

**The Internet IP Security PKI Profile of IKEv1/ISAKMP, IKEv2, and PKIX
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Abstract

IKE and PKIX certificate profile both provide frameworks that must be profiled for use in a given application. This document provides a profile of IKE and PKIX that defines the requirements for using PKI technology in the context of IKE/IPsec. The document complements protocol specifications such as IKEv1 and IKEv2, which assume the existence of public key certificates and related keying materials, but which do not address PKI issues explicitly. This document addresses those issues. The intended audience is implementors of PKI for IPsec.

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1. Introduction

IKE [[1](#)], ISAKMP [[2](#)] and IKEv2 [[3](#)] provide a secure key exchange mechanism for use with IPsec [[4](#)]. In many cases the peers authenticate using digital certificates as specified in PKIX [[5](#)]. Unfortunately, the combination of these standards leads to an underspecified set of requirements for the use of certificates in the context of IPsec.

ISAKMP references the PKIX certificate profile, but in many cases merely specifies the contents of various messages without specifying their syntax or semantics. Meanwhile, the PKIX certificate profile provides a large set of certificate mechanisms which are generally applicable for Internet protocols, but little specific guidance for IPsec. Given the numerous underspecified choices, interoperability is hampered if all implementers do not make similar choices, or at least fail to account for implementations which have chosen differently.

This profile of the IKE and PKIX frameworks is intended to provide an agreed-upon standard for using PKI technology in the context of IPsec by profiling the PKIX framework for use with IKE and IPsec, and by documenting the contents of the relevant IKE payloads and further specifying their semantics.

In addition to providing a profile of IKE and PKIX, this document attempts to incorporate lessons learned from recent experience with both implementation and deployment, as well as the current state of related protocols and technologies.

Material from ISAKMP, IKEv1, IKEv2, or PKIX is not repeated here, and readers of this document are assumed to have read and understood those documents. The requirements and security aspects of those documents are fully relevant to this document as well.

This document is organized as follows. [Section 2](#) defines special terminology used in the rest of this document, [Section 3](#) provides the profile of IKEv1/ISAKMP, [Section 4](#) provides a profile of IKEv2, and [Section 5](#) provides the profile of PKIX. [Section 6](#) covers conventions for the out-of-band exchange of keying materials for configuration purposes.

2. Terms and Definitions

Except for those terms which are defined immediately below, all terms used in this document are defined in either the PKIX [[5](#)], ISAKMP [[2](#)], IKEv1 [[1](#)], IKEv2 [[3](#)], or DOI [[6](#)] documents.

- o Peer source address: The source address in packets from a peer. This address may be different from any addresses asserted as the "identity" of the peer.
- o FQDN: Fully qualified domain name.
- o ID_USER_FQDN: IKEv2 renamed ID_USER_FQDN to ID_RFC822_ADDR. Both are referred to as ID_USER_FQDN in this document.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119](#) [7].

3. Use of Certificates in [RFC 2401](#) and IKEv1/ISAKMP

3.1. Identification Payload

The Identification (ID) Payload indicates the identity claimed by the sender. The recipient can then use the ID as a lookup key for policy and for certificate lookup in whatever certificate store or directory that it has available. Our primary concern in this section is to profile the ID payload so that it can be safely used to generate or lookup policy. IKE mandates the use of the ID payload in Phase 1.

The DOI [\[6\]](#) defines the 11 types of Identification Data that can be used and specifies the syntax for these types. These are discussed below in detail.

The ID payload requirements in this document cover only the portion of the explicit policy checks that deal with the Identification Payload specifically. For instance, in the case where ID does not contain an IP address, checks such as verifying that the peer source address is permitted by the relevant policy are not addressed here as they are out of the scope of this document.

Implementations SHOULD populate ID with identity information that is contained within the end-entity certificate. Populating ID with identity information from the end-entity certificate enables recipients to use ID as a lookup key to find the peer end-entity certificate. The only case where implementations may populate ID with information that is not contained in the end-entity certificate is when ID contains the peer source address (a single address, not a subnet or range).

Because implementations may use ID as a lookup key to determine which policy to use, all implementations MUST be especially careful to verify the truthfulness of the contents by verifying that they correspond to some keying material demonstrably held by the peer. Failure to do so may result in the use of an inappropriate or

insecure policy. The following sections describe the methods for performing this binding.

The following table summarizes the binding of the Identification Payload to the contents of end-entity certificates and of identity information to policy. Each ID type is covered more thoroughly in the following sections.

ID type	Support for send	Correspond PKIX Attrib	Cert matching	SPD lookup rules

IP*_ADDR	MUST [a]	SubjAltName iPAddress	MUST [b]	[c], [d]
FQDN	MUST [a]	SubjAltName dNSName	MUST [b]	[c], [d]
USER_FQDN	MUST [a]	SubjAltName rfc822Name	MUST [b]	[c], [d]
IP range	MUST NOT	n/a	n/a	n/a
DN	MUST [a]	Entire Subject, bitwise compare	MUST [b]	MUST support lookup on any combination of C, CN, O, or OU
GN	MUST NOT	n/a	n/a	n/a
KEY_ID	MUST NOT	n/a	n/a	n/a

[a] = Implementation MUST have the configuration option to send this ID type in the ID payload. Whether or not the ID type is used is a matter of local configuration.

[b] = The ID in the ID payload MUST match the contents of the corresponding field (listed) in the certificate exactly, with no other lookup. The matched ID MAY be used for SPD lookup, but is not required to be used for this.

[c] = At a minimum, Implementation MUST be capable of being configured to perform exact matching of the ID payload contents to an entry in the local SPD.

[d] = In addition, the implementation MAY also be configurable to

perform substring or wildcard matches of ID payload contents to entries in the local SPD. (More on this in [Section 3.1.5](#)).

When sending an IPV4_ADDR, IPV6_ADDR, FQDN, or USER_FQDN, implementations MUST be able to be configured to send the same string as appears in the corresponding SubjectAltName extension. This document RECOMMENDS that deployers use this configuration option. All these ID types are treated the same: as strings that can be compared easily and quickly to a corresponding string in an explicit value in the certificate. Of these types, FQDN and USER_FQDN are RECOMMENDED over IP addresses (see discussion in [Section 3.1.1](#)).

When sending a DN as ID, implementations MUST send the entire DN in ID. Also, implementations MUST support at least the C, CN, O, and OU attributes for SPD matching. See [Section 3.1.5](#) for more details about DN, including SPD matching.

Recipients MUST be able to perform SPD matching on the exact contents of the ID, and this SHOULD be the default setting. In addition, implementations MAY use substrings or wildcards in local policy configuration to do the SPD matching against the ID contents. In other words, implementations MUST be able to do exact matches of ID to SPD, but MAY also be configurable to do substring or wildcard matches of ID to SPD.

[3.1.1.1](#). ID_IPV4_ADDR and ID_IPV6_ADDR

Implementations MUST support at least the ID_IPV4_ADDR or ID_IPV6_ADDR ID type, depending on whether the implementation supports IPv4, IPv6 or both. These addresses MUST be encoded in "network byte order," as specified in IP [\[8\]](#): The least significant bit (LSB) of each octet is the LSB of the corresponding byte in the network address. For the ID_IPV4_ADDR type, the payload MUST contain exactly four octets [\[8\]](#). For the ID_IPV6_ADDR type, the payload MUST contain exactly sixteen octets [\[10\]](#).

Implementations SHOULD NOT populate ID payload with IP addresses due to interoperability issues such as problems with NAT traversal, and problems with IP verification behavior.

Deployments may only want to consider using the IP address as ID if all of the following are true:

- o the peer's IP address is static, not dynamically changing
- o the peer is NOT behind a NAT'ing device
- o the administrator intends the implementation to verify that the peer source address matches the IP address in the ID received, and that in the ipAddress field in the peer certificate's

SubjectAltName extension.

Implementations MUST be capable of verifying that the IP address presented in ID matches via bitwise comparison the IP address present in the certificate's iAddress field of the SubjectAltName extension. Implementations MUST perform this verification by default. When comparing the contents of ID with the iAddress field in the SubjectAltName extension for equality, binary comparison MUST be performed. Note that certificates may contain multiple address identity types in which case at least one must match the source IP. If the default is enabled, then a mismatch between the two addresses MUST be treated as an error and security association setup MUST be aborted. This event SHOULD be auditable. Implementations MAY provide a configuration option to (i.e. local policy configuration can enable) skip that verification step, but that option MUST be off by default. We include the "option-to-skip-validation" in order to permit better interoperability, as today implementations vary greatly in how they behave on this topic.

In addition, implementations MUST be capable of verifying that the address contained in the ID is the same as the peer source address, contained in the outer most IP header. If ID is one of the IP address types, then implementations MUST perform this verification by default. If this default is enabled, then a mismatch MUST be treated as an error and security association setup MUST be aborted. This event SHOULD be auditable. Implementations MAY provide a configuration option to (i.e. local policy configuration can enable) skip that verification step, but that option MUST be off by default. We include the "option-to-skip-validation" in order to permit better interoperability, as today implementations vary greatly in how they behave on the topic of verification of source IP.

If the default for both the verifications above are enabled, then, by transitive property, the implementation will also be verifying that the peer source IP address matches via a bitwise comparison the contents of the iAddress field in the SubjectAltName extension in the certificate. In addition, implementations MAY allow administrators to configure a local policy that explicitly requires that the peer source IP address match via a bitwise comparison the contents of the iAddress field in the SubjectAltName extension in the certificate. Implementations SHOULD allow administrators to configure a local policy that skips this validation check.

Implementations MAY support substring, wildcard, or regular expression matching of the contents of ID to lookup policy in the SPD, and such would be a matter of local security policy configuration.

Implementations MAY use the IP address found in the header of packets received from the peer to lookup the policy, but such implementations MUST still perform verification of the ID payload. Although packet IP addresses are inherently untrustworthy and must therefore be independently verified, it is often useful to use the apparent IP address of the peer to locate a general class of policies that will be used until the mandatory identity-based policy lookup can be performed.

For instance, if the IP address of the peer is unrecognized, a VPN gateway device might load a general "road warrior" policy that specifies a particular CA that is trusted to issue certificates which contain a valid rfc822Name which can be used by that implementation to perform authorization based on access control lists (ACLs) after the peer's certificate has been validated. The rfc822Name can then be used to determine the policy that provides specific authorization to access resources (such as IP addresses, ports, and so forth).

As another example, if the IP address of the peer is recognized to be a known peer VPN endpoint, policy may be determined using that address, but until the identity (address) is validated by validating the peer certificate, the policy MUST NOT be used to authorize any IPsec traffic.

3.1.2. ID_FQDN

Implementations MUST support the ID_FQDN ID type, generally to support host-based access control lists for hosts without fixed IP addresses. However, implementations SHOULD NOT use the DNS to map the FQDN to IP addresses for input into any policy decisions, unless that mapping is known to be secure, for example if DNSSEC [11] were employed for that FQDN.

If ID contains an ID_FQDN, implementations MUST be capable of verifying that the identity contained in the ID payload matches identity information contained in the peer end-entity certificate, in the dNSName field in the SubjectAltName extension. Implementations MUST perform this verification by default. When comparing the contents of ID with the dNSName field in the SubjectAltName extension for equality, case-insensitive string comparison MUST be performed. Note that case-insensitive string comparison works on internationalized domain names (IDNs) as well (See IDN [12]). Substring, wildcard, or regular expression matching MUST NOT be performed for this comparison. If this default is enabled, then a mismatch MUST be treated as an error and security association setup MUST be aborted. This event SHOULD be auditable. Implementations MAY provide a configuration option to (i.e. local policy configuration can enable) skip that verification step, but that

option MUST be off by default. We include the "option-to-skip-validation" in order to permit better interoperability, as today implementations vary greatly in how they behave on this topic.

Implementations MAY support substring, wildcard, or regular expression matching of the contents of ID to lookup policy in the SPD, and such would be a matter of local security policy configuration.

3.1.3. ID_USER_FQDN

Implementations MUST support the ID_USER_FQDN ID type, generally to support user-based access control lists for users without fixed IP addresses. However, implementations SHOULD NOT use the DNS to map the FQDN portion to IP addresses for input into any policy decisions, unless that mapping is known to be secure, for example if DNSSEC [11] were employed for that FQDN.

Implementations MUST be capable of verifying that the identity contained in the ID payload matches identity information contained in the peer end-entity certificate, in the rfc822Name field in the SubjectAltName extension. Implementations MUST perform this verification by default. When comparing the contents of ID with the rfc822Name field in the SubjectAltName extension for equality, case-insensitive string comparison MUST be performed. Note that case-insensitive string comparison works on internationalized domain names (IDNs) as well (See IDN [12]). Substring, wildcard, or regular expression matching MUST NOT be performed for this comparison. If this default is enabled, then a mismatch MUST be treated as an error and security association setup MUST be aborted. This event SHOULD be auditable. Implementations MAY provide a configuration option to (i.e. local policy configuration can enable) skip that verification step, but that option MUST be off by default. We include the "option-to-skip-validation" in order to permit better interoperability, as today implementations vary greatly in how they behave on this topic.

Implementations MAY support substring, wildcard, or regular expression matching of the contents of ID to lookup policy in the SPD, and such would be a matter of local security policy configuration.

3.1.4. ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET, ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET, ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE

Note that RFC 3779 [13] defines blocks of addresses using the certificate extension identified by:

id-pe-ipAddrBlock OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 7 }

although use of this extension in IKE is considered experimental at this time.

3.1.5. ID_DER_ASN1_DN

Implementations MUST support receiving the ID_DER_ASN1_DN ID type. Implementations MUST be capable of generating this type, and the decision to do so will be a matter of local security policy configuration. When generating this type, implementations MUST populate the contents of ID with the Subject field from the end-entity certificate, and MUST do so such that a binary comparison of the two will succeed. If there is not a match, this MUST be treated as an error and security association setup MUST be aborted. This event SHOULD be auditable.

Implementations MUST NOT populate ID with the Subject from the end-entity certificate if it is empty, even though an empty certificate Subject is explicitly allowed in the "Subject" section of the PKIX certificate profile.

Regarding SPD matching, implementations MUST be able to perform matching based on a bitwise comparison of the entire DN in ID to its entry in the SPD. However, operational experience has shown that using the entire DN in local configuration is difficult, especially in large scale deployments. Therefore, implementations also MUST be able to perform SPD matches of any combination of one or more of the C, CN, O, OU attributes within Subject DN in the ID to the same in the SPD. Implementations MAY support matching using additional DN attributes in any combination, although interoperability is far from certain and dubious. Implementations MAY also support performing substring, wildcard, or regular expression matches for any of its supported DN attributes from ID, in any combination, to the SPD. Such flexibility allows deployers to create one SPD entry on the gateway for an entire department of a company (e.g. O=FooBar Inc., OU=Engineering) while still allowing them to draw out other details from the DN (e.g. CN=John Doe) for auditing purposes. All the above is a matter of local implementation and local policy definition and enforcement capability, not bits on the wire, but will have a great impact on interoperability.

3.1.6. ID_DER_ASN1_GN

Implementations MUST NOT generate this type, because the recipient will be unlikely to know how to use it.

3.1.7. ID_KEY_ID

The ID_KEY_ID type used to specify pre-shared keys and thus is out of scope.

3.1.8. Selecting an Identity from a Certificate

Implementations MUST support certificates that contain more than a single identity, such as when the Subject field and the SubjectAltName extension are both populated, or the SubjectAltName extension contains multiple identities irrespective of whether the Subject is empty or not. In many cases a certificate will contain an identity such as an IP address in the SubjectAltName extension in addition to a non-empty Subject.

Implementations should populate ID with whichever identity is likely to be named in the peer's policy. In practice, this generally means FQDN, or USER_FQDN, but this information may also be available to the administrator through some out-of-band means. In the absence of such out-of-band configuration information, the identity with which an implementation chooses to populate the ID payload is a local matter.

3.1.9. Subject for DN Only

If an FQDN is intended to be processed as an identity for the purposes ID matching, it MUST be placed in the dNSName field of the SubjectAltName extension. Implementations MUST NOT populate the Subject with an FQDN in place of populating the dNSName field of the SubjectAltName extension.

While nothing prevents an FQDN, USER_FQDN, or IP address information from appearing somewhere in the Subject contents, such entries MUST NOT be interpreted as identity information for the purposes of matching with ID or for policy lookup.

3.1.10. Binding Identity to Policy

In the presence of certificates that contain multiple identities, implementations should select the most appropriate identity from the certificate and populate the ID with that. The recipient MUST use the identity sent as a first key when selecting the policy. The recipient MUST also use the most specific policy from that database if there are overlapping policies caused by wildcards (or the implementation can de-correlate the policy database so there will not be overlapping entries, or it can also forbid creation of overlapping policies and leave the de-correlation process to the administrator, but as this moves the problem to the administrator it is NOT RECOMMENDED).

For example, imagine that an implementation is configured with a certificate that contains both a non-empty Subject and a `dnsName`. The sender's policy may specify which of those to use, and it indicates the policy to the other end by sending that ID. If the recipient has both a specific policy for the `dnsName` for this host and generic wildcard rule for some attributes present in the Subject field, it will match a different policy depending which ID is sent. As the sender knows why it wanted to connect the peer, it also knows what identity it should use to match the policy it needs to the operation it tries to perform; it is the only party who can select the ID adequately.

In the event the policy cannot be found in the recipient's SPD using the ID sent, then the recipient MAY use the other identities in the certificate when attempting to match a suitable policy. For example, say the certificate contains non-empty Subject field, a `dnsName` and an `ipAddress`. If an `ipAddress` is sent in ID but no specific entry exists for the address in the policy database, the recipient MAY search in the policy database based on the Subject or the `dnsName` contained in the certificate.

3.2. Certificate Request Payload

The Certificate Request (CERTREQ) Payload allows an implementation to request that a peer provide some set of certificates or certificate revocation lists (CRLs). It is not clear from ISAKMP exactly how that set should be specified or how the peer should respond. We describe the semantics on both sides.

3.2.1. Certificate Type

The Certificate Type field identifies to the peer the type of certificate keying materials that are desired. ISAKMP defines 10 types of Certificate Data that can be requested and specifies the syntax for these types. For the purposes of this document, only the following types are relevant:

- o X.509 Certificate - Signature
- o Revocation Lists (CRL and ARL)
- o PKCS #7 wrapped X.509 certificate

The use of the other types are out of the scope of this document:

- o X.509 Certificate - Key Exchange
- o PGP Certificate
- o DNS Signed Key

- o Kerberos Tokens
- o SPKI Certificate
- o X.509 Certificate Attribute

3.2.2. X.509 Certificate - Signature

This type requests that the end-entity certificate be a certificate used for signing.

3.2.3. Revocation Lists (CRL and ARL)

ISAKMP does not support Certificate Payload sizes over approximately 64K, which is too small for many CRLs, and UDP fragmentation is likely to occur at sizes much smaller than that. Therefore, the acquisition of revocation material is to be dealt with out-of-band of IKE. For this and other reasons, implementations SHOULD NOT generate CERTREQs where the Certificate Type is "Certificate Revocation List (CRL)" or "Authority Revocation List (ARL)". Implementations that do generate such CERTREQs MUST NOT require the recipient to respond with a CRL or ARL, and MUST NOT fail when not receiving any. Upon receipt of such a CERTREQ, implementations MAY ignore the request.

In lieu of exchanging revocation lists in-band, a pointer to revocation checking SHOULD be listed in either the CRLDistributionPoints (CDP) or the AuthorityInfoAccess (AIA) certificate extensions (see [Section 5](#) for details). Unless other methods for obtaining revocation information are available, implementations SHOULD be able to process these attributes, and from them be able to identify cached revocation material, or retrieve the relevant revocation material from a URL, for validation processing. In addition, implementations MUST have the ability to configure validation checking information for each certification authority. Regardless of the method (CDP, AIA, or static configuration), the acquisition of revocation material SHOULD occur out-of-band of IKE. Note, however, that an inability to access revocation status data through out-of-band means provides a potential security vulnerability that could potentially be exploited by an attacker.

3.2.4. PKCS #7 wrapped X.509 certificate

This ID type defines a particular encoding (not a particular certificate type), some current implementations may ignore CERTREQs they receive which contain this ID type, and the editors are unaware of any implementations that generate such CERTREQ messages. Therefore, the use of this type is deprecated. Implementations SHOULD NOT require CERTREQs that contain this Certificate Type. Implementations which receive CERTREQs which contain this ID type MAY treat such payloads as synonymous with "X.509 Certificate -

Signature".

3.2.5. Location of Certificate Request Payloads

In IKEv1 Main Mode, the CERTREQ payload MUST be in messages 4 and 5.

3.2.6. Presence or Absence of Certificate Request Payloads

When in-band exchange of certificate keying materials is desired, implementations MUST inform the peer of this by sending at least one CERTREQ. In other words, an implementation which does not send any CERTREQs during an exchange SHOULD NOT expect to receive any CERT payloads.

3.2.7. Certificate Requests

3.2.7.1. Specifying Certification Authorities

When requesting in-band exchange of keying materials, implementations SHOULD generate CERTREQs for every peer trust anchor that local policy explicitly deems trusted during a given exchange. Implementations SHOULD populate the Certification Authority field with the Subject field of the trust anchor, populated such that binary comparison of the Subject and the Certification Authority will succeed.

Upon receipt of a CERTREQ, implementations MUST respond by sending at least the end-entity certificate corresponding to the Certification Authority listed in the CERTREQ unless local security policy configuration specifies that keying materials must be exchanged out-of-band. Implementations MAY send certificates other than the end-entity certificate (see [Section 3.3](#) for discussion).

Note, in the case where multiple end-entity certificates may be available which chain to different trust anchors, implementations SHOULD resort to local heuristics to determine which trust anchor is most appropriate to use for generating the CERTREQ. Such heuristics are out of the scope of this document.

3.2.7.2. Empty Certification Authority Field

Implementations SHOULD generate CERTREQs where the Certificate Type is "X.509 Certificate - Signature" and where the Certification Authority field is not empty. However, implementations MAY generate CERTREQs with an empty Certification Authority field under special conditions. Although PKIX prohibits certificates with an empty Issuer field, there does exist a use case where doing so is appropriate, and carries special meaning in the IKE context. This

has become a convention within the IKE interoperability tests and usage space, and so its use is specified, explained here for the sake of interoperability.

USE CASE: Consider the rare case where you have a gateway with multiple policies for a large number of IKE peers: some of these peers are business partners, some are remote access employees, some are teleworkers, some are branch offices, and/or the gateway may be simultaneously serving many customers (e.g. Virtual Routers). The total number of certificates, and corresponding trust anchors, is very high, say hundreds. Each of these policies is configured with one or more acceptable trust anchors, so that in total, the gateway has one hundred (100) trust anchors that could possibly be used to authenticate an incoming connection. Assume that many of those connections originate from hosts/gateways with dynamically assigned IP addresses, so that the source IP of the IKE initiator is not known to the gateway, nor is the identity of the initiator (until it is revealed in Main Mode message 5). In IKE main mode message 4, the responder gateway will need to send a CERTREQ to the initiator. Given this example, the gateway will have no idea which of the hundred possible Certification Authorities to send in the CERTREQ. Sending all possible Certification Authorities will cause significant processing delays, bandwidth consumption, and UDP fragmentation, so this tactic is ruled out.

In such a deployment, the responder gateway implementation should be able to do all it can to indicate a Certification Authority in the CERTREQ. This means the responder SHOULD first check SPD to see if it can match the source IP, and find some indication of which CA is associated with that IP. If this fails (because the source IP is not familiar, as in the case above), then the responder SHOULD have a configuration option specifying which CAs are the default CAs to indicate in CERTREQ during such ambiguous connections (e.g. send CERTREQ with these N CAs if there is an unknown source IP). If such a fall-back is not configured or impractical in a certain deployment scenario, then the responder implementation SHOULD have both of the following configuration options:

- o send a CERTREQ payload with an empty Certification Authority field, or
- o terminate the negotiation with an appropriate error message and audit log entry.

Receiving a CERTREQ payload with an empty Certification Authority field indicates that the recipient should send all/any end-entity certificates it has, regardless of the trust anchor. The initiator should be aware of what policy and which identity it will use, as it initiated the connection on a matched policy to begin with, and can

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thus respond with the appropriate certificate.

If, after sending an empty CERTREQ in Main Mode message 4, a responder receives a certificate in message 5 that chains to a trust anchor that the responder either (a) does NOT support, or (b) was not configured for the policy (that policy was now able to be matched due to having the initiator's certificate present), this MUST be treated as an error and security association setup MUST be aborted. This event SHOULD be auditable.

Instead of sending a empty CERTREQ, the responder implementation MAY be configured to terminate the negotiation on the grounds of a conflict with locally configured security policy.

The decision of which to configure is a matter of local security policy, this document RECOMMENDS that both options be presented to administrators.

More examples, and explanation on this issue are included in "More on Empty CERTREQs" (Appendix B).

3.2.8. Robustness

3.2.8.1. Unrecognized or Unsupported Certificate Types

Implementations MUST be able to deal with receiving CERTREQs with unsupported Certificate Types. Absent any recognized and supported CERTREQ types, implementations MAY treat them as if they are of a supported type with the Certification Authority field left empty, depending on local policy. ISAKMP [2] [Section 5.10](#) "Certificate Request Payload Processing" specifies additional processing.

3.2.8.2. Undecodable Certification Authority Fields

Implementations MUST be able to deal with receiving CERTREQs with undecodable Certification Authority fields. Implementations MAY ignore such payloads, depending on local policy. ISAKMP specifies other actions which may be taken.

3.2.8.3. Ordering of Certificate Request Payloads

Implementations MUST NOT assume that CERTREQs are ordered in any way.

3.2.9. Optimizations

3.2.9.1. Duplicate Certificate Request Payloads

Implementations SHOULD NOT send duplicate CERTREQs during an exchange.

3.2.9.2. Name Lowest 'Common' Certification Authorities

When a peer's certificate keying material has been cached, an implementation can send a hint to the peer to elide some of the certificates the peer would normally include in the response. In addition to the normal set of CERTREQs that are sent specifying the trust anchors, an implementation MAY send CERTREQs specifying the relevant cached end-entity certificates. When sending these hints, it is still necessary to send the normal set of trust anchor CERTREQs because the hints do not sufficiently convey all of the information required by the peer. Specifically, either the peer may not support this optimization or there may be additional chains that could be used in this context but will not be if only the end-entity certificate is specified.

No special processing is required on the part of the recipient of such a CERTREQ, and the end-entity certificates will still be sent. On the other hand, the recipient MAY elect to elide certificates based on receipt of such hints.

CERTREQs must contain information that identifies a Certification Authority certificate, which results in the peer always sending at least the end-entity certificate. Always sending the end-entity certificate allows implementations to determine unambiguously when a new certificate is being used by a peer (perhaps because the previous certificate has just expired), which may result in a failure because a new intermediate CA certificate might not be available to validate the new end-entity certificate). Implementations which implement this optimization MUST recognize when the end-entity certificate has changed and respond to it by not performing this optimization if the exchange must be retried so that any missing keying materials will be sent during retry.

3.2.9.3. Example

Imagine that an IKEv1 implementation has previously received and cached the peer certificate chain TA->CA1->CA2->EE. If during a subsequent exchange this implementation sends a CERTREQ containing the Subject field in certificate TA, this implementation is requesting that the peer send at least 3 certificates: CA1, CA2, and EE. On the other hand, if this implementation also sends a CERTREQ containing the Subject field of CA2, the implementation is providing a hint that only 1 certificate needs to be sent: EE. Note that in

this example, the fact that TA is a trust anchor should not be construed to imply that TA is a self-signed certificate.

3.3. Certificate Payload

The Certificate (CERT) Payload allows the peer to transmit a single certificate or CRL. Multiple certificates should be transmitted in multiple payloads. For backwards compatibility reasons, implementations MAY send intermediate CA certificates in addition to the appropriate end-entity certificate(s), but SHOULD NOT send any CRLs, ARLs, or trust anchors. Exchanging trust anchors and especially CRLs and ARLs in IKE would increase the likelihood of UDP fragmentation, make the IKE exchange more complex, and consume additional network bandwidth.

Note, however, that while the sender of the CERT payloads SHOULD NOT send any certificates it considers trust anchors, it's possible that the recipient may consider any given intermediate CA certificate to be a trust anchor. For instance, imagine the sender has the certificate chain TA1->CA1->EE1 while the recipient has the certificate chain TA2->EE2 where TA2=CA1. The sender is merely including an intermediate CA certificate, while the recipient receives a trust anchor.

However, not all certificate forms that are legal in the PKIX certificate profile make sense in the context of IPsec. The issue of how to represent IKE-meaningful name-forms in a certificate is especially problematic. This document provides a profile for a subset of the PKIX certificate profile that makes sense for IKEv1/ISAKMP.

3.3.1. Certificate Type

The Certificate Type field identifies to the peer the type of certificate keying materials that are included. ISAKMP defines 10 types of Certificate Data that can be sent and specifies the syntax for these types. For the purposes of this document, only the following types are relevant:

- o X.509 Certificate - Signature
- o Revocation Lists (CRL and ARL)
- o PKCS #7 wrapped X.509 certificate

The use of the other types are out of the scope of this document:

- o X.509 Certificate - Key Exchange

- o PGP Certificate
- o DNS Signed Key
- o Kerberos Tokens
- o SPKI Certificate
- o X.509 Certificate Attribute

3.3.2. X.509 Certificate - Signature

This type specifies that Certificate Data contains a certificate used for signing.

3.3.3. Revocation Lists (CRL and ARL)

These types specify that Certificate Data contains an X.509 CRL or ARL. These types SHOULD NOT be sent in IKE. See [Section 3.2.3](#) for discussion.

3.3.4. PKCS #7 wrapped X.509 certificate

This type defines a particular encoding, not a particular certificate type. Implementations SHOULD NOT generate CERTs that contain this Certificate Type. Implementations SHOULD accept CERTs that contain this Certificate Type because several implementations are known to generate them. Note that those implementations sometimes include entire certificate hierarchies inside a single CERT PKCS #7 payload, which violates the requirement specified in ISAKMP that this payload contain a single certificate.

3.3.5. Location of Certificate Payloads

In IKEv1 Main Mode, the CERT payload MUST be in messages 5 and 6.

3.3.6. Certificate Payloads Not Mandatory

An implementation which does not receive any CERTREQs during an exchange SHOULD NOT send any CERT payloads, except when explicitly configured to proactively send CERT payloads in order to interoperate with non-compliant implementations which fail to send CERTREQs even when certificates are desired. In this case, an implementation MAY send the certificate chain (not including the trust anchor) associated with the end-entity certificate. This MUST NOT be the default behavior of implementations.

Implementations whose local security policy configuration expects that a peer must receive certificates through out-of-band means SHOULD ignore any CERTREQ messages that are received. Such a condition has been known to occur due to non-compliant or buggy implementations.

Implementations that receive CERTREQs from a peer which contain only unrecognized Certification Authorities MAY elect to terminate the exchange, in order to avoid unnecessary and potentially expensive cryptographic processing, denial-of-service (resource starvation) attacks.

3.3.7. Response to Multiple Certification Authority Proposals

In response to multiple CERTREQs which contain different Certification Authority identities, implementations MAY respond using an end-entity certificate which chains to a CA that matches any of the identities provided by the peer.

3.3.8. Using Local Keying Materials

Implementations MAY elect to skip parsing or otherwise decoding a given set of CERTs if those same keying materials are available via some preferable means, such as the case where certificates from a previous exchange have been cached.

3.3.9. Multiple End-Entity Certificates

Implementations SHOULD NOT send multiple end-entity certificates and recipients SHOULD NOT be expected to iterate over multiple end-entity certificates.

If multiple end-entity certificates are sent, they MUST have the same public key, otherwise the responder does not know which key was used in the Main Mode message 5.

3.3.10. Robustness

3.3.10.1. Unrecognized or Unsupported Certificate Types

Implementations MUST be able to deal with receiving CERTs with unrecognized or unsupported Certificate Types. Implementations MAY discard such payloads, depending on local policy. ISAKMP [2] [Section 5.10](#) "Certificate Request Payload Processing" specifies additional processing.

3.3.10.2. Undecodable Certificate Data Fields

Implementations MUST be able to deal with receiving CERTs with undecodable Certificate Data fields. Implementations MAY discard such payloads, depending on local policy. ISAKMP specifies other actions which may be taken.

3.3.10.3. Ordering of Certificate Payloads

Implementations MUST NOT assume that CERTs are ordered in any way.

3.3.10.4. Duplicate Certificate Payloads

Implementations MUST support receiving multiple identical CERTs during an exchange.

3.3.10.5. Irrelevant Certificates

Implementations MUST be prepared to receive certificates and CRLs which are not relevant to the current exchange. Implementations MAY discard such extraneous certificates and CRLs.

Implementations MAY send certificates which are irrelevant to an exchange. One reason for including certificates which are irrelevant to an exchange is to minimize the threat of leaking identifying information in exchanges where CERT is not encrypted in IKEv1. It should be noted, however, that this probably provides rather poor protection against leaking the identity.

Another reason for including certificates that seem irrelevant to an exchange is that there may be two chains from the Certification Authority to the end entity, each of which is only valid with certain validation parameters (such as acceptable policies). Since the end-entity doesn't know which parameters the relying party is using, it should send the certificates needed for both chains (even if there's only one CERTREQ).

Implementations SHOULD NOT send multiple end-entity certificates and recipients SHOULD NOT be expected to iterate over multiple end-entity certificates.

3.3.11. Optimizations

3.3.11.1. Duplicate Certificate Payloads

Implementations SHOULD NOT send duplicate CERTs during an exchange. Such payloads should be suppressed.

3.3.11.2. Send Lowest 'Common' Certificates

When multiple CERTREQs are received which specify certification authorities within the end-entity certificate chain, implementations MAY send the shortest chain possible. However, implementations SHOULD always send the end-entity certificate. See [Section 3.2.9.2](#) for more discussion of this optimization.

3.3.11.3. Ignore Duplicate Certificate Payloads

Implementations MAY employ local means to recognize CERTs that have already been received and SHOULD discard these duplicate CERTs.

3.3.11.4. Hash Payload

IKEv1 specifies the optional use of the Hash Payload to carry a pointer to a certificate in either of the Phase 1 public key encryption modes. This pointer is used by an implementation to locate the end-entity certificate that contains the public key that a peer should use for encrypting payloads during the exchange.

Implementations SHOULD include this payload whenever the public portion of the keypair has been placed in a certificate.

4. Use of Certificates in [RFC4301](#) and IKEv2

4.1. Identification Payload

The Peer Authorization Database (PAD) as described in [RFC 4301](#) [[14](#)] describes the use of the ID payload in IKEv2 and provides a formal model for the binding of identity to policy in addition to providing services that deal more specifically with the details of policy enforcement, which are generally out of scope of this document. The PAD is intended to provide a link between the SPD and the security association management in protocols such as IKE. See [RFC 4301](#) [[14](#)], section 4.4.3 for more details.

Note that IKEv2 adds an optional IDr payload in the second exchange that the initiator may send to the responder in order to specify which of the responder's multiple identities should be used. The responder MAY choose to send an IDr in the 3rd exchange that differs in type or content from the initiator-generated IDr. The initiator MUST be able to receive a responder-generated IDr that is a different type from the one the initiator generated.

4.2. Certificate Request Payload

4.2.1. Revocation Lists (CRL and ARL)

IKEv2 does not support Certificate Payload sizes over approximately 64K. See [Section 3.2.3](#) for the problems this can cause.

4.2.1.1. IKEv2's Hash and URL of X.509 certificate

This ID type defines a request for the peer to send a hash and URL of its X.509 certificate, instead of the actual certificate itself. This is a particularly useful mechanism when the peer is a device with little memory and lower bandwidth, e.g. a mobile handset or consumer electronics device.

If the IKEv2 implementation supports URL lookups, and prefers such a URL to receiving actual certificates, then the implementation will want to send a notify of type HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED. From IKEv2 [3], section 3.10.1, "This notification MAY be included in any message that can include a CERTREQ payload and indicates that the sender is capable of looking up certificates based on an HTTP-based URL (and hence presumably would prefer to receive certificate specifications in that format)." If an HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED notification is sent the sender MUST support the http scheme. See [Section 4.3.1](#) for more discussion of HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED.

4.2.1.2. Location of Certificate Request Payloads

In IKEv2, the CERTREQ payload must be in messages 2 and 3. Note that in IKEv2, it is possible to have one side authenticating with certificates while the other side authenticates with preshared keys.

4.3. Certificate Payload

4.3.1. IKEv2's Hash and URL of X.509 Certificate

This type specifies that Certificate Data contains a hash and the URL to a repository where an X.509 certificate can be retrieved.

An implementation that sends a HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED notification MUST support the http scheme and MAY support the ftp scheme, and MUST NOT require any specific form of the url-path and it SHOULD support having user-name, password and port parts in the URL. The following are examples of mandatory forms:

- o http://certs.example.com/certificate.cer
- o http://certs.example.com/certs/cert.pl?u=foo;a=pw;valid-to=+86400
- o http://certs.example.com/%0a/./foo/bar/zappa

while the following is an example of a form that SHOULD be supported:

- o <http://user:password@certs.example.com:8888/certificate.cer>

FTP MAY be supported, and if it is the following is an example of the ftp scheme that MUST be supported:

- o ftp://ftp.example.com/pub/certificate.cer

4.3.2. Location of Certificate Payloads

In IKEv2, the CERT payload MUST be in messages 3 and 4. Note that in IKEv2, it is possible to have one side authenticating with certificates while the other side authenticates with preshared keys.

4.3.3. Ordering of Certificate Payloads

For IKEv2, implementations MUST NOT assume that any but the first CERT is ordered in any way. IKEv2 specifies that the first CERT contain an end-entity certificate which can be used to authenticate the peer.

5. Certificate Profile for IKEv1/ISAKMP and IKEv2

Except where specifically stated in this document, implementations MUST conform to the requirements of the PKIX [5] certificate profile.

5.1. X.509 Certificates

Users deploying IKE and IPsec with certificates have often had little control over the capabilities of CAs available to them. Implementations of this specification may include configuration knobs to disable checks required by this specification in order to permit use with inflexible and/or noncompliant CAs. However, all checks on certificates exist for a specific reason involving the security of the entire system. Therefore, all checks MUST be enabled by default. Administrators and users ought to understand the security purpose for the various checks, and be clear on what security will be lost by disabling the check.

5.1.1. Versions

Although PKIX states that "implementations SHOULD be prepared to accept any version certificate", in practice this profile requires certain extensions that necessitate the use of Version 3 certificates for all but self-signed certificates used as trust anchors. Implementations that conform to this document MAY therefore reject Version 1 and Version 2 certificates in all other cases.

5.1.2. Subject

Certification Authority implementations MUST be able to create certificates with Subject fields with at least the following four attributes: CN, C, O, OU. Implementations MAY support other Subject

attributes as well. The contents of these attributes SHOULD be configurable on a certificate by certificate basis, as these fields will likely be used by IKE implementations to match SPD policy.

See [Section 3.1.5](#) for details on how IKE implementations need to be able to process Subject field attributes for SPD policy lookup.

[5.1.2.1.](#) Empty Subject Name

IKE Implementations MUST accept certificates which contain an empty Subject field, as specified in the PKIX certificate profile. Identity information in such certificates will be contained entirely in the SubjectAltName extension.

[5.1.2.2.](#) Specifying Hosts and not FQDN in the Subject Name

Implementations which desire to place host names that are not intended to be processed by recipients as FQDNs (for instance "Gateway Router") in the Subject MUST use the commonName attribute.

[5.1.2.3.](#) EmailAddress

As specified in the PKIX certificate profile, implementations MUST NOT populate X.509 distinguished names with the emailAddress attribute.

[5.1.3.](#) X.509 Certificate Extensions

Conforming IKE implementations MUST recognize extensions which must or may be marked critical according to this specification. These extensions are: KeyUsage, SubjectAltName, and BasicConstraints.

Certification Authority implementations SHOULD generate certificates such that the extension criticality bits are set in accordance with the PKIX certificate profile and this document. With respect to compliance with the PKIX certificate profile, IKE implementations processing certificates MAY ignore the value of the criticality bit for extensions that are supported by that implementation, but MUST support the criticality bit for extensions that are not supported by that implementation. That is, a relying party SHOULD process all the extensions it is aware of whether the bit is true or false -- the bit says what happens when a relying party cannot process an extension.

implements	bit in cert	PKIX mandate	behavior

yes	true	true	ok
yes	true	false	ok or reject
yes	false	true	ok or reject
yes	false	false	ok
no	true	true	reject
no	true	false	reject
no	false	true	reject
no	false	false	ok

5.1.3.1. AuthorityKeyIdentifier and SubjectKeyIdentifier

Implementations SHOULD NOT assume support for the AuthorityKeyIdentifier or SubjectKeyIdentifier extensions, and thus Certification Authority implementations should not generate certificate hierarchies which are overly complex to process in the absence of these extensions, such as those that require possibly verifying a signature against a large number of similarly named CA certificates in order to find the CA certificate which contains the key that was used to generate the signature.

5.1.3.2. KeyUsage

IKE uses an end-entity certificate in the authentication process. The end-entity certificate may be used for multiple applications. As such, the CA can impose some constraints on the manner that a public key ought to be used. The KeyUsage (KU) and ExtendedKeyUsage (EKU) extensions apply in this situation.

Since we are talking about using the public key to validate a signature, if the KeyUsage extension is present, then at least one of the digitalSignature or the nonRepudiation bits in the KeyUsage extension MUST be set (both can be set as well). It is also fine if other KeyUsage bits are set.

A summary of the logic flow for peer cert validation follows:

- o If no KU extension, continue.
- o If KU present and doesn't mention digitalSignature or nonRepudiation (both, in addition to other KUs, is also fine), reject cert.
- o If none of the above, continue.

5.1.3.3. PrivateKeyUsagePeriod

The PKIX certificate profile recommends against the use of this extension. The PrivateKeyUsageExtension is intended to be used when signatures will need to be verified long past the time when signatures using the private keypair may be generated. Since IKE SAs are short-lived relative to the intended use of this extension in addition to the fact that each signature is validated only a single time, the usefulness of this extension in the context of IKE is unclear. Therefore, Certification Authority implementations MUST NOT generate certificates that contain the PrivateKeyUsagePeriod extension. If an IKE implementation receives a certificate with this set, it SHOULD ignore it.

5.1.3.4. CertificatePolicies

Many IKE implementations do not currently provide support for the CertificatePolicies extension. Therefore, Certification Authority implementations that generate certificates which contain this extension SHOULD NOT mark the extension as critical. As is the case with all certificate extensions, a relying party receiving this extension but who can process the extension SHOULD NOT reject the certificate because it contains the extension.

5.1.3.5. PolicyMappings

Many IKE implementations do not support the PolicyMappings extension. Therefore, implementations that generate certificates which contain this extension SHOULD NOT mark the extension as critical.

5.1.3.6. SubjectAltName

Deployments that intend to use an ID of FQDN, USER_FQDN, IPV4_ADDR, or IPV6_ADDR MUST issue certificates with the corresponding SubjectAltName fields populated with the same data. Implementations SHOULD generate only the following GeneralName choices in the SubjectAltName extension, as these choices map to legal IKEv1/ISAKMP/IKEv2 Identification Payload types: rfc822Name, dNSName, or iPAddress. Although it is possible to specify any GeneralName choice in the Identification Payload by using the ID_DER_ASN1_GN ID type, implementations SHOULD NOT assume support for such functionality, and SHOULD NOT generate certificates that do so.

5.1.3.6.1. dNSName

If the IKE ID type is FQDN, then this field MUST contain a fully qualified domain name. If the IKE ID type is FQDN then the dNSName field MUST match its contents. Implementations MUST NOT generate

names that contain wildcards. Implementations MAY treat certificates that contain wildcards in this field as syntactically invalid.

Although this field is in the form of an FQDN, IKE implementations SHOULD NOT assume that this field contains an FQDN that will resolve via the DNS, unless this is known by way of some out-of-band mechanism. Such a mechanism is out of the scope of this document. Implementations SHOULD NOT treat the failure to resolve as an error.

5.1.3.6.2. iPAddress

If the IKE ID type is IPV4_ADDR or IPV6_ADDR then the iPAddress field MUST match its contents. Note that although PKIX permits CIDR [[15](#)] notation in the "Name Constraints" extension, the PKIX certificate profile explicitly prohibits using CIDR notation for conveying identity information. In other words, the CIDR notation MUST NOT be used in the SubjectAltName extension.

5.1.3.6.3. rfc822Name

If the IKE ID type is USER_FQDN then the rfc822Name field MUST match its contents. Although this field is in the form of an Internet mail address, IKE implementations SHOULD NOT assume that this field contains a valid email address, unless this is known by way of some out-of-band mechanism. Such a mechanism is out of the scope of this document.

5.1.3.7. IssuerAltName

Certification Authority implementations SHOULD NOT assume that other implementations support the IssuerAltName extension, and especially should not assume that information contained in this extension will be displayed to end users.

5.1.3.8. SubjectDirectoryAttributes

The SubjectDirectoryAttributes extension is intended to convey identification attributes of the subject. IKE implementations MAY ignore this extension when it is marked non-critical, as the PKIX certificate profile mandates.

5.1.3.9. BasicConstraints

The PKIX certificate profile mandates that CA certificates contain this extension and that it be marked critical. IKE implementations SHOULD reject CA certificates that do not contain this extension. For backwards compatibility, implementations may accept such certificates if explicitly configured to do so, but the default for

this setting MUST be to reject such certificates.

5.1.3.10. NameConstraints

Many IKE implementations do not support the NameConstraints extension. Since the PKIX certificate profile mandates that this extension be marked critical when present, Certification Authority implementations which are interested in maximal interoperability for IKE SHOULD NOT generate certificates which contain this extension.

5.1.3.11. PolicyConstraints

Many IKE implementations do not support the PolicyConstraints extension. Since the PKIX certificate profile mandates that this extension be marked critical when present, Certification Authority implementations which are interested in maximal interoperability for IKE SHOULD NOT generate certificates which contain this extension.

5.1.3.12. ExtendedKeyUsage

The CA SHOULD NOT include the ExtendedKeyUsage (EKU) extension in certificates for use with IKE. Note that there were three IPsec related object identifiers in EKU that were assigned in 1999. The semantics of these values were never clearly defined. The use of these three EKU values in IKE/IPsec is obsolete and explicitly deprecated by this specification. CAs SHOULD NOT issue certificates for use in IKE with them. (For historical reference only, those values were id-kp-ipsecEndSystem, id-kp-ipsecTunnel, and id-kp-ipsecUser.)

The CA SHOULD NOT mark the EKU extension in certificates for use with IKE and one or more other applications. Nevertheless, this document defines an ExtendedKeyUsage keyPurposeID that MAY be used to limit a certificate's use:

```
id-kp-ipsecIKE OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 17 }
```

where id-kp is defined in [RFC-3280](#) [5]. If a certificate is intended to be used with both IKE and other applications, and one of the other applications requires use of an EKU value, then such certificates MUST contain either the keyPurposeID id-kp-ipsecIKE or anyExtendedKeyUsage [5] as well as the keyPurposeID values associated with the other applications. Similarly, if a CA issues multiple otherwise-similar certificates for multiple applications including IKE, and it is intended that the IKE certificate NOT be used with another application, the IKE certificate MAY contain an EKU extension listing a keyPurposeID of id-kp-ipsecIKE to discourage its use with the other application. Recall however, EKU extensions in

certificates meant for use in IKE are NOT RECOMMENDED.

A summary of the logic flow for peer certificate validation regarding the EKU extension follows:

- o If no EKU extension, continue.
- o If EKU present AND contains either id-kp-ipsecIKE or anyExtendedKeyUsage, continue.
- o Otherwise, reject cert.

5.1.3.13. CRLDistributionPoints

Because this document deprecates the sending of CRLs in-band, the use of CRLDistributionPoints (CDP) becomes very important if CRLs are used for revocation checking (as opposed to say Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP [16]). The IPsec peer either needs to have a URL for a CRL written into its local configuration, or it needs to learn it from CDP. Therefore, Certification Authority implementations SHOULD issue certificates with a populated CDP.

Failure to validate the CRLDistributionPoints/IssuingDistributionPoint pair can result in CRL substitution where an entity knowingly substitutes a known good CRL from a different distribution point for the CRL which is supposed to be used which would show the entity as revoked. IKE implementations MUST support validating that the contents of CRLDistributionPoints match those of the IssuingDistributionPoint to prevent CRL substitution when the issuing CA is using them. At least one CA is known to default to this type of CRL use. See [Section 5.2.2.5](#) for more information.

CDPs SHOULD be "resolvable". Several non-compliant Certification Authority implementations are well known for including unresolvable CDPs like http://localhost/path_to_CRL and http:///path_to_CRL which are equivalent to failing to include the CDP extension in the certificate.

See the IETF IPR web page for CRLDistributionPoints intellectual property rights (IPR) information. Note that both the CRLDistributionPoints and IssuingDistributionPoint extensions are RECOMMENDED but not REQUIRED by the PKIX certificate profile, so there is no requirement to license any IPR.

5.1.3.14. InhibitAnyPolicy

Many IKE implementations do not support the InhibitAnyPolicy extension. Since the PKIX certificate profile mandates that this extension be marked critical when present, Certification Authority implementations which are interested in maximal interoperability for

IKE SHOULD NOT generate certificates which contain this extension.

5.1.3.15. FreshestCRL

IKE implementations MUST NOT assume that the FreshestCRL extension will exist in peer certificates. Note that most IKE implementations do not support delta CRLs.

5.1.3.16. AuthorityInfoAccess

The PKIX certificate profile defines the AuthorityInfoAccess extension, which is used to indicate "how to access CA information and services for the issuer of the certificate in which the extension appears." Because this document deprecates the sending of CRLs in-band, the use of AuthorityInfoAccess (AIA) becomes very important if OCSP [16] is to be used for revocation checking (as opposed to CRLs). The IPsec peer either needs to have a URI for the OCSP query written into its local configuration, or it needs to learn it from AIA. Therefore, implementations SHOULD support this extension, especially if OCSP will be used.

5.1.3.17. SubjectInfoAccess

The PKIX certificate profile defines the SubjectInfoAccess certificate extension, which is used to indicate "how to access information and services for the subject of the certificate in which the extension appears." This extension has no known use in the context of IPsec. Conformant IKE implementations SHOULD ignore this extension when present.

5.2. X.509 Certificate Revocation Lists

When validating certificates, IKE implementations MUST make use of certificate revocation information, and SHOULD support such revocation information in the form of CRLs, unless non-CRL revocation information is known to be the only method for transmitting this information. Deployments that intend to use CRLs for revocation SHOULD populate the CRLDistributionPoints extension. Therefore Certification Authority implementations MUST support issuing certificates with this field populated. IKE implementations MAY provide a configuration option to disable use of certain types of revocation information, but that option MUST be off by default. Such an option is often valuable in lab testing environments.

5.2.1. Multiple Sources of Certificate Revocation Information

IKE implementations which support multiple sources of obtaining certificate revocation information MUST act conservatively when the

information provided by these sources is inconsistent: when a certificate is reported as revoked by one trusted source, the certificate MUST be considered revoked.

5.2.2. X.509 Certificate Revocation List Extensions

5.2.2.1. AuthorityKeyIdentifier

Certification Authority implementations SHOULD NOT assume that IKE implementations support the AuthorityKeyIdentifier extension, and thus should not generate certificate hierarchies which are overly complex to process in the absence of this extension, such as those that require possibly verifying a signature against a large number of similarly named CA certificates in order to find the CA certificate which contains the key that was used to generate the signature.

5.2.2.2. IssuerAltName

Certification Authority implementations SHOULD NOT assume that IKE implementations support the IssuerAltName extension, and especially should not assume that information contained in this extension will be displayed to end users.

5.2.2.3. CRLNumber

As stated in the PKIX certificate profile, all issuers MUST include this extension in all CRLs.

5.2.2.4. DeltaCRLIndicator

5.2.2.4.1. If Delta CRLs Are Unsupported

IKE implementations that do not support delta CRLs MUST reject CRLs which contain the DeltaCRLIndicator (which MUST be marked critical according to the PKIX certificate profile) and MUST make use of a base CRL if it is available. Such implementations MUST ensure that a delta CRL does not "overwrite" a base CRL, for instance in the keying material database.

5.2.2.4.2. Delta CRL Recommendations

Since some IKE implementations that do not support delta CRLs may behave incorrectly or insecurely when presented with delta CRLs, administrators and deployers should consider whether issuing delta CRLs increases security before issuing such CRLs. And, if all the elements in the VPN and PKI systems do not adequately support Delta CRLs, then their use should be questioned.

The editors are aware of several implementations which behave in an incorrect or insecure manner when presented with delta CRLs. See [Appendix A](#) for a description of the issue. Therefore, this specification RECOMMENDS NOT issuing delta CRLs at this time. On the other hand, failure to issue delta CRLs may expose a larger window of vulnerability if a full CRL is not issued as often as delta CRLs would be. See the Security Considerations section of the PKIX [5] certificate profile for additional discussion. Implementors as well as administrators are encouraged to consider these issues.

5.2.2.5. IssuingDistributionPoint

A CA that is using CRLDistributionPoints may do so to provide many "small" CRLs, each only valid for a particular set of certificates issued by that CA. To associate a CRL with a certificate, the CA places the CRLDistributionPoints extension in the certificate, and places the IssuingDistributionPoint in the CRL. The distributionPointName field in the CRLDistributionPoints extension MUST be identical to the distributionPoint field in the IssuingDistributionPoint extension. At least one CA is known to default to this type of CRL use. See [Section 5.1.3.13](#) for more information.

5.2.2.6. FreshestCRL

Given the recommendations against Certification Authority implementations generating delta CRLs, this specification RECOMMENDS that implementations do not populate CRLs with the FreshestCRL extension, which is used to obtain delta CRLs.

5.3. Strength of Signature Hashing Algorithms

At the time that this document is being written, popular certification authorities and CA software issue certificates using the RSA-with-SHA1 and RSA-with-MD5 signature algorithms. Implementations MUST be able to validate certificates with either of those algorithms.

As described in [17], both the MD5 and SHA-1 hash algorithms are weaker than originally expected with respect to hash collisions. Certificates that use these hash algorithms as part of their signature algorithms could conceivably be subject to an attack where a CA issues a certificate with a particular identity, and the recipient of that certificate can create a different valid certificate with a different identity. So far, such an attack is only theoretical, even with the weaknesses found in the hash algorithms.

Because of the recent attacks, there has been a heightened interest in having widespread deployment of additional signature algorithms. The algorithm that has been mentioned most often is RSA-with-SHA256, two types of which are described in detail in [18]. It is widely expected that this signature algorithm will be much more resilient to collision-based attacks than the current RSA-with-SHA1 and RSA-with-MD5, although no proof of that has been shown. There is active discussion in the cryptographic community of better hash functions that could be used in signature algorithms.

In order to interoperate, all implementations need to be able to validate signatures for all algorithms that the implementations will encounter. Therefore, implementations SHOULD be able to use signatures that use the sha256WithRSAEncryption signature algorithm (PKCS#1 version 1.5) as soon as possible. At the time that this document is being written, there is at least one CA that supports generating certificates with sha256WithRSAEncryption signature algorithm and it is expected that there will be significant deployment of this algorithm by the end of 2007.

6. Configuration Data Exchange Conventions

Below we present a common format for exchanging configuration data. Implementations MUST support these formats, MUST support receiving arbitrary whitespace at the beginning and end of any line, MUST support receiving arbitrary line lengths although they SHOULD generate lines less than 76 characters, and MUST support receiving the following three line-termination disciplines: LF (US-ASCII 10), CR (US-ASCII 13), and CRLF.

6.1. Certificates

Certificates MUST be Base64 [19] encoded and appear between the following delimiters:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----  
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

6.2. CRLs and ARLs

CRLs and ARLs MUST be Base64 encoded and appear between the following delimiters:

```
-----BEGIN CRL-----  
-----END CRL-----
```


6.3. Public Keys

IKE implementations MUST support two forms of public keys: certificates and so-called "raw" keys. Certificates should be transferred in the same form as [Section 6.1](#). A raw key is only the SubjectPublicKeyInfo portion of the certificate, and MUST be Base64 encoded and appear between the following delimiters:

```
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----  
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
```

6.4. PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Requests

A PKCS#10 [\[9\]](#) Certificate Signing Request MUST be Base64 encoded and appear between the following delimiters:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----  
-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
```

7. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the expired [draft-ietf-ipsec-pki-reg-05.txt](#) for providing valuable materials for this document.

The authors would like to especially thank Eric Rescorla, one of its original authors, in addition to Greg Carter, Steve Hanna, Russ Housley, Charlie Kaufman, Tero Kivinen, Pekka Savola, Paul Hoffman, and Gregory Lebovitz for their valuable comments, some of which have been incorporated verbatim into this document. Paul Knight performed the arduous tasks of converting the text to XML format.

8. Security Considerations

8.1. Certificate Request Payload

The Contents of CERTREQ are not encrypted in IKE. In some environments this may leak private information. Administrators in some environments may wish to use the empty Certification Authority option to prevent such information from leaking, at the cost of performance.

8.2. IKEv1 Main Mode

Certificates may be included in any message, and therefore implementations may wish to respond with CERTs in a message that offers privacy protection, in Main Mode messages 5 and 6.

Implementations may not wish to respond with CERTs in the second message, thereby violating the identity protection feature of Main Mode in IKEv1.

8.3. Disabling Certificate Checks

It is important to note that anywhere this document suggests implementors provide users with the configuration option to simplify, modify, or disable a feature or verification step, there may be security consequences for doing so. Deployment experience has shown that such flexibility may be required in some environments, but making use of such flexibility can be inappropriate in others. Such configuration options MUST default to "enabled" and it is appropriate to provide warnings to users when disabling such features.

9. IANA Considerations

There are no known numbers which IANA will need to manage.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

- [1] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", [RFC 2409](#), November 1998.
- [2] Maughan, D., Schneider, M., and M. Schertler, "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)", [RFC 2408](#), November 1998.
- [3] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", [RFC 4306](#), December 2005.
- [4] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", [RFC 2401](#), November 1998.
- [5] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", [RFC 3280](#), April 2002.
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- [9] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Version 1.5", [RFC 2314](#), March 1998.

10.2. Informative References

- [10] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", [RFC 2460](#), December 1998.
- [11] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", [RFC 2535](#), March 1999.
- [12] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, "Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)", [RFC 3490](#), March 2003.
- [13] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", [RFC 3779](#), June 2004.
- [14] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", [RFC 4301](#), December 2005.
- [15] Fuller, V., Li, T., Yu, J., and K. Varadhan, "Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR): an Address Assignment and Aggregation Strategy", [RFC 1519](#), September 1993.
- [16] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", [RFC 2560](#), June 1999.
- [17] Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols", [RFC 4270](#), November 2005.
- [18] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", [RFC 4055](#), June 2005.
- [19] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", [RFC 3548](#), July 2003.

Appendix A. The Possible Dangers of Delta CRLs

The problem is that the CRL processing algorithm is sometimes written incorrectly with the assumption that all CRLs are base CRLs and it is

assumed that CRLs will pass content validity tests. Specifically, such implementations fail to check the certificate against all possible CRLs: if the first CRL that is obtained from the keying material database fails to decode, no further revocation checks are performed for the relevant certificate. This problem is compounded by the fact that implementations which do not understand delta CRLs may fail to decode such CRLs due to the critical DeltaCRLIndicator extension. The algorithm that is implemented in this case is approximately:

- o fetch newest CRL
- o check validity of CRL signature
- o if CRL signature is valid then
- o if CRL does not contain unrecognized critical extensions and certificate is on CRL then set certificate status to revoked

The authors note that a number of PKI toolkits do not even provide a method for obtaining anything but the newest CRL, which in the presence of delta CRLs may in fact be a delta CRL, not a base CRL.

Note that the above algorithm is dangerous in many ways. See the PKIX [5] certificate profile for the correct algorithm.

Appendix B. More on Empty CERTREQs

Sending empty certificate requests is commonly used in implementations, and in the IPsec interop meetings, vendors have generally agreed that it means that send all/any end-entity certificates you have (if multiple end-entity certificates are sent, they must have same public key, as otherwise the other end does not know which key was used). For 99% of cases the client have exactly one certificate and public key, so it really doesn't matter, but the server might have multiple, thus it simply needs to say to the client, use any certificate you have. If we are talking about corporate vpns etc, even if the client have multiple certificates or keys, all of them would be usable when authenticating to the server, so client can simply pick one.

If there is some real difference on which certificate to use (like ones giving different permissions), then the client must be configured anyways, or it might even ask the user which one to use (the user is the only one who knows whether he needs admin privileges, thus needs to use admin cert, or is the normal email privileges ok, thus using email only cert).

99% of the cases the client have exactly one certificate, so it will send it. In 90% of the rest of the cases, any of the certificates is

ok, as they are simply different certificates from same CA, or different CAs for the same corporate VPN, thus any of them is ok.

Sending empty certificate requests has been agreed there to mean "give me your cert; any cert".

Justification:

- o Responder first does all it can to send a CERTREQ with a CA, check for IP match in SPD, have a default set of CAs to use in ambiguous cases, etc.
- o sending empty CERTREQs is fairly common in implementations today, and is generally accepted to mean "send me a certificate, any certificate that works for you"
- o saves responder sending potentially 100's of certs, the fragmentation problems that follow, etc.
- o in +90% of use cases, Initiators have exactly 1 certificate
- o in +90% of the remaining use cases, the multiple certificates it has are issued by the same CA
- o in the remaining use case(s) -- if not all the others above -- the Initiator will be configured explicitly with which certificate to send, so responding to an empty CERTREQ is easy.

The following example shows why initiators need to have sufficient policy definition to know which certificate to use for a given connection it initiates.

EXAMPLE: Your client (initiator) is configured with VPN policies for gateways A and B (representing perhaps corporate partners).

The policies for the two gateways look something like:

Acme Company policy (gateway A)

Engineering can access 10.1.1.0

Trusted CA: CA-A, Trusted Users: OU=Engineering

Partners can access 20.1.1.0

Trusted CA: CA-B, Trusted Users: OU=AcmePartners

Bizco Company policy (gateway B)

Sales can access 30.1.1.0

Trusted CA: CA-C, Trusted Users: OU=Sales

Partners can access 40.1.1.0

Trusted CA: CA-B, Trusted Users: OU=BizcoPartners

You are an employee of Acme and you are issued the following certificates:

- o From CA-A: CN=JoeUser,OU=Engineering
- o From CA-B: CN=JoePartner,OU=BizcoPartners

The client MUST be configured locally to know which CA to use when connecting to either gateway. If your client is not configured to know the local credential to use for the remote gateway, this scenario will not work either. If you attempt to connect to Bizco, everything will work... as you are presented with responding with a certificate signed by CA-B or CA-C... as you only have a certificate from CA-B you are OK. If you attempt to connect to Acme, you have an issue because you are presented with an ambiguous policy selection. As the initiator, you will be presented with certificate requests from both CA A and CA B. You have certificates issued by both CAs, but only one of the certificates will be usable. How does the client know which certificate it should present? It must have sufficiently clear local policy specifying which one credential to present for the connection it initiates.

[Appendix C](#). Change History

[RFC Editor, please remove Change History prior to publication as an RFC]

April 2006 (-10)

- * Many places - s/PKIX/the PKIX certificate profile/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 1 - removed text describing discussion of the document on pki4ipsec@icsalabs.com mailing list (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.1 - Better wording: "The Identification (ID) Payload indicates the identity claimed by the sender." (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * Many places - s/2401bis/RFC 4301/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.1 - s/attribute/extension/ when talking about SubjectAltName (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.1 - s/attribute/value/ when talking about strings in certificates (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.1.2/3.1.3 - IDN is ok case-insensitive comparison (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.1.4 - Change ref from SBGP to [RFC 3779](#) (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * Many places - s/SubjectName/Subject/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.2 - add "(CRLs)" (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.2.1 - improved wording (Russ Housley, AD Review)

- * 3.2.8.2 - s/empty IssuerName fields/an empty Issuer field/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.2.10.2 - s/keying materials have been/keying material has been/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.2.10.2 - s/respond with/include in the response/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.2.10.3 - s/SubjectName of CA2/CA2's Subject name/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.3 - improved wording (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.3.4 - changed ".crt" extension to ".cer" (for alignment with [RFC 2585](#)) (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.3.6 - made inconsistent musts both MUST (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.3.7 - s/denial of service/denial-of-service/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 4.1.2.3 - s/DistinguishedNames/X.500 distinguished names/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 4.1.3 - s/PKIX compliance/the PKIX certificate profile compliance/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 4.1.3 - s/PKIX and/the PKIX certificate profile and/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 4.1.3 - "Perhaps "peer" instead of "relying party" should be used to match the rest of the document." (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 4.1.3.13 - s/PKIX docs/the IETF IPR web page/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 4.2 - removed ambiguous "according to administrator's needs" (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 4.2.2.3 - s/conforming to PKIX// (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 4.3 - at least 1 CA issues sha256WithRSAEncryption (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 5.1 - added reference for base64 ([RFC3548](#)) (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * s/[3]/[[RFC 4306](#)]/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * s/[10]/[[RFC 4301](#)]/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * s/[13]/[[RFC 3779](#)]/ (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * Moved CHANGE HISTORY to the end of the document (Russ Housley, AD Review)
- * 3.3.7 - point out strange case has been known to occur due to bugs (March 26, 2006 pki4ipsec from Pekka Savola)
- * 3.1.2/3.1.3 - make the example clearer that DNSSEC must be used for the dereference (March 26, 2006 pki4ipsec from Pekka Savola)
- * 3.2.5 - point out that going to IKE doc is for discussion of HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED (March 26, 2006 pki4ipsec from Pekka Savola)

- * 3.1 - added GN type to table (MUST NOT) (March 26, 2006 pki4ipsec from Pekka Savola)
- * 3.1 - reordered table to match section order (March 26, 2006 pki4ipsec from Pekka Savola)
- * Fixed HTTP_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED to be HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED (March 26, 2006 pki4ipsec from Pekka Savola)

February 2006 (-09)

- * 3.2.6/3.3.6 - clarified text, that it applies to Main Mode only (text was updated in -08 3.3.6, not 3.2.6, but needed to be fixed in both places) but not here)
- * Moved text from security considerations regarding SHA-256

February 2006 (-08)

- * 3.2.6 - clarified text, that it applies to Main Mode only
- * Added text to security considerations regarding SHA-256 (30 Jan 2005 pki4ipsec email from Paul Hoffman)

November 2005 (-07)

- * 3.1 - renumbered table notes to avoid confusion with references (9 Nov 2005 pki4ipsec email from Jim Schaad)
- * 3.2.2 - changed "signing certificate" to "a certificate used for signing" (9 Nov 2005 pki4ipsec email from Jim Schaad)
- * 4.1 - added text re: implications of disabling checks ("escape clause") (8 Nov 2005 pki4ipsec email from Bill Sommerfeld, 10 Nov 2005 pki4ipsec email from Gregory M Lebovitz)
- * 4.1.3.2 - removed text from pseudocode: "If told (by configuration) to ignore KeyUsage (KU), accept certificate regardless of its markings."
- * 4.1.3.12 - replaced text with clearer text (8 Nov 2005 pki4ipsec email from Bill Sommerfeld)
- * 4.1.3.12 - removed text from pseudocode: "If told (by configuration) to ignore ExtendedKeyUsage (EKU), accept cert regardless of the presence or absence of the extension."
- * 4.1.3.17 - removed gratuitous "private" modifier from SubjectInfoAccess section (9 Nov 2005 pki4ipsec email from Jim Schaad)
- * 4.2.2.4.2 - clarified delta CRL text so that it no longer could be read as implying that full CRLs can't be issued at the time a certificate is revoked. (9 Nov 2005 pki4ipsec email from Jim Schaad)

- * Security Considerations - added "Disabling Certificate Checks" section

October 2005 (-06)

- * 4.1.3.12 - added text re: id-kp-ipsecIKE

July 2005 (-05)

- * 3.1 - added "See 2401bis, [section 4.4.3.2](#) for more details." to resolve issue #561.
- * 3.1.10 - added text pointing to PAD in 2401bis to discussion of binding identity to policy.

December 2004 (-04)

- * Added Paul Hoffman's text from issue #708
- * Added text explaining that it's possible for a recipient to receive CERT payloads containing certs that the recipient considers a trust anchor (15 Nov 2004 pki4ipsec email from Peter Williams)
- * Replaced text in 4.1.3 with Kent's text (issue #655) (22 Nov 2004 pki4ipsec email from Stephen Kent, Paul Hoffman)

September 2004 (-03)

- * Minor editorial changes in abstract and introduction clarifying when something is from IPsec, IKE, etc
- * Minor editorial changes throughout
- * Fixed "Certification Authority" instead of "Certificate Authority"
- * Cleaned up initiator/responder when really referred to sender/recipient
- * Fixed inconsistency in text by making sure that all text on the topic of sending CERTREQs follow Gregory Lebovitz's proposal for CERT payloads: "should deal with all the CRL, Intermediate Certs, Trust Anchors, etc OOB of IKE; MUST be able to send and receive EE cert payload; only real exception is Intermediate Certs which MAY be sent and SHOULD be able to be receivable (but in reality there are very few hierarchies in operation, so really it's a corner case); SHOULD NOT send the other stuff (CRL, Trust Anchors, etc) in cert payloads in IKE; SHOULD be able to accept the other stuff if by chance it gets sent, though we hope they don't get sent"

- * 3.1 - removed text suggesting that it would be reasonable to terminate IKEv2 processing if the initiator were to receive a responder-generated IDr
- * 3.1.1 - noted that certificates may contain multiple IP addresses
- * 3.1.9 - removed (temporarily?) confusing text stating that overlapping policies was prohibited, text which was inconsistent with text right above it
- * 3.2.7.2 - SHOULD changed to MUST terminate if peer's certificate chain violates local policy
- * 3.3 - removed text implying that pausing in the middle of an IKE exchange in order to obtain revocation status information via http or OCSP would reduce latency in IKE
- * 4.2 - allow deployments that don't wish to populate CDP (for instance if a source of revocation information is configured via some other means) to skip populating CDP, making consistent with 4.1.3.13 and the issues IPR spelled out in PKIX
- * Somehow a CRL out-of-band configuration format had been omitted.
- * #555: Kent-1.0 Introduction - document now references IKEv2
- * #559: Kent-Profile Document 3.1.0 - use sender/recipient instead of agent
- * #564: Kent-Profile Document 3.1.1 - specified that support for ID_IPV4_ADDR and/or ID_IPV6_ADDR are contingent on device support for IPv4 and/or IPv6
- * #568: Kent-Profile document 3.1.4 - specified that there wasn't a standard and besides no one has implemented it
- * #571: Kent-Profile document 3.1.8 - tried to be even more clearer than was asked for by spelling things out in detail
- * #572: Kent-Profile document 3.1.8 Formerly issue #18 - now specifies that it's only a local matter if that information is not coordinated with other administrators
- * #573: Kent-Profile document 3.2.3/Myers - revocation information no longer exchanged in-band, plus Mike Myers has submitted an OCSP w/IKE draft, which is references by this document.
- * #578 Kent-Profile document 4.0.0 - went through entire PKIX profile section and prefaced "implementation" with "IKE" or "Certification Authority" wherever it was sure to be one or the other
- * #581: Kent-Profile document 4.1.3.9 - replaced description with text from [RFC 2459](#)
- * #584: Maillist-Lebovitz PKI Life Cycle-Revocation - fixed
- * #586: Maillist-Allison Empty CertReq - there is now lots of text dealing with when empty certreqs are permitted
- * 3.2.7.1 - CERTREQ only mandatory if in-band exchange of keymat is desired (28 Jul 2004 pki4ipsec email from jknowles@SonicWALL.com)

- * 3.3.6 - clarified that "non-compliant" means not sending a CERTREQ (28 Jul 2004 pki4ipsec email from jknowles@SonicWALL.com)
- * 3.2.7.1 - fixed contradiction: mandatory to respond to CERTREQ UNLESS configured not to (28 Jul 2004 pki4ipsec email from jknowles@SonicWALL.com)
- * 3.2.9.2 and 3.2.9.3 - CERTREQ contains an issuer name only for IKEv2 (19 Sep 2004 email from Charlie Kaufman)
- * Answered '[Section 3.1.9](#) para 2: "The initiator MUST know by policy..." is a difficult to interpret requirement. It could mean that it must be possible to configure in policy which ID is to be sent. Did you mean "the initiator must decide..."', where the decision might be wired into a particular implementation?' by changing it to be merely descriptive, and to refer to policy configuration (19 Sep 2004 email from Charlie Kaufman)
- * IPSEC -> IPsec (19 Sep 2004 email from Charlie Kaufman)
- * 3.1.1 para 1: "MUST be stored" changed to "MUST be encoded" (19 Sep 2004 email from Charlie Kaufman)
- * 3.1.5 para 2 - made it clear that empty SubjectNames are permitted by PKIX in certificates, but this document doesn't permit them in ID (19 Sep 2004 email from Charlie Kaufman)
- * 3.2.7.1 - clarified by specifying that it's a trust anchor that's being chosen, not end-entity certificate (19 Sep 2004 email from Charlie Kaufman)
- * 3.3.9.5 - fixed confusing last paragraph (19 Sep 2004 email from Charlie Kaufman)
- * 3.3.10.3 - made it more clear that this section is really talking about duplicate certificate payloads (19 Sep 2004 email from Charlie Kaufman)
- * 4.1.2.2 para 2 and 3 - moved to 3.1.x section where it belongs (19 Sep 2004 email from Charlie Kaufman)
- * 4.1.3.5 - the last sentence of 4.1.3.4 copied here (19 Sep 2004 email from Charlie Kaufman)
- * 4.2.2.4.2 - SHOULD -> should (19 Sep 2004 email from Charlie Kaufman)
- * 3.2.5 and 3.3.4 - added description of URL scheme support (16 Aug 2004 pki4ipsec email from Tero Kivinen)
- * Removed 6.1 and 6.3 because they were either incorrect or didn't add any new security considerations above and beyond the IKE documents.

August 2004 (-02) (Edited by Gregory Lebovitz, with XML formatting and cross-referencing by Paul Knight)

- * 3.1.1 the text between the **s was added to paragraph, per the question that arose in IETF60 WG session: Implementations MUST be capable of verifying that the address contained in the ID is the same as the peer source address **contained in the outer

most IP header**.

- * 3.2.7 - added HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED to this section and described its use - #38
- * 3.3 - changed back sending of intermediate CA certificates from SHOULD NOT to MAY (for backward compatibility). Added text to explain further why we want to stay away from actually doing it though.
- * 3.3.8 - changed text per Knowles/Korver 2004.07.28.
- * 3.3.9.5 - Change discard of Irrelevant Certificates from may to SHOULD - #23(Kent 2004.04.26)
- * 4.1.3.2 KU - re-worked to reflect discussion on list and in IETF60 - #36
- * 4.1.3.12 EKU - re-worked to reflect discussion on list and in IETF60 - #36
- * [IKEv2] update the reference to the -14 draft of May 29, 2004

July 2004 (-01) (Edited by Gregory Lebovitz)

- * Changed ISAKMP references in Abstract and Intro to IKE.
- * Editorial changes to make the text conform with the summary table in 3.1, especially in the text following the table in 3.1. Particular note should be paid to changes in [section 3.5.1](#).
- * Sect 3.1.1 - editorial changes to aid in clarification. Added text on when deployers might consider using IP addr, but strongly encouraged not to.
- * Sect 3.1.8 removed IP address from list of practically used ID types.
- * 3.1.9 overhauled (per Kivinen, July 18)
- * 3.2 - added IKEv2's Hash and URL of x.509 to list of those profiled and gave it its own section, now 3.2.5
- * added note in CRL/ARL section about revocation occurring 00B of IKE
- * deleted ARL as its own section and collapsed it into Revocation Lists (CRL and ARL) for consciseness. Renumbered accordingly.
- * Sect 3.2.7.2 - Changed from MUST not send empty certreqs to SHOULD send CERTREQs which contain CA fields with direction on how, but MAY send empty CERTREQs in certain case. Use case added, and specifics of both initiator and responder behavior listed.
- * APPENDIX C added to fill out the explanation (mostly discussion from list).
- * 3.3 - clarified that sending CRLs and chaining certs is deprecated.
- * added IKEv2's Hash and URL of x.509 to list of those profiled and gave it its own section. Condensed ARL into CRL and renumbered accordingly.

- * duplicate section was removed, renumbered accordingly
- * 3.3.10.2 - title changed. sending chaining becomes SHOULD NOT.
- * 4.1.2 added text to explicitly call out support for CN, C, O, OU
- * collapsed 4.1.2.3 into 4.1.2.2 and renumbered accordingly.
- * Collapsed 4.1.3.2 into 4.1.3.1 and renumbered accordingly
- * Edited 4.1.3.2 Key Usage and 4.1.3.12 ExtKey Usage according to Hoffman, July18
- * 4.1.3.3 if receive cert w/ PKUP, ignore it.
- * 4.1.3.13 - CDP changed text to represent SHOULD issue, and how important CDP becomes when we do not send CRLs in-band. Added SHOULD for CDPs actually being resolvable (reilly email).
- * Reordered 6.4 for better clarity.
- * Added Rescorla to Acknowledgements section, as he is no longer listed as an editor, since -00.

May 2004 (renamed [draft-ietf-pki4ipsec-ikecert-profile-00.txt](#))
(edited by Brian Korver)

- * Made it clearer that the format of the ID_IPV4_ADDR payload comes from [RFC791](#) and is nothing new. (Tero Kivinen Feb 29)
- * Permit implementations to skip verifying that the peer source address matches the contents of ID_IPV{4,6}_ADDR. (Tero Kivinen Feb 29, Gregory Lebovitz Feb 29)
- * Removed paragraph suggesting that implementations favor unauthenticated peer source addresses over an unauthenticated ID for initial policy lookup. (Tero Kivinen Feb 29, Gregory Lebovitz Feb 29)
- * Removed some text implying RSA encryption mode was in scope. (Tero Kivinen Feb 29)
- * Relaxed deprecation of PKCS#7 CERT payloads. (Tero Kivinen Feb 29)
- * Made it clearer that out-of-scope local heuristics should be used for picking an EE cert to use when generating CERTREQ, not when receiving CERTREQ. (Tero Kivinen Feb 29)
- * Made it clearer that CERT processing can be skipped when the contents of a CERT are already known. (Tero Kivinen Feb 29)
- * Implementations SHOULD generate BASE64 lines less than 76 characters. (Tero Kivinen Feb 29)
- * Added "Except where specifically stated in this document, implementations MUST conform to the requirements of PKIX" (Steve Hanna Oct 7, 2003)
- * RECOMMENDS against populating the ID payload with IP addresses due to interoperability issues such as problem with NAT traversal. (Gregory Lebovitz May 14)
- * Changed "as revoked by one source" to "as revoked by one trusted source". (Michael Myers, May 15)

- * Specifying Certificate Authorities section needed to be regularized with Gregory Lebovitz's CERT proposal from -04. (Tylor Allison, May 15)
- * Added text specifying how recipients SHOULD NOT be expected to iterate over multiple end-entity certs. (Tylor Allison, May 15)
- * Modified text to refer to IKEv2 as well as IKEv1/ISAKMP where relevant.
- * IKEv2: Explained that IDr sent by responder doesn't have to match the [IDr] sent initiator in second exchange.
- * IKEv2: Noted that "The identity ... does not necessarily have to match anything in the CERT payload" (S3.5) is not contradicted by SHOULD in this document.
- * IKEv2: Noted that ID_USER_FQDN renamed to ID_RFC822_ADDR, and ID_USER_FQDN would be used exclusively in this document.
- * IKEv2: Declared that 3 new CERTREQ and CERT types are not profiled in this document (well, at least not yet, pending WG discussion of what to do -- note that they are only SHOULDs in IKEv2).
- * IKEv2: Noted that CERTREQ payload changed from DN to SHA-1 of SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
- * IKEv2: Noted new requirement that specifies that the first certificate sent MUST be the EE cert ([section 3.6](#)).

February 2004 (-04)

- * Minor editorial changes to clean up language
- * Deprecate in-band exchange of CRLs
- * Incorporated Gregory Lebovitz's proposal for CERT payloads: "should deal with all the CRL, Intermediate Certs, Trust Anchors, etc OOB of IKE; MUST be able to send and receive EE cert payload; only real exception is Intermediate Certs which MAY be sent and SHOULD be able to be receivable (but in reality there are very few hierarchies in operation, so really it's a corner case); SHOULD NOT send the other stuff (CRL, Trust Anchors, etc) in cert payloads in IKE; SHOULD be able to accept the other stuff if by chance it gets sent, though we hope they don't get sent"
- * Incorporated comments contained in Oct 7, 2003 email from steve.hanna@sun.com to ipsec@lists.tislabs.com
- * Moved text from "Profile of ISAKMP" Background section to each payload section (removing duplication of these sections)
- * Removed "Certificate-Related Payloads in ISAKMP" section since it was not specific to IKE.
- * Incorporated Gregory Lebovitz's table in the "Identification Payload" section

- * Moved text from "binding identity to policy" sections to each payload section
- * Moved text from "IKE" section into now-combined "IKE/ISAKMP" section
- * ID_USER_FQDN and ID_FQDN promoted to MUST from MAY
- * Promoted sending ID_DER_ASN1_DN to MAY from SHOULD NOT, and receiving from MUST from MAY
- * Demoted ID_DER_ASN1_GN to MUST NOT
- * Demoted populating SubjectName in place of populating the dNSName from SHOULD NOT to MUST NOT and removed the text regarding domainComponent
- * Revocation information checking MAY now be disabled, although not by default
- * Aggressive Mode removed from this profile

June 2003 (-03)

- * Minor editorial changes to clean up language
- * Minor additional clarifying text
- * Removed hyphenation
- * Added requirement that implementations support configuration data exchange having arbitrary line lengths

February 2003 (-02)

- * Word choice: move from use of "root" to "trust anchor", in accordance with PKIX
- * SBGP note and reference for placing address subnet and range information into certificates
- * Clarification of text regarding placing names of hosts into the Name commonName attribute of SubjectName
- * Added table to clarify text regarding processing of the certificate extension criticality bit
- * Added text underscoring processing requirements for CRLDistributionPoints and IssuingDistributionPoint

October 2002, Reorganization (-01)

June 2002, Initial Draft (-00)

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