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# PPP TRILL Protocol Control Protocol <draft-ietf-pppext-trill-protocol-08.txt>

#### Abstract

The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) defines a Link Control Protocol (LCP) and a method for negotiating the use of multi-protocol traffic over point-to-point links. This document describes PPP support for the Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL) Protocol, allowing direct communication between Routing Bridges (RBridges) via PPP links.

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# **1**. Introduction

The TRILL Protocol [<u>RFCtrill</u>] defines a set of mechanisms used to communicate between RBridges. These devices can bridge together large 802 networks using link-state protocols in place of the traditional spanning tree mechanisms.

Over Ethernet, TRILL uses two separate Ethertypes to distinguish between encapsulation headers, which carry user data, and link-state messages, which compute network topology using a protocol based on [IS-IS]. These two protocols must be distinguished from one another, and segregated from all other traffic.

In a network where PPP [RFC1661] is used to interconnect routers (often over telecommunications links), it may be advantageous to be able to bridge between Ethernet segments over those PPP links, and thus integrate remote networks with an existing TRILL cloud. The existing Bridging Control Protocol (BCP) [RFC3518] allows direct bridging of Ethernet frames over PPP. However, this mechanism is inefficient and inadequate for TRILL, which can be optimized for use over PPP links.

To interconnect these devices over PPP links, three protocol numbers are needed, and are reserved as follows:

Value (in hex)	Protocol Name		
TBD-00XX	TRILL Network Protocol (TNP)		
TBD-40YY	TRILL Link State Protocol (TLSP)		
TBD-80ZZ	TRILL Network Control Protocol (TNCP)		

The usage of these three protocols is described in detail in the following section.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [<u>RFC2119</u>].

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## 2. PPP TRILL Negotiation

The TRILL Network Control Protocol (TNCP) is responsible for negotiating the use of the TRILL Network Protocol (TNP) and TRILL Link State Protocol (TLSP) on a PPP link. TNCP uses the same option negotiation mechanism and state machine as described for LCP (<u>section</u> <u>4 of [RFC1661]</u>).

TNCP packets MUST NOT be exchanged until PPP has reached the Network-Layer Protocol phase. Any TNCP packets received when not in that phase MUST be silently ignored.

The encapsulated network layer data, carried in TNP packets, and topology information, carried in TLSP packets, MUST NOT be sent unless TNCP is in Opened state. If a TNP or TLSP packet is received when TNCP is not in Opened state and LCP is Opened, an implementation MUST silently discard the unexpected TNP or TLSP packet.

#### 2.1 TNCP Packet Format

Exactly one TNCP packet is carried in the PPP Information field, with the PPP Protocol field set to hex TBD-80ZZ (TNCP). A summary of the TNCP packet format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.

Θ	1	2	3		
012345	6789012345	678901234	5678901		
+-+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	+ - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + -	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		
Code	Identifier	Length	ו		
+-					
Data					
+-+-+-+					

Code

Only LCP Code values 1 through 7 (Configure-Request, Configure-Ack, Configure-Nak, Configure-Reject, Terminate-Request, Terminate-Ack, and Code-Reject) are used. All other codes SHOULD result in a TNCP Code-Reject reply.

Identifier and Length

These are as documented for LCP.

Data

This field contains data formatted as described in  $\underline{section \ 5}$  of

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[<u>RFC1661</u>]. Codes 1-4 use Type-Length-Data sequences, Codes 5 and 6 use uninterpreted data, and Code 7 uses a Rejected-Packet, all as described in [<u>RFC1661</u>].

Because no Configuration Options have been defined for TNCP, negotiating the use of TRILL Protocol with IS-IS for the link state protocol is the default when no options are specified. A future document may specify the use of Configuration Options to enable different TRILL operating modes, such as the use of a different link state protocol.

#### 2.2 TNP Packet Format

When TNCP is in Opened state, TNP packets are sent by setting the PPP Protocol field to hex TBD-00XX (TNP) and placing TRILL-encapsulated data representing exactly one encapsulated packet in the PPP Information field.

A summary of this format is provided below:

This is identical to the TRILL Ethernet format (section 4.1 of [<u>RFCtrill</u>], "Ethernet Data Encapsulation,") except that the Outer MAC header and Ethertype are replaced by the PPP headers and Protocol Field, and the Ethernet FCS is not present. Both user data and ESADI packets are encoded in this format.

The PPP FCS follows the encapsulated data on links where the PPP FCS is in use.

Unlike the TRILL Ethernet encapsulation, PPP nodes do not have MAC addresses, so no outer MAC is present. (HDLC addresses MAY be present in some situations; such usage is outside the scope of this document.)

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# 2.3 TLSP Packet Format

When TNCP is in Opened state, TLSP packets are sent by setting the PPP Protocol field to hex TBD-40YY (TLSP) and placing exactly one IS-IS Payload (section 4.2.3 of [RFCtrill], "TRILL IS-IS Frames") in the PPP Information field.

Note that point-to-point IS-IS links have only an arbitrary Circuit ID, and do not use MAC addresses for identification.

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#### 3. TRILL PPP Behavior

- On a PPP link, TRILL always uses P2P Hellos. There is no need for TRILL-Hello frames, nor is per-port configuration necessary. P2P Hello messages, per "Point-to-Point IS to IS Hello PDU" (section 9.7 of [IS-IS]), do not use Neighbor IDs in the same manner as on Ethernet. However, per section 4.2.4.1 of [RFCtrill], three-way IS-IS handshake using extended circuit IDs is required on pointto-point links, such as PPP.
- 2. RBridges are never appointed forwarders on PPP links. If an implementation includes BCP [RFC3518], then it MUST ensure that only one of BCP or TNCP is negotiated on a link, and not both. If the peer is an RBridge, then there is no need to pass unencapsulated frames, as the link can have no TRILL-ignorant peer to be concerned about. If the peer is not an RBridge, then TNCP negotiation fails and TRILL is not used on the link.
- 3. An implementation that has only PPP links might have no Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) that can form an IS-IS System ID. Resolving that issue is outside the scope of this document, however it is strongly RECOMMENDED that all TRILL implementations have at least one zero-configuration mechanism to obtain a valid System ID. Refer to ISO/IEC 10589 regarding System ID uniqueness requirements.
- 4. TRILL MTU-probe and TRILL MTU-ack messages (section 4.3.2 of [<u>RFCtrill</u>]) are not needed on a PPP link. Implementations MUST NOT send MTU-probe and SHOULD NOT reply to these messages. The MTU computed by LCP SHOULD be used instead. Negotiating an LCP MTU of at least 1524, to allow for an inner Ethernet payload of 1500 octets, is RECOMMENDED.

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#### **<u>4</u>**. Security Considerations

Existing PPP and IS-IS security mechanisms may play important roles in a network of RBridges interconnected by PPP links. The IS-IS authentication mechanism [<u>RFC5304</u>] [<u>RFC5310</u>], at the TRILL IS-IS layer, prevents fabrication of link-state control messages.

Not all implementations need to include specific security mechanisms at the PPP layer, for example if they are designed to be deployed only in cases where the networking environment is trusted or where other layers provide adequate security. A complete enumeration of possible deployment scenarios and associated threats and options is not possible and is outside the scope of this document. For applications involving sensitive data, end-to-end security should always be considered in addition to link security to provide security in depth.

However, in case a PPP layer authentication mechanism to protect the establishment of a link and identify a link with a known peer is needed, implementation of PPP CHAP [<u>RFC1994</u>] is RECOMENDED. Should greater flexibility be required than that provided by CHAP, EAP [<u>RFC3748</u>] is a good alternative.

If TRILL over PPP packets also require confidentiality, the PPP ECP link encryption mechanisms [<u>RFC1968</u>] can protect the confidentiality and integrity of all packets on the PPP link.

And when PPP is run over tunneling mechanisms, such as L2TP [<u>RFC3931</u>], tunnel security protocols may be available.

For general TRILL protocol security considerations, see [RFCtrill].

#### 5. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assigned three PPP Protocol field values, TBD-00XX, TBD-40YY, and TBD-80ZZ, as described in <u>Section 1</u> of this document.

IANA is requested to create a new "PPP TNCP Configuration Option Types" in the PPP-Numbers registry using the same format as the existing "PPP LCP Configuration Option Types" table.

All TNCP Configuration Option Types except 00 are "Unassigned" and available for future use, based on "IETF Review," as described in <u>BCP</u> <u>26</u> [<u>RFC5226</u>]. Option 00 is allocated for use with Vendor Specific Options, as described in [<u>RFC2153</u>].

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## **<u>6</u>**. References

Normative and Informational references are listed below.

#### 6.1 Normative

- [RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels," <u>BCP 14</u> and <u>RFC 2119</u>, March 1997
- [RFC5226] T. Narten and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs," <u>BCP 26</u> and <u>RFC 5226</u>, May 2008
- [RFCtrill] R. Perlman, et al., "RBridges: Base Protocol Specification," draft-ietf-trill-rbridge-protocol-16.txt, in RFC Editor queue

#### 6.2 Informative

- [IS-IS] International Organization for Standardization, "Intermediate system to Intermediate system intra-domain routeing information exchange protocol for use in conjunction with the protocol for providing the connectionless-mode Network Service (ISO 8473)", ISO/IEC 10589:2002, Second Edition, Nov 2002
- [RFC1968] G. Meyer, "The PPP Encryption Control Protocol (ECP)," <u>RFC 1968</u>, June 1996
- [RFC1994] W. Simpson, "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)," <u>RFC 1994</u>, August 1996
- [RFC2153] W. Simpson, "PPP Vendor Extensions," <u>RFC 2153</u>, May 1997
- [RFC3518] M. Higashiyama, et al., "Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) Bridging Control Protocol (BCP)," <u>RFC 3518</u>, April 2003
- [RFC3748] B. Aboba, et al., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)," <u>RFC 3748</u>, June 2004

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- [RFC3931] J. Lau, Ed., et al., "Layer Two Tunneling Protocol -Version 3 (L2TPv3)," <u>RFC 3931</u>, March 2005
- [RFC5304] T. Li and R. Atkinson, "IS-IS Cryptographic Authentication," <u>RFC 5304</u>, October 2008
- [RFC5310] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R., and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication", <u>RFC</u> 5310, February 2009.

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