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Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

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Abstract

This document defines the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), an authentication framework which supports multiple authentication mechanisms. EAP typically runs directly over the link layer without requiring IP, but is reliant on lower layer ordering guarantees as in PPP and IEEE 802. EAP does provide its own support for duplicate elimination and retransmission. Fragmentation is not supported within EAP itself; however, individual EAP methods may support this. While EAP was originally developed for use with PPP, it is also now in use with IEEE 802.

This document obsoletes [RFC 2284](#).

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[1.](#) Introduction

This document defines the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), an authentication framework which supports multiple authentication mechanisms. EAP typically runs directly over the link layer without requiring IP, but is reliant on lower layer ordering guarantees as in PPP and IEEE 802. EAP does provide its own support for duplicate elimination and retransmission. Fragmentation is not supported within EAP itself; however, individual EAP methods may support this.

EAP may be used on dedicated links as well as switched circuits, and wired as well as wireless links. To date, EAP has been implemented with hosts and routers that connect via switched circuits or dial-up lines using PPP [[RFC1661](#)]. It has also been implemented with switches and access points using IEEE 802 [[IEEE802](#)]. EAP encapsulation on IEEE 802 wired media is described in [[IEEE8021X](#)].

One of the advantages of the EAP architecture is its flexibility. EAP is used to select a specific authentication mechanism, typically after the authenticator requests more information in order to determine the specific authentication mechanism(s) to be used. Rather than requiring the authenticator to be updated to support each new authentication method, EAP permits the use of a backend authentication server which may implement some or all authentication methods, with the authenticator acting as a pass-through for some or all methods and users.

Within this document, authenticator requirements apply regardless of whether the authenticator is operating as a pass-through. Where the requirement is meant to apply to either the authenticator or backend authentication server, depending on where the EAP authentication is terminated, the term "EAP server" will be used.

[1.1.](#) Specification of Requirements

In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key words

"MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

[1.2](#). Terminology

This document frequently uses the following terms:

authenticator

The end of the link requiring the authentication. This terminology is also used in [[IEEE8021X](#)], and has the same meaning in this document.

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peer The other end of the point-to-point link (PPP), point-to-point LAN segment (IEEE 802 wired media) or 802.11 wireless link, which being authenticated by the authenticator. In [[IEEE8021X](#)], this end is known as the Supplicant.

backend authentication server

A backend authentication server is an entity that provides an authentication service to an authenticator. This service verifies from the credentials provided by the peer, the claim of identity made by the peer. This terminology is also used in [[IEEE8021X](#)].

Displayable Message

This is interpreted to be a human readable string of characters, and MUST NOT affect operation of the protocol. The message encoding MUST follow the UTF-8 transformation format [[RFC2279](#)].

EAP server

The entity that terminates the EAP authentication with the peer. In the case where there is no backend authentication server, this term refers to the authenticator. Where the authenticator operates in pass-through, it refers to the backend authentication server.

Silently Discard

This means the implementation discards the packet without further processing. The implementation SHOULD provide the capability of logging the event, including the contents of the

silently discarded packet, and SHOULD record the event in a statistics counter.

Security claims (see [Section 7.2](#)):

Mutual authentication

This refers to an EAP method in which, within an interlocked exchange, the authenticator authenticates the peer and the peer authenticates the authenticator. Two one-way conversations, running in opposite directions do not provide mutual authentication as defined here.

Integrity protection

This refers to per-packet authentication and integrity protection of EAP packets, including EAP Requests and Responses, and method-specific success and failure indications. When making this claim, a method specification MUST describe the fields within the EAP packet that are protected.

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Replay protection

This refers to protection against replay of EAP messages, including EAP Requests and Responses, and method-specific success and failure indications.

Confidentiality

This refers to encryption of EAP messages, including EAP Requests and Responses, and method-specific success and failure indications. A method making this claim MUST support identity protection.

Key derivation

This refers to the ability of the EAP method to derive a Master Key which is not exported, as well as a ciphersuite-independent Master Session Keys. Both the Master Key and Master Session Keys are used only for further key derivation, not directly for protection of the EAP conversation or subsequent data.

Key strength

This refers to the effective entropy of the derived Master Session Keys, independent of their physical length. For

example, a 128-bit key derived from a password might have an effective entropy much less than 128 bits.

Dictionary attack resistance

Where password authentication is used, users are notoriously prone to selection of poor passwords. A method may be said to be dictionary attack resistant if, when there is a weak password in the secret, the method does not allow an attack more efficient than brute force.

Fast reconnect

The ability, in the case where a security association has been previously established, to create a new or refreshed security association in a smaller number of round-trips.

Man-in-the-Middle resistance

The ability for the peer to demonstrate to the authenticator that it has acted as the peer for each method within a sequence of methods or tunnel. Similarly, the authenticator demonstrates to the peer that it has acted as the authenticator for each method within the sequence or tunnel. If this is not possible, then the authentication sequence or tunnel may be vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.

Acknowledged result indications

The ability of the authenticator to provide the peer with an

indication of whether the peer has successfully authenticated to it, and for the peer to acknowledge receipt, as well as providing an indication of whether the authenticator has successfully authenticated to the peer. Since EAP Success and Failure packets are neither acknowledged nor integrity protected, this claim requires implementation of a method-specific result exchange that is integrity protected.

[2.](#) Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

The EAP authentication exchange proceeds as follows:

- [1] The authenticator sends a Request to authenticate the peer. The Request has a type field to indicate what is being requested. Examples of Request types include Identity, MD5-challenge, etc.

The MD5-challenge type corresponds closely to the CHAP authentication protocol [[RFC1994](#)]. Typically, the authenticator will send an initial Identity Request; however, an initial Identity Request is not required, and MAY be bypassed. For example, the identity may not be required where it is determined by the port to which the peer has connected (leased lines, dedicated switch or dial-up ports); or where the identity is obtained in another fashion (via calling station identity or MAC address, in the Name field of the MD5-Challenge Response, etc.).

- [2] The peer sends a Response packet in reply to a valid Request. As with the Request packet, the Response packet contains a Type field which corresponds to the Type field of the Request.
- [3] The authenticator sends an additional Request packet, and the peer replies with a Response. The sequence of Requests and Responses continues as long as needed.
- [4] The conversation continues until the authenticator cannot authenticate the peer (unacceptable Responses to one or more Requests), in which case the authenticator implementation MUST transmit an EAP Failure. Alternatively, the authentication conversation can continue until the authenticator determines that successful authentication has occurred, in which case the authenticator MUST transmit an EAP Success.

Since EAP is a peer-to-peer protocol, an independent and simultaneous authentication may take place in the reverse direction. Both peers may act as authenticators and authenticates at the same time.

Advantages

The EAP protocol can support multiple authentication mechanisms

without having to pre-negotiate a particular one.

Devices (e.g. a NAS, switch or access point) do not have to understand each authentication method and MAY act as a pass-through agent for a backend authentication server. Support for pass-through is optional. An authenticator MAY authenticate local users while at the same time acting as a pass-through for non-local users and authentication methods it does not implement locally.

For sessions in which the authenticator acts as a pass-through, it MUST determine the outcome of the authentication solely based on the Accept/Reject indication sent by the backend authentication server; the outcome MUST NOT be determined by the contents of an EAP packet sent along with the Accept/Reject indication, or the absence of such an encapsulated EAP packet.

Separation of the authenticator from the backend authentication server simplifies credentials management and policy decision making.

Disadvantages

For use in PPP, EAP does require the addition of a new authentication type to PPP LCP and thus PPP implementations will need to be modified to use it. It also strays from the previous PPP authentication model of negotiating a specific authentication mechanism during LCP. Similarly, switch or access point implementations need to support [\[IEEE8021X\]](#) in order to use EAP.

Where the authenticator is separate from the backend authentication server, this complicates the security analysis and, if needed, key distribution.

[2.1.](#) Support for sequences

An EAP conversation MAY utilize a sequence of methods. A common example of this is an Identity request followed by a single EAP authentication method such as an MD5-Challenge. However, within or associated with each EAP server, it is not anticipated that a particular named peer will utilize multiple authentication methods (Type 4 or greater), either by supporting a choice of methods or by using multiple methods in sequence. This would make the peer vulnerable to attacks that negotiate the least secure method from among a set (negotiation attacks, described in [Section 7.8](#)) or man-in-the-middle attacks (described in [Section 7.4](#)). Instead, for each named peer there SHOULD be an indication of exactly one method used to authenticate that peer name. If a peer needs to make use of different authentication methods under different circumstances, then distinct identities SHOULD be employed, each of which identifies exactly one authentication method.

one, the authenticator MAY send a Request packet for a subsequent authentication method, or it MAY send another Identity request. If the peer does not support additional methods, it SHOULD respond with a Nak, indicating no acceptable alternative, as described in [Section 5.3](#). However, peer implementations MAY not respond at all, in which case a timeout will result and authentication will fail. Since the authenticator presumably requires successful completion of the sequence in order to grant access, authentication failure is the correct result. Therefore, it is not necessary for the authenticator to determine that the peer supports sequences prior to sending a Request for a subsequent authentication method.

The above prescription also applies in the situation where an authenticator sends a message of a different Type prior to completion of the final round of a given method. If the peer wishes to continue authenticating with the method in progress, it SHOULD send a Nak in response to such a Request, indicating the Type in progress as the alternative. Otherwise it MAY send a Response with the same Type as the Request. Since an EAP packet with a different Type may be sent by an attacker, an authenticator receiving a Nak including a preference for the Type in progress SHOULD log the event, but otherwise not take any action.

Once a peer has sent a Response of the same Type as a Request, some existing peer implementations might expect the method to run to completion. As a result, these implementations silently discard EAP Requests of a Type different from the method in progress, despite the requirement for a Response in [section 4.1](#). For this reason, EAP authenticators that must interoperate with these peers are discouraged from switching methods before the final round of a given method has completed.

[2.2](#). EAP multiplexing model

Conceptually, EAP implementations consist of the following components:

- [a] Lower layer. The lower layer is responsible for transmitting and receiving EAP frames between the peer and authenticator. EAP has been run over a variety of lower layers including PPP; wired IEEE 802 LANs [[IEEE8021X](#)]; IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs [[IEEE80211](#)]; UDP (L2TP [[RFC2661](#)] and ISAKMP [[PIC](#)]); and TCP [[PIC](#)]. Lower layer behavior is discussed in [Section 3](#).
- [b] EAP layer. The EAP layer receives and transmits EAP packets via the lower layer, implements the EAP state machine, and delivers and receives EAP messages to and from EAP methods.

- [c] EAP method. EAP methods implement the authentication algorithms and receive and transmit EAP messages via the EAP layer. Since fragmentation support is not provided by EAP itself, this is the responsibility of EAP methods, which are discussed in [Section 5](#).

The EAP multiplexing model is illustrated in figure 1 on the next page. Note that there is no requirement that an implementation conform to this model, as long as the on-the-wire behavior is consistent with it.

Within EAP, the Type field functions much like a port number in UDP or TCP. With the exception of Types handled by the EAP layer, it is assumed that the EAP layer multiplexes incoming EAP packets according to their Type, and delivers them only to the EAP method corresponding to that Type code, with one exception.

Since EAP methods may wish to access the Identity, the Identity Response can be assumed to be stored within the EAP layer so as to be available to methods of Types other than 1 (Identity). The Identity Type is discussed in [Section 5.1](#).




Figure 1. EAP Multiplexing Model

A Notification Response is only used as confirmation that the peer received the Notification Request, not that it has processed it, or

displayed the message to the user. It cannot be assumed that the contents of the Notification Request or Response is available to another

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method. The Notification Type is discussed in [Section 5.2](#).

The Nak method is utilized for the purposes of method negotiation. Peers MUST respond to an EAP Request for an unacceptable Type with a Nak Response. It cannot be assumed that the contents of the Nak Response is available to another method. The Nak Type is discussed in [Section 5.3](#).

EAP packets with codes of Success or Failure do not include a Type, and therefore are not delivered to an EAP method. Success and Failure are discussed in [Section 4.2](#).

Given these considerations, the Success, Failure, Nak Response and Notification Request/Response messages MUST NOT used to carry data destined for delivery to other EAP methods.

[3](#). Lower layer behavior

[3.1](#). Lower layer requirements

EAP makes the following assumptions about lower layers:

- [1] Lower layer CRC or checksum. In EAP, the authenticator retransmits Requests that have not yet received Responses, so that EAP does not assume that lower layers are reliable. Since EAP defines its own retransmission behavior, when run over a reliable lower layer, it is possible (though undesirable) for retransmission to occur both in the lower layer and the EAP layer.

If lower layers exhibit a high loss rate, then retransmissions are likely, and since EAP Success and Failure are not retransmitted, timeouts are also likely to result. EAP methods such as EAP TLS [[RFC2716](#)] include a message integrity check (MIC) and regard MIC errors as fatal. Therefore if a checksum or CRC is not provided by the lower layer, then some methods may not behave well.

- [2] Lower layer data security. After EAP authentication is complete, the peer will typically transmit data to the network, through the authenticator. In order to provide assurance that the peer transmitting data is the one that successfully completed EAP

authentication, it is necessary for the lower layer to provide per-packet integrity, authentication and replay protection that is bound to the original EAP authentication, or for the lower layer to be physically secure. Otherwise it is possible for subsequent data traffic to be hijacked, or replayed.

As a result of these considerations, EAP SHOULD be used only when lower layers provide physical security for data (e.g. wired PPP or IEEE 802 links), or for insecure links, where per-packet

authentication, integrity and replay protection is provided. Where keying material for the lower layer ciphersuite is itself provided by EAP, typically the lower layer ciphersuite cannot be enabled until late in the EAP conversation, after key derivation has completed. Thus it may only be possible to use the lower layer ciphersuite to protect a portion of the EAP conversation, such as the EAP Success or Failure packet.

- [3] Known MTU. The EAP layer does not support fragmentation and reassembly. However, EAP methods SHOULD be capable of handling fragmentation and reassembly. As a result, EAP is capable of functioning across a range of MTU sizes, as long as the MTU is known.
- [4] Possible duplication. Where the lower layer is reliable, it will provide the EAP layer with a non-duplicated stream of packets. However, while it is desirable that lower layers provide for non-duplication, this is not a requirement. The Identifier field provides both the peer and authenticator with the ability to detect duplicates.
- [5] Ordering guarantees. EAP does not require the Identifier to be monotonically increasing, and so is reliant on lower layer ordering guarantees for correct operation. Also, EAP was originally defined to run on PPP and [\[RFC1661\] Section 1](#) has an ordering requirement:

"The Point-to-Point Protocol is designed for simple links which transport packets between two peers. These links provide full-duplex simultaneous bi-directional operation, and are assumed to deliver packets in order."

Lower layer transports for EAP MUST preserve ordering between a

source and destination, at a given priority level (the level of ordering guarantee provided by [[IEEE802](#)]).

[3.2.](#) EAP usage within PPP

In order to establish communications over a point-to-point link, each end of the PPP link must first send LCP packets to configure the data link during Link Establishment phase. After the link has been established, PPP provides for an optional Authentication phase before proceeding to the Network-Layer Protocol phase.

By default, authentication is not mandatory. If authentication of the link is desired, an implementation **MUST** specify the Authentication-Protocol Configuration Option during Link Establishment phase.

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The server can use the identification of the connecting host or router in the selection of options for network layer negotiations.

When implemented within PPP, EAP does not select a specific authentication mechanism at PPP Link Control Phase, but rather postpones this until the Authentication Phase. This allows the authenticator to request more information before determining the specific authentication mechanism. This also permits the use of a "back-end" server which actually implements the various mechanisms while the PPP authenticator merely passes through the authentication exchange. The PPP Link Establishment and Authentication phases, and the Authentication-Protocol Configuration Option, are defined in The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [[RFC1661](#)].

[3.2.1.](#) PPP Configuration Option Format

A summary of the PPP Authentication-Protocol Configuration Option format to negotiate the EAP Authentication Protocol is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.

Exactly one EAP packet is encapsulated in the Information field of a PPP Data Link Layer frame where the protocol field indicates type hex C227 (PPP EAP).

0

1

2

3

```

 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|      Type      |      Length      |      Authentication-Protocol      |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

Type

3

Length

4

Authentication-Protocol

C227 (Hex) for PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

[3.3.](#) EAP usage within IEEE 802

The encapsulation of EAP over IEEE 802 is defined in [[IEEE8021X](#)]. The IEEE 802 encapsulation of EAP does not involve PPP, and IEEE 802.1X does not include support for link or network layer negotiations. As a result, within IEEE 802.1X it is not possible to negotiate non-EAP

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authentication mechanisms, such as PAP or CHAP [[RFC1994](#)].

[3.4.](#) Link layer indications

The reliability and security of link layer indications is dependent on the medium. Link layer failure indications accepted by the link layer and provided to EAP MUST be processed. However, link layer success indications MUST NOT result in an EAP implementation concluding that authentication has succeeded, since these indications are typically unauthenticated.

In PPP, link layer indications are not authenticated and are therefore subject to spoofing, provided that the attacker can gain access to the physical medium. This includes LCP-Terminate (a link failure indication), NCP (a link success indication), and "link down" (a link failure indication).


In IEEE 802 wired networks, the IEEE 802.1X EAPOL-Start and EAPOL-Logoff

frames are not authenticated or integrity protected, whereas within 802.11, authentication and integrity protection is possible depending on when they are sent and the ciphersuite that has been negotiated. Therefore, depending on the circumstances, EAPOL-Start and EAPOL-Logoff frames may or may not be subject to authenticated and integrity protected.

In 802.11 a "link down" indication is an unreliable indication of link failure, since wireless signal strength can come and go and may be influenced by radio frequency interference generated by an attacker. In 802.11, control and management frames are not authenticated and an attacker within range can gain access to the physical medium. Link layer indications include Disassociate and Deauthenticate frames (link failure indications), and Association and Reassociation Response frames (link success indications).

4. EAP Packet format

A summary of the EAP packet format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.



Code

The Code field is one octet and identifies the type of EAP packet. EAP Codes are assigned as follows:

- 1 Request
- 2 Response
- 3 Success
- 4 Failure

Since EAP only defines Codes 1-4, EAP packets with other codes MUST be silently discarded by both authenticators and peers.

Identifier

The Identifier field is one octet and aids in matching Responses with Requests.

Length

The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP packet including the Code, Identifier, Length and Data fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should be treated as Data Link Layer padding and should be ignored on reception.

Data

The Data field is zero or more octets. The format of the Data field is determined by the Code field.

[4.1.](#) Request and Response

Description

The Request packet (Code field set to 1) MUST be sent by the authenticator to the peer; the peer MUST NOT send Request packets to the authenticator. Each Request has a Type field which serves to indicate what is being requested. Additional Request packets MUST be sent until a valid Response packet is received, or an optional retry counter expires. In [[IEEE8021X](#)], the retry counter is effectively set to zero, so that retransmission never occurs, and instead the peer times out and authentication is restarted.

Retransmitted Requests MUST be sent with the same Identifier value in order to distinguish them from new Requests. The contents of the data field is dependent on the Request type. The peer MUST send a Response packet in reply to a valid Request packet. Responses MUST only be sent in reply to a valid Request and never retransmitted on a timer.

The Identifier field of the Response MUST match that of the Request; if it does not match, then the Response MUST be silently discarded. Authenticators receiving a Response with a Type other than Nak, for which the authenticator has no outstanding Request MUST silently

discard the Response.

The authenticator MUST NOT send a new Request until a valid Response is received to an outstanding Request. Since the authenticator can retransmit before receiving a valid Response from the peer, the authenticator can receive duplicate Responses. The authenticator MUST silently discard these duplicate Responses.

If a Message Integrity Check (MIC) is employed within an EAP method, then implementations MUST silently discard any message that fails this check. In this document, the descriptions of EAP message handling assume that MIC validation is effectively performed as though it occurs before examining any of the EAP message fields (such as 'Code').

Implementation Note: These obligations apply regardless of whether pass-through is implemented. The authenticator is responsible for retransmitting Request messages. If the Request message is obtained from elsewhere (such as from a backend authentication server), then the authenticator will need to save a copy of the Request in order to accomplish this. The authenticator is also responsible for discarding Response messages with the wrong Identifier value before acting on them in any way, including passing them on to the backend authentication server for verification. Similarly, the peer is responsible for detecting and handling duplicate Request messages before processing them in any way, including passing them on to an outside party.

Because the authentication process will often involve user input, some care must be taken when deciding upon retransmission strategies and authentication timeouts. By default, where EAP is run over an unreliable lower layer, the EAP retransmission timer (EAP_RTO) SHOULD be computed as described in [\[RFC2988\]](#). This includes use of Karn's algorithm to filter RTT estimates resulting from retransmissions. A maximum of 3-5 retransmissions is suggested.


When run over a reliable lower layer (e.g. EAP over ISAKMP/TCP, as within [\[PIC\]](#)), the EAP retransmission timer SHOULD be set to an infinite value, so that retransmissions do not occur at the EAP layer.

Where the authentication process requires user input, the measured round trip times are largely determined by user responsiveness

rather than network characteristics, so that RTO estimation is not helpful. Instead, the retransmission timers SHOULD be set so as to provide sufficient time for the user to respond, with longer timeouts required in certain cases, such as where Token Cards are involved.

In order to provide the EAP authenticator with guidance as to the appropriate timeout value, a hint can be communicated to the authenticator by the backend authentication server (such as via the RADIUS Session-Timeout attribute).

A summary of the Request and Response packet format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.



Code

- 1 for Request
- 2 for Response

Identifier

The Identifier field is one octet. The Identifier field MUST be the same if a Request packet is retransmitted due to a timeout while waiting for a Response. Any new (non-retransmission) Requests MUST modify the Identifier field. In order to avoid confusion between new Requests and retransmissions, the Identifier value chosen for each new Request need only be different from the previous Request, but need not be unique within the conversation. One way to achieve this is to start the Identifier at an initial value and increment it for each new Request. Initializing the first Identifier with a random number rather than starting from zero is recommended, since it makes sequence attacks somewhat harder.

Since the Identifier space is unique to each session, authenticators are not restricted to only 256 simultaneous authentication conversations. Similarly, with re-authentication, an EAP conversation might continue over a long period of time, and is not limited to only 256 roundtrips.

If a peer receives a valid duplicate Request for which it has already

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sent a Response, it MUST resend its original Response. If a peer receives a duplicate Request before it has sent a Response, but after it has determined the initial Request to be valid (i.e. it is waiting for user input), it MUST silently discard the duplicate Request. An EAP message may be found invalid for a variety of reasons: failed lower layer CRC or checksum, malformed EAP packet, EAP method MIC failure, etc.

Length

The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and Type-Data fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should be treated as Data Link Layer padding and should be ignored on reception.

Type

The Type field is one octet. This field indicates the Type of Request or Response. A single Type MUST be specified for each EAP Request or Response. Normally, the Type field of the Response will be the same as the Type of the Request. However, there is also a Nak Response Type for indicating that a Request type is unacceptable to the peer. An initial specification of Types follows in a later section of this document.

Type-Data

The Type-Data field varies with the Type of Request and the associated Response.

[4.2.](#) Success and Failure

The Success packet is sent by the authenticator to the peer to acknowledge successful authentication. The authenticator MUST transmit an EAP packet with the Code field set to 3 (Success). If the authenticator cannot authenticate the peer (unacceptable Responses to one or more Requests) then the implementation MUST transmit an EAP packet with the Code field set to 4 (Failure). An authenticator MAY wish to issue multiple Requests before sending a

Failure response in order to allow for human typing mistakes.
 Success and Failure packets MUST NOT contain additional data.

Implementation Note: Because the Success and Failure packets are not acknowledged, the authenticator cannot know whether they have been received. As a result, these packets are not retransmitted by the authenticator, and if they are lost, the peer will timeout. If acknowledged success and failure indications are desired, these

MAY be implemented within individual EAP methods.

A summary of the Success and Failure packet format is shown below.
 The fields are transmitted from left to right.

0	1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Code		Identifier Length	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			

Code

3 for Success
 4 for Failure

Identifier

The Identifier field is one octet and aids in matching replies to Responses. The Identifier field MUST match the Identifier field of the Response packet that it is sent in response to.

Length

4

[4.2.1.](#) Processing of success and failure

Within EAP, success and failure indications consist of the EAP Success and Failure messages, as well as method-specific indications. Within EAP, these indications may be protected or unprotected.

EAP Success and Failure packets are considered unprotected indications

which may be spoofed, since as described in [Section 4.2](#), they contain no message integrity check (MIC).

In order to provide additional protection against tampering, EAP methods MAY support a MIC that covers some or all of the EAP packet, including headers. In addition, such a MIC MAY include coverage of previous Request and Response messages, so as to enable protection of other packets to that do not contain MICs, such as Identity Request/Response, Notification Request/Response and Nak Response.

EAP methods also MAY include support for method-specific acknowledged success and failure indications. This enables the authenticator to indicate whether the peer has successfully authenticated, as well as for the peer to acknowledge receipt of that indication, and respond with an indication of whether the authenticator has successfully authenticated

to the peer. If a key has previously been derived, the result exchange MAY be protected by a Message Integrity Check (MIC), and if so, then this success/failure indication is considered protected.

In order to decrease vulnerability to spoofing of success and failure indications, the following processing rules are recommended:

- [a] Processing of protected success and failure indications. Where a method-specific protected success/failure indication has been received, the implementation MUST validate the EAP method MIC, with a MIC failure handled via silent discard, as specified in [Section 4.1](#).
- [b] Receipt of EAP Success and Failure packets prior to method completion. A peer EAP implementation receiving an EAP Success packet prior to completion of the method in progress MUST silently discard it. This ensures that a rogue authenticator will not be able to bypass mutual authentication by sending an EAP Success prior to conclusion of the EAP method conversation. A peer EAP implementation receiving an EAP Failure packet prior to completion of the method in progress MAY silently discard it. When using EAP methods that provide their own (protected) error indications, premature EAP Failure packets are unexpected, so that this technique may be more readily employed.
- [c] Authentication requirement. An EAP peer implementation that has

been configured to require authentication MUST silently discard a "canned" EAP Success message (an EAP Success message sent immediately upon connection).

- [d] Contradictory indications. Where protected and unprotected result indications are both available, protected indications take precedence. For example, where an EAP method provides a protected indication that authentication failure has occurred in either direction, the implementation MUST silently discard subsequent EAP Success packets. Similarly, where an EAP method provides a protected indication that authentication has succeeded in both directions, the EAP implementation MAY silently discard EAP Failure packets.
- [e] Processing of EAP Success and Failure in the absence of protected indications. Subsequent to the completion of the EAP authentication method (Types 4 and greater), and in the absence of protected result indications, EAP Success and Failure packets MUST be accepted and processed by the EAP implementation.

[5.](#) Initial EAP Request/Response Types

This section defines the initial set of EAP Types used in Request/Response exchanges. More Types may be defined in follow-on documents. The Type field is one octet and identifies the structure of an EAP Request or Response packet. The first 3 Types are considered special case Types.

The remaining Types define authentication exchanges. The Nak Type is valid only for Response packets, it MUST NOT be sent in a Request. The Nak Type MUST only be sent in response to a Request which uses an authentication Type code (i.e., Type of 4 or greater).

All EAP implementations MUST support Types 1-4, which are defined in this document, and SHOULD support Type 254. Follow-on RFCs MAY define additional EAP Types.

- 1 Identity
- 2 Notification

3	Nak (Response only)
4	MD5-Challenge
5	One Time Password (OTP)
6	Generic Token Card (GTC)
254	Vendor-specific
255	Experimental use

[5.1.](#) Identity

Description

The Identity Type is used to query the identity of the peer. Generally, the authenticator will issue this as the initial Request. An optional displayable message MAY be included to prompt the peer in the case where there expectation of interaction with a user. A Response of Type 1 (Identity) SHOULD be sent in Response to a Request with a Type of 1 (Identity).

Since Identity Requests and Responses are not protected, from a security perspective, it may be preferable for protected method-specific Identity exchanges to be used instead.

Implementation Note: The peer MAY obtain the Identity via user input. It is suggested that the authenticator retry the Identity Request in the case of an invalid Identity or authentication failure to allow for potential typos on the part of the user. It is suggested that the Identity Request be retried a minimum of 3 times before terminating the authentication phase with a Failure reply. The Notification Request MAY be used to indicate an

invalid authentication attempt prior to transmitting a new Identity Request (optionally, the failure MAY be indicated within the message of the new Identity Request itself).

Type

1

Type-Data

This field MAY contain a displayable message in the Request, containing UTF-8 encoded 10646 characters [[RFC2279](#)]. The Response

uses this field to return the Identity. If the Identity is unknown, this field should be zero bytes in length. The field MUST NOT be null terminated. The length of this field is derived from the Length field of the Request/Response packet and hence a null is not required.

[5.2.](#) Notification

Description

The Notification Type is optionally used to convey a displayable message from the authenticator to the peer. An authenticator MAY send a Notification Request to the peer at any time, The peer MUST respond to a Notification Request with a Notification Response; a Nak Response MUST NOT be sent.

The peer SHOULD display this message to the user or log it if it cannot be displayed. The Notification Type is intended to provide an acknowledged notification of some imperative nature, but it is not an error indication, and therefore does not change the state of the peer. Examples include a password with an expiration time that is about to expire, an OTP sequence integer which is nearing 0, an authentication failure warning, etc. In most circumstances, Notification should not be required.

Type

2

Type-Data

The Type-Data field in the Request contains a displayable message greater than zero octets in length, containing UTF-8 encoded 10646 characters [[RFC2279](#)]. The length of the message is determined by Length field of the Request packet. The message MUST NOT be null terminated. A Response MUST be sent in reply to the Request with a

Type field of 2 (Notification). The Type-Data field of the Response is zero octets in length. The Response should be sent immediately (independent of how the message is displayed or logged).

[5.3.](#) Nak

Description

The Nak Type is valid only in Response messages. It is sent in reply to a Request where the desired authentication Type is unacceptable. Authentication Types are numbered 4 and above. The Response contains one or more authentication Types desired by the Peer. Type zero (0) is used to indicate that the sender has no viable alternatives.

Since the Nak Type is only valid in Responses and has very limited functionality, it MUST NOT be used as a general purpose error indication, such as for communication of error messages, or negotiation of parameters specific to a particular EAP method.

Code

2 for Response.

Identifier

The Identifier field is one octet and aids in matching Responses with Requests. The Identifier field of a Nak Response MUST match the Identifier field of the Request packet that it is sent in response to.

Length

≥ 6

Type


3

Type-Data

Where the Request contains a Type within the original EAP Type space (1-253, 255), or the Request contains an expanded Type as defined in [Section 5.7](#), but the peer does not support expanded Types, then the Type-Data field of the Nak Response MUST contain one or more octets indicating the desired authentication Type(s), one octet per Type, or the value zero (0) to indicate no proposed alternative. When the Nak Response includes as one of the Type(s) the value 254, this indicates an expanded Type of preference indicated by the relative order. If

the authenticator can accomodate this preference, it will respond with a an expanded Type Request.

If a peer supporting expanded Types receives an expanded Type Request, then the Type-Data field of the Nak Response, if sent, MUST contain one or more authentication Types, all of which MUST be in the format below (8 octets per Type). This includes the encoding of zero (0), to indicate no proposed alternative. See [Section 5.7](#) for details on the Vendor-Id and Vendor-Type fields. If the peer does not support expanded Types, then the Type-Data field of the Nak Response MUST contain one or more authentication Type(s), one octet per Type, or the value zero (0) to indicate no proposed alternative. However, the value 254 MUST NOT be included as one of the preferred authentication Types.



5.4. MD5-Challenge

Description

The MD5-Challenge Type is analogous to the PPP CHAP protocol [\[RFC1994\]](#) (with MD5 as the specified algorithm). The Request contains a "challenge" message to the peer. A Response MUST be sent in reply to the Request. The Response MAY be either of Type 4 (MD5-Challenge) or Type 3 (Nak). The Nak reply indicates the peer's desired authentication Type(s). EAP peer and EAP server implementations MUST support the MD5-Challenge mechanism. An authenticator that supports only pass-through MUST allow communication with a backend authentication server that is capable of supporting MD5-Challenge, although the EAP authenticator implementation need not support MD5-Challenge itself. However, if the EAP authenticator can be configured to authenticate peers via any non-pass-through mechanism, then the requirement applies.

Note that the use of the Identifier field in the MD5-Challenge Type is different from that described in [\[RFC1994\]](#). EAP allows for retransmission of MD5-Challenge Request packets while [\[RFC1994\]](#) states that both the Identifier and Challenge fields MUST change each time a Challenge (the CHAP equivalent of the MD5-Challenge Request packet) is sent.

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Type

4

Type-Data

The contents of the Type-Data field is summarized below. For reference on the use of this fields see the PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol [[RFC1994](#)].

```

      0               1               2               3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| Value-Size | Value ...
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| Name ...
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

Security Claims (see [Section 7.3](#))

Intended use:	Wired networks, including PPP, PPPoE, and IEEE 802 wired media. Use over the Internet or with wireless media only when protected.
Mechanism:	Password or pre-shared key.
Mutual authentication:	No
Integrity protection:	No
Replay protection:	No
Confidentiality:	No
Key Derivation:	No
Key strength:	N/A
Dictionary attack prot:	No
Key hierarchy:	N/A
Fast reconnect:	No
MiTM resistance:	No
Acknowledged S/F:	No

[5.5.](#) One-Time Password (OTP)

Description

The One-Time Password system is defined in "A One-Time Password System" [[RFC2289](#)] and "OTP Extended Responses" [[RFC 2243](#)]. The

Request contains a displayable message containing an OTP challenge. A Response MUST be sent in reply to the Request. The Response MUST be of Type 5 (OTP) or Type 3 (Nak). The Nak Response indicates the peer's desired authentication Type(s).

Type

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5

Type-Data

The Type-Data field contains the OTP "challenge" as a displayable message in the Request. In the Response, this field is used for the 6 words from the OTP dictionary [[RFC2289](#)]. The messages MUST NOT be null terminated. The length of the field is derived from the Length field of the Request/Reply packet.

Security Claims (see [Section 7.3](#))

Intended use:	Wired networks, including PPP, PPPoE, and IEEE 802 wired media. Use over the Internet or with wireless media only when protected.
Mechanism:	One-Time Password
Mutual authentication:	No
Integrity protection:	No
Replay protection:	No
Confidentiality:	No
Key Derivation:	No
Key strength:	N/A
Dictionary attack prot:	No
Key hierarchy:	N/A
Fast reconnect:	No
MiTM resistance:	No
Acknowledged S/F:	No

[5.6.](#) Generic Token Card (GTC)

Description

The Generic Token Card Type is defined for use with various Token Card implementations which require user input. The Request contains a displayable message and the Response contains the Token Card

information necessary for authentication. Typically, this would be information read by a user from the Token card device and entered as ASCII text. A Response MUST be sent in reply to the Request. The Response MUST be of Type 6 (GTC) or Type 3 (Nak). The Nak Response indicates the peer's desired authentication Type(s).

Type

6

Type-Data

The Type-Data field in the Request contains a displayable message

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greater than zero octets in length. The length of the message is determined by Length field of the Request packet. The message MUST NOT be null terminated. A Response MUST be sent in reply to the Request with a Type field of 6 (Generic Token Card). The Response contains data from the Token Card required for authentication. The length of the data is determined by the Length field of the Response packet.

Security Claims (See [Section 7.3](#))

Intended use:	Wired networks, including PPP, PPPoE, and IEEE 802 wired media. Use over the Internet wireless media only when protected.
Mechanism:	Hardware token.
Mutual authentication:	No
Integrity protection:	No
Replay protection:	No
Confidentiality:	No
Key Derivation:	No
Key strength:	N/A
Dictionary attack prot:	No
Key hierarchy:	N/A
Fast reconnect:	No
MiTM resistance:	No
Acknowledged S/F:	No

[5.7.](#) Vendor-specific

Description

Due to EAP's popularity, the original Method Type space, which only provides for 255 values, is being allocated at a pace, which if continued, would result in exhaustion within a few years. Since many of the existing uses of EAP are vendor-specific, the Vendor-Specific Method Type is available to allow vendors to support their own extended Types not suitable for general usage.

The Vendor-specific type is also used to expand the global Method Type space beyond the original 255 values. A Vendor-Id of 0 maps the original 255 possible types onto a namespace of $2^{32}-1$ possible types, allowing for virtually unlimited expansion. (Note that type 0 is never used.)

An implementation that supports the Vendor-specific attribute MUST treat EAP types that are less than 256 equivalently whether they appear as a single octet or as the 32-bit Vendor-Type within a Vendor-specific type where Vendor-Id is 0. Peers not equipped to interpret the Vendor-specific Type MUST send a Nak as described in

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[Section 5.3](#), and negotiate a more suitable authentication method.

A summary of the Vendor-specific Type format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.

0	1																2																3															
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1																	
Type																Vendor-Id																																
Vendor-Type																																																
Vendor data...																																																

Type

254 for Vendor-specific

Vendor-Id

The Vendor-Id is 3 octets and represents the SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Code of the Vendor in network byte order, as allocated by IANA. A Vendor-Id of zero is reserved for use by the IETF in providing an expanded global EAP Type space.

Vendor-Type

The Vendor-Type field is four octets and represents the vendor-specific Method Type.

If Vendor-Id is zero, the Vendor-Type field is an extension and superset of the existing namespace for EAP types. The first 256 types are reserved for compatibility with single-octet EAP types that have already been assigned or may be assigned in the future. Thus, EAP types from 0 through 255 are semantically identical whether they appear as single octet EAP types or as Vendor-Types when Vendor-Id is zero.

Vendor-Data

The Vendor-Data field is defined by the vendor. Where a Vendor-Id of zero is present, the Vendor-Data field will be used for transporting the contents of EAP methods of Types defined by the IETF.

[6.](#) IANA Considerations

This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the EAP protocol, in accordance with [BCP 26](#), [[RFC2434](#)].

There are two name spaces in EAP that require registration: Packet Codes and Method Types.

EAP is not intended as a general-purpose protocol, and allocations SHOULD NOT be made for purposes unrelated to authentication.

[6.1.](#) Definition of Terms

The following terms are used here with the meanings defined in [BCP 26](#): "name space", "assigned value", "registration".

The following policies are used here with the meanings defined in BCP 26: "Private Use", "First Come First Served", "Expert Review", "Specification Required", "IETF Consensus", "Standards Action".

[6.2.](#) Recommended Registration Policies

For registration requests where a Designated Expert should be consulted, the responsible IESG area director should appoint the Designated Expert. For Designated Expert with Specification Required, the request is posted to the EAP WG mailing list (or, if it has been disbanded, a successor designated by the Area Director) for comment and review, and MUST include a pointer to a public specification. Before a period of 30 days has passed, the Designated Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and publish a notice of the decision to the EAP WG mailing list or its successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and, in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the request can be modified so as to become acceptable.

For registration requests requiring Expert Review, the EAP mailing list should be consulted. If the EAP mailing list is no longer operational, an alternative mailing list may be designated by the responsible IESG Area Director.

Packet Codes have a range from 1 to 255, of which 1-4 have been allocated. Because a new Packet Code has considerable impact on interoperability, a new Packet Code requires Standards Action, and should be allocated starting at 5.

The original EAP Method Type space has a range from 1 to 255, and is the scarcest resource in EAP, and thus must be allocated with care. Method Types 1-36 have been allocated, with 20 available for re-use. Method

Types 37-191 may be allocated following Designated Expert, with Specification Required.

Release of blocks of Method Types (more than one for a given purpose) should require IETF Consensus. EAP Type Values 192-253 are reserved and allocation requires Standards Action.

Method Type 254 is allocated for the Vendor-Specific Type. Where the Vendor-Id field is non-zero, the Vendor-Specific Type is used for functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of EAP, where no interoperability is deemed useful. When used with a Vendor-Id of zero, Method Type 254 can also be used to provide for an expanded Method Type space. Method Type values 256-4294967295 may be allocated after Type values 1-191 have been allocated.

Method Type 255 is allocated for Experimental use, such as testing of new EAP methods before a permanent Type code is allocated.

7. Security Considerations

EAP was designed for use with dialup PPP [[RFC1661](#)] and wired [[IEEE802](#)] networks such as Ethernet [[IEEE8023](#)]. On these networks, an attacker would need to gain physical access to the telephone or switch infrastructure in order to mount an attack. While such attacks have been documented, such as in [[DECEPTION](#)], they are assumed to be rare.

However, subsequently EAP has been proposed for use on wireless networks, and over the Internet, where physical security cannot be assumed. On such networks, the security vulnerabilities are greater, as are the requirements for EAP security.

This section defines the threat model and security terms and describes the security claims section required in EAP method specifications. We then discuss threat mitigation.

7.1. Threat model

On physically insecure networks, it is possible for an attacker to gain access to the physical medium. This enables a range of attacks, including the following:

- [1] An adversary may try to discover user identities by snooping authentication traffic.
- [2] An adversary may try to modify or spoof EAP packets.
- [3] An adversary may launch denial of service attacks by spoofing layer 2 indications or EAP layer success/failure indications, replaying

EAP packets, or generating packets with overlapping Identifiers.

- [4] An adversary might attempt to recover the pass-phrase by mounting an offline dictionary attack.
- [5] An adversary may attempt to convince the peer to connect to an untrusted network, by mounting a man-in-the-middle attack.
- [6] An adversary may attempt to disrupt the EAP negotiation in order to weaken the authentication.
- [7] An attacker may attempt to recover the key by taking advantage of weak key derivation techniques used within EAP methods.
- [8] An attacker may attempt to take advantage of weak ciphersuites subsequently used after the EAP conversation is complete.

Where EAP is used over wireless networks, an attacker needs to be within the coverage area of the wireless medium in order to carry out these attacks. However, where EAP is used over the Internet, no such restrictions apply.

[7.2.](#) Security claims

In order to clearly articulate the security provided by an EAP method, EAP method specifications MUST include a Security Claims section including the following declarations:

- [a] Intended use. This includes a statement of whether the method is intended for use over a physically secure or insecure network, as well as a statement of the applicable media.
- [b] Mechanism. This is a statement of the authentication technology: certificates, pre-shared keys, passwords, token cards, etc.
- [c] Security claims. This is a statement of the claimed security properties of the method, using terms defined in [Section 1.2](#): mutual authentication, integrity protection, replay protection, confidentiality, key derivation, key strength, dictionary attack resistance, fast reconnect, man-in-the-middle resistance, acknowledged result indications. The Security Claims section SHOULD include references to proof, or the proof itself (preferably in an Appendix).
- [d] Key strength. If the method derives keys, then the effective key strength MUST be estimated.

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- [e] Description of key hierarchy. EAP methods deriving keys MUST either provide a reference to a key hierarchy specification, or describe how keys used for authentication/integrity, encryption and IVs are to be derived from the provided keying material, and how cryptographic separation is maintained between keys used for different purposes.
- [f] Indication of vulnerabilities. In addition to the security claims that are made, the specification MUST indicate which of the security claims detailed in [Section 1.2](#) are NOT being made, and discuss the security implications.

[7.3.](#) Identity protection

An Identity exchange is an optional within the EAP conversation. Therefore, it is possible to omit the Identity exchange entirely, or to postpone it until later in the conversation once a protected channel has been established.

However, where roaming is supported as described in [\[RFC2607\]](#), it may be necessary to locate the appropriate backend authentication server before the authentication conversation can proceed. The realm portion of the Network Access Identifier (NAI) [\[RFC2486\]](#) is typically included within the Identity-Response in order to enable the authentication exchange to be routed to the appropriate backend authentication server. Therefore while the peer-name portion of the NAI may be omitted in the Identity-Response, where proxies or relays are present, the realm portion may be required.

[7.4.](#) Man-in-the-middle attacks

Where a sequence of methods is utilized for authentication or EAP is tunneled within another protocol that omits peer authentication, there exists a potential vulnerability to man-in-the-middle attack.

Where a sequence of EAP methods is utilized for authentication, the peer might not have proof that a single entity has acted as the authenticator for all EAP methods within the sequence. For example, an authenticator might terminate one EAP method, then forward the next method in the sequence to another party without the peer's knowledge or consent. Similarly, the authenticator might not have proof that a single entity has acted as the peer for all EAP methods within the sequence.

This enables an attack by a rogue EAP authenticator tunneling EAP to a legitimate server. Where the tunneling protocol is used for key establishment but does not require peer authentication, an attacker convincing a legitimate peer to connect to it will be able to tunnel EAP packets to a legitimate server, successfully authenticating and

obtaining the key. This allows the attacker to successfully establish itself as a man-in-the-middle, gaining access to the network, as well as the ability to decrypt data traffic between the legitimate peer and server.

This attack may be mitigated by the following measures:

- [a] Requiring mutual authentication within EAP tunneling mechanisms.
- [b] Requiring cryptographic binding between EAP methods executed within a sequence or between the EAP tunneling protocol and the tunneled EAP methods. Where cryptographic binding is supported, a mechanism is also needed to protect against downgrade attacks that would bypass it.
- [c] Limiting the EAP methods authorized for use without protection, based on peer and authenticator policy.
- [d] Avoiding the use of sequences or tunnels when a single, strong method is available.

[7.5.](#) Packet modification attacks

While individual EAP methods may support per-packet data origin authentication, integrity and replay protection, EAP itself does not provide built-in support for this.

Since the Identifier is only a single octet, it is easy to guess, allowing an attacker to successfully inject or replay EAP packets. An attacker may also modify EAP headers within EAP packets where the header is unprotected. This could cause packets to be inappropriately discarded or misinterpreted.

In the case of PPP and IEEE 802 wired links, it is assumed that such attacks are restricted to attackers who can gain access to the physical link. However, where EAP is run over physically insecure lower layers

such as IEEE 802.11 or the Internet (such as within protocols supporting PPP, EAP or Ethernet Tunneling), this assumption is no longer valid and the vulnerability to attack is greater.

To protect EAP messages sent over physically insecure lower layers, methods providing mutual authentication and key derivation, as well as per-packet origin authentication, integrity and replay protection SHOULD be used. Method-specific MICs may be used to provide protection. Since EAP messages of Types Identity, Notification, and Nak do not include their own MIC, it may be desirable for the EAP method MIC to cover information contained within these messages, as well as the header of each EAP message.

To provide protection, EAP also may be encapsulated within a protected channel created by protocols such as ISAKMP [[RFC2408](#)] as is done in [[PIC](#)] or within TLS [[RFC2246](#)]. However, as noted in [Section 7.4](#), EAP tunneling may result in a man-in-the-middle vulnerability.

[7.6.](#) Dictionary attacks

Password authentication algorithms such as EAP-MD5, MS-CHAPv1 [[RFC2433](#)] and Kerberos V [[RFC1510](#)] are known to be vulnerable to dictionary attacks. MS-CHAPv1 vulnerabilities are documented in [[PPTPv1](#)]; Kerberos vulnerabilities are described in [[KRBATTACK](#)], [[KRBLIM](#)], and [[KERB4WEAK](#)].

In order to protect against dictionary attacks, an authentication algorithm resistant to dictionary attack (as defined in [Section 7.2](#)) may be used. This is particularly important when EAP runs over media which are not physically secure.

If an authentication algorithm is used that is known to be vulnerable to dictionary attack, then the conversation may be tunneled within a protected channel, in order to provide additional protection. However, as noted in [Section 7.4](#), EAP tunneling may result in a man-in-the-middle vulnerability, and therefore dictionary attack resistant methods are preferred.

[7.7.](#) Connection to an untrusted network

With EAP methods supporting one-way authentication, such as EAP-MD5, the authenticator's identity is not verified. Where the lower layer is not physically secure (such as where EAP runs over wireless media or IP),

this enables the peer to connect to a rogue authenticator. As a result, where the lower layer is not physically secure, a method supporting mutual authentication is recommended.

In EAP there is no requirement that authentication be full duplex or that the same protocol be used in both directions. It is perfectly acceptable for different protocols to be used in each direction. This will, of course, depend on the specific protocols negotiated. However, in general, completing a single unitary mutual authentication is preferable to two one-way authentications, one in each direction. This is because separate authentications that are not bound cryptographically so as to demonstrate they are part of the same session are subject to man-in-the-middle attacks, as discussed in [Section 7.4](#).

[7.8](#). Negotiation attacks

In a negotiation attack, the attacker attempts to convince the peer and authenticator to negotiate a less secure EAP method. EAP does not provide protection for the Nak packet, although it is possible for a

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method to include coverage of Nak Responses within a method-specific MIC.

To avoid negotiation attacks in situations where EAP runs over physically insecure media, for each named peer there SHOULD be an indication of exactly one method used to authenticate that peer name, as described in [Section 2.1](#).

[7.9](#). Implementation idiosyncrasies

The interaction of EAP with lower layer transports such as PPP and IEEE [802](#) are highly implementation dependent.

For example, upon failure of authentication, some PPP implementations do not terminate the link, instead limiting traffic in Network-Layer Protocols to a filtered subset, which in turn allows the peer the opportunity to update secrets or send mail to the network administrator indicating a problem. Similarly, while in IEEE 802.1X an authentication failure will result in denied access to the controlled port, limited traffic may be permitted on the uncontrolled port.

In EAP there is no provision for retries of failed authentication.

However, in PPP the LCP state machine can renegotiate the authentication protocol at any time, thus allowing a new attempt. Similarly, in IEEE 802.1X the Supplicant or Authenticator can re-authenticate at any time. It is recommended that any counters used for authentication failure not be reset until after successful authentication, or subsequent termination of the failed link.

[7.10.](#) Key derivation

It is possible for the peer and EAP server to mutually authenticate, and derive a Master Key (MK). The MK is unique to the peer and EAP server and MUST NOT be exported by the EAP method, or used directly to protect the EAP conversation or subsequent data. As a result, possession of the MK represents proof of a successful authentication, and this is potentially useful in enabling features such as fast reconnect, or fast handoff.

In order to provide keying material for use in a subsequently negotiated ciphersuite, the EAP method exports a Master Session Key (MSK). Like the EAP Master Key, EAP Master Session Keys are also not used directly to protect data; however, they are of sufficient size to enable subsequent derivation of Transient Session Keys (TSKs) for use with the selected ciphersuite.

EAP methods provide Master Session Keys and not Transient Session Keys so as to allow EAP methods to be ciphersuite and media independent.

Depending on the lower layer, EAP methods may run before or after ciphersuite negotiation, so that the selected ciphersuite may not be known to the EAP method. By providing keying material usable with any ciphersuite, EAP methods can be used with a wide range of ciphersuites and media. Since the peer and EAP client reside on the same machine, TSKs can be provided to the lower layer security module without needing to leave the machine.

In the case where the backend authentication server and authenticator reside on different machines, there are several implications for security:

- [a] Mutual authentication may occur between the peer and the backend authentication server, if the negotiated EAP method supports this. However, where the authenticator and backend authentication server

are separate, the peer and authenticator do not mutually authenticate within EAP. However, subsequent to completion of the EAP conversation, the lower layer may support mutual authentication between the peer and authenticator. For example, IEEE 802.11i includes a Transient Session Key derivation protocol known as the 4-way handshake, which guarantees liveness of the TSKs, provides for mutual authentication between the peer and authenticator, replay protection, and protected ciphersuite negotiation.

- [b] The MSK negotiated between the peer and backend authentication server will need to be transmitted to the authenticator. The specification of this transit mechanism is outside the scope of this document.

This specification does not provide detailed guidance on how EAP methods are to derive the MK and MSK. Key derivation is an art that is best practiced by professionals; rather than inventing new key derivation algorithms, reuse of existing algorithms such as those specified in IKE [[RFC2409](#)], or TLS [[RFC2246](#)] is recommended.

However, some general guidelines can be provided:

- [1] The MK is for use only by the EAP authenticator and peer and MUST NOT be exported by the EAP method or provided to a third party.
- [2] Since the MSK is exported by the EAP method, while the MK is not, possession of the MSK MUST NOT provide information useful in determining the MK.
- [3] The MSK and TSKs MUST be fresh. Otherwise it is infeasible to detect messages replayed from prior sessions.

- [4] TSKs MUST be cryptographically independent from each other so that if an attacker obtains one of them, it will not have gained information useful in determining the other ones.
- [5] There MUST be a way to determine whether TSKs belong to this or to some other session.
- [6] The MSK derived by EAP methods MUST be bound to the peers as well

as to the authentication method, so as to avoid a man-in-the-middle attack (see [Section 7.4](#)).

[7.11](#). Weak ciphersuites

If after the initial EAP authentication, data packets are sent without per-packet authentication, integrity, replay protection, an attacker with access to the media can inject packets, "flip bits" within existing packets, replay packets, or even hijack the session completely. Without per-packet confidentiality, it is possible to snoop data packets.

As a result, as noted in [Section 3.1](#), where EAP is used over a physically insecure lower layer, per-packet authentication, integrity and replay protection SHOULD be used, and per-packet confidentiality is also recommended.

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