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Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure LDAP Schema and Syntaxes for PKIs and PMIs <draft-ietf-pkix-ldap-schema-02.txt>

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ABSTRACT

This document describes LDAP schema features that are needed to support X.509 Public Key Infrastructures and Privilege Management Infrastructures. Specifically, X.509 attribute types, object classes, matching rules, attribute value syntaxes and attribute value assertion syntaxes are defined.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <u>RFC 2119</u> [<u>5</u>].

1. Introduction

<u>RFC2587</u> [8] describes some of the subschema applicable to LDAPv2 servers [2], specifically the public key certificate related attribute types and object classes that MUST or MAY be supported. This [document/ID/standard] does not revoke any of the contents of <u>RFC2587</u>, but supplements them.

<u>RFC2587</u> is equally applicable to LDAPv3 [<u>4</u>] servers as to LDAPv2 servers and MUST be supported by LDAPv3 servers.

Finally none of the previously cited documents mention attributeCertificates or any schema to support privilege management infrastructures, so this [document/ID/standard] rectifies this deficiency.

2. Subschema Publishing

LDAPv3 allows the subschema supported by a server to be published in a subschema subentry. Clients following this profile which support the Search operation containing an extensible matching rule SHOULD use the subschemaSubentry attribute in the root DSE to find the subschemaSubentry, and SHOULD use the matchingRule and matchingRuleUse operational attributes in the subschema subentry in order to determine whether the server supports the various matching rules described below. Servers that support extensible matching SHOULD publish the matching rules they support in the matchingRule and matchingRuleUse operational attributes.

3. Public Key Certificate and CRL Attributes and Syntaxes

3.1 userCertificate Attribute

The userCertificate attribute type contains the public-key certificates a user has obtained from one or more CAs. This attribute is to be stored and requested in the binary form, as 'userCertificate; binary'.

(2.5.4.36 NAME 'userCertificate' EQUALITY certificateExactMatch SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.8)

3.2 cACertificate Attribute

The cACertificate attribute of a CA's directory entry shall be used to store self-issued certificates (if any) and certificates issued to this CA by CAs in the same realm as this CA. This attribute is to be stored and requested in the binary form, as 'cACertificate; binary'.

(2.5.4.37 NAME 'cACertificate' EQUALITY certificateExactMatch SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.8)

<u>3.3</u> Certificate Syntax

A value in this syntax is the binary string that results from BER/DERencoding an X.509 public key certificate. The following string states the OID assigned to this syntax:

(1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.8 DESC 'Certificate')

Due to the changes from X.509(1988) to X.509(1993) and subsequent changes to the ASN.1 definition to support certificate extensions, no string representation is defined, and values in this syntax MUST only be transferred using the binary encoding, by requesting or returning the attributes with descriptions "userCertificate; binary" or "caCertificate; binary". The BNF notation in <u>RFC 1778</u> [12] for "User Certificate" is not recommended to be used. **3.4 authorityRevocationList Attribute**

A value of this attribute is a list of CA certificates that are no longer valid. This attribute is to be stored and requested in the binary form, as 'authorityRevocationList;binary'.

(2.5.4.38 NAME 'authorityRevocationList' EQUALITY certificateListExactMatch SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.9)

3.5 certificateRevocationList Attribute

A value of this attribute is a list of user certificates that are no longer valid. This attribute is to be stored and requested in the binary form, as 'certificateRevocationList; binary'.

(2.5.4.39 NAME 'certificateRevocationList' EQUALITY certificateListExactMatch SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.9)

3.6 deltaRevocationList Attribute

This attribute contains a list of revoked certificates (user or CA) that is an addition to a previous certificate revocation list. This attribute is to be stored and requested in the binary form, as 'deltaRevocationList; binary'.

(2.5.4.53 NAME 'deltaRevocationList' EQUALITY certificateListExactMatch SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.9)

<u>3.7</u> Certificate List Syntax

A value in this syntax is the binary string that results from BER/DERencoding an X.509 certificate revocation list. The following string states the OID assigned to this syntax:

(1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.9 DESC 'Certificate List')

Due to the incompatibility of the X.509(1988) and X.509(1993) definitions of revocation lists, values in this syntax MUST only be transferred using a binary encoding, by requesting or returning the attributes with descriptions "certificateRevocationList;binary", "authorityRevocationList;binary" or "deltaRevocationList;binary". The BNF notation in <u>RFC 1778</u> [12] for "Authority Revocation List" is not recommended to be used.

3.8 crossCertificatePair Attribute

The following definition is taken from X.509(2000) [9]. The term forward was used in earlier editions of X.509 for issuedToThisCA and the term reverse was used in earlier editions for issuedByThisCA.

The issuedToThisCA elements of the crossCertificatePair attribute of a CA's directory entry shall be used to store all, except self-issued certificates, issued to this CA. Optionally, the issuedByThisCA elements of the crossCertificatePair attribute, of a CA's directory entry may contain a subset of certificates issued by this CA to other CAs. If a CA issues a certificate to another CA, and the subject CA is not a subordinate to the issuer CA in a hierarchy, then the issuer CA shall place that certificate in the issuedByThisCA element of the crossCertificatePair attribute of its own directory entry. When both the issuedToThisCA and the issuer ByThisCA elements are present in a single attribute value, issuer name in one certificate shall match the subject name in the other and vice versa, and the subject public key in one certificate shall be capable of verifying the digital signature on the other certificate and vice versa.

This attribute is to be stored and requested in the binary form, as 'crossCertificatePair;binary'.

(2.5.4.40 NAME 'crossCertificatePair' EQUALITY certificatePairExactMatch SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.10)

<u>3.9</u> Certificate Pair Syntax

A value in this syntax is the binary string that results from BER/DERencoding an X.509 public key certificate pair. The following string states the OID assigned to this syntax:

(1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.10 DESC 'Certificate Pair')

Values in this syntax MUST only be transferred using a binary encoding, e.g. by requesting or returning the attribute description "crossCertificatePair;binary". The BNF notation in <u>RFC 1778</u> [12] for "Certificate Pair" is not recommended to be used.

4. Public Key Certificate Matching Rules and Assertion Syntaxes

X.509 [9] supports both equality and flexible certificate matching rules by the server, via the certificateExactMatch and certificateMatch MATCHING-RULEs respectively. (For example, a client may flexibly search for certificates with a particular validity time, key usage, policy or other field.) LDAP servers MUST support the certificateExactMatch matching rule. Clients MAY support certificateExactMatch values for equalityMatch filters. LDAPv3 servers SHOULD support the certificateMatch matching rule. If the server does support flexible matching (either via certificateMatch or some other matching rule), then the extensibleMatch filter of the Search request MUST be supported. Clients MAY support the extensibleMatch filter and one or more of the optional elements of certificateMatch.

Neither RFC2587 nor the user schema for LDAPv3 (RFC2256-bis [3]) nor the attribute syntax definitions for LDAPv3 (<u>RFC2252</u>-bis [7]) describe the certificate matching rules that should be supported by LDAP servers, nor do they describe how attribute value assertions for each certificate matching rule should be encoded in filter items. The native LDAP (i.e. string) encodings for the assertion syntaxes defined in this document are specified by the Generic String Encoding Rules in Section 8 of [13]. The ABNF in this document for these assertion syntaxes is provided only as a convenience and is equivalent to the encoding specified by the application of [13]. Since the associated ASN.1 types for the assertion syntaxes described here may be extended in future editions of X.509 [9], the provided ABNF should be regarded as a snapshot in time. The native LDAP encoding for any extension to a syntax's underlying ASN.1 type can be determined from [13]. In the event that there is a discrepancy between the ABNF in this document and the encoding determined by [13], [13] is to be taken as definitive.

4.1 Certificate Exact Match

Certificate exact match is defined in 11.3.1 of [9]. The string description of the certificateExactMatch matching rule is:

(2.5.13.34 NAME 'certificateExactMatch' SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.1)

The LDAP syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.1
 DESC 'CertificateExactAssertion (Serial Number and Issuer Name)')

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following Augmented BNF [10]:

```
cea-serialNumber = id-serialNumber msp CertificateSerialNumber
cea-issuer = id-issuer msp Name
id-serialNumber = %x73.65.72.69.61.6C.4E.75.6D.62.65.72
; "serialNumber"
id-issuer = %x69.73.73.75.65.72 ; "issuer"
Name = id-rdnSequence ":" RDNSequence
id-rdnSequence = %x72.64.6E.53.65.71.75.65.6E.63.65 ; "rdnSequence"
CertificateSerialNumber = INTEGER
```

Note. [<u>14</u>] states that CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a nonnegative integer. Non-conforming CAs MAY issue certificates with serial numbers that are negative, or zero. Certificate users SHOULD be

The <sp>, <msp>, <RDNSequence> and <INTEGER> rules are given in [16].

4.2 Certificate Match

Certificate match is defined in 11.3.2 of $[\underline{9}]$. The string description of the certificateMatch matching rule is:

(2.5.13.35 NAME 'certificateMatch' SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.2)

prepared to handle such certificates.

The syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.2 DESC 'Certificate Assertion')

The ASN.1 for CertificateAssertion is defined in 11.3.2 of [9], as are the semantics of each of its component types.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following ABNF:

```
CertificateAssertion = "{" [ sp ca-serialNumber ]
    [ sep sp ca-issuer ]
    [ sep sp ca-subjectKeyIdentifier ]
    [ sep sp ca-authorityKeyIdentifier ]
    [ sep sp ca-certificateValid ]
    [ sep sp ca-privateKeyValid ]
    [ sep sp ca-subjectPublicKeyAlgID ]
    [ sep sp ca-subjectAltName ]
    [ sep sp ca-policy ]
    [ sep sp ca-subject ]
    [ sep sp ca-nameConstraints ]
    sp "}"
```

The $\langle \text{sep} \rangle$ rule is given in [<u>16</u>].

ca-serialNumber = id-serialNumber msp CertificateSerialNumber ca-issuer = id-issuer msp Name ca-subjectKeyIdentifier = id-subjectKeyIdentifier msp SubjectKeyIdentifier ca-authorityKeyIdentifier = id-authorityKeyIdentifier msp AuthorityKeyIdentifier ca-certificateValid = certificateValid msp Time ca-privateKeyValid = id-privateKeyValid msp GeneralizedTime ca-subjectPublicKeyAlgID = id-subjectPublicKeyAlgID msp **OBJECT-IDENTIFIER** = id-keyUsage msp KeyUsage ca-keyUsage = id-subjectAltName msp AltNameType ca-subjectAltName ca-policy = id-policy msp CertPolicySet = id-pathToName msp Name ca-pathToName = id-subject msp Name ca-subject = id-nameConstraints msp ca-nameConstraints NameConstraintsSyntax id-subjectKeyIdentifier = %x73.75.62.6A.65.63.74.4B.65.79.49.64.65 %x6E.74.69.66.69.65.72 ; "subjectKeyIdentifier" id-authorityKeyIdentifier = %x61.75.74.68.6F.72.69.74.79.4B.65.79.49 %x64.65.6E.74.69.66.69.65.72 ; "authorityKeyIdentifier" id-certificateValid $= \% \times 63.65.72.74.69.66.69.63.61.74.65.56.61$ %x6C.69.64 ; "certificateValid" id-privateKeyValid = %x70.72.69.76.61.74.65.4B.65.79.56.61.6C %x69.64 ; "privateKeyValid" id-subjectPublicKeyAlgID = %x73.75.62.6A.65.63.74.50.75.62.6C.69.63 %x4B.65.79.41.6C.67.49.44 ; "subjectPublicKeyAlgID" id-keyUsage = %x6B.65.79.55.73.61.67.65 ; "keyUsage" id-subjectAltName = %x73.75.62.6A.65.63.74.41.6C.74.4E.61.6D %x65 ; "subjectAltName" id-policy = %x70.6F.6C.69.63.79 ; "policy" = %x70.61.74.68.54.6F.4E.61.6D.65 id-pathToName ; "pathToName" id-subject = %x73.75.62.6A.65.63.74 ; "subject" id-nameConstraints = %x6E.61.6D.65.43.6F.6E.73.74.72.61.69.6E %x74.73 ; "nameConstraints"

SubjectKeyIdentifier = KeyIdentifier

KeyIdentifier = OCTET-STRING

AuthorityKeyIdentifier = "{" [sp aki-keyIdentifier]

```
[ sep sp aki-authorityCertIssuer ]
                           [ sep sp aki-authorityCertSerialNumber ]
                                 sp "}"
aki-keyIdentifier
                       = id-keyIdentifier msp KeyIdentifier
aki-authorityCertIssuer = id-authorityCertIssuer msp GeneralNames
GeneralNames = "{" sp GeneralName *( "," sp GeneralName ) sp "}"
GeneralName = gn-otherName
              / gn-rfc822Name
              / gn-dNSName
              / gn-x400Address
              / gn-directoryName
              / gn-ediPartyName
              / gn-uniformResourceIdentifier
              / gn-iPAddress
              / gn-registeredID
                                     ":" OtherName
              = id-otherName
gn-otherName
gn-rfc822Name
               = id-rfc822Name
                                     ":" IA5String
gn-dNSName = id-dNSName
                                     ":" IA5String
gn-x400Address = id-x400Address
                                     ":" ORAddress
gn-directoryName = id-directoryName
                                     ":" Name
gn-ediPartyName = id-ediPartyName
                                     ":" EDIPartyName
gn-iPAddress
                = id-iPAddress
                                     ":" OCTET-STRING
gn-registeredID = gn-id-registeredID ":" OBJECT-IDENTIFIER
gn-uniformResourceIdentifier = id-uniformResourceIdentifier
                                 ":" IA5String
id-otherName
                  = %x6F.74.68.65.72.4E.61.6D.65 ; "otherName"
gn-id-registeredID = %x72.65.67.69.73.74.65.72.65.64.49.44
                       ; "registeredID"
OtherName = "{" sp on-type-id "," sp on-value sp "}"
on-type-id = id-type-id msp OBJECT-IDENTIFIER
on-value = id-value msp Value
id-type-id = %x74.79.70.65.2D.69.64 ; "type-id"
id-value = %x76.61.6C.75.65 ; "value"
The <Value> rule is defined in Section 8 of [13].
ORAddress
                = dquote *SafeIA5Character dquote
SafeIA5Character = %x01-21 / %x23-7F / ; ASCII minus dquote
                                 ; escaped double quote
                  dquote dquote
                = %x22 ; " (double quote)
dquote
```

The <ORAddress> rule encodes the x400Address component of a GeneralName as a character string between double quotes. The character string is first derived according to Section 4.1 of [11], and then any embedded double quotes are escaped by being repeated. This resulting string is

```
output between double quotes.
               = "{" [ sp nameAssigner "," ] sp partyName sp "}"
EDIPartyName
               = id-nameAssigner msp DirectoryString
nameAssigner
               = id-partyName msp DirectoryString
partyName
id-nameAssigner = %x6E.61.6D.65.41.73.73.69.67.6E.65.72
                     ; "nameAssigner"
               = %x70.61.72.74.79.4E.61.6D.65 ; "partyName"
id-partyName
aki-authorityCertSerialNumber = id-authorityCertSerialNumber msp
                                  CertificateSerialNumber
id-keyIdentifier
                      = %x6B.65.79.49.64.65.6E.74.69.66.69.65.72
                            ; "keyIdentifier"
id-authorityCertIssuer = %x61.75.74.68.6F.72.69.74.79.43.65.72.74.49
                           %x73.73.75.65.72 ; "authorityCertIssuer"
id-authorityCertSerialNumber = %x61.75.74.68.6F.72.69.74.79.43.65.72
                                 %x74.53.65.72.69.61.6C.4E.75.6D.62
                                  %x65.72
                                  ; "authorityCertSerialNumber"
Time
                    = time-utcTime / time-generalizedTime
                    = id-utcTime
                                          ":" UTCTime
time-utcTime
time-generalizedTime = id-generalizedTime ":" GeneralizedTime
id-utcTime
                   = %x75.74.63.54.69.6D.65 ; "utcTime"
id-generalizedTime = %x67.65.6E.65.72.61.6C.69.7A.65.64.54.69.6D.65
                          ; "generalizedTime"
KeyUsage
                  = BIT-STRING / key-usage-bit-list
key-usage-bit-list = "{" [ sp key-usage *( "," sp key-usage ) ] sp "}"
The <key-usage-bit-list> rule encodes the one bits in a KeyUsage value
as a comma separated list of identifiers. The <BIT-STRING> rule is given
in [<u>16</u>].
key-usage = id-digitalSignature
           / id-nonRepudiation
           / id-keyEncipherment
           / id-dataEncipherment
            / id-keyAgreement
           / id-keyCertSign
           / id-cRLSign
           / id-encipherOnly
            / id-decipherOnly
id-digitalSignature = %x64.69.67.69.74.61.6C.53.69.67.6E.61.74.75.72
                        %x65 ; "digitalSignature"
id-nonRepudiation = %x6E.6F.6E.52.65.70.75.64.69.61.74.69.6F.6E
                        ; "nonRepudiation"
id-keyEncipherment = %x6B.65.79.45.6E.63.69.70.68.65.72.6D.65.6E.74
```

```
; "keyEncipherment"
id-dataEncipherment = %x64.61.74.61.45.6E.63.69.70.68.65.72.6D.65.6E
                        %x74 ; "dataEncipherment"
id-kevAgreement
                   = %x6B.65.79.41.67.72.65.65.6D.65.6E.74
                        ; "keyAgreement"
id-keyCertSign
                   = %x6B.65.79.43.65.72.74.53.69.67.6E
                         ; "keyCertSign"
id-cRLSign
                   = %x63.52.4C.53.69.67.6E ; "cRLSign"
id-encipherOnly
                   = %x65.6E.63.69.70.68.65.72.4F.6E.6C.79
                         ; "encipherOnly"
id-decipherOnly
                   = %x64.65.63.69.70.68.65.72.4F.6E.6C.79
                         ; "decipherOnly"
AltNameType = ant-builtinNameForm / ant-otherNameForm
ant-builtinNameForm = id-builtinNameForm ":" BuiltinNameForm
ant-otherNameForm = id-otherNameForm ":" OBJECT-IDENTIFIER
id-builtinNameForm = %x62.75.69.6C.74.69.6E.4E.61.6D.65.46.6F.72.6D
                           ; "builtinNameForm"
                  = %x6F.74.68.65.72.4E.61.6D.65.46.6F.72.6D
id-otherNameForm
                           ; "otherNameForm"
BuiltinNameForm = id-rfc822Name
                  / id-dNSName
                  / id-x400Address
                  / id-directoryName
                  / id-ediPartyName
                  / id-uniformResourceIdentifier
                  / id-iPAddress
                  / id-registeredId
id-rfc822Name
                = %x72.66.63.38.32.32.4E.61.6D.65 ; "rfc822Name"
id-dNSName
                = %x64.4E.53.4E.61.6D.65 ; "dNSName"
id-x400Address
                = %x78.34.30.30.41.64.64.72.65.73.73
                      ; "x400Address"
id-directoryName = %x64.69.72.65.63.74.6F.72.79.4E.61.6D.65
                     ; "directoryName"
id-ediPartyName = %x65.64.69.50.61.72.74.79.4E.61.6D.65
                      ; "ediPartyName"
id-iPAddress
                = %x69.50.41.64.64.72.65.73.73 ; "iPAddress"
id-registeredId = %x72.65.67.69.73.74.65.72.65.64.49.64
                      ; "registeredId"
id-uniformResourceIdentifier = %x75.6E.69.66.6F.72.6D.52.65.73.6F.75
                              %x72.63.65.49.64.65.6E.74.69.66.69.65
                              %x72 ; "uniformResourceIdentifier"
CertPolicySet = "{" sp CertPolicyId *( "," sp CertPolicyId ) sp "}"
CertPolicyId = OBJECT-IDENTIFIER
NameConstraintsSyntax = "{" [ sp ncs-permittedSubtrees ]
```

```
[ sep sp ncs-excludedSubtrees ]
                                sp "}"
ncs-permittedSubtrees = id-permittedSubtrees msp GeneralSubtrees
ncs-excludedSubtrees = id-excludedSubtrees msp GeneralSubtrees
id-permittedSubtrees = %x70.65.72.6D.69.74.74.65.64.53.75.62.74.72
                          %x65.65.73 ; "permittedSubtrees"
id-excludedSubtrees
                     = %x65.78.63.6C.75.64.65.64.53.75.62.74.72.65
                          %x65.73 ; "excludedSubtrees"
GeneralSubtrees = "{" sp GeneralSubtree
                     *( "," sp GeneralSubtree ) sp "}"
GeneralSubtree = "{"
                         sp gs-base
                    ["," sp gs-minimum ]
                    [ "," sp gs-maximum ]
                          sp "}"
gs-base
           = id-base
                         msp GeneralName
gs-minimum = id-minimum msp BaseDistance
gs-maximum = id-maximum msp BaseDistance
id-base = %x62.61.73.65
                                     ; "base"
id-minimum = %x6D.69.6E.69.6D.75.6D ; "minimum"
id-maximum = %x6D.61.78.69.6D.75.6D ; "maximum"
BaseDistance = INTEGER-0-MAX
```

The <OBJECT-IDENTIFIER>, <OCTET-STRING>, <IA5String>, <DirectoryString>, <RelativeDistinguishedName>, <UTCTime>, <GeneralizedTime> and <INTEGER-0-MAX> rules are given in [16].

<u>4.3</u> Certificate Pair Exact Match

Certificate pair exact match is defined in 11.3.3 of [9]. The string description of the certificatePairExactMatch matching rule is:

```
( 2.5.13.36 NAME 'certificatePairExactMatch'
SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.8)
```

The LDAP syntax definition is:

```
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.8
DESC 'Certificate Pair Exact Assertion' )
```

The ASN.1 for CertificatePairExactAssertion is defined in 11.3.3 of [9], as are the semantics of each of its component types.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following Augmented BNF [10]:

```
CertificatePairExactAssertion = "{" [ sp cpea-issuedTo ]
[sep sp cpea-issuedBy ]
sp "}"
```

4.4 Certificate Pair Match

Certificate pair match is defined in 11.3.4 of [9]. The string description of the certificatePairMatch matching rule is:

(2.5.13.37 NAME 'certificatePairExactMatch' SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.9)

The LDAP syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.9 DESC 'Certificate Pair Assertion')

The ASN.1 for CertificatePairAssertion is defined in 11.3.4 of [9], as are the semantics of each of its component types.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following Augmented BNF [10]:

CertificatePairAssertion = "{" [sp cpa-issuedTo] [sep sp cpa-issuedBy] sp "}"

At least one of <cpa-issuedTo> and <cpa-issuedBy> MUST be present.

cpa-issuedTo = id-issuedToThisCAAssertion msp CertificateAssertion cpa-issuedBy = id-issuedByThisCAAssertion msp CertificateAssertion

<u>5</u> Certificate Revocation List Matching Rules

X.509[9] defines both equality and flexible matching rules for CRLs, via the certificateListExactMatch and certificateListMatch MATCHING-RULEs respectively. LDAP servers MUST support the certificateListExactMatch matching rule. Clients MAY support certificateListExactMatch values for equalityMatch filters. LDAPv3 servers MAY support the certificateListMatch matching rule. If the server does support flexible matching (either via certificateListMatch or some other matching rule), then the extensibleMatch filter of the Search request MUST be supported. Clients MAY support the extensibleMatch filter and one or more of the optional elements of certificateListMatch.

5.1 Certificate List Exact Match

Certificate List exact match is defined in 11.3.5 of [9]. The string description of the certificateListExactMatch matching rule is:

(2.5.13.38 NAME 'certificateListExactMatch' SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.3)

The syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.3 DESC 'Certificate List Exact Assertion (Issuer name, time and distribution point name)')

The ASN.1 for CertificateListExactAssertion is defined in 11.3.5 of [9], as are the semantics of each of its component types.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following ABNF:

```
CertificateListExactAssertion = "{"
                                        sp clea-issuer
                                     "," sp clea-thisUpdate
                                   [ "," sp clea-distributionPoint ]
                                         sp "}"
clea-issuer
                     = id-issuer msp Name
clea-thisUpdate = id-thisUpdate msp Time
clea-distributionPoint = id-distributionPoint msp
                            DistributionPointName
id-thisUpdate
                    = %x74.68.69.73.55.70.64.61.74.65
                          ; "thisUpdate"
id-distributionPoint = %x64.69.73.74.72.69.62.75.74.69.6F.6E
                         %x50.6F.69.6E.74 ; "distributionPoint"
DistributionPointName = dpn-fullName / dpn-nameRelativeToCRLIssuer
                           = id-fullName ":" GeneralNames
dpn-fullName
dpn-nameRelativeToCRLIssuer = id-nameRelativeToCRLIssuer ":"
                                 RelativeDistinguishedName
                          = %x66.75.6C.6C.4E.61.6D.65 ; "fullName"
id-fullName
id-nameRelativeToCRLIssuer = %x6E.61.6D.65.52.65.6C.61.74.69.76.65
                                %x54.6F.43.52.4C.49.73.73.75.65.72
                                ; "nameRelativeToCRLIssuer"
```

5.2 Certificate List Match

Certificate List match is defined in 11.3.6 of [9]. The string description of the certificateListMatch matching rule is:

```
( 2.5.13.39 NAME 'certificateListMatch'
SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.4)
```

The syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.4 DESC 'Certificate List Assertion')

The ASN.1 for CertificateListAssertion is defined in 11.3.6 of [9], as are the semantics of its components.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following ABNF:

```
CertificateListAssertion = "{"
                                  [ sp cla-issuer ]
                              [ sep sp cla-minCRLNumber ]
                              [ sep sp cla-maxCRLNumber ]
                              [ sep sp cla-reasonFlags ]
                              [ sep sp cla-dateAndTime ]
                              [ sep sp cla-distributionPoint ]
                              [ sep sp cla-authorityKeyIdentifier ]
                                    sp "}"
cla-issuer = id-issuer
                                   msp Name
cla-minCRLNumber = id-minCRLNumber msp CRLNumber
cla-maxCRLNumber = id-maxCRLNumber msp CRLNumber
cla-reasonFlags = id-reasonFlags msp ReasonFlags
cla-dateAndTime = id-dateAndTime msp Time
cla-distributionPoint
                          = id-distributionPoint msp
                                DistributionPointName
cla-authorityKeyIdentifier = id-authorityKeyIdentifier msp
                                AuthorityKeyIdentifier
id-minCRLNumber = %x6D.69.6E.43.52.4C.4E.75.6D.62.65.72
                     ; "minCRLNumber"
id-maxCRLNumber = %x6D.61.78.43.52.4C.4E.75.6D.62.65.72
                     ; "maxCRLNumber"
id-reasonFlags = %x72.65.61.73.6F.6E.46.6C.61.67.73 ; "reasonFlags"
id-dateAndTime = %x64.61.74.65.41.6E.64.54.69.6D.65 ; "dateAndTime"
CRLNumber = INTEGER-0-MAX
ReasonFlags = BIT-STRING
              / "{" [ sp reason-flag
                   *( "," sp reason-flag ) ] sp "}"
```

<pre>reason-flag = id-unused / id-keyCompromise / id-cACompromise / id-affiliationChanged / id-superseded / id-cessationOfOperation / id-certificateHold / id-privilegeWithdrawn / id-aACompromise</pre>		
id-unused	= %x75.6E.75.73.65.64 ; "unused"	
id-keyCompromise	= %x6B.65.79.43.6F.6D.70.72.6F.6D.69.73.65	
	; "keyCompromise"	
id-cACompromise	= %x63.41.43.6F.6D.70.72.6F.6D.69.73.65	
	; "cACompromise"	
id-affiliationChanged	= %x61.66.66.69.6C.69.61.74.69.6F.6E.43.68	
	%x61.6E.67.65.64 ; "affiliationChanged"	
id-superseded	= %x73.75.70.65.72.73.65.64.65.64	
	; "superseded"	
id-cessationOfOperation	= %x63.65.73.73.61.74.69.6F.6E.4F.66.4F.70	
	%x65.72.61.74.69.6F.6E	
	; "cessationOfOperation"	
id-certificateHold	= %x63.65.72.74.69.66.69.63.61.74.65.48.6F	
	%x6C.64 ; "certificateHold"	
id-privilegeWithdrawn	= %x70.72.69.76.69.6C.65.67.65.57.69.74.68	
	%x64.72.61.77.6E ; "privilegeWithdrawn"	
id-aACompromise	= %x61.41.43.6F.6D.70.72.6F.6D.69.73.65	
	; "aACompromise"	

<u>6</u>. Privilege Management Attribute Certificate and CRL Attributes and Syntaxes

LDAP servers MAY store any type of attribute with the AttributeCertificate syntax, and LDAP clients MAY request them to be returned by adding them to the Search Request AttributeDescriptionList (either explicitly or implicity via requesting all attributes).

6.1 Attribute Certificate Attribute

The attributeCertificateAttribute is defined in 17.2.1 of $[\underline{9}]$. It is used to hold the attribute certificates of a user.

The corresponding LDAP description is

(2.5.4.58 NAME 'attributeCertificateAttribute' EQUALITY attributeCertificateExactMatch SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.5)

6.2 Attribute Authority Certificate Attribute

The attribute authority attribute certificate is defined in 17.2.2 of [9]. The aAcertificate attribute holds the privileges of an attribute authority.

The corresponding LDAP description is

```
( 2.5.4.61 NAME 'aACertificate'
        EQUALITY attributeCertificateExactMatch
        SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.5 )
6.3 Attribute Descriptor Certificate Attribute
```

The attributeDescriptorCertificate attribute is defined in 17.2.3 of $[\underline{9}]$. The certificate is self signed by a source of authority and holds a description of the privilege and its delegation rules.

The corresponding LDAP description is

```
( 2.5.4.62 NAME 'attributeDescriptorCertificate'
        EQUALITY attributeCertificateExactMatch
        SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.5 )
```

6.4 Attribute Certificate Syntax

A value in this syntax is the binary string that results from BER/DERencoding an X.509 attribute certificate. The following string states the OID assigned to this syntax:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.5 DESC 'Attribute Certificate')

6.5 Attribute Certificate Revocation List Attribute

The attributeCertificateRevocationList attribute is defined in section 17.2.4 of [9]. It holds a list of attribute certificates that have been revoked.

```
attributeCertificateRevocationList ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    WITH SYNTAX CertificateList
    EQUALITY MATCHING RULE certificateListExactMatch
    ID { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) aCRL(59) } }
```

The corresponding LDAP description is

(2.5.4.59 NAME 'attributeCertificateRevocationList' EQUALITY certificateListExactMatch SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.9)

6.6 Attribute Authority Certificate Revocation List Attribute

The attribute authority certificate revocation list attribute is defined in section 17.2.5 of [9]. It holds a list of AA certificates that have been revoked.

attributeAuthorityRevocationList ATTRIBUTE ::= {
 WITH SYNTAX CertificateList
 EQUALITY MATCHING RULE certificateListExactMatch
 ID { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) aARL(63) } }

The corresponding LDAP description is

```
( 2.5.4.63 NAME 'attributeAuthorityRevocationList'
        EQUALITY certificateListExactMatch
        SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.9 )
```

7 PMI Matching Rules

LDAP servers that support the storage of attributes with the AttributeCertificate syntax MUST support searching for entries containing specific attribute certificates, via the attributeCertificateExactMatch matching rule.

LDAPv3Servers MAY support flexible matching for any attributes with the AttributeCertificate syntax via the attributeCertificateMatch matching rule or any of the matching rules defined for the certificate extensions. LDAPv3 servers SHOULD publish the matching rules that they do support in the matchingRule and matchingRuleUse operational attributes of the subschema subentry. If the server does support flexible matching (either via attributeCertificateMatch or some other matching rule), then the extensibleMatch filter of the Search request MUST be supported. LDAPv3 clients MAY support the extensibleMatch filter of the Search operation, along one or more of the optional elements of attributeCertificateMatch or any of the certificate extension matching rules.

7.1 Attribute Certificate Exact Match

The equality matching rule for all types of attribute with

```
AttributeCertificate syntax is the attributeCertificateExactMatch,
This is defined in 17.3.1 of [9]. It is reproduced below for the
convenience of the reader (but see Outstanding Issue iv).
attributeCertificateExactMatch MATCHING-RULE ::= {
       SYNTAX AttributeCertificateExactAssertion
               { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) mr (13)
        ID
                   attributeCertificateExactMatch (45) } }
AttributeCertificateExactAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
        serialNumber
                       CertificateSerialNumber,
       issuer
                       AttCertIssuer }
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
AttCertIssuer ::=
                       [0]
                               SEQUENCE {
     issuerName
                                       GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
     baseCertificateID [0]
                               IssuerSerial OPTIONAL,
     objectDigestInfo [<u>1</u>]
                               ObjectDigestInfo OPTIONAL }
-- At least one component shall be present
IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
       issuer
                       GeneralNames,
        serial
                       CertificateSerialNumber,
       issuerUID
                               UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL }
UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING
ObjectDigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        digestedObjectType ENUMERATED {
               publicKey
                                               (0),
               publicKeyCert
                                       (1),
               otherObjectTypes
                                       (2) },
       otherObjectTypeID
                           OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
       digestAlgorithm
                              AlgorithmIdentifier,
       objectDigest
                               BIT STRING }
The LDAP definition for the above matching rule is:
( 2.5.13.45 NAME 'attributeCertificateExactMatch'
               SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.6)
The syntax definition is:
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.6 DESC 'Attribute certificate exact assertion (
serial number and issuer details)' )
The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given
by the following ABNF:
AttributeCertificateExactAssertion = "{" sp acea-serialNumber ","
```

```
sp acea-issuer
                                         sp "}"
acea-serialNumber = id-serialNumber msp CertificateSerialNumber
                   = id-issuer
acea-issuer
                                     msp AttCertIssuer
AttCertIssuer = "{" [ sp aci-issuerName ]
                   [ sep sp aci-baseCertificateID ]
                   [ sep sp aci-objectDigestInfo ]
                         sp "}"
At least one of <aci-issuerName>, <aci-baseCertificateID> or
<aci-objectDigestInfo> MUST be present.
                      = id-issuerName
aci-issuerName
                                             msp GeneralNames
aci-baseCertificateID = id-baseCertificateID msp IssuerSerial
aci-objectDigestInfo = id-objectDigestInfo msp ObjectDigestInfo
id-issuerName
                     = %x69.73.73.75.65.72.4E.61.6D.65
                           ; "issuerName"
id-objectDigestInfo = %x6F.62.6A.65.63.74.44.69.67.65.73.74.49.6E
                           %x66.6F ; "objectDigestInfo"
ObjectDigestInfo = "{"
                            sp odi-digestedObjectType
                      [ "," sp odi-otherObjectTypeID ]
                        "," sp odi-digestAlgorithm
                        "," sp odi-objectDigest
                            sp "}"
odi-digestedObjectType = id-digestedObjectType msp
                            DigestedObjectType
odi-otherObjectTypeID = id-otherObjectTypeID msp OBJECT-IDENTIFIER
odi-digestAlgorithm = id-digestAlgorithm msp AlgorithmIdentifier
odi-objectDigest
                      = id-objectDigest msp BIT-STRING
id-digestedObjectType = %x64.69.67.65.73.74.65.64.4F.62.6A.65.63.74
                           %x54.79.70.65 ; "digestedObjectType"
id-otherObjectTypeID = %x6F.74.68.65.72.4F.62.6A.65.63.74.54.79.70
                           %x65.49.44 ; "otherObjectTypeID"
id-digestAlgorithm
                      = %x64.69.67.65.73.74.41.6C.67.6F.72.69.74.68
                           %x6D ; "digestAlgorithm"
id-objectDigest
                      = %x6F.62.6A.65.63.74.44.69.67.65.73.74
                           ; "objectDigest"
DigestedObjectType = id-publicKey
                      / id-publicKeyCert
                      / id-otherObjectTypes
id-publicKey
                   = %x70.75.62.6C.69.63.4B.65.79 ; "publicKey"
id-publicKeyCert
                   = %x70.75.62.6C.69.63.4B.65.79.43.65.72.74
                         ; "publicKeyCert"
id-otherObjectTypes = %x6F.74.68.65.72.4F.62.6A.65.63.74.54.79.70.65
```

```
%x73 ; "otherObjectTypes"
AlgorithmIdentifier = "{"
                             sp ai-algorithm
                        ["," sp ai-parameters ]
                              sp "}"
ai-algorithm = id-algorithm msp OBJECT-IDENTIFIER
ai-parameters = id-parameters msp Value
id-algorithm = %x61.6C.67.6F.72.69.74.68.6D ; "algorithm"
id-parameters = %x70.61.72.61.6D.65.74.65.72.73 ; "parameters"
IssuerSerial = "{"
                      sp is-issuer
                    "," sp is-serial
                  [ "," sp is-issuerUID ]
                       sp "}"
is-issuer = id-issuer msp GeneralNames
is-serial
           = id-serial
                          msp CertificateSerialNumber
is-issuerUID = id-issuerUID msp UniqueIdentifier
id-serial = %x73.65.72.69.61.6C
                                           ; "serial"
id-issuerUID = %x69.73.73.75.65.72.55.49.44 ; "issuerUID"
UniqueIdentifier = BIT-STRING
7.2 Attribute Certificate Match
Attribute certificate matching rule is defined in section 17.3.2 of
[\underline{9}]. For the convenience of the reader it is reproduced below:
attributeCertificateMatch MATCHING-RULE ::= {
       SYNTAX AttributeCertificateAssertion
               { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) mr (13)
        ID
                       attributeCertificateMatch (42) }
AttributeCertificateAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
       holder
                       [0] CHOICE {
                           baseCertificateID [0] IssuerSerial,
                           subjectName
                                              [1] GeneralNames
                               } OPTIONAL,
                       [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
       issuer
       attCertValidity [2] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
                       [3] SET OF AttributeType OPTIONAL }
       attType
--At least one component of the sequence must be present
The LDAP definition of the attributeCertificateMatch matching rule
is:
```

```
( 2.5.13.42 NAME 'attributeCertificateMatch'
SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.7 )
```

```
The syntax definition is:
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.7
    DESC 'Attribute Certificate Assertion' )
The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given
by the following ABNF:
AttributeCertificateAssertion = "{"
                                       [ sp aca-holder ]
                                   [ sep sp aca-issuer ]
                                   [ sep sp aca-attCertValidity ]
                                   [ sep sp aca-attType ]
                                         sp "}"
                   = id-holder
aca-holder
                                         msp ACAHolder
                   = id-issuer
aca-issuer
                                         msp GeneralNames
aca-attCertValidity = id-attCertValidity msp GeneralizedTime
aca-attType
                   = id-attType
                                         msp SETOFAttributeType
ACAHolder = acah-baseCertificateID / acah-holderName
acah-baseCertificateID = id-baseCertificateID ":" IssuerSerial
acah-holderName
                     = id-holderName
                                              ":" GeneralNames
id-baseCertificateID = %x62.61.73.65.43.65.72.74.69.66.69.63.61.74
                          %x65.49.44 ; "baseCertificateID"
id-holderName
                     = %x68.6F.6C.64.65.72.4E.61.6D.65
                          : "holderName"
SETOFAttributeType = "{" sp AttributeType
                        *( "," sp AttributeType ) sp "}"
The \langle AttributeType \rangle rule is given in [<u>16</u>].
<u>8</u> AC Extensions Matching Rules
X.509 defines the following matching rules for matching on various
extensions within an attribute certificate.
8.1 Holder Issuer Match
Holder Issuer Match is described in section 17.3.3 of [9]. The string
description of the holderIssuerMatch matching rule is:
( 2.5.13.46 NAME 'holderIssuerMatch'
    SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.10)
The syntax definition is:
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.10 DESC 'Holder Issuer Assertion' )
The ASN.1 for HolderIssuerAssertion is defined in 17.3.3 of [9], as are
the semantics of its components.
```

```
The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given
by the following ABNF:
HolderIssuerAssertion = "{" [ sp hia-holder ]
                          [ sep sp hia-issuer ]
                                sp "}"
hia-holder = id-holder msp Holder
hia-issuer = id-issuer msp AttCertIssuer
Holder = "{" [ sp h-baseCertificateID ]
           [ sep sp h-entityName ]
           [ sep sp h-objectDigestInfo ]
                 sp "}"
At least one of <h-baseCertificateID>, <h-entityName> or
<h-objectDigestInfo> MUST be present.
h-baseCertificateID = id-baseCertificateID msp IssuerSerial
h-entityName = id-entityName
                                         msp GeneralNames
h-objectDigestInfo = id-objectDigestInfo msp ObjectDigestInfo
                  = %x65.6E.74.69.74.79.4E.61.6D.65 ; "entityName"
id-entityName
8.2 Delegation Path Match
```

Delegation Path Match is described in section 17.3.4 of [9]. The string description of the delegationPathMatch matching rule is:

```
( 2.5.13.61 NAME 'delegationPathMatch'
SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.10)
```

The syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.10 DESC 'DelMatchSyntax')

The ASN.1 for DelMatchSyntax is defined in 17.3.4 of [9], as are the semantics of its components.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following ABNF:

<u>8.3</u> Authority Attribute Identifier Match

Authority Attribute Identifier Match is described in section 15.5.2.4.1 of [9]. The string description of the authAttIdMatch matching rule is:

(2.5.13.53 NAME 'authAttIdMatch' SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.12)

The syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.12 DESC 'Authority Attribute Identifier Syntax')

The ASN.1 for AuthorityAttributeIdentifierSyntax is defined in 15.5.2.4 of [9], as are the semantics of its components.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following ABNF:

AuthorityAttributeIdentifierSyntax = "{" sp AuthAttId *("," sp AuthAttId) sp "}"

AuthAttId = IssuerSerial

8.4 Role Specification Certificate Identifier Match

Role Specification Certificate Identifier match is described in section <u>15.4.2.1.1</u> of [9]. The string description of the roleSpecCertIdMatch Match matching rule is:

```
( 2.5.13.54 NAME 'roleSpecCertIdMatch '
SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.13)
```

The syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.13 DESC 'Role Specification Ceritificate
Identifier Syntax')

The ASN.1 for RoleSpecCertIdentifierSyntax is defined in 15.4.2.1 of $[\underline{9}]$, as are the semantics of its components.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following ABNF:

RoleSpecCertIdentifierSynta	ax = "{" sp RoleCertSpecIdentifier
	*("," sp RoleCertSpecIdentifier) sp "}"
RoleCertSpecIdentifier = "{	[" sp rsci-roleName
	"," sp rsci-roleCertIssuer
	["," sp rsci-roleCertSerialNumber]
	["," sp rsci-roleCertLocator]
	sp "}"
rsci-roleName =	= id-roleName msp GeneralName
rsci-roleCertIssuer =	= id-roleCertIssuer msp GeneralName
rsci-roleCertSerialNumber =	= id-roleCertSerialNumber msp
	CertificateSerialNumber

rsci-roleCertLocator	= id-roleCertLocator msp GeneralName
id-roleName	= %x72.6F.6C.65.4E.61.6D.65 ; "roleName"
id-roleCertIssuer	= %x72.6F.6C.65.43.65.72.74.49.73.73.75.65
	%x72 ; "roleCertIssuer"
id-roleCertSerialNumber	= %x72.6F.6C.65.43.65.72.74.53.65.72.69.61
	%x6C.4E.75.6D.62.65.72
	; "roleCertSerialNumber"
id-roleCertLocator	= %x72.6F.6C.65.43.65.72.74.4C.6F.63.61.74
	%x6F.72 ; "roleCertLocator"

8.5 Basic Attribute Constraints Match

Basic Attribute Constraints Match is described in section 15.5.2.1.1 of [9]. The string description of the holderIssuerMatch matching rule is:

(2.5.13.55 NAME ' basicAttConstraintsMatch '
 SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.14)

The syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.14 DESC 'Basic Attributes Constraints Syntax')

The ASN.1 for BasicAttConstraintsSyntax is defined in 15.5.2.1 of [9], as are the semantics of its components.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following ABNF:

The $\langle BOOLEAN \rangle$ rule is given in [<u>16</u>].

<u>8.6</u> Delegated Name Constraints Match

Delegated Name Constraints Match is described in section 15.5.2.2.1 of [9]. The string description of the holderIssuerMatch matching rule is:

The syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.15 DESC 'Name Constraints Syntax')

The ASN.1 for NameConstraintsSyntax is defined in 8.4.2.2 of [9], and the semantics of its components when used for delegated name constraints are described in 15.5.2.2.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given in Section 4.2.

8.7 Time Specification Match

Time Specification Match is described in section 15.1.2.1.1 of [9]. The string description of the timeSpecificationMatch matching rule is:

(2.5.13.57 NAME ' timeSpecificationMatch '
 SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.16)

The syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.16 DESC 'Time Specification')

The ASN.1 for TimeSpecification is defined in 7.2 of [15], as are the semantics of its components.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following ABNF:

```
TimeSpecification = "{" sp ts-time
                      [ "," sp ts-notThisTime ]
                      [ "," sp ts-timeZone ]
                          sp "}"
ts-time = id-time
                        msp TSTime
ts-notThisTime = id-notThisTime msp BOOLEAN
ts-timeZone = id-timeZone msp TimeZone
id-time = %x74.69.6D.65
                                                 ; "time"
id-notThisTime = %x6E.6F.74.54.68.69.73.54.69.6D.65 ; "notThisTime"
                                                 ; "timeZone"
id-timeZone = %x74.69.6D.65.5A.6F.6E.65
        = tst-absolute / tst-periodic
TSTime
tst-absolute = id-absolute ":" AbsoluteTime
tst-periodic = id-periodic ":" Periods
AbsoluteTime = "{" [ sp at-startTime ]
                 [ sep sp at-endTime ]
                      sp "}"
at-startTime = id-startTime msp GeneralizedTime
at-endTime = id-endTime msp GeneralizedTime
id-startTime = %x73.74.61.72.74.54.69.6D.65 ; "startTime"
id-endTime = %x65.6E.64.54.69.6D.65
                                      ; "endTime"
Periods = "{" [ sp Period *( "," sp Period ) ] sp "}"
Period = "{" [ sp p-timesOfDay ]
            [ sep sp p-days ]
            [ sep sp p-weeks ]
```

```
[ sep sp p-months ]
             [ sep sp p-years ]
                  sp "}"
p-timesOfDay = id-timesOfDay msp DayTimeBands
p-days
            = id-days
                             msp Days
p-weeks= id-weeksmsp Weeksp-months= id-monthsmsp Monthsp-years= id-yearsmsp Years
id-timesOfDay = %x74.69.6D.65.73.4F.66.44.61.79 ; "timesOfDay"
id-days = %x64.61.79.73
                                               ; "days"
           = %x77.65.65.6B.73
id-weeks
                                               ; "weeks"
                                              ; "months"
id-months
            = %x6D.6F.6E.74.68.73
id-years = %x79.65.61.72.73
                                               ; "years"
DayTimeBands = "{" sp DayTimeBand *( "," sp DayTimeBand ) sp "}"
DayTimeBand = "{"
                    [ sp dtb-startDayTime ]
                  [ sep sp dtb-endDayTime ]
                       sp "}"
dtb-startDayTime = id-startDayTime msp DayTime
dtb-endDayTime = id-endDayTime msp DayTime
id-startDayTime = %x73.74.61.72.74.44.61.79.54.69.6D.65
                     ; "startDayTime"
id-endDayTime = %x65.6E.64.44.61.79.54.69.6D.65 ; "endDayTime"
DayTime = "{"
                 sp dt-hour
             ["," sp dt-minute ]
             [ "," sp dt-second ]
                  sp "}"
dt-hour
         = id-hour
                     msp INTEGER ; 0 to 23
dt-minute = id-minute msp INTEGER ; 0 to 59
dt-second = id-second msp INTEGER ; 0 to 59
id-hour = %x68.6F.75.72 ; "hour"
id-minute = %x6D.69.6E.75.74.65 ; "minute"
id-second = %x73.65.63.6F.6E.64 ; "second"
           = days-intDay / days-bitDay / days-dayOf
Days
days-intDay = id-intDay ":" SET-OF-INTEGER
days-bitDay = id-bitDay ":" BitDay
days-dayOf = id-dayOf ":" XDayOf
id-intDay = %x69.6E.74.44.61.79 ; "intDay"
id-bitDay = %x62.69.74.44.61.79 ; "bitDay"
id-dayOf = %x64.61.79.4F.66 ; "dayOf"
SET-OF-INTEGER = "{" [ sp INTEGER *( "," sp INTEGER ) ] "}"
            = BIT-STRING / day-bit-list
BitDay
day-bit-list = "{" [ sp day *( "," sp day ) ] sp "}"
            = %x73.75.6E.64.61.79
                                       ; "sunday"
day
              / %x6D.6F.6E.64.61.79
                                            ; "monday"
               / %x74.75.65.73.64.61.79 ; "tuesday"
```

```
/ %x77.65.64.6E.65.73.64.61.79 ; "wednesday"
                / %x74.68.75.72.73.64.61.79 ; "thursday"
               / %x66.72.69.64.61.79 ; "friday"
                / %x73.61.74.75.72.64.61.79 ; "saturday"
XDayOf = xdo-first / xdo-second / xdo-third / xdo-fourth / xdo-fifth
xdo-first = id-first ":" NamedDay
xdo-second = id-second ":" NamedDay
xdo-third = id-third ":" NamedDay
xdo-fourth = id-fourth ":" NamedDay
xdo-fifth = id-fifth ":" NamedDay
                = nd-intNamedDays / nd-bitNamedDays
NamedDay
nd-intNamedDays = id-intNamedDays ":" day
nd-bitNamedDays = id-bitNamedDays ":" ( BIT-STRING / day-bit-list )
id-intNamedDays = %x69.6E.74.4E.61.6D.65.64.44.61.79.73
                      ; "intNamedDays"
id-bitNamedDays = %x62.69.74.4E.61.6D.65.64.44.61.79.73
                      ; "bitNamedDays"
Weeks
        = weeks-allWeeks / weeks-intWeek / weeks-bitWeek
weeks-allWeeks = id-allWeeks ":" NULL
weeks-intWeek = id-intWeek ":" SET-OF-INTEGER
weeks-bitWeek = id-bitWeek ":" BitWeek
id-allWeeks = %x61.6C.6C.57.65.65.6B.73 ; "allWeeks"
id-intWeek = %x69.6E.74.57.65.65.6B ; "intWeek"
id-bitWeek = %x62.69.74.57.65.65.6B ; "bitWeek"
BitWeek = BIT-STRING / week-bit-list
week-bit-list = "{" [ sp week-bit *( "," sp week-bit ) ] sp "}"
week-bit = %x77.65.65.6B.31 ; "week1"
                 / %x77.65.65.6B.32 ; "week2"
                 / %x77.65.65.6B.33 ; "week3"
                  / %x77.65.65.6B.34 ; "week4"
                  / %x77.65.65.6B.35 ; "week5"
Months = months-allMonths / months-intMonth / months-bitMonth
months-allMonths = id-allMonths ":" NULL
months-intMonth = id-intMonth ":" SET-OF-INTEGER
months-bitMonth = id-bitMonth ":" BitMonth
id-allMonths = %x61.6C.6C.4D.6F.6E.74.68.73 ; "allMonths"
id-intMonth = %x69.6E.74.4D.6F.6E.74.68 ; "intMonth"
id-bitMonth = %x62.69.74.4D.6F.6E.74.68 ; "bitMonth"
               = BIT-STRING / month-bit-list
BitMonth
month-bit-list = "{" [ sp month-bit *( "," sp month-bit ) ] sp "}"
month-bit = %x6A.61.6E.75.61.72.79 ; "january"
                   / %x66.65.62.72.75.61.72.79 ; "february"
                                                       ; "march"
                    / %x6D.61.72.63.68
                    / %x61.70.72.69.6C
                                                      ; "april"
                                                        ; "may"
                    / %x6D.61.79
```

/ %x6A.75.6E.65 ; "june" ; "july" / %x6A.75.6C.79 ; "august" / %x61.75.67.75.73.74 / %x22.73.65.70.74.65.6D.62.65.72 ; "september" ; "october" / %x6F.63.74.6F.62.65.72 / %x6E.6F.76.65.6D.62.65.72 ; "november" / %x64.65.63.65.6D.62.65.72 ; "december" Years = "{" [sp Year *("," sp Year)] sp "}" Year = INTEGER ; must be >= 1000 TimeZone = INTEGER ; -12 to 12 The <NULL> rule is given in [16]. 8.8 Acceptable Certificate Policies Match Acceptable Certificate Policies Match is described in section 15.5.2.3.1

of [9]. The string description of the acceptableCertPoliciesMatch matching rule is:

The syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.17 DESC 'Acceptable Certificate Policies Syntax)

The ASN.1 for AcceptableCertPoliciesSyntax is defined in 15.5.2.3 of $[\underline{9}]$, as are the semantics of its components.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following ABNF:

AcceptableCertPoliciesSyntax = "{" sp CertPolicyId *("," sp CertPolicyId) sp "}"

8.9 Attribute Descriptor Match

Attribute Descriptor Match is described in section 15.3.2.2.1 of [9]. The string description of the attDescriptor matching rule is:

```
( 2.5.13.58 NAME 'attDescriptor'
SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.18)
```

The syntax definition is:

(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.18 DESC 'Attribute Descriptor Syntax')

The ASN.1 for AttributeDescriptorSyntax is defined in 15.3.2.2 of [9], as are the semantics of its components.

The LDAP string encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is given by the following ABNF:

AttributeDescriptorSyntax = "{" sp ads-identifier "," sp ads-attributeSyntax "," sp ads-name] [["," sp ads-description] "," sp ads-dominationRule sp "}" ads-identifier = id-identifier msp AttributeIdentifier ads-attributeSyntax = id-attributeSyntax msp AttributeSyntax ads-name = id-name msp AttributeName ads-description = id-description msp AttributeDescription ads-dominationRule = id-dominationRule msp PrivilegePolicyIdentifier id-identifier = %x69.64.65.6E.74.69.66.69.65.72 ; "identifier" id-attributeSyntax = %x61.74.74.72.69.62.75.74.65.53.79.6E.74.61.78 ; "attributeSyntax" id-name = %x6E.61.6D.65 ; "name" id-description = %x64.65.73.63.72.69.70.74.69.6F.6E ; "description" id-dominationRule = %x64.6F.6D.69.6E.61.74.69.6F.6E.52.75.6C.65 ; "dominationRule" AttributeSyntax = OCTET-STRING ; an empty string is not allowed AttributeIdentifier = AttributeType AttributeName = UTF8String ; an empty string is not allowed AttributeDescription = UTF8String ; an empty string is not allowed PrivilegePolicyIdentifier = "{" sp ppi-privilegePolicy "," sp ppi-privPolSyntax sp "}" ppi-privilegePolicy = id-privilegePolicy msp PrivilegePolicy ppi-privPolSyntax = id-privPolSyntax msp InfoSyntax id-privilegePolicy = %x70.72.69.76.69.6C.65.67.65.50.6F.6C.69.63.79 ; "privilegePolicy" id-privPolSyntax = %x70.72.69.76.50.6F.6C.53.79.6E.74.61.78 ; "privPolSyntax" PrivilegePolicy = OBJECT-IDENTIFIER InfoSyntax = is-content / is-pointer is-content = id-content ":" DirectoryString is-pointer = id-pointer ":" InfoSyntaxPointer id-content = %x63.6F.6E.74.65.6E.74 ; "content" id-pointer = %x70.6F.69.6E.74.65.72 ; "pointer" InfoSyntaxPointer = "{" sp isp-name ["," sp isp-hash] sp "}"

The <UTF8String> rule is given in [16].

8.10 Source of Authority Match

Note. This rule has not been defined by X.509, but this is perhaps an omission that should be rectified. It is an easy matching rule to define since it has a null syntax i.e. we will be matching on whether the extension is present or not.

Source of Authority Match returns TRUE if an attribute certificate contains an SOA Identifier extension. The SOA Identifier extension is described in section 15.3.2.1 of $[\underline{9}]$. The string description of the sOAIdentifierMatch matching rule is:

(2.5.13.x NAME 'sOAIdentifierMatch' SYNTAX 1.2.36.79672281.1.5.1)

The syntax definition of 1.2.36.79672281.1.5.1 (NULL) is given in [13].

9 PMI Object Classes

The definitions of the PMI directory object classes can be found in section 17.1 of $[\underline{9}]$. They are repeated here for the convenience of the reader.

```
pmiUser OBJECT-CLASS ::= {
    -- a privilege holder
        SUBCLASS OF {top}
        KIND auxiliary
        MAY CONTAIN {attributeCertificateAttribute}
        ID { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) objectClass(6) pmiUser (24) } }
```

```
pmiAA OBJECT-CLASS ::= {
    -- an attribute authority
        SUBCLASS OF {top}
```

```
KIND
                        auxiliary
        MAY CONTAIN
                        {aACertificate |
                        attributeCertificateRevocationList |
                        attributeAuthorityRevocationList}
        ID { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) objectClass(6) pmiAA (25) } }
pmiSOA OBJECT-CLASS ::= {
 -- a PMI Source of Authority
        SUBCLASS OF
                        {top}
        KIND
                        auxiliary
        MAY CONTAIN
                        {attributeCertificateRevocationList |
                        attributeAuthorityRevocationList |
                        attributeDescriptorCertificate}
        ID { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) objectClass(6) pmiSOA (26) } }
attCertCRLDistributionPt
                                OBJECT-CLASS ::= {
-- an AC CRL distribution point
  SUBCLASS OF
                        {top}
  KIND
                        auxiliary
  MAY CONTAIN
                        { attributeCertificateRevocationList |
                                attributeAuthorityRevocationList }
   ID { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) objectClass(6)
attCertCRLDistributionPts (27) } }
pmiDelegationPath
                  OBJECT-CLASS
                                        ::= {
-- an object that may contain a delegation path
        SUBCLASS OF
                        {top}
        KIND
                                auxiliary
        MAY CONTAIN
                        { delegationPath }
ID { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) objectClass(6) delegationPath (33) } }
privilegePolicy OBJECT-CLASS
                                ::= {
-- an object that may contain privilege policy information
        SUBCLASS OF
                        {top}
        KIND
                                auxiliary
        MAY CONTAIN
                        {privPolicy }
ID { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) objectClass(6) privilegePolicy (32) } }
```

10. Security Considerations

This [Internet Draft/Standard] describes the schema for the storage and matching of attribute certificates and revocation lists in an LDAP directory server. It does not address the protocol for the retrieval of this information.

LDAP servers SHOULD use access control information to protect the information during its storage. In addition, clients MAY choose to

encrypt the attributes in the attribute certificates before storing them in an LDAP server.

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<u>14</u>. Authors' Addresses

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15. Changes

From Version 00

i) Added ABNF notation for all of the syntaxes.

ii) Removed the restriction on the syntax of Distribution Point Names.

iii) Removed constraints on IssuerSerial.

iv) Bug detected in X.509 AttributeCertificateExactMatch that will need resolving.

v) Changed the string encodings for non-exact matches to keywords for each component instead of $\$ separators.

From Version 01

i) Added and corrected all X.509 PKI schema definitions, since these have been removed from <u>RFC2252</u>-bis.
ii) Changed assertion syntaxes to use the syntax defined by Component Matching Rules
iii) Included all the matching rules for AC extensions

16. Outstanding Issues

i. We need to decide if userSMIMECertificates should also be supported as part of this profile or not. ii. Should we obsolete <u>RFC 2587</u> and copy relevant schema into this document, or continue to reference it. iii. Should the PMI schema be put in a separate document, so that the PKI schema can progress at a faster rate? One reason for separating them is that Matched Values and LDAPv3 Profile reference this ID. iv. There is still a bug in the X.509 AttributeCertificateExactAssertion. It reads: AttributeCertificateExactAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {

serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL, issuer IssuerSerial } OPTIONAL should be removed from the serialNumber. IssuerSerial should be replaced by AttCertIssuer. This ID has assumed that the change will be made.

v. Should the AttributeType in Attribute Certificate Match allow the LDAP <descr> encoding option for describing attribute type OIDs (i.e. user friendly names instead of object identifiers)? Note that attribute names are not guaranteed to be unique, whereas OIDs are.

<u>17</u>. Table of Contents

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