

IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "ACL TLS Version Codes". Codes in this registry are used as valid values of 'tls-version' parameter. Further assignments are to be made through Expert Review [RFC8126].

Value	Label	Description	Reference
1	tls-1.2	TLS Version 1.2	[RFC5246]
2	tls-1.3	TLS Version 1.3	[RFC8446]

#### 10.3. ACL DTLS version registry

IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "ACL DTLS Version Codes". Codes in this registry are used as valid values of 'dtls-version' parameter. Further assignments are to be made through Expert Review [RFC8126].

Value	Label	Description	Reference
1	dtls-1.2	DTLS Version 1.2	[RFC6346]
2	dtls-1.3	DTLS Version 1.3	[draft-ietf-tls-dtls13]

#### 10.4. ACL (D)TLS Parameters registry

IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "ACL (D)TLS parameters".

The values for all the (D)TLS parameters in the registry are defined in the TLS and DTLS IANA registries (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.txt> and <https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.txt>) excluding the tls-version, dtls-version, spki-pin-set and certificate-authority parameters. Further assignments are to be made through Expert Review [RFC8126]. The registry is initially populated with the following parameters:

Parameter Name	YANG Type	JSON Type	Description
extension-type	uint16	Number	Extension type
supported-group	uint16	Number	Supported group
spki-pin-set	binary	String	Subject public
signature-algorithm	uint16	Number	Signature algor
psk-key-exchange-mode	uint8	Number	pre-shared key
application-protocol	string	String	Application pro
cert-compression-algorithm	uint16	Number	Certificate com
certificate-authority	string	String	Distinguished n
cipher-algorithm	uint8	Number	AEAD encryption
hash-algorithm	uint8	Number	Hash algorithm
tls-version	enumeration	String	TLS version
dtls-version	enumeration	String	DTLS version

## 10.5. MUD Extensions registry

IANA is requested to create a new MUD Extension Name "ietf-mud-tls" in the MUD Extensions IANA registry <https://www.iana.org/assignments/mud/mud.xhtml>.



## 11. Acknowledgments

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