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Security Extension for OSPFv2 when using Manual Key Management
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Abstract

The current OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication mechanism as defined in the OSPF standards is vulnerable to both inter-session and intra-session replay attacks when its uses manual keying. Additionally, the existing cryptographic authentication schemes do not cover the IP header. This omission can be exploited to carry out various types of attacks.

This draft proposes changes to the authentication sequence number mechanism that will protect OSPFv2 from both inter-session and intra-session replay attacks when its using manual keys for securing its protocol packets. Additionally, we also describe some changes in the cryptographic hash computation so that we eliminate most attacks that result because OSPFv2 does not protect the IP header.

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1. Introduction

The OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication mechanism as described in [\[RFC2328\]](#) uses per-packet sequence numbers to provide protection against replay attacks. The sequence numbers increase monotonically so that the attempts to replay the stale packets can be thwarted. The sequence number values are maintained as a part of adjacency states. Therefore, if an adjacency is broken down, the associated sequence numbers get reinitialized and the neighbors start all over again. Additionally, the cryptographic authentication mechanism does not specify how to deal with the rollover of a sequence number when its value would wrap. These omissions can be taken advantage of by attackers to implement various replay attacks ([\[RFC6039\]](#)). In order to address these issues, we propose extensions to the authentication sequence number mechanism. Compared with the cryptographic authentication mechanism proposed in [\[RFC5709\]](#), the solution proposed does not impose any more security presumption.

The cryptographic authentication as described in [\[RFC2328\]](#) and later updated in [\[RFC5709\]](#) does not include the IP header. This also can be exploited to launch several attacks as the source address in the IP header is no longer protected. The OSPF specification, for broadcast and NBMA (Non-Broadcast Multi-Access Networks), requires the implementations to look at the source address in the IP header to determine the neighbor from which the packet was received. Changing the IP source address of a packet which can confuse the receiver and can be exploited to produce a number of denial of service attacks [\[RFC6039\]](#). If the packet is interpreted as coming from a different neighbor, the sequence number received from the neighbor may be updated. This may disrupt communication with the legitimate neighbor. Hello packets may be reflected to cause a neighbor to appear to have one-way communication. Old Database descriptions may be reflected in cases where the per-packet sequence numbers are sufficiently divergent in order to disrupt an adjacency [\[I-D.ietf-karp-ospf-analysis\]](#). This is referred to as the IP layer issue in [\[I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs\]](#).

[\[RFC2328\]](#) states that implementations MUST offer keyed MD5 authentication. It is likely that this will be deprecated in favor of the stronger algorithms described in [\[RFC5709\]](#) in future deployments [\[I-D.ietf-opsec-igp-crypto-requirements\]](#).

This draft proposes a simple change in the cryptographic authentication mechanism, as currently described in [\[RFC5709\]](#), to prevent such IP layer attacks.

1.1. Requirements Section

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

When used in lowercase, these words convey their typical use in common language, and are not to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

2. Replay Protection using Extended Sequence Numbers

In order to provide replay protection against both inter-session and intra-session replay attacks, the OSPFv2 sequence number is expanded to 64-bits with the least significant 32-bit value containing a strictly increasing sequence number and the most significant 32-bit value containing the boot count. OSPFv2 implementations are required to retain the boot count in non-volatile storage for the deployment life the OSPF router. The requirement to preserve the boot count is also placed on SNMP agents by the SNMPv3 security architecture (refer to snmpEngineBoots in [[RFC4222](#)]).

Since there is no room in the OSPFv2 packet for a 64-bit sequence number, it will occupy the 8 octets following the OSPFv2 packet and MUST be included when calculating the OSPFv2 packet digest. These additional 8 bytes are not included in the OSPFv2 packet header length but are included in the OSPFv2 header Authentication Data length and the IPv4 packet header length.

The lower order 32-bit sequence number MUST be incremented for every OSPF packet sent by the OSPF router. Upon reception, the sequence number MUST be greater than the sequence number in the last OSPF packet of that type accepted from the sending OSPF neighbor. Otherwise, the OSPF packet is considered a replayed packet and dropped. OSPF packets of different types may arrive out of order if they are prioritized as recommended in [[RFC3414](#)].

OSPF routers implementing this specification MUST use available mechanisms to preserve the sequence number's strictly increasing property for the deployed life of the OSPFv3 router (including cold restarts). This is achieved by maintaining a boot count in non-volatile storage and incrementing it each time the OSPF router loses its prior sequence number state. The SNMPv3 snmpEngineBoots variable [[RFC4222](#)] MAY be used for this purpose. However, maintaining a separate boot count solely for OSPF sequence numbers has the advantage of decoupling SNMP reinitialization and OSPF reinitialization. Also, in the rare event that the lower order 32-

bit sequence number wraps, the boot count can be incremented to preserve the strictly increasing property of the aggregate sequence number. Hence, a separate OSPF boot count is RECOMMENDED.

3. OSPF Packet Extensions

The OSPF packet header includes an authentication type field, and 64-bits of data for use by the appropriate authentication scheme (determined by the type field). Authentication types 0, 1 and 2 are defined [[RFC2328](#)]. This section of this defines Authentication type TBD (3 is recommended).

When using this authentication scheme, the 64-bit Authentication field in the OSPF packet header as defined in section D.3 of [[RFC2328](#)] is changed as shown below. The sequence number is removed and the Key ID is extended to 32 bits and moved to the former position of the sequence number.

Additionally, the 64-bit sequence number is moved to the first 64-bits following the OSPFv2 packet and is protected by the authentication digest. These additional 64 bits or 8 octets are included in the IP header length but not the OSPF header packet length.

4.1. Key Selection for Unicast OSPF Packet Transmission

Assume that a router R1 tries to send a unicast OSPF packet from its interface I1 to the interface R2 of a remote router R2 using security protocol P via interface I at time T. Firstly consider the circumstances where R1 and R2 are not connected with a virtual link. R1 then needs to select a long long-lived symmetric key from its key table. Because the key should be shared by the by both R1 and R2 to protect the communication between I1 and I2, the key should satisfy the following requirements:

- o The Peer field includes the router ID of R2.
- o the PeerKeyID field is not "unknown".
- o The Interfaces field includes I1.
- o the Direction field is either "out" or "both".

When R1 and R2 are connected to a virtual link, the third condition is a little more complex. Because the virtual link can be regarded as an unnumbered point-to-point network, the IP address of the interface actually used to send the packet (i.e., I1) is discovered during routing table calculation. Therefore, when the system operator configures keys to protect the virtual link, I1 is unknown and can be any OSPF interface in the OSPF virtual link's transit area. Therefore, the key should be identified solely by the local and remote router IDs rather than by the interface on which the packet is sent. The third requirement list above should be changed to "the Interface field includes the router ID".

4.2. Key Selection for Multicast OSPF Packet Transmission

If a router R1 sends an OSPF packet from its interface I1 to a multicast address (e.g., AllSPFRouters, AllDRouters), it needs to select a key according to the following requirements:

- o The Peer field includes the multicast address.
- o The PeerKeyID field is "group".
- o The Interfaces field includes I1.
- o The Direction field is either "out" or "both".

4.3. Key Selection for OSPF Packet Reception

When Cryptographic Authentication is employed, the ID of the authentication key is included in the authentication field of the OSPF packet header. Using this key ID, it is relatively easy for a receiver to locate the key. The simple requirements are:

- o The Peer field includes the router ID of the sender.
- o The PeerKeyID field includes the key ID obtained from the authentication field.
- o The Direction field is either "in" or "both".

5. Mechanism to secure the IP header

This document updates the definition of Apad which is currently a constant defined in [[RFC5709](#)] to the source address from the IP header of the OSPFv2 protocol packet. The overall cryptographic authentication process defined in [[RFC5709](#)] remains unchanged. To reduce the potential for confusion, this section minimizes the repetition of text from [RFC 5709](#) and is incorporated here by reference [[RFC5709](#)].

[RFC 5709, Section 3.3](#), describes how the cryptographic authentication must be computed. It requires OSPFv2 packet's Authentication Trailer (which is the appendage described in [RFC 2328](#), Section D.4.3, Page 233, items (6)(a) and (6)(d)) to be filled with the value Apad where Apad is a hexadecimal constant value 0x878FE1F3 repeated (L/4) times, where L is the length of the hash being used and is measured in octets rather than bits.

Routers at the sending side must initialize Apad to a value of the source address that would be used when sending out the OSPFv2 packet, repeated L/4 times, where L is the length of the hash, measured in octets. The basic idea is to incorporate the source address from the IP header in the cryptographic authentication computation so that any change of IP source address in a replayed packet can be detected.

At the receiving end, implementations MUST initialize Apad as the source address from IP Header of the incoming OSPFv2 packet, repeated L/4 times, instead of the constant that's currently defined in [[RFC5709](#)]. Besides changing the value of Apad, this document does not introduce any other changes to the authentication mechanism described in [[RFC5709](#)]. This would prevent all attacks where a rogue OSPF router changes the IP source address of an OSPFv2 packet and replays it on the same multi-access interface or another interface

since the IP source address is now protected and such changes would cause the authentication check to fail and the replayed packet to be rejected.

6. Security Considerations

This document attempts to fix the manual key management procedure that currently exists within OSPFv2, as part of the Phase 1 of the KARP Working Group. Therefore, only the OSPFv2 manual key management mechanism is considered. Any solution that takes advantage of the automatic key management mechanism is beyond the scope of this document.

The proposed sequence number extension offers most of the benefits of of more complicated mechanisms involving challenges. There are, however, a couple drawbacks to this approach. First, it requires the OSPF implementation to be able to save its boot count in non-volatile storage. If the non-volatile storage is ever repaired or upgraded such that the contents are lost or the OSPFv2 router is replaced with a model, the keys **MUST** be changed to prevent replay attacks.

Second, if a router is taken out of service completely (either intentionally or due to a persistent failure), the potential exists for reestablishment of an OSPFv2 adjacency by replaying the entire OSPFv2 session establishment. This scenario is however, extremely unlikely, since it would imply an identical OSPFv2 adjacency formation packet exchange. The replay of OSPFv2 hello packets alone for an OSPFv2 router that has been taken out of service should not result in any serious attack as the only consequence is superfluous processing. Of course, this attack could also be thwarted by changing the relevant manual keys.

This document also provides a solution to prevent certain denial of service attacks that can be launched by changing the source address in the IP header of the OSPFv2 protocol packet.

7. IANA Considerations

This document requests a new code point from the "OSPF Shortest Path First (OSPF) Authentication Codes" registry:

- o TBD - Cryptographic Authentication with Extended Sequence Numbers. The value 3 is recommended.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

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