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Transport Layer Security Version 1.3 (TLS 1.3) Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol Version 3 (SNMPv3)

#### Abstract

This document updates the TLS Transport Model (TLSTM), as defined in RFC 6353 to support Transport Layer Security Version 1.3 (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.3 (DTLS), which are jointly known as "(D)TLS". This document may be applicable to future versions of SNMP and (D)TLS.

This document updates the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB as defined in RFC 6353.

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Author's Address

#### 1. Introduction

This document updates and clarifies how the rules of [RFC6353] apply when using Transport Layer Security Version 1.3 (TLS) or Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.3 (DTLS), which are jointly known as "(D)TLS". The update also incorporates the [RFC8996] update, which prohibits the use of TLS versions prior to TLS 1.2. Although the title and text of this document specifically reference SNMPv3 and (D)TLS 1.3, this document may be applicable to future versions of these protocols and is backwards compatible with (D)TLS 1.2.

## 1.1. Conventions

Within this document the terms "TLS", "DTLS", "(D)TLS", "SNMP", and "TLSTM" mean "TLS 1.3", "DTLS 1.3", "TLS 1.3 and/or DTLS 1.3", "SMNPv3", and "TLSTM 1.3", respectively. These version numbers are only used when the text needs to emphasize version numbers, such as

within the title. When this document refers to any other version of these protocols, it always explicitly states the version intended.

For consistency with SNMP-related specifications, this document favors terminology as defined in [STD62], rather than favoring terminology that is consistent with non-SNMP specifications. This is consistent with the IESG decision to not require the SNMPv3 terminology be modified to match the usage of other non-SNMP specifications when SNMPv3 was advanced to a Full Standard. "Authentication" in this document typically refers to the English meaning of "serving to prove the authenticity of" the message, not data source authentication or peer identity authentication. The terms "manager" and "agent" are not used in this document because, in the RFC3411 architecture, all SNMP entities have the capability of acting as manager, agent, or both depending on the SNMP application types supported in the implementation. Where distinction is necessary, the application names of command generator, command responder, notification originator, notification receiver, and proxy forwarder are used. See "SNMP Applications" (RFC3411) for further information.

Throughout this document, the terms "client" and "server" are used to refer to the two ends of the TLS transport connection. The client actively opens the TLS connection, and the server passively listens for the incoming TLS connection. An SNMP entity MAY act as a TLS client or server or both, depending on the SNMP applications supported.

While TLS frequently refers to a user, the terminology preferred in RFC3411 and in this memo is "principal". A principal is the "who" on whose behalf services are provided or processing takes place. A principal can be, among other things, an individual acting in a particular role; a set of individuals, with each acting in a particular role; an application or a set of applications, or a combination of these within an administrative domain.

Throughout this document, the term "session" is used to refer to a secure association between two TLS Transport Models that permits the transmission of one or more SNMP messages within the lifetime of the session. The TLS protocol also has an internal notion of a session and although these two concepts of a session are related, when the term "session" is used this document is referring to the TLSTM's specific session and not directly to the TLS protocol's session.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", NOT RECOMMENDED, "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

# 2. Changes from RFC 6353

This document updates [RFC6353]. The changes from [RFC6353] are defined in the following clauses.

## 2.1. TLSTM Fingerprint

[RFC6353] defines a fingerprint algorithm that references the one-octet TLS 1.2 hash algorithm identifier. TLS 1.3 replaced the one-octet hash algorithm identifier with a two-octet TLS 1.3 cipher suite identifier. The TLS 1.3 cipher suite still includes a hashing algorithm but new hashing algorithms (e.g., for use in TLS 1.3) will not be assigned values in the IANA TLS HashAlgorithm Registry, as defined in RFC 5246.

This document updates the definition of SnmpTLSFingerprint to clarify that the one-octet identifier in the fingerprint algorithm uses a registry that is consistent with the IANA TLS HashAlgorithm Registry for its initial values but one that can be extended to support new hashing algorithms that might be used for TLS versions after version 1.2. This change allows the reuse of the existing fingerprint TEXTUAL-CONVENTION and minimizes the impact to RFC 6353.

# 2.2. Security Level

The <a href="RFC3411">RFC3411</a> architecture recognizes three levels of security:

\*without authentication and without privacy (noAuthNoPriv)

\*with authentication but without privacy (authNoPriv)

\*with authentication and with privacy (authPriv)

With (D)TLS 1.3, authentication and privacy are always provided. Hence, all exchanges conforming to the rules of this document will include authentication and privacy, regardless of the security level requested. This is consistent with what was prescribed in RFC6353, where a TLS Transport Model is expected to provide for outgoing connections with a security level at least that of the requested security level.

#### 2.3. TLS Version

[RFC6353] stated that TLSTM clients and servers MUST NOT request, offer, or use SSL 2.0. [RFC8996] prohibits the use of (D)TLS versions prior to version 1.2. TLSTMv1.3 MUST only be used with (D)TLS version 1.2 and later.

#### 3. Additional Rules for TLS 1.3

This document specifies additional rules and clarifications for the use of TLS 1.3.

# 3.1. Zero Round Trip Time Resumption (0-RTT)

TLS 1.3 implementations for SNMPv3 MUST NOT enable the 0-RTT mode of session resumption (either sending or accepting) and MUST NOT automatically resend 0-RTT data if it is rejected by the server. The reason 0-RTT is disallowed is that there are no "safe" messages that if replayed will be guaranteed to cause no harm at a server side: all incoming notification or command responses are meant to be acted upon only once. See Security considerations section for further details.

TLS TM clients and servers MUST NOT request, offer or use the 0-RTT mode of TLS 1.3. [RFC8446] removed the renegotiation supported in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]; for session resumption, it introduced a zero-RTT (0-RTT) mode, saving a round-trip at connection setup at the cost of increased risk of replay attacks (it is possible for servers to guard against this attack by keeping track of all the messages received). [RFC8446] requires a profile be written for any application that wants to use 0-RTT, specifying which messages are "safe to use" on this mode. The reason 0-RTT is disallowed here is that there are no "safe" SNMPv3 messages that if replayed will be sure to cause no harm at a server side: all incoming notification or command responses have consequences and are to be acted upon only once.

Renegotiation of sessions is not supported as it is not supported by TLS 1.3.

# 3.2. TLS ciphersuites, extensions and protocol invariants

[RFC8446] section 9 requires that, in the absence of application profiles, certain cipher suites, TLS extensions, and TLS protocol invariants are mandatory to implement. This document does not specify an application profile, hence all of the compliance requirements in [RFC8446] apply.

4. MIB Module Definition

```
IMPORTS
   MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE,
    OBJECT-IDENTITY, mib-2, snmpDomains,
    Counter32, Unsigned32, Gauge32, NOTIFICATION-TYPE
                                      -- RFC 2578 or any update thereof
      FROM SNMPv2-SMI
   TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, TimeStamp, RowStatus, StorageType,
   AutonomousType
     FROM SNMPv2-TC
                                      -- RFC 2579 or any update thereof
   MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP, NOTIFICATION-GROUP
     FROM SNMPv2-CONF
                                      -- RFC 2580 or any update thereof
   SnmpAdminString
     FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB
                                     -- RFC 3411 or any update thereof
    snmpTargetParamsName, snmpTargetAddrName
     FROM SNMP-TARGET-MIB
                                     -- RFC 3413 or any update thereof
snmpTlstmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
    LAST-UPDATED "202203050000Z"
   ORGANIZATION "OPSA Working Group"
   CONTACT-INFO "WG-EMail:
                             opsawg@ietf.org
               Mailing list subscription info:
               https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsawg
               Kenneth Vaughn
               Trevilon LLC
               6606 FM 1488 RD, STE 503
               Magnolia, TX 77354
               United States
               Phone: +1 571 331 5670
               Email: kvaughn@trevilon.com"
   DESCRIPTION "
        The TLS Transport Model MIB
        Copyright (c) 2010-2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified
        as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
        Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
       without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
        to the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License
```

REVISION "202203050000Z"

DESCRIPTION "This version of this MIB module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal

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set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions

notices. This version:

- 1. Updates the definition of SnmpTLSFingerprint to clarify the registry used for the one-octet hash algorithm identifier.
- 2. Capitalizes key words in conformance with **BCP 14**
- 3. Replaces 'may not' with 'MUST NOT' to clarify intent in several locations."

#### "201107190000Z" REVISION

DESCRIPTION "This version of this MIB module is part of RFC 6353; see the RFC itself for full legal notices. The only change was to introduce new wording to reflect require changes for IDNA addresses in the SnmpTLSAddress TC."

REVISION "201005070000Z"

DESCRIPTION "This version of this MIB module is part of RFC 5953; see the RFC itself for full legal

notices."

```
::= { mib-2 198 }
```

\_ \_ \*

-- subtrees of the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB

\_\_ \*

```
snmpTlstmNotifications OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 0 }
snmpTlstmIdentities     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 1 }
snmpTlstmConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 3 }
```

\_\_ \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

-- snmpTlstmObjects - Objects

\_\_ \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

#### snmpTLSTCPDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY

STATUS current

# **DESCRIPTION**

"The SNMP over TLS via TCP transport domain. The corresponding transport address is of type SnmpTLSAddress.

The securityName prefix to be associated with the snmpTLSTCPDomain is 'tls'. This prefix MAY be used by security models or other components to identify which secure transport infrastructure authenticated a securityName."

# REFERENCE

```
"RFC 2579: Textual Conventions for SMIv2"
::= { snmpDomains 8 }
```

STATUS current DESCRIPTION

"The SNMP over DTLS via UDP transport domain. The corresponding transport address is of type SnmpTLSAddress.

The securityName prefix to be associated with the snmpDTLSUDPDomain is 'dtls'. This prefix MAY be used by security models or other components to identify which secure transport infrastructure authenticated a securityName."

REFERENCE

"RFC 2579: Textual Conventions for SMIv2"
::= { snmpDomains 9 }

SnmpTLSAddress ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION

DISPLAY-HINT "1a" STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

"Represents an IPv4 address, an IPv6 address, or a

US-ASCII-encoded hostname and port number.

An IPv4 address MUST be in dotted decimal format followed by a

in US-ASCII.

An IPv6 address MUST be a colon-separated format (as described

colon ':' (US-ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number

in RFC 5952), surrounded by square brackets ('[', US-ASCII character 0x5B, and ']', US-ASCII character 0x5D), followed by a colon ':' (US-ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number in US-ASCII.

A hostname is always in US-ASCII (as per RFC 1123); internationalized hostnames are encoded as A-labels as specified in RFC 5890. The hostname is followed by a colon ':' (US-ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number in US-ASCII. The name SHOULD be fully qualified whenever possible.

Values of this textual convention MUST NOT be directly usable as transport-layer addressing information, and may require run-time resolution. As such, applications that write them MUST be prepared for handling errors if such values are not supported, or cannot be resolved (if resolution occurs at the time of the management operation).

The DESCRIPTION clause of TransportAddress objects that may have SnmpTLSAddress values MUST fully describe how (and when) such names are to be resolved to IP addresses and vice versa.

This textual convention SHOULD NOT be used directly in object

definitions since it restricts addresses to a specific format. However, if it is used, it MAY be used either on its own or in conjunction with TransportAddressType or TransportDomain as a pair.

When this textual convention is used as a syntax of an index object, there may be issues with the limit of 128 sub-identifiers specified in SMIv2 (STD 58). It is RECOMMENDED that all MIB documents using this textual convention make explicit any limitations on index component lengths that management software MUST observe. This MAY be done either by

including SIZE constraints on the index components or by specifying applicable constraints in the conceptual row DESCRIPTION clause or in the surrounding documentation."

REFERENCE

"RFC 1123: Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and Support

RFC 5890: Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA):

Definitions and Document Framework

RFC 5952: A Recommendation for IPv6 Address Text Representation

SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..255))

"A fingerprint value that can be used to uniquely reference other data of potentially arbitrary length.

An SnmpTLSFingerprint value is composed of a 1-octet hashing algorithm identifier followed by the fingerprint value. The octet value encoded is based on the IANA TLS HashAlgorithm Registry (RFC 5246), However, this registry is only applicable to (D)TLS protocol versions prior to 1.3, which are now designated as "obsolete" and are not expected to ever support additional values. To allow the fingerprint algorithm to support additional hashing algorithms that might be used by later versions of (D)TLS, the octet value encoded is taken from IANA SnmpTLSFingerprintAlgorithm Registry, The initial values within this registry are identical to the values in the TLS HashAlgorithm registry but can be extended to support new hashing algorithms as needed.

This TEXTUAL-CONVENTION allows for a zero-length (blank) SnmpTLSFingerprint value for use in tables where the fingerprint value MAY be optional. MIB definitions or implementations MAY refuse to accept a zero-length value as

```
appropriate."
      REFERENCE "http://www.iana.org/assignments/tlstm-parameters/"
    SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (0..255))
-- Identities for use in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities OBJECT IDENTIFIER
    ::= { snmpTlstmIdentities 1 }
snmpTlstmCertSpecified OBJECT-IDENTITY
   STATUS
                 current
   DESCRIPTION "Directly specifies the tmSecurityName to be used for
                  this certificate. The value of the tmSecurityName
                  to use is specified in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNData
                 column. The snmpTlstmCertToTSNData column MUST
                 contain a non-zero length SnmpAdminString compliant
                 value or the mapping described in this row MUST be
                 considered a failure."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 1 }
snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name OBJECT-IDENTITY
   STATUS
                 current
   DESCRIPTION "Maps a subjectAltName's rfc822Name to a
                  tmSecurityName. The local part of the rfc822Name is
                  passed unaltered but the host-part of the name MUST
                  be passed in lowercase. This mapping results in a
                 1:1 correspondence between equivalent subjectAltName
                  rfc822Name values and tmSecurityName values except
                  that the host-part of the name MUST be passed in
                  lowercase.
                 Example rfc822Name Field: FooBar@Example.COM
                  is mapped to tmSecurityName: FooBar@example.com."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 2 }
snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName OBJECT-IDENTITY
   STATUS
                 current
   DESCRIPTION "Maps a subjectAltName's dNSName to a
                  tmSecurityName after first converting it to all
                 lowercase (RFC 5280 does not specify converting to
                 lowercase so this involves an extra step). This
                 mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
                  subjectAltName dNSName values and the tmSecurityName
                 values."
    REFERENCE "RFC 5280 - Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                        Certificate and Certificate Revocation
                         List (CRL) Profile."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 3 }
```

snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress OBJECT-IDENTITY

STATUS

current

DESCRIPTION "Maps a subjectAltName's iPAddress to a tmSecurityName by transforming the binary encoded address as follows:

- 1) for IPv4, the value is converted into a decimal-dotted quad address (e.g., '192.0.2.1').
- 2) for IPv6 addresses, the value is converted into a 32-character all lowercase hexadecimal string without any colon separators.

This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between subjectAltName iPAddress values and the tmSecurityName values.

The resulting length of an encoded IPv6 address is the maximum length supported by the View-Based Access Control Model (VACM). Using both the Transport Security Model's support for transport prefixes (see the SNMP-TSM-MIB's snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix object for details) will result in securityName lengths that exceed what VACM can handle."

::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 4 }

snmpTlstmCertSANAny OBJECT-IDENTITY

STATUS

current

DESCRIPTION "Maps any of the following fields using the corresponding mapping algorithms:

Type	+    Algorithm
rfc822Name   dNSName	snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name   snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName   snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress

The first matching subjectAltName value found in the certificate of the above types MUST be used when deriving the tmSecurityName. The mapping algorithm specified in the 'Algorithm' column MUST be used to derive the tmSecurityName.

This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between subjectAltName values and tmSecurityName values. The three sub-mapping algorithms produced by this combined algorithm cannot produce conflicting

```
results between themselves."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 5 }
snmpTlstmCertCommonName OBJECT-IDENTITY
   STATUS
                 current
   DESCRIPTION "Maps a certificate's CommonName to a tmSecurityName
                 after converting it to a UTF-8 encoding. The usage
                 of CommonNames is deprecated and users are
                 encouraged to use subjectAltName mapping methods
                 instead. This mapping results in a 1:1
                 correspondence between certificate CommonName values
                  and tmSecurityName values."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 6 }
-- The snmpTlstmSession Group
snmpTlstmSession
                          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmObjects 1 }
snmpTlstmSessionOpens OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                Counter32
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
      "The number of times an openSession() request has been executed
      as a (D)TLS client, regardless of whether it succeeded or
      failed."
    ::= { snmpTlstmSession 1 }
snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                Counter32
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
       "The number of times a closeSession() request has been
       executed as a (D)TLS client, regardless of whether it
        succeeded or failed."
    ::= { snmpTlstmSession 2 }
snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                Counter32
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
        "The number of times an openSession() request failed to open a
       session as a (D)TLS client, for any reason."
    ::= { snmpTlstmSession 3 }
snmpTlstmSessionAccepts OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                Counter32
```

```
MAX-ACCESS
                read-only
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
      "The number of times a (D)TLS server has accepted a new
      connection from a client and has received at least one SNMP
      message through it."
    ::= { snmpTlstmSession 4 }
snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                Counter32
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
        "The number of times a closeSession() request has been
        executed as a (D)TLS server, regardless of whether it
        succeeded or failed."
    ::= { snmpTlstmSession 5 }
snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                Counter32
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
                current
   STATUS
   DESCRIPTION
        "The number of times an outgoing message was dropped because
        the session associated with the passed tmStateReference was no
        longer (or was never) available."
    ::= { snmpTlstmSession 6 }
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX
                Counter32
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
        "The number of times an incoming session was not established
        on a (D)TLS server because the presented client certificate
        was invalid. Reasons for invalidation include, but are not
        limited to, cryptographic validation failures or lack of a
        suitable mapping row in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable."
    ::= { snmpTlstmSession 7 }
snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                Counter32
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
        "The number of times an outgoing session was not established
         on a (D)TLS client because the server certificate presented
         by an SNMP over (D)TLS server was invalid because no
         configured fingerprint or Certification Authority (CA) was
```

```
acceptable to validate it.
        This may result because there was no entry in the
         snmpTlstmAddrTable or because no path could be found to a
        known CA."
    ::= { snmpTlstmSession 8 }
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               Counter32
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
        "The number of times an outgoing session was not established
        on a (D)TLS client because the server certificate presented
        by an SNMP over (D)TLS server could not be validated even if
        the fingerprint or expected validation path was known. That
        is, a cryptographic validation error occurred during
        certificate validation processing.
       Reasons for invalidation include, but are not
       limited to, cryptographic validation failures."
    ::= { snmpTlstmSession 9 }
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               Counter32
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
        "The number of outgoing messages dropped because the
        tmStateReference referred to an invalid cache."
    ::= { snmpTlstmSession 10 }
-- Configuration Objects
snmpTlstmConfig
                   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmObjects 2 }
-- Certificate mapping
snmpTlstmCertificateMapping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConfig 1 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNCount OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               Gauge32
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
        "A count of the number of entries in the
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 1 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               TimeStamp
```

MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION

"The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not been modified since the command responder was started."

::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 2 }

snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable OBJECT-TYPE

SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry

MAX-ACCESS not-accessible

STATUS current

**DESCRIPTION** 

"This table is used by a (D)TLS server to map the (D)TLS client's presented X.509 certificate to a tmSecurityName.

On an incoming (D)TLS/SNMP connection, the client's presented certificate MUST either be validated based on an established trust anchor, or it MUST directly match a fingerprint in this table. This table does not provide any mechanisms for configuring the trust anchors; the transfer of any needed trusted certificates for path validation is expected to occur through an out-of-band transfer.

Once the certificate has been found acceptable (either by path validation or directly matching a fingerprint in this table), this table is consulted to determine the appropriate tmSecurityName to identify with the remote connection. This is done by considering each active row from this table in prioritized order according to its snmpTlstmCertToTSNID value. Each row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value determines whether the row is a match for the incoming connection:

- 1) If the row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value identifies the presented certificate, then consider the row as a successful match.
- 2) If the row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value identifies a locally held copy of a trusted CA certificate and that CA certificate was used to validate the path to the presented certificate, then consider the row as a successful match.

Once a matching row has been found, the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType value can be used to determine how the tmSecurityName to associate with the session should be determined. See the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType column's DESCRIPTION for details on determining the tmSecurityName value. If it is impossible to determine a tmSecurityName from

the row's data combined with the data presented in the

certificate, then additional rows MUST be searched looking for another potential match. If a resulting tmSecurityName mapped from a given row is not compatible with the needed requirements of a tmSecurityName (e.g., VACM imposes a 32-octet-maximum length and the certificate derived securityName could be longer), then it MUST be considered an invalid match and additional rows MUST be searched looking for another potential match.

If no matching and valid row can be found, the connection MUST be closed and SNMP messages MUST NOT be accepted over it.

Missing values of snmpTlstmCertToTSNID are acceptable and implementations SHOULD continue to the next highest numbered row. It is RECOMMENDED that administrators skip index values to leave room for the insertion of future rows (for example, use values of 10 and 20 when creating initial rows).

Users are encouraged to make use of certificates with subjectAltName fields that can be used as tmSecurityNames so that a single root CA certificate can allow all child certificate's subjectAltName to map directly to a tmSecurityName via a 1:1 transformation. However, this table is flexible to allow for situations where existing deployed certificate infrastructures do not provide adequate subjectAltName values for use as tmSecurityNames. Certificates MAY also be mapped to tmSecurityNames using the CommonName portion of the Subject field. However, the usage of the CommonName field is deprecated and thus this usage is NOT RECOMMENDED. Direct mapping from each individual certificate fingerprint to a tmSecurityName is also possible but requires one entry in the table per tmSecurityName and requires more management operations to completely configure a device."

```
SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
    snmpTlstmCertToTSNID
                                   Unsigned32,
    snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint
                                   SnmpTLSFingerprint,
    snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType
                                   AutonomousType,
    snmpTlstmCertToTSNData
                                   OCTET STRING,
    snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType StorageType,
    snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus
                                   RowStatus
}
snmpTlstmCertToTSNID OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
   MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
        "A unique, prioritized index for the given entry. Lower
        numbers indicate a higher priority."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 1 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                SnmpTLSFingerprint (SIZE(1..255))
   MAX-ACCESS read-create
                current
   STATUS
   DESCRIPTION
        "A cryptographic hash of an X.509 certificate. The results of
        a successful matching fingerprint to either the trusted CA in
        the certificate validation path or to the certificate itself
        is dictated by the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType column."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 2 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               AutonomousType
   MAX-ACCESS read-create
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
        "Specifies the mapping type for deriving a tmSecurityName from
        a certificate. Details for mapping of a particular type SHALL
        be specified in the DESCRIPTION clause of the OBJECT-IDENTITY
        that describes the mapping. If a mapping succeeds it will
        return a tmSecurityName for use by the TLSTM model and
        processing stops.
        If the resulting mapped value is not compatible with the
```

If the resulting mapped value is not compatible with the needed requirements of a tmSecurityName (e.g., VACM imposes a 32-octet-maximum length and the certificate derived securityName could be longer), then future rows MUST be searched for additional snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint matches to look for a mapping that succeeds.

Suitable values for assigning to this object that are defined

```
within the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB can be found in the
        snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities portion of the MIB tree."
   DEFVAL { snmpTlstmCertSpecified }
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 3 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024))
   MAX-ACCESS read-create
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
        "Auxiliary data used as optional configuration information for
       a given mapping specified by the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType
       column. Only some mapping systems will make use of this
       column. The value in this column MUST be ignored for any
       mapping type that does not require data present in this
   DEFVAL { "" }
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 4 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                StorageType
   MAX-ACCESS read-create
   STATUS
            current
   DESCRIPTION
        "The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows
       having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access to
       any columnar objects in the row."
   DEFVAL
               { nonVolatile }
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 5 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               RowStatus
   MAX-ACCESS read-create
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
       "The status of this conceptual row. This object MAY be used
       to create or remove rows from this table.
       To create a row in this table, an administrator MUST set this
       object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).
       Until instances of all corresponding columns are appropriately
```

In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active until the corresponding snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint, snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType, and snmpTlstmCertToTSNData columns have been set.

configured, the value of the corresponding instance of the

snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus column is notReady(3).

```
The following objects MUST NOT be modified while the
        value of this object is active(1):
            - snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint
            - snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType
            - snmpTlstmCertToTSNData
        An attempt to set these objects while the value of
        snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus is active(1) will result in
        an inconsistentValue error."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 6 }
-- Maps tmSecurityNames to certificates for use by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB
snmpTlstmParamsCount OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               Gauge32
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
        "A count of the number of entries in the snmpTlstmParamsTable."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 4 }
snmpTlstmParamsTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               TimeStamp
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
        "The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmParamsTable
       was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not been
        modified since the command responder was started."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 5 }
snmpTlstmParamsTable OBJECT-TYPE
               SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmParamsEntry
   SYNTAX
   MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
        "This table is used by a (D)TLS client when a (D)TLS
        connection is being set up using an entry in the
        SNMP-TARGET-MIB. It extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's
        snmpTargetParamsTable with a fingerprint of a certificate to
        use when establishing such a (D)TLS connection."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 6 }
snmpTlstmParamsEntry OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               SnmpTlstmParamsEntry
   MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
        "A conceptual row containing a fingerprint hash of a locally
```

```
held certificate for a given snmpTargetParamsEntry. The
        values in this row SHOULD be ignored if the connection that
        needs to be established, as indicated by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB
        infrastructure, is not a certificate and (D)TLS based
        connection. The connection SHOULD NOT be established if the
        certificate fingerprint stored in this entry does not point to
        a valid locally held certificate or if it points to an
        unusable certificate (such as might happen when the
        certificate's expiration date has been reached)."
    INDEX
             { IMPLIED snmpTargetParamsName }
    ::= { snmpTlstmParamsTable 1 }
SnmpTlstmParamsEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
    snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint,
    snmpTlstmParamsStorageType
                                     StorageType,
    snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus
                                     RowStatus
}
snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                SnmpTLSFingerprint
   MAX-ACCESS read-create
                current
   STATUS
   DESCRIPTION
        "This object stores the hash of the public portion of a
        locally held X.509 certificate. The X.509 certificate, its
        public key, and the corresponding private key will be used
       when initiating a (D)TLS connection as a (D)TLS client."
    ::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 1 }
snmpTlstmParamsStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               StorageType
   MAX-ACCESS read-create
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
        "The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows
        having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access to
        any columnar objects in the row."
   DEFVAL
                { nonVolatile }
    ::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 2 }
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               RowStatus
   MAX-ACCESS read-create
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
        "The status of this conceptual row. This object MAY be used
        to create or remove rows from this table.
```

To create a row in this table, an administrator MUST set this

object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).

Until instances of all corresponding columns are appropriately configured, the value of the corresponding instance of the snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus column is notReady(3).

In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active until the corresponding snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint column has been set.

The snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint object MUST NOT be modified while the value of this object is active(1).

```
An attempt to set these objects while the value of
        snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus is active(1) will result in
        an inconsistentValue error."
    ::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 3 }
snmpTlstmAddrCount OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                Gauge32
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
        "A count of the number of entries in the snmpTlstmAddrTable."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 7 }
snmpTlstmAddrTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               TimeStamp
   MAX-ACCESS read-only
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
        "The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmAddrTable
       was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not been
        modified since the command responder was started."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 8 }
snmpTlstmAddrTable OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmAddrEntry
   MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
   STATUS
                current
```

"This table is used by a (D)TLS client when a (D)TLS connection is being set up using an entry in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB. It extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's

DESCRIPTION

snmpTargetAddrTable so that the client can verify that the correct server has been reached. This verification can use either a certificate fingerprint, or an identity authenticated via certification path validation.

If there is an active row in this table corresponding to the entry in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB that was used to establish the connection, and the row's snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint column has non-empty value, then the server's presented certificate is compared with the snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint value (and the snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity column is ignored). If the fingerprint matches, the verification has succeeded. If the fingerprint does not match, then the connection MUST be closed.

If the server's presented certificate has passed certification path validation [RFC5280] to a configured trust anchor, and an active row exists with a zero-length snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint value, then the snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity column contains the expected host name. This expected host name is then compared against the server's certificate as follows:

- Implementations MUST support matching the expected host name against a dNSName in the subjectAltName extension field and MAY support checking the name against the CommonName portion of the subject distinguished name.
- The '\*' (ASCII 0x2a) wildcard character is allowed in the dNSName of the subjectAltName extension (and in common name, if used to store the host name), but only as the left-most (least significant) DNS label in that value. This wildcard matches any left-most DNS label in the server name. That is, the subject \*.example.com matches the server names a.example.com and b.example.com, but does not match example.com or a.b.example.com. Implementations MUST support wildcards in certificates as specified above, but MAY provide a configuration option to disable them.
- If the locally configured name is an internationalized domain name, conforming implementations MUST convert it to the ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format for performing comparisons, as specified in Section 7 of [RFC5280].

If the expected host name fails these conditions then the connection MUST be closed.

If there is no row in this table corresponding to the entry in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB and the server can be authorized by another, implementation-dependent means, then the connection MAY still proceed."

::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 9 }

```
snmpTlstmAddrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               SnmpTlstmAddrEntry
   MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
        "A conceptual row containing a copy of a certificate's
        fingerprint for a given snmpTargetAddrEntry. The values in
        this row SHOULD be ignored if the connection that needs to be
        established, as indicated by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB
        infrastructure, is not a (D)TLS based connection. If an
        snmpTlstmAddrEntry exists for a given snmpTargetAddrEntry, then
        the presented server certificate MUST match or the connection
        MUST NOT be established. If a row in this table does not
        exist to match an snmpTargetAddrEntry row, then the connection
        SHOULD still proceed if some other certificate validation path
        algorithm (e.g., RFC 5280) can be used."
            { IMPLIED snmpTargetAddrName }
    ::= { snmpTlstmAddrTable 1 }
SnmpTlstmAddrEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
                                      SnmpTLSFingerprint,
    snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint
    snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity
                                      SnmpAdminString,
    snmpTlstmAddrStorageType
                                      StorageType,
    snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus
                                      RowStatus
}
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX
               SnmpTLSFingerprint
   MAX-ACCESS read-create
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
        "A cryptographic hash of a public X.509 certificate. This
        object should store the hash of the public X.509 certificate
        that the remote server should present during the (D)TLS
        connection setup. The fingerprint of the presented
        certificate and this hash value MUST match exactly or the
        connection MUST NOT be established."
   DEFVAL { "" }
    ::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 1 }
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               SnmpAdminString
   MAX-ACCESS read-create
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
        "The reference identity to check against the identity
       presented by the remote system."
   DEFVAL { "" }
    ::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 2 }
```

```
snmpTlstmAddrStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
                StorageType
   MAX-ACCESS read-create
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
       "The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows
       having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access to
       any columnar objects in the row."
               { nonVolatile }
    ::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 3 }
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
   SYNTAX
               RowStatus
   MAX-ACCESS read-create
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
       "The status of this conceptual row. This object may be used
       to create or remove rows from this table.
       To create a row in this table, an administrator MUST set this
       object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).
       Until instances of all corresponding columns are
       appropriately configured, the value of the
       corresponding instance of the snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus
       column is notReady(3).
       In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active until
       the corresponding snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint column has been
       set.
       Rows MUST NOT be active if the snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint
       column is blank and the snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity is set to
       '*' since this would insecurely accept any presented
       certificate.
       The snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint object MUST NOT be modified
       while the value of this object is active(1).
       An attempt to set these objects while the value of
       snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus is active(1) will result in
       an inconsistentValue error."
    ::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 4 }
_ _ ***************
   snmpTlstmNotifications - Notifications Information
```

```
OBJECTS { snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate }
   STATUS current
   DESCRIPTION
       "Notification that the server certificate presented by an SNMP
        over (D)TLS server was invalid because no configured
        fingerprint or CA was acceptable to validate it. This may be
        because there was no entry in the snmpTlstmAddrTable or
        because no path could be found to known Certification
        Authority.
        To avoid notification loops, this notification MUST NOT be
        sent to servers that themselves have triggered the
        notification."
   ::= { snmpTlstmNotifications 1 }
snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate NOTIFICATION-TYPE
   OBJECTS { snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint,
             snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates}
   STATUS current
   DESCRIPTION
       "Notification that the server certificate presented by an SNMP
        over (D)TLS server could not be validated even if the
        fingerprint or expected validation path was known. That is, a
        cryptographic validation error occurred during certificate
        validation processing.
        To avoid notification loops, this notification MUST NOT be
        sent to servers that themselves have triggered the
        notification."
   ::= { snmpTlstmNotifications 2 }
__ ***************************
-- snmpTlstmCompliances - Conformance Information
  snmpTlstmCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConformance 1 }
snmpTlstmGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConformance 2 }
__ *************************
-- Compliance statements
__ ***************
snmpTlstmCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
   STATUS
              current
   DESCRIPTION
       "The compliance statement for SNMP engines that support the
       SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB"
   MODULE
       MANDATORY-GROUPS { snmpTlstmStatsGroup,
```

```
snmpTlstmIncomingGroup,
                          snmpTlstmOutgoingGroup,
                          snmpTlstmNotificationGroup }
   ::= { snmpTlstmCompliances 1 }
  ***********
-- Units of conformance
__ **************
snmpTlstmStatsGroup OBJECT-GROUP
   OBJECTS {
       snmpTlstmSessionOpens,
       snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses,
       snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors,
       snmpTlstmSessionAccepts,
       snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses,
       snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions,
       snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates,
       snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate,
       snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates,
       snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches
   }
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
       "A collection of objects for maintaining
       statistical information of an SNMP engine that
       implements the SNMP TLS Transport Model."
   ::= { snmpTlstmGroups 1 }
snmpTlstmIncomingGroup OBJECT-GROUP
   OBJECTS {
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNCount,
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNTableLastChanged,
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint,
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType,
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNData,
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType,
       snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus
   }
   STATUS
               current
   DESCRIPTION
       "A collection of objects for maintaining
       incoming connection certificate mappings to
       tmSecurityNames of an SNMP engine that implements the
       SNMP TLS Transport Model."
    ::= { snmpTlstmGroups 2 }
snmpTlstmOutgoingGroup OBJECT-GROUP
   OBJECTS {
       snmpTlstmParamsCount,
```

```
snmpTlstmParamsTableLastChanged,
        snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint,
        snmpTlstmParamsStorageType,
        snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus,
        snmpTlstmAddrCount,
        snmpTlstmAddrTableLastChanged,
        snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint,
        snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity,
        snmpTlstmAddrStorageType,
        snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus
   }
   STATUS
                current
   DESCRIPTION
        "A collection of objects for maintaining
        outgoing connection certificates to use when opening
        connections as a result of SNMP-TARGET-MIB settings."
    ::= { snmpTlstmGroups 3 }
snmpTlstmNotificationGroup NOTIFICATION-GROUP
   NOTIFICATIONS {
        snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown,
        snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate
   }
   STATUS current
   DESCRIPTION
        "Notifications"
    ::= { snmpTlstmGroups 4 }
END
```

#### 5. Security Considerations

This document updates a transport model that permits SNMP to utilize TLS security services. The security threats and how the TLS transport model mitigates these threats are covered throughout this document and in [RFC6353]. Security considerations for TLS are described in Section 10 and Appendix E of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446].

SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security. Even if the network itself is secure (for example, by using IPsec), even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB module.

It is **RECOMMENDED** that only SNMPv3 messages using the Transport Security Model (TSM) or another secure-transport aware security model be sent over the TLSTM transport.

# 6. IANA Considerations

This document requires the establishment of a new TLSTM HashAlgorithm Table, which is referenced in the above MIB as being located at "http://www.iana.org/assignments/tlstm-parameters/". The initial values for this table **MUST** be identical to the contents of the TLS HashAlgorithm Registry (RFC 5246).

#### 7. Acknowledgements

Acknowledgements This document is based on [RFC6353]. This document was reviewed by the following people who helped provide useful comments: Michaela Vanderveen, Joe Clarke, Jürgen Schönwälder, and Tom Petch

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#### Appendix A. Target and Notification Configuration Example

The following sections describe example configuration for the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB, the SNMP-TARGET-MIB, the NOTIFICATION-MIB, and the SNMP-VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB.

# A.1. Configuring a Notification Originator

The following row adds the "Joe Cool" user to the "administrators" group:

vacmGroupName = "administrators"
vacmSecurityToGroupStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile)
vacmSecurityToGroupStatus = 4 (createAndGo)

The following row configures the snmpTlstmAddr13Table to use certificate path validation and to require the remote notification receiver to present a certificate for the "server.example.org" identity.

snmpTargetAddrName = "toNRAddr"

snmpTlstmAddr13ServerFingerprint = ""

The following row configures the snmpTargetAddrTable to send notifications using TLS/TCP to the snmptls-trap port at 192.0.2.1:

```
snmpTargetAddrName
                                = "toNRAddr"
snmpTargetAddrTDomain
                                = snmpTLSTCPDomain
                                = "192.0.2.1:10162"
snmpTargetAddrTAddress
snmpTargetAddrTimeout
                                = 1500
snmpTargetAddrRetryCount
                                = 3
                                = "toNRTag"
snmpTargetAddrTagList
                                = "toNR"
snmpTargetAddrParams
                                             (MUST match below)
snmpTargetAddrStorageType
                                = 3
                                             (nonVolatile)
snmpTargetAddrRowStatus
                                = 4
                                             (createAndGo)
```

The following row configures the snmpTargetParamsTable to send the notifications to "Joe Cool", using authPriv SNMPv3 notifications through the TransportSecurityModel [[RFC5591]]:

```
= "toNR"
                                             (MUST match above)
snmpTargetParamsName
snmpTargetParamsMPModel
                                = 3 (SNMPv3)
snmpTargetParamsSecurityModel
                                = 4 (TransportSecurityModel)
snmpTargetParamsSecurityName
                                = "Joe Cool"
snmpTargetParamsSecurityLevel
                                = 3
                                             (authPriv)
snmpTargetParamsStorageType
                                = 3
                                             (nonVolatile)
snmpTargetParamsRowStatus
                                = 4
                                             (createAndGo)
```

# A.2. Configuring TLSTM to Utilize a Simple Derivation of tmSecurityName

The following row configures the snmpTlstmCertToTSN13Table to map a validated client certificate, referenced by the client's public X. 509 hash fingerprint, to a tmSecurityName using the subjectAltName component of the certificate.

This type of configuration should only be used when the naming conventions of the (possibly multiple) Certification Authorities are well understood, so two different principals cannot inadvertently be identified by the same derived tmSecurityName.

# A.3. Configuring TLSTM to Utilize Table-Driven Certificate Mapping

The following row configures the snmpTlstmCertToTSN13Table to map a validated client certificate, referenced by the client's public X. 509 hash fingerprint, to the directly specified tmSecurityName of "Joe Cool".

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