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Serguei Leontiev, CRYPTO-PRO  
Dennis Shefanovski, DEMOS Co Ltd  
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Using the GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001 and  
GOST R 34.11-94 algorithms with the  
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure  
Certificate and CRL Profile.

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#### Abstract

This document supplements [RFC 3279](#). It describes encoding formats, identifiers and parameter formats for the algorithms GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94 for use in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).

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## 1. Introduction

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

This document supplements [RFC 3279](#) [[PKALGS](#)]. It describes the conventions for using the GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 signature algorithms, VKO GOST R 34.10-94 and VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 key derivation algorithms, and GOST R 34.11-94 one-way hash function in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [[PROFILE](#)].

This document provides supplemental information and specifications needed by the "Russian Cryptographic Software Compatibility Agreement" community.

The algorithm identifiers and associated parameters for subject public keys that employ the GOST R 34.10-94 [[GOSTR341094](#)] / VKO GOST R 34.10-94 [[CPALGS](#)] or the GOST R 34.10-2001 [[GOSTR341001](#)] / VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 [[CPALGS](#)] algorithms, and the encoding format for the signatures produced by these algorithms are specified. Also, the algorithm identifiers for using the GOST R 34.11-94 one-way hash function with the GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 signature algorithms are specified.



This specification defines the contents of the signatureAlgorithm, signatureValue, signature, and subjectPublicKeyInfo fields within X.509 Certificates and CRLs. For each algorithm, the appropriate alternatives for the keyUsage certificate extension are provided.

ASN.1 modules, including all the definitions used in this document can be found in [[CPALGS](#)].

## **2. Algorithm Support**

This section is an overview of cryptographic algorithms, that may be used within the Internet X.509 certificates and CRL profile [[PROFILE](#)]. It describes one-way hash functions and digital signature algorithms, that may be used to sign certificates and CRLs, and identifies OIDs and ASN.1 encoding for public keys contained in a certificate.

CAs and/or applications conforming to this standard MUST support at least one of the specified public key and signature algorithms.

### **2.1. One-way Hash Function**

This section describes the use of a one-way, collision free hash function GOST R 34.11-94 - the only one that can be used in digital signature algorithms GOST R 34.10-94/2001. The data that is hashed for certificates and CRL signing is fully described in [RFC 3280](#) [[PROFILE](#)].

#### **2.1.1 One-way Hash Function GOST R 34.11-94**

GOST R 34.11-94 has been developed by "GUBS of Federal Agency Government Communication and Information" and "All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute of Standardization". The algorithm GOST R 34.11-94 produces a 256-bit hash value of an arbitrary finite bit length input. This document does not contain the full GOST R 34.11-94 specification, which can be found in [GOSTR3411] (in Russian). [[Schneier95](#)] ch. 18.11, p. 454. contains a brief technical description in English.

This function MUST always be used with parameter set identified by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet (see section 8.2 of [[CPALGS](#)]).

### **2.2. Signature Algorithms**

Conforming CAs may use GOST R 34.10-94 or GOST R 34.10-2001 signature algorithms to sign certificates and CRLs.

These signature algorithms MUST always be used with a one-way hash



function GOST R 34.11-94 as indicated in [[GOSTR341094](#)] and [[GOSTR341001](#)].

This section defines algorithm identifiers and parameters to be used in the signatureAlgorithm field in a Certificate or CertificateList.

### **2.2.1. Signature Algorithm GOST R 34.10-94**

GOST R 34.10-94 has been developed by "GUBS of Federal Agency Government Communication and Information" and "All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute of Standardization". This document does not contain the full GOST R 34.10-94 specification, which can be found in [[GOSTR341094](#)] (in Russian). [[Schneier95](#)] ch. 20.3, p. 495 contains a brief technical description in English.

The ASN.1 object identifier used to identify this signature algorithm is:

```
id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
    { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2)
      gostR3411-94-with-gostR3410-94(4) }
```

When the id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 algorithm identifier appears as the algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding SHALL omit the parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: the OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94.

Signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-94 generates a digital signature in the form of two 256-bit numbers  $r'$  and  $s$ . Its octet string representation consists of 64 octets, where first 32 octets contain the big endian representation of  $s$  and second 32 octets contain the big endian representation of  $r'$ .

This definition of a signature value is directly usable in CMS [[CMS](#)], where such values are represented as octet strings. However, signature values in certificates and CRLs [[PROFILE](#)] are represented as bit strings, and thus the octet string representation must be converted.

To convert an octet string signature value to a bit string, the most significant bit of the first octet of the signature value SHALL become the first bit of the bit string, and so on through the least significant bit of the last octet of the signature value, which SHALL become the last bit of the bit string.

### **2.2.2. Signature Algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001**



GOST R 34.10-2001 was developed by "GUBS of Federal Agency Government Communication and Information" and "All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute of Standardization". This document does not contain the full GOST R 34.10-2001 specification, which can be found in [[GOSTR341001](#)] (in Russian).

The ASN.1 object identifier used to identify this signature algorithm is:

```
id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
    { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2)
      gostR3411-94-with-gostR3410-2001(3) }
```

When the id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 algorithm identifier appears as the algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding SHALL omit the parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: the OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001.

Signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001 generates a digital signature in the form of two 256-bit numbers  $r'$  and  $s$ . Its octet string representation consists of 64 octets, where first 32 octets contain the big endian representation of  $s$  and second 32 octets contain the big endian representation of  $r'$ .

The process described above ([Section 2.2.10](#)) MUST be used to convert this octet string representation to a bit string for use in certificates and CRLs.

### **2.3. Subject Public Key Algorithms**

This section defines OIDs and public key parameters for public keys that employ the GOST R 34.10-94 [[GOSTR341094](#)] / VKO GOST R 34.10-94 [[CPALGS](#)] or the GOST R 34.10-2001 [[GOSTR341001](#)] / VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 [[CPALGS](#)] algorithms.

Use of the same key for both signature and key derivation is NOT RECOMMENDED. The intended application for the key MAY be indicated in the keyUsage certificate extension (see [[PROFILE](#)], Section 4.2.1.3).

#### **2.3.1. GOST R 34.10-94 Keys**

GOST R 34.10-94 public keys can be used for signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-94 [[GOSTR341094](#)] and for key derivation algorithm VKO GOST R 34.10-94 [[CPALGS](#)].

GOST R 34.10-94 public keys are identified by the following OID:



```
id-GostR3410-94 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2)
    gostR3410-94(20) }
```

The SubjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.algorithm field (see [RFC 3280 \[PROFILE\]](#)) for GOST R 34.10-94 keys MUST be set to id-GostR3410-94.

When the id-GostR3410-94 algorithm identifier appears as the algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding MAY omit the parameters field or set it to NULL. Otherwise this field MUST have the following structure:

```
GostR3410-94-PublicKeyParameters ::=
  SEQUENCE {
    publicKeyParamSet
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    digestParamSet
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    encryptionParamSet
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER DEFAULT
      id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
  }
```

where:

- \* publicKeyParamSet - public key parameters identifier for GOST R 34.10-94 (see section 8.3 of [\[CPALGS\]](#))
- \* digestParamSet - parameters identifier for GOST R 34.11-94 (see section 8.2 of [\[CPALGS\]](#))
- \* encryptionParamSet - parameters identifier for GOST 28147-89 (see section 8.1 of [\[CPALGS\]](#))

Absence of parameters SHALL be processed as described in [RFC 3280 \[PROFILE\]](#), section 6.1, that is, parameters are inherited from the issuer certificate. When the working\_public\_key\_parameters variable is set to null, any signature SHALL be rejected.

The GOST R 34.10-94 public key MUST be ASN.1 DER encoded as an OCTET STRING; this encoding shall be used as the contents (i.e., the value) of the subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo data element.

```
GostR3410-94-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING -- public key, Y
```

GostR3410-94-PublicKey MUST contain 128 octets of the little-endian representation of the public key  $Y = a^x \pmod{p}$ , where  $a$  and  $p$  are public key parameters, and  $x$  is a private key.

If the keyUsage extension is present in an end-entity certificate



that contains a GOST R 34.10-94 public key, the following values MAY be present:

```
digitalSignature;  
nonRepudiation;  
keyEncipherment; and  
keyAgreement.
```

If the keyAgreement or keyEncipherment extension is present in a certificate GOST R 34.10-94 public key, the following values MAY be present as well:

```
encipherOnly; and  
decipherOnly.
```

The keyUsage extension MUST NOT assert both encipherOnly and decipherOnly.

If the keyUsage extension is present in an CA or CRL signer certificate which contains a GOST R 34.10-94 public key, the following values MAY be present:

```
digitalSignature;  
nonRepudiation;  
keyCertSign; and  
cRLSign.
```

### **2.3.2. GOST R 34.10-2001 Keys**

GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys can be used for signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001 [[GOSTR341001](#)] and for key derivation algorithm VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 [[CPALGS](#)].

GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys are identified by the following OID:

```
id-GostR3410-2001 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2)
    gostR3410-2001(19) }
```

The SubjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.algorithm field (see [RFC 3280](#) [[PROFILE](#)]) for GOST R 34.10-2001 keys MUST be set to id-GostR3410-2001.

When the id-GostR3410-2001 algorithm identifier appears as the algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding MAY omit the parameters field or set it to NULL. Otherwise this field MUST have the following structure:



```
GostR3410-2001-PublicKeyParameters ::=
  SEQUENCE {
    publicKeyParamSet
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    digestParamSet
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    encryptionParamSet
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER DEFAULT
      id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
  }
```

where:

- \* publicKeyParamSet - public key parameters identifier for GOST R 34.10-2001 (see section 8.4 of [[CPALGS](#)])
- \* digestParamSet - parameters identifier for GOST R 34.11-94 (see section 8.2 of [[CPALGS](#)])
- \* encryptionParamSet - parameters identifier for GOST 28147-89 (see section 8.1 of [[CPALGS](#)])

Absence of parameters SHALL be processed as described in [RFC 3280](#) [[PROFILE](#)], section 6.1, that is, parameters are inherited from the issuer certificate. When the `working_public_key_parameters` variable is set to null, any signature SHALL be rejected.

The GOST R 34.10-2001 public key MUST be ASN.1 DER encoded as an OCTET STRING; this encoding shall be used as the contents (i.e., the value) of the `subjectPublicKey` component (a BIT STRING) of the `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` data element.

GostR3410-2001-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING -- public key vector, Q

According to [[GOSTR341001](#)], a public key is a point on the elliptic curve  $Q = (x,y)$ .

GostR3410-2001-PublicKey MUST contain 64 octets, where first 32 octets contain little endian representation of x and second 32 octets contain little endian representation of y. This corresponds to the binary representation of ( $\langle y \rangle_{256} || \langle x \rangle_{256}$ ) from [[GOSTR341001](#)], ch. 5.3.

The same `keyUsage` constraints apply for use of GOST R 34.10-2001 keys as described in [Section 2.3.1](#) for GOST R 34.10-94 keys.

### 3. Security Considerations

It is RECOMMENDED, that applications verify signature values and subject public keys to conform to [[GOSTR341001](#)] [[GOSTR341094](#)] standards prior to their use.



When a certificate is used to support digital signatures as an analogue to manual ("wet") signatures, in the context of Russian Federal Digital Signature Law [[RFDSL](#)], the certificate MUST contain keyUsage extension, it MUST be critical, and keyUsage MUST NOT include keyEncipherment and keyAgreement.

It is RECOMMENDED, that CAs and applications make sure that the private key is not used for more than it's allowed validity period (typically 15 months for both GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 algorithms).

For security discussion concerning use of algorithm parameters, see section Security Considerations from [[CPALGS](#)].

#### 4. [Appendix Examples](#)

##### 4.1. GOST R 34.10-94 Certificate

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

```
0 30 523: SEQUENCE {
4 30 442: SEQUENCE {
8 02 16: INTEGER
: 23 0E E3 60 46 95 24 CE C7 0B E4 94 18 2E 7E EB
26 30 8: SEQUENCE {
28 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 (1 2 643 2 2 4)
: }
36 30 105: SEQUENCE {
38 31 29: SET {
40 30 27: SEQUENCE {
42 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
47 0C 20: UTF8String 'GostR3410-94 example'
: }
: }
69 31 18: SET {
```



```
71 30 16: SEQUENCE {
73 06 3:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
78 0C 9:   UTF8String 'CryptoPro'
      :   }
      :   }
89 31 11: SET {
91 30 9:   SEQUENCE {
93 06 3:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
98 13 2:   PrintableString 'RU'
      :   }
      :   }
102 31 39: SET {
104 30 37: SEQUENCE {
106 06 9:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER emailAddress (1 2 840 113549 1 9 1)
117 16 24: IA5String 'GostR3410-94@example.com'
      :   }
      :   }
      :   }
143 30 30: SEQUENCE {
145 17 13: UTCTime '050816123250Z'
160 17 13: UTCTime '150816123250Z'
      :   }
175 30 105: SEQUENCE {
177 31 29: SET {
179 30 27: SEQUENCE {
181 06 3:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
186 0C 20: UTF8String 'GostR3410-94 example'
      :   }
      :   }
208 31 18: SET {
210 30 16: SEQUENCE {
212 06 3:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
217 0C 9:   UTF8String 'CryptoPro'
      :   }
      :   }
228 31 11: SET {
230 30 9:   SEQUENCE {
232 06 3:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
237 13 2:   PrintableString 'RU'
      :   }
      :   }
241 31 39: SET {
243 30 37: SEQUENCE {
245 06 9:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER emailAddress (1 2 840 113549 1 9 1)
256 16 24: IA5String 'GostR3410-94@example.com'
      :   }
      :   }
      :   }
```



```

282 30 165: SEQUENCE {
285 30 28: SEQUENCE {
287 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-GostR3410-94 (1 2 643 2 2 20)
295 30 18: SEQUENCE {
297 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
: (1 2 643 2 2 32 2)
306 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet
: (1 2 643 2 2 30 1)
: }
: }
315 03 132: BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates {
319 04 128: OCTET STRING
: BB 84 66 E1 79 9E 5B 34 D8 2C 80 7F 13 A8 19 66
: 71 57 FE 8C 54 25 21 47 6F 30 0B 27 77 46 98 C6
: FB 47 55 BE B7 B2 F3 93 6C 39 B5 42 37 26 84 E2
: 0D 10 8A 24 0E 1F 0C 42 4D 2B 3B 11 2B A8 BF 66
: 39 32 5C 94 8B C1 A8 FE 1B 63 12 F6 09 25 87 CC
: 75 1B F4 E5 89 8A 09 82 68 D3 5C 77 A6 0F B6 90
: 10 13 8D E3 3E 7C 9C 91 D6 AC 0D 08 2C 3E 78 C1
: B5 C2 B6 B7 1A A8 2A 8B 45 81 93 32 32 76 FA 7B
: }
: }
: }
450 30 8: SEQUENCE {
452 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 (1 2 643 2 2 4)
: }
460 03 65: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 11 C7 08 7E 12 DC 02 F1 02 23 29 47 76 8F 47 2A
: 81 83 50 E3 07 CC F2 E4 31 23 89 42 C8 73 E1 DE
: 22 F7 85 F3 55 BD 94 EC 46 91 9C 67 AC 58 D7 05
: 2A A7 8C B7 85 2A 01 75 85 F7 D7 38 03 FB CD 43
: }

```

In the signature of the above certificate, r' equals to  
0x22F785F355BD94EC46919C67AC58D7052AA78CB7852A017585F7D73803FBCD43  
and s equals to  
0x11C7087E12DC02F102232947768F472A818350E307CCF2E431238942C873E1DE

#### [4.2.](#) GOST R 34.10-2001 Certificate

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIB0DCCAX8CECv1xh7CEb0Xx9zUYma0LiEwCAYGKoUDAgIDMG0xHzAdBgNVBAMM
Fkdvc3RSMzQxMC0yMDAxIGV4YW1wbGUxYjAQBGNVBAoMCUNyeXB0b1BybzELMAkG
A1UEBhMCU1UxKTAnBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWGkdvc3RSMzQxMC0yMDAxQGV4YW1wbGUu

```



Y29tMB4XDTA1MDgxNjE0MTgyMFoXDTE1MDgxNjE0MTgyMFowbTEfMB0GA1UEAwW  
R29zdFIZNDEwLTIwMDEgZxhhbXBsZTESMBAGA1UECgwJQ3J5cHRvUHVjVWQswCQYD  
VQQGEwJSVTEpMCCGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYaR29zdFIZNDEwLTIwMDFAZXhhbXBsZS5j  
b20wYzAcBgYqhQMAhMwEgYHhKoUDAgIkAAYHhKoUDAgIeAQNDAARAhJVodWACGkB1  
CM0TjDGJLP3lBQN6Q1z0bSsP508yfleP68wWuZWIA9CafIWuD+SN6qa7f1bHy7Df  
D2a8yuoaYDAIBgYqhQMAgMDQQA8L8kJRLcnqeyn1en7U23Sw6pkfEQu3u0xFkVP  
vFQ/3cHeF26NG+xxTZPz3TaTVXdoiYkXYiD02rEx1bUcM97i

-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

0 30 464: SEQUENCE {
4 30 383: SEQUENCE {
8 02 16: INTEGER
: 2B F5 C6 1E C2 11 BD 17 C7 DC D4 62 66 B4 2E 21
26 30 8: SEQUENCE {
28 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 (1 2 643 2 2 3)
: }
36 30 109: SEQUENCE {
38 31 31: SET {
40 30 29: SEQUENCE {
42 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
47 0C 22: UTF8String 'GostR3410-2001 example'
: }
: }
71 31 18: SET {
73 30 16: SEQUENCE {
75 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
80 0C 9: UTF8String 'CryptoPro'
: }
: }
91 31 11: SET {
93 30 9: SEQUENCE {
95 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
100 13 2: PrintableString 'RU'
: }
: }
104 31 41: SET {
106 30 39: SEQUENCE {
108 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER emailAddress (1 2 840 113549 1 9 1)
119 16 26: IA5String 'GostR3410-2001@example.com'
: }
: }
: }
147 30 30: SEQUENCE {
149 17 13: UTCTime '050816141820Z'
164 17 13: UTCTime '150816141820Z'
: }
179 30 109: SEQUENCE {

```



```
181 31 31: SET {
183 30 29: SEQUENCE {
185 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
190 0C 22: UTF8String 'GostR3410-2001 example'
      : }
      : }
214 31 18: SET {
216 30 16: SEQUENCE {
218 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
223 0C 9: UTF8String 'CryptoPro'
      : }
      : }
234 31 11: SET {
236 30 9: SEQUENCE {
238 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
243 13 2: PrintableString 'RU'
      : }
      : }
247 31 41: SET {
249 30 39: SEQUENCE {
251 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER emailAddress (1 2 840 113549 1 9 1)
262 16 26: IA5String 'GostR3410-2001@example.com'
      : }
      : }
      : }
290 30 99: SEQUENCE {
292 30 28: SEQUENCE {
294 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-GostR3410-2001 (1 2 643 2 2 19)
302 30 18: SEQUENCE {
304 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      : id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet
      : (1 2 643 2 2 36 0)
313 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      : id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet
      : (1 2 643 2 2 30 1)
      : }
      : }
322 03 67: BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates {
325 04 64: OCTET STRING
      : 84 95 68 75 60 02 1A 40 75 08 CD 13 8C 31 89 2C
      : FD E5 05 03 7A 43 5C F4 6D 2B 0F E7 4F 32 7E 57
      : 8F EB CC 16 B9 95 88 03 D0 9A 7C 85 AE 0F E4 8D
      : EA A6 BB 7E 56 C7 CB B0 DF 0F 66 BC CA EA 1A 60
      : }
      : }
      : }
391 30 8: SEQUENCE {
393 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
```



```

      :   id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 (1 2 643 2 2 3)
      :   }
401 03 65: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
      :   3C 2F C9 09 44 B7 27 A9 EC A7 D5 E9 FB 53 6D D2
      :   C3 AA 64 7C 44 2E DE ED 31 16 45 4F BC 54 3F DD
      :   C1 DE 17 6E 8D 1B EC 71 B5 93 F3 DD 36 93 55 77
      :   68 89 89 17 62 20 F4 DA B1 31 D5 B5 1C 33 DE E2
      :   }

```

In the public key of the above certificate, x equals to  
0x577E324FE70F2B6DF45C437A0305E5FD2C89318C13CD0875401A026075689584  
and y equals to  
0x601AEACABC660FDFB0CBC7567EBBA6EA8DE40FAE857C9AD0038895B916CCEB8F  
Corresponding private key d equals to  
0x0B293BE050D0082BDAE785631A6BAB68F35B42786D6DDA56AF169891040F77

In the signature of the above certificate, r' equals to  
0xC1DE176E8D1BEC71B593F3DD36935577688989176220F4DAB131D5B51C33DEE2  
and s equals to  
0x3C2FC90944B727A9ECA7D5E9FB536DD2C3AA647C442EDEED3116454FBC543FDD

**5. IANA Considerations**

No IANA actions are necessary.

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### Contact Information

Serguei Leontiev  
CRYPTO-PRO  
38, Obraztsova,  
Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation

EMail: lse@cryptopro.ru

Dennis Shefanovski  
DEMOS Co Ltd  
6/1, Ovchinnikovskaja naberezhnaya,  
Moscow, 113035, Russian Federation

EMail: sdb@dol.ru

Grigorij Chudov  
CRYPTO-PRO  
38, Obraztsova,  
Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation



E-Mail: chudov@cryptopro.ru

Alexandr Afanasiev  
Factor-TS  
office 711, 14, Presnenskij val,  
Moscow, 123557, Russian Federation

E-Mail: afa1@factor-ts.ru

Nikolaj Nikishin  
Infotecs GmbH  
p/b 35, 80-5, Leningradskij prospekt,  
Moscow, 125315, Russian Federation

E-Mail: nikishin@infotecs.ru

Boleslav Izotov  
FGUE STC "Atlas"  
38, Obraztsova,  
Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation

E-Mail: izotov@nii.voskhod.ru

Elena Minaeva  
MD PREI  
build 3, 6A, Vtoroj Troitskij per.,  
Moscow, Russian Federation

E-Mail: evminaeva@mail.ru

Igor Ovcharenko  
MD PREI  
Office 600, 14, B.Novodmitrovskaya,  
Moscow, Russian Federation

E-Mail: igori@mo.msk.ru

Serguei Murugov  
R-Alpha  
4/1, Raspletina,  
Moscow, 123060, Russian Federation



E-Mail: [msm@top-cross.ru](mailto:msm@top-cross.ru)

Igor Ustinov  
Cryptocom  
office 239, 51, Leninskij prospekt,  
Moscow, 119991, Russian Federation

E-Mail: [igus@cryptocom.ru](mailto:igus@cryptocom.ru)

Anatolij Erkin  
SPRCIS (SPbRCZI)  
1, Obrucheva,  
St.Petersburg, 195220, Russian Federation

E-Mail: [erkin@nevsky.net](mailto:erkin@nevsky.net)

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