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PANA Mobility Optimizations
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Abstract

This specification describes PANA optimizations for handling

mobility. Proposed optimizations aim reducing protocol latency and signaling associated with PANA-based network access AAA.

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1. Introduction

A PaC using PANA [[I-D.ietf-pana-pana](#)] MUST execute full EAP/PANA upon inter-subnet (inter-PAA) movement. In case seamless mobility is desirable, having to execute full EAP authentication with a AAA server would incur undesirable latency. This document outlines the required extensions to the base PANA specification to eliminate the need to execute EAP each time the PaC performs an inter-PAA handover.

The scheme described in this document allows creation of a new PANA session with a new PAA based on an existing session with another PAA. Generation of the new PANA session does not require executing EAP-based authentication. Instead, a context-transfer-based scheme is used to bring in relevant state information from the previous PAA to the new PAA.


It should be noted that this document is limited to describing AAA optimizations on the PANA protocol. Additional optimizations aiming at EAP or specific AAA backend protocols (e.g., RADIUS, Diameter) can be defined independently. Furthermore, specification of the required context-transfer mechanism is left to other documents ([\[I-D.bournelle-pana-ctp\]](#)).

2. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

3. Framework

The call flow depicting mobility-optimized PANA execution is shown below.



In this flow, the PaC is already authorized and connected to subnet1, where prePAA resides (step 1). Later, the PaC performs a handover from subnet1 to subnet2 (step 2). Following the movement, PANA discovery and handshake phases are executed (steps 3-5). In response to the parameters included in the PSA, PANA session context is transferred from the prePAA to the newPAA (steps 6,7). Finally, PANA-Bind exchange signals the successful PANA authorization (steps 8,9). In this flow, EAP authentication does not take place.

4. Protocol Details

A mobile PaC's network access authentication performance can be enhanced by deploying a context-transfer-based mechanism, where some session attributes are transferred from the previous PAA to the new one in order to avoid performing a full EAP authentication (reactive approach). Additional mechanisms that are based on the proactive AAA state establishment at one or more candidate PAAs may be developed in the future (see for example [[I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff](#)]). The details of a context-transfer-based mechanism is provided in this section.

Upon changing its point of attachment, a PaC that wants to quickly resume its ongoing PANA session without running EAP MAY send its unexpired PANA session identifier in its PANA-Start-Answer message. Along with the Session-Id AVP, a MAC AVP MUST be included in this message. The MAC AVP is computed by using the PANA_MAC_KEY shared between the PaC and its previous PAA that has an unexpired PANA session with the PaC. This action signals the PaC's desire to perform the mobility optimization. In the absence of a Session-Id AVP in this message, the PANA session takes its usual course (i.e., EAP-based authentication is performed).

If a PAA receives a session identifier in the PANA-Start-Answer message, and it is configured to enable this optimization, it SHOULD retrieve the PANA session attributes from the previous PAA. The identity of the previous PAA is determined by looking at the DiameterIdentity part of the PANA session identifier. The MAC AVP can only be verified by the previous PAA, therefore a copy of the PANA message MUST be provided to the previous PAA. The mechanism required to send a copy of the PANA-Start-Answer message from current PAA to the previous PAA, and to retrieve the session attributes is outside the scope of PANA protocol. The Context Transfer Protocol [[I-D.ietf-seamoby-ctp](#)] might be useful for this purpose.

When the previous or current PAA is not configured to enable this optimization, the current PAA can not retrieve the PANA session attributes, or the PANA session has already expired (i.e., session lifetime is zero), the PAA MUST send the PANA-Auth-Request message with a new session identifier and let the PANA exchange take its usual course. As a result the PaC will engage in EAP-based authentication and create a fresh PANA session from scratch.

In case the current PAA can retrieve the on-going PANA session attributes from the previous PAA, the PANA session continues with a PANA-Bind exchange.

As part of the context transfer, an intermediate AAA-Key material is

provided by the previous PAA to the current PAA.

AAA-Key-int = The first N bits of
HMAC-SHA1(AAA-Key, DiameterIdentity | Session-ID)

The value of N depends on the integrity protection algorithm in use, i.e., N=160 for HMAC-SHA1. DiameterIdentity is the identifier of the current (new) PAA. Session-ID is the identifier of the PaC's PANA session with the previous PAA.

The current PAA and the PaC compute the new AAA-Key by using the nonce values and the AAA-Key-int.

AAA-Key-new = The first N bits of
HMAC-SHA1(AAA-Key-int, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce)

New PANA_MAC_KEY is computed based on the algorithm described in [[I-D.ietf-pana-pana](#)], by using the new AAA-Key and the new Session-ID assigned by the current PAA. The MAC AVP contained in the PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be generated and verified by using the new PANA_MAC_KEY. The Session-ID AVP MUST include a new session identifier assigned by the current PAA. A new PANA session is created upon successful completion of this exchange.

5. Deployment Considerations

Correct operation of this optimization relies on many factors, including applicability of authorization state from one network attachment to another. [[I-D.ietf-eap-keying](#)] identifies this operation as "fast handoff" and provides deployment considerations. Operators are recommended to take those guidelines into account when using this optimization in their networks.

6. Keying Considerations

Upon PaC's movement to a another PAA (new PAA) and request to perform a context transfer based optimization, the previous PAA computes a AAA-Key-int based on the AAA-Key, ID of new PAA, and the session ID. This AAA-Key-int is delivered to the new PAA, and used in the computation of the AAA-Key-new, which further takes a pair of nonce values into account. After this point on, the AAA-Key-new becomes the AAA-Key between the PaC and the new PAA.

The AAA-Key-int can be deleted as soon as AAA-Key-new is derived. The lifetime of AAA-Key-new is bounded by the lifetime of AAA-Key.

7. Security Considerations

The mobility optimization described in this document involves the previous PAA (possessing the AAA-Key) providing a AAA-Key-new to the current PAA of the PaC. There are security risks stemming from potential compromise of PAAs. Compromise of the current PAA does not yield compromise of the previous PAA, as the AAA-Key cannot be computed from a compromised AAA-Key-new. But a compromised previous PAA along with the intercepted nonce values on the current link leads to the compromise of AAA-Key-new. Operators should be aware of the potential risk of using this optimization.

An operator can reduce the risk exposure by forcing the PaC to perform an EAP-based authentication immediately after the PaC gains access to new link via the optimized PANA execution.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-eap-keying]

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8.2. Informative References

[I-D.bournelle-pana-ctp]

Bournelle, J., "Use of Context Transfer Protocol (CxTP) for PANA", [draft-bournelle-pana-ctp-03](#) (work in progress), June 2005.

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