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**Networking Policy Condition Information Model**  
**draft-ietf-policy-conditions-00.txt**

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Abstract

This document defines an information model for networking policy conditions as part of the general information model for representing networking policy defined in [draft-ietf-policy-core-schema-02.txt](#). The information model described in this document is focussed on the structural class `networkingPolicyCondition` that extends the class `policyCondition` described in [draft-ietf-policy-core-schema-02.txt](#). Five auxiliary



classes are defined to describe conditions that refer to (1) the communicating hosts, (2) the communicating users (3) application data (4) routing information at the device enforcing the policy and (5) layer 2 or data link layer information of the device. This document is based on the QoS and IPSec schema first described in [3] and [4].

## **1. Introduction**

This document extends the Policy Framework Core Information Model Class Hierarchy (PFCIM)[[1](#)] which presents a schema for representing networking policies. The schema contains five core classes: policyGroup, policyRule, policyCondition, policyAction, and policyValidityPeriodCondition. The classes comprising the PFCIM are intended to serve as an extensible class hierarchy (through specialization) for defining policy objects that enable application developers, network administrators, and policy administrators to represent policies of different types. Please refer to [[1](#)] for details on the classes and their relationships to one another. Policy conditions are meant to represent criteria that administrators use in enforcing control over behavior of devices or users in a network. This document is NOT concerned with all possible conditions that may arise with respect to computing and communication devices. It is particularly targeted at the needs of controlling resource usage and securing communication between users in an IP network. As mandated by the policy working group, the ability to represent policy requirements of integrated services with RSVP, differentiated services and IPsec are the first targets of this effort.

In keeping with the focus of this effort, we identify 5 conditional categories that are commonly used by administrators in controlling access to network resources and services. These are host, user, application and routing and layer 2 or data link layer information. We extend the class policyCondition to the subclass networkingPolicyCondition, and define 5 auxiliary classes: hostConditionAuxClass, userConditionAuxClass, applicationConditionAuxClass, routeConditionAuxClass and layer2ConditionAuxclass. The auxiliary classes may be attached to networkingPolicyCondition in order to create fully formed conditional statements that are appropriately structured for the purpose at hand.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#), reference [[5](#)].

## **2. Extending policyCondition**

### **2.1. The Class Hierarchy**

As defined in [[1](#)] the class policyCondition inherits from the class top. We extend the class policyCondition to the subclass networkingPolicyCondition. The class networkingPolicyCondition has 5 auxiliary classes: hostConditionAuxClass, userConditionAuxClass,



applicationConditionAuxClass, routeConditionAuxClass and layer2ConditionAuxClass.

```

top
|
|
|----policyCondition
|      |
|      networkingPolicyCondition ~~~~~
|                                     |(auxiliary classes)
|-----hostConditionAuxClass
|-----userConditionAuxClass
|-----applicationConditionAuxClass
|-----routeConditionAuxClass
|-----layer2ConditionAuxClass

```

## 2.2. Class Definitions

The class definition of policyCondition, repeated from [1] is as follows:

NAME	policyCondition
DESCRIPTION	A class representing a condition to be evaluated in conjunction with a policy rule.
DERIVED FROM	top
TYPE	structural
AUXILIARY CLASSES	none
POSSIBLE SUPERIORS	policyRule
OID	<to be assigned>
MUST	cn PolicyConditionName
MAY	

The class policyCondition is specialized to networkingPolicyCondition for extensibility. The class definition is as follows:

NAME	networkingPolicyCondition
DESCRIPTION	A class representing a networking condition to be evaluated in conjunction with a policy rule.
DERIVED FROM	policyCondition
TYPE	structural
AUXILIARY CLASSES	hostConditionAuxClass userConditionAuxClass applicationConditionAuxClass routeConditionAuxClass layer2ConditionAuxClass
POSSIBLE SUPERIORS	policyRule



OID <to be assigned>  
MUST  
MAY

The following auxiliary classes are used to append attributes to the class networkingPolicyCondition.

NAME hostConditionAuxClass  
DESCRIPTION An auxiliary class representing a condition to be evaluated in conjunction with a policy rule. The condition is based on the communicating end hosts.  
DERIVED FROM top  
TYPE auxiliary  
AUXILIARY CLASSES none  
POSSIBLE SUPERIORS networkingPolicyCondition  
OID <to be assigned>  
MUST  
MAY sourceIPAddressRange  
destinationIPAddressRange  
sourceHostID  
destinationHostID

NAME userConditionAuxClass  
DESCRIPTION An auxiliary class representing a condition to be evaluated in conjunction with a policy rule. The condition is based on the communicating users.  
DERIVED FROM top  
TYPE auxiliary  
AUXILIARY CLASSES none  
POSSIBLE SUPERIORS networkingPolicyCondition  
OID <to be assigned>  
MUST  
MAY senderID  
receiverID

NAME applicationConditionAuxClass  
DESCRIPTION An auxiliary class representing a condition to be evaluated in conjunction with a policy rule. The condition is based on the nature of traffic, the transport layer in use and the application.  
DERIVED FROM top  
TYPE auxiliary  
AUXILIARY CLASSES none  
POSSIBLE SUPERIORS networkingPolicyCondition  
OID <to be assigned>  
MUST  
MAY applicationName





sourcePortRange,  
destinationPortRange,  
protocolNumberRange,  
receivedTOSByteCheck

NAME routeConditionAuxClass  
DESCRIPTION An auxiliary class representing a condition to be  
evaluated in conjunction with a policy rule. The  
condition is based on the routing of the packet  
through a device e.g. incoming and outgoing  
interfaces.  
DERIVED FROM top  
TYPE auxiliary  
AUXILIARY CLASSES none  
POSSIBLE SUPERIORS networkingPolicyCondition  
OID <to be assigned>  
MUST  
MAY interface

NAME layer2ConditionAuxClass  
DESCRIPTION An auxiliary class representing a condition to be  
evaluated in conjunction with a policy rule. The  
condition is based on the nature of traffic, the  
transport layer in use and the application  
generating data.  
DERIVED FROM top  
TYPE auxiliary  
AUXILIARY CLASSES none  
POSSIBLE SUPERIORS networkingPolicyCondition  
OID <to be assigned>  
MUST  
MAY sourceMACAddress  
destinationMACAddress  
802.1QVLANId  
SNAPHeaderValue  
etherTypeValue  
DSAP  
SSAP  
encapsulationType  
encapsualtionValue



### **2.3. Rationale behind the class structure**

There are two design choices that we need to justify in the manner of extending `policyCondition`. First, the decision to choose particular condition categories and the second the choice of class structures, especially the use of auxiliary classes. The three categories - users, hosts and applications - are very natural to administrative decision making. The need to define policies in terms of a dynamic category such as routing requires some explanation, however. Consider, for instance, a corporation that has its campuses connected by a leased line infrastructure with a backup connection over the internet. When the primary network is down, it is prudent policy to require that inter-campus traffic be encrypted. There are many ways to enforce this, for instance instruct access routers to encrypt traffic based on the destination as well as the outgoing interface. Similar examples may be considered for QoS as well, where a high grade reservation is made over a primary ISP backbone, with a lower grade backup reservation triggered by routing changes. A number of different class hierarchies are feasible even when we have determined the categories we wish to represent, and their attributes. For instance, one choice would have been to associate all the attributes of users, applications, hosts, etc, to the class `policyCondition`. Why subclass at all? The answer is extensibility. Suppose the same information model is used to represent policy conditions for DHCP. While we would like to have host attributes to express this condition, layer 2 attributes may be totally irrelevant. The subclass `networkingPolicyCondition` allows us to group all the conditions required for the purpose of expressing networking policy without requiring that all extensions have the same condition attributes. Now the design choice that comes directly from the above is to associate all attributes we want - those of users, hosts, applications, etc - all the class `networkingPolicyCondition` (as optional attributes, say). Will this not have the same result as the structure presented above? The issue again is extensibility. If one vendor desires to extend the category application, a second only wants to represent users in greater depth, and a third wants to do both, then they don't have to extend `networkingPolicyCondition` in slightly different ways. Further, the auxiliary classes `hostPolicyAuxClass`, etc, may be associated with other subclasses of `policyCondition`, `DHCPpolicyCondition` for instance, in a selective manner. Finally, the advantage of auxiliary classes is that they allow us to mix and match attributes creating fewer objects, when compared to subclasses.

### **3. Attributes of HostConditionAuxClass**

NAME	sourceIPAddressRange
------	----------------------



DESC                   Source IP addresses to which the policy applies

SYNTAX                IA5String

EQUALITY             caseExactIA5Match

MULTI-VALUED

FORMAT                sourceIPAddressRange may be described in any of the  
                      following formats.

1     The string ``1''  
      Indicates policy applies to locally generated packets.

2-<IPv4Address>-<CIDRPrefixLength>  
      Three dash (-) seperated strings. The IP-v4  
      address is in dotted decimal format. The  
      CIDRPrefixLength is the number of unmasked leading  
      bits. A packet matches the condition if the  
      unmasked bits on the packet are identical to the  
      unmasked bits on the condition.

3-<IPv4Address>-<IPv4Address>  
      IP-v4 addresses in dotted decimal format. The  
      second address must be no smaller than the first.  
      The first denotes the start of the range, and the  
      second denotes the end of the range. A packet  
      matches the condition if its source address is no  
      smaller than the first IP address in the  
      condition, and no larger than the second.

4-<IPv6Address>-<IPv6Address>  
      IP-v6 addresses in any of the formats supported in  
      [RFC 2373](#). The second address must be no smaller  
      than the first. The first denotes the start of the  
      range, and the second denotes the end of the  
      range. A packet matches the condition if its  
      source address is no smaller than the first  
      address in the condition, and no larger than the  
      second.

DEFAULT               Defaults to the entire address range, i.e., every  
                      packet matches the source address range condition.

EXAMPLES             2-83.23.23.1-24  
                      A packet with source address 83.23.23.5 matches.  
                      A packet with source address 83.23.24.1 does not.

                      3-83.23.23.0-83.28.28.0  
                      A packet with source address 83.23.23.5 matches.  
                      A packet with source address 83.29.24.1 does not.

NAME                  destinationIPAddressRange



DESC	destination IP addresses to which policy applies
SYNTAX	IA5String
EQUALITY	caseExactIA5Match
MULTI-VALUED	
FORMAT	Identical to that of sourceIPAddressRange above. The value of ``1'' indicates a locally destined packet.
DEFAULT	Defaults to the entire address range, i.e., every packet matches the destination address range condition.
NAME	sourceHostID
DESC	Source Host Identifier
SYNTAX	IA5String
EQUALITY	caseExact1A5Match
MULTI-VALUED	
FORMAT	Two strings, colon (':') seperated, the first describing the ID type and the second the ID value. The following IdTypes and their corresponding values are as defined in [2]. Host-FQDN:<ID> X500-DN:<ID> X500-GN:<ID> Key-Id:<ID>
DEFAULT	Any ID is considered valid.
NAME	destinationHostID
DESC	Destination Host Identifier
SYNTAX	IA5String
EQUALITY	caseExact1A5Match
MULTI-VALUED	
DEFAULT	Any ID is considered valid.
FORMAT	Same as SourceHostID.

#### **[4. Attributes of UserConditionAuxClass](#)**

NAME	senderID
DESC	Source User Identifier
SYNTAX	IA5String
EQUALITY	caseExact1A5Match
MULTI-VALUED	
FORMAT	Two strings colon (':') seperated, the first describing the ID type and the second the ID value. The following ID Types and their corresponding values are as defined in [2]. User-FQDN:<ID> X500-DN:<ID>





	X500-GN:<ID>
	Key-Id:<ID>
DEFAULT	Any ID is considered valid.
NAME	receiverID
DESC	Destination User Identifier
SYNTAX	IA5String
EQUALITY	caseExactIA5Match
MULTI-VALUED	
DEFAULT	Any ID is considered valid.
FORMAT	Same as SourceHostID.

## 5. Attributes of ApplicationConditionAuxClass

NAME	sourcePortRange
DESC	Source Ports to which policy applies
SYNTAX	IA5String
EQUALITY	caseExactIA5Match
MULTI-VALUED	
FORMAT	String consisting of two colon separated positive integers, the second no smaller than the first, or one positive integer.
DEFAULT	Defaults to the entire port range 0 to 65535, i.e. every packet matches the destination address range condition.
EXAMPLE	8000:8080 (ports 8000 to 8080), 8000 (only port 8000)

NAME	destinationPortRange
DESC	Destination Ports to which policy applies
SYNTAX	IA5String
EQUALITY	caseExactIA5Match
MULTI-VALUED	
FORMAT	String consisting of two colon separated positive integers, the second no smaller than the first, or one positive integer.
DEFAULT	Defaults to the entire port range 0 to 65535, i.e. every packet matches the source address range condition.

NAME	protocolNumberRange
DESC	Protocol numbers to which policy applies
SYNTAX	INTEGER
EQUALITY	integerMatch
MULTI-VALUED	
FORMAT	String consisting of two colon separated positive integers, the second no smaller than the first, or



one positive integer.

DEFAULT Defaults to the entire protocol range 0 to 255, i.e., every packet matches the ip protocol range condition.

EXAMPLE 50:51 (protocol 50 to 51),  
50 (only protocol 50)

NAME receivedTOSByteCheck

DESC A condition attribute used to select traffic based on the contents of the TOS byte of the received packet's IP header

SYNTAX IA5String

EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match

MULTI-VALUED

FORMAT String of the form xxxxxxxx:xxxxxxx, where each of the x's is either 0 or 1.

SEMANTICS Each of the substrings is treated as specifying an 8-bit field. The left substring is termed Mask and the right substring Match. The TOS byte of the received packet's IP header is ANDed with Mask and the result is compared against Match. The combination of Mask and Match allows definition of TOS byte based conditions where certain bits in the TOS byte may be ignored for the purpose of comparison. Note that <Mask> is superior to <Match> in that TOS bit positions corresponding to a Mask bit of 0 are ignored irrespective of the corresponding <Match> bit.

EXAMPLE An incoming packet with TOS byte 11001010 matches the condition specified by a value of 00111100:00001000 for receivedTOSByte.

## **6. Attributes of RouteConditionAuxClass**

NAME interface

DESC An attribute that limits the scope of the policy to packets on specified interface(s) and the direction(s) of traffic on these.

SYNTAX IA5String

EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match

MULTI-VALUED

FORMAT Three colon separated strings. The left-most string is a numeral denoting the type of the specification, followed by the incoming and outgoing interface identifiers. Currently defined type/value formats are



```

1-<IPv4Address>-<IPv4Address>
2-<IPv6Address>-<IPv6Address>
3-<InterfaceID>-<InterfaceID>

```

The IP addresses are in dotted decimal notation. The interface IDs are integers unique to the host device. The first address string specifies a restriction of the rule to traffic inbound on the interface, and the rightmost string specifies a corresponding restriction of the rule to traffic outbound from that interface. An unspecified interface(s) defaults to all interfaces on the device that this rule applies to.

DEFAULTS Defaults to traffic inbound on all interfaces, outbound on all interfaces.

EXAMPLE 1-9.3.1.52-9.2.1.54  
(Applies to traffic inbound on 9.3.1.52 and outbound on 9.3.1.54)

1-9.3.1.32-  
(Applies to traffic inbound on 9.3.1.52 outbound on any interface)

1- -3  
(Applies to traffic outbound on interface 3 and inbound on any interface)

## **7. Attributes of Layer2ConditionAuxClass**

NAME	sourceMACAddress
DESC	The sourceMACAddress(es) to which the policy applies.
EQUALITY	CaseIgnoreIA5String
SYNTAX	IA5String
MULTI-VALUED	
FORMAT	The IEEE Canonical representation of the MAC address.
Default	Entire range of values

NAME	destinationMACAddress
DESC	The destination MAC Address(es) to which the policy applies.
EQUALITY	CaseIgnoreIA5String
SYNTAX	IA5String
MULTI-VALUED	
FORMAT	Same as sourceMACAddress



Default	Entire range of values
NAME	802.1QVLANID
DESC	The VLAN identified by the value in the 802.1Q VLAN tag.
EQUALITY	IntegerMatch
SYNTAX	Integer
MULTI-VALUED	
FORMAT	The VLAN id in the 802.1Q defined header.
Default	Entire range of values
NAME	SNAPHeaderValue
DESC	The value contained in the SNAP header that identifies the protocol contained in the frame.
EQUALITY	caseIgnoreIA5Match
SYNTAX	IA5String
MULTI-VALUED	
FORMAT	A string representing the hexadecimal value that would appear in the SNAP header to identify the protocol.
Default	Entire range of values
NAME	ethertypeValue
DESC	The value contained in the ethertype portion of the frame header identifying the protocol contained in the frame.
EQUALITY	caseIgnoreIA5Match
SYNTAX	IA5String
MULTI-VALUED	
FORMAT	A string representing the hexadecimal value that would appear in the ethertype header to identify the protocol.
NAME	DSAP
DESC	The value contained in the destination SAP of the frame that can be used to identify the frame e.g. a DSAP value of 0x04 identifies SNA frames.
EQUALITY	caseIgnoreIA5Match
SYNTAX	IA5String
MULTI-VALUED	
FORMAT	A string representing the hexadecimal value that would appear in the DSAP header to identify the protocol.
NAME	SSAP
DESC	The value contained in the source SAP of the frame that can be used to identify the frame





e.g a SSAP value of 0x04 identifies SNA frames.  
EQUALITY caseIgnoreIA5Match  
SYNTAX IA5String  
MULTI-VALUED  
FORMAT A string representing the hexadecimal value that  
would appear in the SSAP header to identify the  
protocol.

## 8. Security Considerations

There are two potential security considerations, both of which may be addressed through standards compliant mechanisms. The first is the unauthorized access to read or change policy rules and related objects in the directory repository. The schema in this document SHOULD be used in conjunction with an LDAP access control mechanisms. The second exposure for violation of security lies in the communication between policy decision point and the directory repository. Such communication SHOULD be secured, with both ends mutually authenticated using SSL/TLS or IPsec.

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