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DeKok, Alan  
FreeRADIUS  
J. Korhonen  
Nokia Siemens Networks

Dynamic Authorization Proxying in  
Remote Authorization Dial-In User Service Protocol (RADIUS)  
draft-ietf-radext-coa-proxy-01.txt

## Abstract

[RFC 5176](#) defines Change of Authorization (CoA) and Disconnect Message (DM) behavior for RADIUS. [Section 3.1](#) of that document suggests that proxying these messages is possible, but gives no guidance as to how that is done. This specification corrects that omission.

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## 1. Introduction

[RFC 5176](#) [[RFC5176](#)] defines Change of Authorization (CoA) and Disconnect Message (DM) behavior for RADIUS. [Section 3.1](#) of that document suggests that proxying these messages is possible, but gives no guidance as to how that is done. This omission means that proxying of CoA packets is, in practice, impossible.

We correct that omission here by explaining how an existing RADIUS attribute, Operator-Name ( [Section 4.1 of \[RFC5580\]](#) ), can be used to record the visited network for a particular session. We then explain how that attribute can be used by CoA proxies to route packets "backwards" through a RADIUS proxy chain. We introduce a new attribute; Operator-NAS-Identifier, and show how this attribute can increase privacy about the internal implementation of the visited network.

We conclude with a discussion of the security implications of the design, and show how they are acceptable.

### 1.1. Terminology

This document frequently uses the following terms:

#### CoA

Change of Authorization, e.g. CoA-Request, or CoA-ACK, or CoA-NAK, as defined in [[RFC5176](#)]. That specification also defines Disconnect-Request, Disconnect-ACK, and Disconnect-NAK. For

simplicity here, where we use "CoA", we mean a generic "CoA-Request or Disconnect-Request" packet. We use "CoA-Request" or "Disconnect-Request" to refer to the specific packet types.

### Network Access Identifier

The Network Access Identifier (NAI) is the user identity submitted by the client during network access authentication. The purpose of the NAI is to identify the user as well as to assist in the routing of the authentication request. Please note that the NAI may not necessarily be the same as the user's email address or the user identity submitted in an application layer authentication.

### Network Access Server

The Network Access Server (NAS) is the device that clients connect to in order to get access to the network. In PPTP terminology, this is referred to as the PPTP Access Concentrator (PAC), and in L2TP terminology, it is referred to as the L2TP Access

Concentrator (LAC). In IEEE 802.11, it is referred to as an Access Point.

### Home Network

The network which holds the authentication credentials for a user.

### Visited Network

A network other than the home network, where the user attempts to gain network access. The Visited Network typically has a relationship with the Home Network, and can ask the Home Network if the user is authentic (or not).

## [1.2.](#) Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

## [2.](#) Problem Statement

This section describes how RADIUS proxying works, how CoA packets work, and why CoA proxying does not work in the current system.

### [2.1.](#) Typical RADIUS Proxying

When a RADIUS server proxies an Access-Request packet, it typically does so based on the contents of the User-Name attribute, which contains Network Access Identifier [[RFC7542](#)]. Other methods are possible, but we restrict ourselves to this usage, as it is the most common one.

The proxy server looks up the "Realm" portion of the NAI in a logical AAA routing table, as described in [Section 3 of \[RFC7542\]](#). The entry

in that table is the "next hop" to which the packet is sent. This "next hop" may be another proxy, or it may be the home server for that realm.

If the "next hop" is a proxy, it will perform the same Realm lookup, and then proxy the packet. Alternatively, if the "next hop" is the Home Server for that realm, it will try to authenticate the user, and respond with an Access-Accept, Access-Reject, or Access-Challenge.

The RADIUS client will match the response packet to an outstanding request. If the client is part of a proxy, it will then proxy that response packet in turn to the system which originated the Access-Request. This process occurs until the response packet arrives at the NAS.

The proxies are typically stateful with respect to ongoing request / response packets, but stateless with respect to user sessions. Once a reply has been received by the proxy, it can discard all information about the user.

The same proxy method is used for Accounting-Request packets. The combination of the two methods allows proxies to connect Visited Networks to Home Networks for all AAA purposes.

## [2.2.](#) CoA Processing

[RFC5176] describes how CoA clients send packets to CoA servers. We note that system comprising the CoA client is typically co-located with, or the same as, the RADIUS server. Similarly, the CoA server is a system that is either co-located with, or the same as, the RADIUS client.

In the case of packets sent inside of one network, the source and

destination of CoA packets is locally determined. There is thus no need for standardization of that process, as networks are free to send CoA packets whenever they want, for whatever reason they want.

## [2.3.](#) Failure of CoA Proxying

The situation is more complicated when multiple networks are involved. [RFC5176] suggests that CoA proxying is permitted, but

makes no suggestions for how it should be done.

If proxies tracked user sessions, it might be possible for a proxy to match an incoming CoA-Request to a user session, and then to proxy that packet to the RADIUS client which originated the Access-Request for that sessions.

There are many problems with such a scenario. The CoA server may, in fact, not be co-located with the RADIUS client. The RADIUS client may be down, but there may be a different CoA server which could accept the packet. User session tracking can be expensive and complicated for a proxy, and many proxies do not record user sessions. Finally, [\[RFC5176\]](#) is silent on the topic of "session identification attributes", which makes it impossible for a proxy to determine if a CoA packet matches a particular user session.

The result is that CoA proxying cannot be performed when using the behavior defined in [\[RFC5176\]](#).

### 3. How to Perform CoA Proxying

The solution to the above problem is to use the Operator-Name attribute defined in [\[RFC5580\]](#), [Section 4.1](#). We repeat portions of that definition here for clarity:

This attribute carries the operator namespace identifier and the operator name. The operator name is combined with the namespace identifier to uniquely identify the owner of an access network.

Followed by a description of the REALM namespace:

REALM ('1' (0x31)):

The REALM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on any registered domain name. Such names are required to be unique, and the rights to use a given realm name are obtained coincident with acquiring the rights to use a particular Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). ...

In short, the Operator-Name attribute contains the an ASCII "1",

followed by the Realm of the Visited Network. e.g. for the



"example.com" realm, the Operator-Name attribute contains the text "1example.com". This information is precisely what we need to perform CoA proxying.

### 3.1. Operator-Name in Access-Request and Accounting-Request packets

When a Visited Network proxies an Access-Request or Accounting-Request packet outside of its network, it SHOULD include an Operator-Name attribute in the packet, as discussed in [Section 4.1 of \[RFC5580\]](#). The contents of the Operator-Name should be "1", followed by the realm name of the Visited Network. Where the Visited Network has more than one realm name, one should be chosen, and used for all packets.

Visited Networks MUST use a consistent value for Operator-Name for one user session. That is, sending "1example.com" in an Access-Request packet, and "1example.org" in an Accounting-Request packet for that same session is forbidden.

Proxies which record user session information SHOULD also record Operator-Name. Proxies which do not record user session information SHOULD NOT record Operator-Name.

Home Networks SHOULD record Operator-Name along with other information about user sessions. Home Networks which expect to send CoA packets to Visited Networks MUST record Operator-Name for each user session which originates from a Visited Network.

Networks which contain both the RADIUS client and RADIUS server do not need to record or track Operator-Name.

### 3.2. Operator-Name in CoA-Request and Disconnect-Request packets

When a Home Network wishes to send a CoA-Request or Disconnect-Request packet to a Visited Network, it MUST include an Operator-Name attribute in the packet. The value of the Operator-Name MUST be the value which was recorded earlier for that user session.

The Home Network MUST lookup the realm from the Operator-Name in a logical "realm routing table", as discussed in [\[RFC7542\] Section 3](#). In this case, the destination of the packet is not a RADIUS server, but a CoA server.

In practice, this means that CoA proxying works exactly like "normal" RADIUS proxying, except that the proxy decision is based on the realm from the Operator-Name attribute, instead of on the realm from the User-Name attribute.

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Proxies which receive the CoA packet MUST look up the realm from the Operator-Name in a logical "realm routing table", as with Home Servers, above. This process continues with any additional proxies until the packet reaches the Visited Network.

The Visited Network can then send the CoA packet to the NAS, and return any response packet back up the proxy chain to the Home Server.

Networks which contain both the CoA client and CoA server do not need to record or track Operator-Name.

### [3.3.](#) Operator-NAS-Identifier

The process described in the previous section allows for CoA proxying, but it does not support privacy for Visited Networks. That is, all "internal" information about the Visited Network is public. This information includes NAS-Identifier, NAS-IP-Address, NAS-IPv6-Address, etc. We believe that the internals of the Visited Network should be opaque to third parties.

In addition, we will see that privacy provisions can have a positive impact on the security of the system.

The Operator-NAS-Identifier attribute contains opaque information identifying a NAS. It MAY appear in the following packets: Access-Request, Accounting-Request, CoA-Request, Disconnect-Request. Operator-NAS-Identifier MUST NOT appear in any other packet.

Operator-NAS-Identifier MAY occur in a packet if the packet also contains an Operator-Name attribute. Operator-NAS-Identifier MUST NOT appear in a packet if there is no Operator-Name in the packet. Operator-NAS-Identifier MUST NOT occur more than once in a packet.

An Operator-NAS-Identifier attribute SHOULD be added to an Access-Request or Accounting-Request packet by a Visited Network just before proxying a packet to an external RADIUS server. When the Operator-NAS-Identifier attribute is added to a packet, the following attributes MUST be deleted: NAS-IP-Address, NAS-IPv6-Address, NAS-Identifier. The proxy MUST then add a NAS-Identifier attribute, in order satisfy the requirements of [Section 4.1 of \[RFC2865\]](#), and of [\[RFC2866\]](#).

We suggest that the contents of the NAS-Identifier be the Realm name of the Visited Network. That is, for everyone outside of the Visited Network, the identity of the NAS is the Visited Network. For the

Visited Network, the identity of the NAS is private information, which is opaque to everyone else.

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#### Description

An opaque token describing the NAS a user has logged into.

#### Type

TBD. To be assigned by IANA

#### Length

TBD. Depends on IANA allocation.

Implementations supporting this attribute MUST be able to handle between one (1) and twenty (20) octets of data. Implementations creating an Operator-NAS-Identifier SHOULD NOT create attributes with more than twenty octets of data. A twenty octet string is more than sufficient to individually address all of the NASes on the planet.

#### Data Type

string. See [[DATA](#)] [Section 2.6](#) for a definition.

#### Value

The contents of this attribute are an opaque token interpretable only by the Visited Network. The attribute MUST NOT contain any secret or private information.

## [4.](#) Requirements

### [4.1.](#) Requirements on Home Servers

A Home Server MUST NOT send CoA packets for users who are not part of its realm. The provisions of the next few sections describe how other participants in the RADIUS ecosystem can enforce this requirement.

The Operator-NAS-Identifier attribute MUST be stored by a Home Server along with any user session identification attributes. When sending a CoA packet for a user session, the Home Server MUST include any Operator-NAS-Identifier it has recorded for that session.

#### [4.2.](#) Requirements on Visited Networks

A Visited Network which receives a proxied CoA packet MUST perform all of the checks discussed above for proxies. This requirement is because we assume that the Visited Network has a proxy in between the NAS and any external (i.e. third-party) proxy. Situations where a NAS sends packets directly to a third-party RADIUS server are outside of the scope of this specification.

Due to the requirements of [Section 2.3 of \[RFC5176\]](#), a Visited Network MUST remove Operator-Name and Operator-NAS-Identifier from any CoA-Request or Disconnect-Request packet prior to proxying that packet to a CoA server. This requirement is phrase more generically below, in Section XX.

While a Visited Network may create an Operator-NAS-Identifier via many methods. The value SHOULD be cryptographically strong. It SHOULD be verifiable by the Visited Network, without tracking every single user session.

#### [4.3.](#) Requirements on Proxies

There are a number of requirements on proxies, both CoA proxies and RADIUS proxies. For the purpose of this section, we assume that each RADIUS proxy shares a common administration with a corresponding CoA proxy, and that the two systems can communicate electronically. There is no requirement that these systems are co-located.

##### [4.3.1.](#) Security Requirements on Proxies

[Section 6.1 of \[RFC5176\]](#) has some security requirements on proxies which handle CoA-Request and Disconnect-Request packets:

... a proxy MAY perform a "reverse path forwarding" (RPF) check to verify that a Disconnect-Request or CoA-Request originates from an authorized Dynamic Authorization Client.

We change that requirement to a proxy MUST perform a "reverse path forwarding" (RPF) check to verify that a Disconnect-Request or CoA-Request originates from an authorized Dynamic Authorization Client. Without this change, a proxy may forward forged packets, and thus contribute to the forgery problem instead of preventing it.

Proxies which record user session information SHOULD verify the contents of a received CoA packet against the recorded data for that user session. If the proxy determines that the information in the packet does not match the recorded user session, it SHOULD return a

CoA-NAK or Disconnect-NAK packet, which contains an Error-Cause attribute having value 503 ("Session Context Not Found").

We recognize that because a RADIUS proxy will see Access-Request and Accounting-Request packets, that it will have sufficient information to forge CoA packets. It will thus have the ability to subsequently disconnect any user who was authenticated via the RADIUS proxy.

We suggest that the real-world effect of this security problem is minimal. RADIUS proxies can already return Access-Accept or Access-Reject for Access-Request packets, and can change authorization attributes contained in an Access-Accept. Allowing a proxy to change (or disconnect) a user session post-authentication is not substantially different from changing (or refusing to connect) a user session during the initial process of authentication.

There are no provisions in RADIUS for "end to end" security. That is, the Visited Network and Home Network cannot communicate privately in the presence of proxies. This limitation originates from the design of RADIUS for Access-Request and Accounting-Request packets. That limitation is then carried over to CoA-Request and Disconnect-Request packets.

We cannot therefore prevent proxies or Home Servers from forging CoA packets. We can only create scenarios where that forgery is hard to

perform, and/or is likely to be detected.

#### 4.3.2. Filtering Requirements on Proxies

[Section 2.3 of \[RFC5176\]](#) makes the following requirement for CoA servers:

In CoA-Request and Disconnect-Request packets, all attributes MUST be treated as mandatory.

These requirements are too stringent for a CoA proxy. Instead, we say that for a CoA proxy, all attributes MUST NOT be treated as mandatory. Proxies SHOULD perform proxying based on Operator-Name, but other schemes are possible (though not discussed here). Proxies SHOULD forward all packets as-is, with minimal changes. Only the final CoA server (i.e RADIUS NAS) can make a decision on which attributes are mandatory and which are not.

Where Operator-Realm and Operator-NAS-Identifier is received by a proxy, the proxy MUST pass those attributes through unchanged.

All attributes added by a RADIUS proxy when sending packets from the Visited Network to the Home Network Network MUST be removed by the

corresponding CoA proxy from packets which travel the reverse path. The result is that a NAS will only ever receive CoA packets which contain either attributes sent by the NAS to the RADIUS server, or attributes which are required to perform a change of authorization.

We note that the above requirement applies not only to Operator-Name and Operator-NAS-Identifier, but also to any future attributes which are added by a RADIUS proxy.

In short, proxies SHOULD behave much like a CoA server, and where possible, perform many of the same validations done by a CoA server.

## 5. Functionality

This section describes how the two attributes work together to permit CoA proxying.

### 5.1. User Login

In this scenario, we follow a roaming user attempting authentication in a visited network. The login attempt is done via a visited NAS. That NAS will send an Access-Request packet to the visited RADIUS server. The visited RADIUS server will see that the user is roaming, and proxy the authentication request to an upstream server. That server may be the home server for the user, or it may be another proxy.

The visited RADIUS server should add an Operator-Name attribute, with value "1" followed by it's own realm name. e.g. "1example.com". Where the visited network has multiple realms, it MUST choose a realm name which permits packets to be routed back to itself. The visited RADIUS server MAY also add an Operator-NAS-Identifier as discussed below.

The upstream proxy or proxies will then forward the packet to the home server. Intermediate proxies MUST NOT modify the contents of, or delete the Operator-Name or Operator-NAS-Identifier attributes.

The Home Server SHOULD record both Operator-Name and Operator-NAS-Identifier along with other information about the users session.

## [5.2.](#) CoA Proxing

When the Home Server decides to disconnect a user, it looks up the Operator-Name and Operator-NAS-Identifier, along with other user session identifiers as described in [[RFC5176](#)]. It then looks up the Operator-Name in the logical AAA routing table to find the CoA server for that realm (which may be a proxy). The CoA-Request is then sent

to that server.

The CoA server receives the request, and if it is a proxy, performs a similar lookup as done by the Home Server. The packet is then proxied repeatedly until it reaches the Visited Network.

If the proxy cannot find a destination for the request, or if no Operator-Name attribute exists in the request, the proxy returns a CoA-NAK with Error-Cause 502 (Request Not Routable).

The Visited Network receives the CoA-Request packet, and uses the

Operator-NAS-Identifier attribute to determine which local CoA server (i.e. NAS) the packet should be sent to.

If no CoA server can be found, the Visited Network return a CoA-NAK with Error-Cause 403 (NAS Identification Mismatch).

Any response from the CoA server (NAS) is returned to the Home Network.

## 6. Security Considerations

This specification incorporates by reference the [[RFC6929](#)] [Section 11](#). In short, RADIUS has known issues which are discussed there.

This specification adds one new attribute, and defines new behavior for RADIUS proxying. As this behavior mirrors existing RADIUS proxying, we do not believe that it introduces any new security issues.

Operator-NAS-Identifier should remain secure. We don't say how.

## 7. IANA Considerations

IANA is instructed to allocated one new RADIUS attribute, as per [Section 3.1](#), above.

## 8. References

### 8.1. Normative References

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## Acknowledgments

Stuff

## Authors' Addresses

Alan DeKok  
The FreeRADIUS Server Project

Email: [aland@freeradius.org](mailto:aland@freeradius.org)

Jouni Korhonen  
Broadcom Corporation  
3151 Zanker Road  
San Jose, California 95134  
United States

EMail: [jouni.nospam@gmail.com](mailto:jouni.nospam@gmail.com)