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DTLS as a Transport Layer for RADIUS  
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## Abstract

The RADIUS protocol [[RFC2865](#)] has limited support for authentication and encryption of RADIUS packets. The protocol transports data "in the clear", although some parts of the packets can have "obfuscated" content. Packets may be replayed verbatim by an attacker, and client-server authentication is based on fixed shared secrets. This document specifies how the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol may be used as a fix for these problems. It also describes how implementations of this proposal can co-exist with current RADIUS systems.

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## 1. Introduction

The RADIUS protocol as described in [[RFC2865](#)], [[RFC2866](#)], [[RFC5176](#)], and others has traditionally used methods based on MD5 [[RFC1321](#)] for per-packet authentication and integrity checks. However, the MD5 algorithm has known weaknesses such as [[MD5Attack](#)] and [[MD5Break](#)]. As a result, some specifications such as [[RFC5176](#)] have recommended using IPsec to secure RADIUS traffic.

While RADIUS over IPsec has been widely deployed, there are difficulties with this approach. The simplest point against IPsec is that there is no straightforward way for a RADIUS application to control or monitor the network security policies. That is, the requirement that the RADIUS traffic be encrypted and/or authenticated is implicit in the network configuration, and is not enforced by the RADIUS application.

This specification takes a different approach. We define a method for using DTLS [[RFC6347](#)] as a RADIUS transport protocol. This approach has the benefit that the RADIUS application can directly monitor and control the security policies associated with the traffic that it processes.

Another benefit is that RADIUS over DTLS continues to be a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) based protocol. This continuity ensures that existing network-layer infrastructure (firewall rules, etc.) does not need to be changed when RADIUS clients and servers are upgraded to support RADIUS over DTLS.

This specification does not, however, solve all of the problems associated with RADIUS. The DTLS protocol does not add reliable or in-order transport to RADIUS. DTLS also does not support fragmentation of application-layer messages, or of the DTLS messages themselves. This specification therefore shares with traditional RADIUS the issues of order, reliability, and fragmentation.

### 1.1. Terminology

This document uses the following terms:

#### RADIUS/DTLS

This term is a short-hand for "RADIUS over DTLS".

#### RADIUS/DTLS client

This term refers both to RADIUS clients as defined in [[RFC2865](#)], and to Dynamic Authorization clients as defined in [[RFC5176](#)], that implement RADIUS/DTLS.

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#### RADIUS/DTLS server

This term refers both to RADIUS servers as defined in [[RFC2865](#)], and to Dynamic Authorization servers as defined in [[RFC5176](#)], that implement RADIUS/DTLS.

#### RADIUS/UDP

RADIUS over UDP, as defined in [[RFC2865](#)].

#### RADIUS/TLS

RADIUS over TLS, as defined in [[RFC6614](#)].

#### silently discard

This means that the implementation discards the packet without further processing.

### 1.2. Requirements Language

In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements of the specification. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

## [2.](#) Building on Existing Foundations

Adding DTLS as a RADIUS transport protocol requires a number of changes to systems implementing standard RADIUS. This section outlines those changes, and defines new behaviors necessary to implement DTLS.

### [2.1.](#) Changes to RADIUS

The RADIUS packet format is unchanged from [[RFC2865](#)], [[RFC2866](#)], and [[RFC5176](#)]. Specifically, all of the following portions of RADIUS MUST be unchanged when using RADIUS/DTLS:

- \* Packet format
- \* Permitted codes

- \* Request Authenticator calculation
- \* Response Authenticator calculation
- \* Minimum packet length
- \* Maximum packet length
- \* Attribute format
- \* Vendor-Specific Attribute (VSA) format
- \* Permitted data types
- \* Calculations of dynamic attributes such as CHAP-Challenge, or Message-Authenticator.
- \* Calculation of "obfuscated" attributes such as User-Password and Tunnel-Password.
- \* UDP port numbering and relationship between code and port

In short, the application creates a RADIUS packet via the usual methods, and then instead of sending it over a UDP socket, sends the packet to a DTLS layer for encapsulation. DTLS then acts as a transport layer for RADIUS, hence the names "RADIUS/UDP" and "RADIUS/DTLS".

The requirement that RADIUS remain largely unchanged ensures the simplest possible implementation and widest interoperability of this specification.

We note that the DTLS encapsulation of RADIUS means that the minimum and maximum UDP packet sizes increase by the DTLS overhead. Implementations should be aware of this, and take it into account when allocating buffers to read and write RADIUS/DTLS packets.

The only changes made from RADIUS/UDP to RADIUS/DTLS are the following two items:

- (1) The Length checks defined in [\[RFC2865\] Section 3](#) MUST use the length of the decrypted DTLS data instead of the UDP packet

length.

- (2) The shared secret secret used to compute the MD5 integrity checks and the attribute encryption MUST be "radius/dtls".

All other aspects of RADIUS are unchanged.

## [2.2.](#) Similarities with RADIUS/TLS

While this specification can be thought of as RADIUS/TLS over UDP instead of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), there are some differences between the two methods. The bulk of [\[RFC6614\]](#) applies to this specification, so we do not repeat it here.

This section explains the differences between RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS, as semantic "patches" to [\[RFC6614\]](#). The changes are as follows:

- \* We replace references to "TCP" with "UDP"
- \* We replace references to "RADIUS/TLS" with "RADIUS/DTLS"
- \* We replace references to "TLS" with "DTLS"

Those changes are sufficient to cover the majority of the differences between the two specifications. The next section reviews some more detailed changes from [\[RFC6614\]](#), giving additional commentary only where necessary.

#### [2.2.1](#). Changes from RADIUS/TLS to RADIUS/DTLS

This section describes where this specification is similar to [\[RFC6614\]](#), and where it differs.

[Section 2.1](#) does not apply to RADIUS/DTLS. The relationship between RADIUS packet codes and UDP ports in RADIUS/DTLS is unchanged from RADIUS/UDP.

[Section 2.2](#) applies to RADIUS/DTLS. Servers and clients need to be preconfigured to use RADIUS/DTLS for a given endpoint.

Most of [Section 2.3](#) applies also to RADIUS/DTLS. Item (1) should be interpreted as applying to DTLS session initiation, instead of TCP connection establishment. Item (2) applies, except for the recommendation that implementations "SHOULD" support TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_RC4\_128\_SHA. This recommendation is a historical artifact of RADIUS/TLS, and does not apply to RADIUS/DTLS. Item (3) applies to RADIUS/DTLS. Item (4) applies, except that the fixed

shared secret is "radius/dtls", as described above.



[Section 2.4](#) does not apply to RADIUS/DTLS.

[Section 2.5](#) does not apply to RADIUS/DTLS. The relationship between RADIUS packet codes and UDP ports in RADIUS/DTLS is unchanged from RADIUS/UDP.

Sections [3.1](#), [3.2](#), and [3.3](#) apply to RADIUS/DTLS.

[Section 3.4](#) item (1) does not apply to RADIUS/DTLS. Each RADIUS packet is encapsulated in one DTLS packet, and there is no "stream" of RADIUS packets inside of a TLS session. Implementors MUST enforce the requirements of [\[RFC2865\] Section 3](#) for the RADIUS Length field, using the length of the decrypted DTLS data for the checks. This check replaces the RADIUS method of using the length field from the UDP packet.

[Section 3.4](#) item (3) does not apply to RADIUS/DTLS. The relationship between RADIUS packet codes and UDP ports in RADIUS/DTLS is unchanged from RADIUS.

[Section 3.4](#) item (4) does not apply to RADIUS/DTLS. As RADIUS/DTLS still uses UDP for a transport, the use of negative ICMP responses is unchanged from RADIUS.

[Section 4](#) does not apply to RADIUS/DTLS. Protocol compatibility considerations are defined in this document.

#### [2.2.2](#). Reinforcement of RADIUS/TLS

We re-iterate that much of [\[RFC6614\]](#) applies to this document. Specifically, [Section 4](#) and [Section 6](#) of that document are applicable in their entirety to RADIUS/DTLS.

### [3](#). Transition Path

Transitioning to DTLS is a process which needs to be done carefully. A poorly handled transition is complex for administrators, and potentially subject to security downgrade attacks. This section describes how clients and servers should transition to DTLS.

#### [3.1](#). Server Transition to DTLS

As this specification permits server implementations to accept both RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/DTLS packets on the same port, we require a method to disambiguate packets between the two protocols. This method is applicable only to RADIUS/DTLS servers.

RADIUS/DTLS servers MUST maintain a boolean "DTLS Required" flag for each client that indicates if it requires a client to use RADIUS/DTLS. The interpretation of this flag is as follows. If the flag is "true" then the client supports RADIUS/DTLS, and all packets from that client MUST be processed as RADIUS/DTLS. If the flag is "false", then the client supports RADIUS/UDP, but may still support RADIUS/DTLS. Packets from the client need to be examined to see if they are RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/DTLS.

The "DTLS Required" flag MUST be exposed to administrators of the server. As clients are upgraded, administrators can then manually mark them as using RADIUS/DTLS. The default value for the flag SHOULD be "false".

It is RECOMMENDED that the default value for the "DTLS Required" flag be set to "true" when this specification has achieved wide-spread adoption.

Once a RADIUS/DTLS server has established a DTLS session with a client that previously had the flag set to "false", the server MUST set the "DTLS Required" flag to "true". This change requires all subsequent traffic from that client to use DTLS, and prevents bidding-down attacks. The server SHOULD also notify the administrator that it has successfully established the first DTLS session with that client.

Note that this last requirement on servers can impose significant changes for clients. These changes are discussed in the next section.

#### 4. Client Transition

As this specification permits client implementations to send both RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/DTLS packets from the same address, we require guidelines for when to use one or the other. This method is applicable only to RADIUS/DTLS clients.

RADIUS/DTLS clients MUST maintain a boolean "DTLS Required" flag for each server that indicates if that server requires it to use RADIUS/DTLS. The interpretation of this flag is as follows. If the flag is "true" then the server supports RADIUS/DTLS, and all packets sent to that server MUST be RADIUS/DTLS. If the flag is "false", then the server supports RADIUS/UDP, but may still support RADIUS/DTLS. Packets sent to that server MUST be RADIUS/UDP.

The "DTLS Required" flag MUST be exposed to administrators of the

client. As servers are upgraded, administrators can then manually mark them as using RADIUS/DTLS. The default value for the flag

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SHOULD be "false".

It is RECOMMENDED that the default value for the "DTLS Required" flag be set to "true" when this specification has achieved wide-spread adoption.

RADIUS/DTLS clients SHOULD NOT probe servers to see if they support DTLS transport. Doing so would cause servers to immediately require that all new packets from the client use DTLS. This requirement may be difficult for a client to satisfy. Instead, clients SHOULD use DTLS as a transport layer only when administratively configured.

The requirements of this specification mean that RADIUS/DTLS clients can no longer have multiple independent RADIUS implementations, or processes that originate RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/DTLS packets. Instead, clients MUST use only one transport layer to communicate with a specific server. It is RECOMMENDED that clients use a local proxy as described in [Section 6.1](#), above.

## [5.](#) Connection Management

Where [\[RFC6614\]](#) can rely on the TCP state machine to perform connection tracking, this specification cannot. As a result, implementations of this specification may need to perform connection management of the DTLS session in the application layer. This section describes logically how this tracking is done. Implementations may choose to use the method described here, or another, equivalent method.

### [5.1.](#) Server Connection Management

A RADIUS/DTLS server MUST track ongoing client connections based on a key composed of the following 4-tuple:

- \* source IP address
- \* source port
- \* destination IP address
- \* destination port

Note that this key is independent of IP address version (IPv4 or IPv6).

Each entry associated with a key contains the following information:

Protocol Type

A flag which is either "RADIUS/UDP" for old-style RADIUS traffic, or "RADIUS/DTLS" for RADIUS/DTLS connections.

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DTLS Data

An implementation-specific variable containing information about the active DTLS connection. For non-DTLS connections, this variable MUST be empty.

Last Packet

A variable containing a timestamp which indicates when the last valid packet was received for this connection. Packets which are "silently discarded" MUST NOT update this variable.

Each entry may contain other information, such as idle timeouts, connection lifetimes, and other implementation-specific data.

5.1.1. Session Management

Session tracking is subject to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks due to the ability of an attacker to forge UDP traffic. RADIUS/DTLS servers SHOULD use the stateless cookie tracking technique described in [\[RFC6347\] Section 4.2.1](#). DTLS sessions SHOULD NOT be tracked until a ClientHello packet has been received with an appropriate Cookie value. The requirement to accept RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/DTLS on the same port makes this recommendation difficult to implement in practice. Server implementation SHOULD therefore have a way of tracking partially setup DTLS connections. Servers SHOULD limit both the number and impact on resources of partial connections.

Sessions (both key and entry) MUST be deleted when a TLS Closure Alert ([\[RFC5246\] Section 7.2.1](#)) or a TLS Error Alert ([\[RFC5246\] Section 7.2.2](#)) is received. When a session is deleted due to failed security, the DTLS session MUST be closed, and any TLS session resumption parameters for that session MUST be discarded, and all tracking information MUST be deleted.

Sessions MUST also be deleted when a RADIUS packet fails validation due to a packet being malformed, or when it has an invalid Message-Authenticator, or invalid Request Authenticator. There are other cases when the specifications require that a packet received via a DTLS session be "silently discarded". In those cases, implementations MAY delete the underlying session as described above. There are few reasons to communicate with a NAS which is not implementing RADIUS.

Once a DTLS session is established, a RADIUS/DTLS server SHOULD use DTLS Heartbeats [[RFC6520](#)] to determine connectivity between the two servers. A server may also use watchdog packets from the client to determine that the connection is still active.

As UDP does not guarantee delivery of messages, RADIUS/DTLS servers

MUST also maintain a "Last Packet" timestamp per DTLS session. The timestamp SHOULD be updated on reception of a valid RADIUS/DTLS packet. The timestamp MUST NOT be updated in other situations. When a session has not received a packet for a period of time, it is labelled "idle". The server SHOULD delete idle DTLS sessions after an "idle timeout". The server MAY cache the TLS session parameters, in order to provide for fast session resumption.

This session "idle timeout" SHOULD be exposed to the administrator as a configurable setting. It SHOULD NOT be set to less than 60 seconds, and SHOULD NOT be set to more than 600 seconds (10 minutes). The minimum value useful value for this timer is determined by the application-layer watchdog mechanism defined in the following section.

RADIUS/DTLS servers SHOULD also monitor the total number of sessions they are tracking. They SHOULD stop the creating of new sessions when a large number are already being tracked. This "maximum sessions" number SHOULD be exposed to administrators as a configurable setting.

RADIUS/DTLS servers SHOULD implement session resumption, preferably stateless session resumption as given in [[RFC5077](#)]. This practice lowers the time and effort required to start a DTLS session with a client, and increases network responsiveness.

### [5.1.2.](#) Protocol Disambiguation

When the "DTLS Required" flag for a client is set to "false", the client may, or may not be sending DTLS packets. For existing connections, protocol disambiguation is simple, the "Protocol Type" field in the session tracking entry is examined. New connections must still be disambiguated.

In order to provide a robust upgrade path, the RADIUS/DTLS server MUST examine the packet to see if it is RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/DTLS. This examination method is defined here.

We justify the examination methods by analysing the packet formats for the two protocols. We assume that the server has a buffer in which it has received a UDP packet matching no entry based on the 4-tuple key defined above. It must then analyse this buffer to determine which protocol is used to process the packet.

The DTLS record format ([\[RFC6347\] Section 4.1](#)) is shown below, in pseudo-code:

```
struct {
```

```
    uint8 type;
    uint16 version;
    uint16 epoch;
    uint48 sequence_number;
    uint16 length;
    uint8 fragment[DTLSPlaintext.length];
} DTLSPlaintext;
```

The RADIUS record format ([\[RFC2865\] Section 3](#)) is shown below, in pseudo-code, with AuthVector.length=16.

```
struct {
    uint8 code;
    uint8 id;
    uint16 length;
    uint8 vector[AuthVector.length];
    uint8 data[RadiusPacket.length - 20];
} RadiusPacket;
```

We can see here that a number of fields overlap between the two protocols. At first glance, it seems difficult for an application to accept both protocols on the same port. However, this is not the case.

The initial DTLS packet of a connection requires that the type field (first octet) has value 22 (handshake). The first octet of a RADIUS packet is the code field. The code value of 22 has been assigned as Resource-Free-Response. That code is intended to be a response from a server to a client, and will therefore never be sent by a client to a server.

As a result, protocol disambiguation for new connections to a server is straightforward. Only the first octet of the packet needs to be examined to disambiguate RADIUS/DTLS from RADIUS/UDP. If that octet has value 22, then the packet is likely to be RADIUS/DTLS. Otherwise, the packet is likely to be RADIUS/UDP.

#### [5.1.3.](#) Processing Algorithm

When a RADIUS/DTLS server receives a packet, it uses the following algorithm to process that packet. As with RADIUS/UDP, packets from unknown clients MUST be silently discarded.

The "DTLS Required" flag for that client is examined. If it is set to "true", then the packet MUST be processed as RADIUS/DTLS.

If the "DTLS Required" flag is set to "false", the session is looked up using the 4-tuple key defined above. Packets matching an existing

entry MUST be processed as defined by the "Protocol Type" field of that entry.

If the "DTLS Required" flag is set to "false" and no matching entry has been found, then the first octet of the packet is examined. If it has value 22, then the packet MUST be processed as RADIUS/DTLS. Otherwise, the packet MUST be processed as RADIUS/UDP.

In all cases, the packet MUST be checked for correctness. For RADIUS/UDP, any packets which are silently discarded MUST NOT affect the state of any variable in session tracking entry. For

RADIUS/DTLS, any packets which are discarded by the DTLS layer MUST NOT affect the state of any variable in the session tracking entry. For RADIUS/DTLS, any RADIUS packets which are subsequently silently discarded MUST result in the removal of the associated entry and key.

When the packet matches an existing key, and is accepted for processing by the server, the "Last Packet" timestamp is updated in that entry. Where the packet does not match an existing key, a new entry is created for that key. The "Protocol Type" flag for that entry is set to "RADIUS/DTLS", or "RADIUS/UDP", as determined by examining the first octet of the packet.

When a server has the clients "DTLS Required" flag set to "false", it MUST set the flag to "true" after establishing a DTLS session with that client. It MUST NOT set the flag to "true" until a DTLS session has been fully established. Doing so would mean that attackers could perform a DoS attack by sending forged DTLS ClientHello packets to a server.

Since UDP is stateless, the potential exists for the client to initiate a new DTLS session using a particular 4-tuple, before the server has closed the old session. For security reasons, the server must keep the old session active until it has received secure notification from the client that the session is closed. Or, when the server has decided for itself that the session is closed. Taking any other action would permit unauthenticated clients to perform a DoS attack, by closing active DTLS session.

As a result, servers MUST ignore any attempts to re-use an existing 4-tuple from an active session. This requirement can likely be reached by simply processing the packet through the existing session, as with any other packet received via that 4-tuple. Non-compliant, or unexpected packets will be ignored by the SSL layer.

The above requirement is mitigated by the suggestion in [Section 6.1](#), below, that the client use a local proxy for all RADIUS traffic. That proxy can then track the ports which it uses, and ensure that

re-use of 4-tuples is avoided. The exact process by which this tracking is done is outside of the scope of this document.

## [5.2](#). Client Connection Management



Clients SHOULD use Path MTU (PMTU) discovery [[RFC6520](#)] to determine the PMTU between the client and server, prior to sending any RADIUS traffic. Once a DTLS session is established, a RADIUS/DTLS client SHOULD use DTLS Heartbeats [[RFC6520](#)] to determine connectivity between the two servers. Alternatively, RADIUS/DTLS clients may use the application-layer watchdog algorithm defined in [[RFC3539](#)] to determine server responsiveness. The Status-Server packet defined in [[RFC5997](#)] SHOULD be used as the "watchdog packet" in any application-layer watchdog algorithm.

RADIUS/DTLS clients SHOULD pro-actively close sessions when they have been idle for a period of time. Clients SHOULD close a session when the DTLS Heartbeat algorithm indicates that the session is no longer active. Clients SHOULD close a session when no traffic other than watchdog packets and (possibly) watchdog responses have been sent for three watchdog timeouts. This behavior ensures that clients do not waste resources on the server by causing it to track idle sessions.

DTLS sessions MUST also be deleted when a RADIUS packet fails validation due to a packet being malformed, or when it has an invalid Message-Authenticator, or invalid Response Authenticator. There are other cases when the specifications require that a packet received via a DTLS session be "silently discarded". In those cases, implementations MAY delete the underlying DTLS session.

RADIUS/DTLS clients MUST NOT send both RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/DTLS packets over the same key of (source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port) as defined in [Section 4.1](#), above . Doing so would make it impossible to correctly process either kind of packet.

RADIUS/DTLS clients SHOULD NOT send both RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/DTLS packets to different servers from the same source socket. This practice causes increased complexity in the client application, and increases the potential for security breaches due to implementation issues.

RADIUS/DTLS clients SHOULD implement session resumption, preferably stateless session resumption as given in [[RFC5077](#)]. This practice lowers the time and effort required to start a DTLS session with a server, and increases network responsiveness.

## 6. Implementation Guidelines

The text above describes the protocol. In this section, we give additional implementation guidelines. These guidelines are not part of the protocol, but may help implementors create simple, secure, and inter-operable implementations.

Where a TLS pre-shared key (PSK) method is used, implementations **MUST** support keys of at least 16 octets in length. Implementations **SHOULD** support key lengths of 32 octets, and **SHOULD** allow for longer keys. The key data **MUST** be capable of being any value (0 through 255, inclusive). Implementations **MUST NOT** limit themselves to using textual keys. It is **RECOMMENDED** that the administration interface allow for the keys to be entered as hex strings.

It is **RECOMMENDED** that keys be derived from a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG). If managing keys is too complicated, a certificate-based TLS method **SHOULD** be used instead.

### 6.1. Client Implementations

RADIUS/DTLS clients **SHOULD** use connected sockets where possible. Use of connected sockets means that the underlying kernel tracks the sessions, so that the client subsystem does not need to. It is a good idea to leverage existing functionality.

RADIUS/DTLS clients **SHOULD** use a local proxy which arbitrates all RADIUS traffic between the client and all servers. The proxy **SHOULD** accept traffic only from the authorized subsystems on the client machine, and **SHOULD** proxy that traffic to known servers. Each authorized subsystem **SHOULD** include an attribute which uniquely identifies that subsystem to the proxy, so that the proxy can apply origin-specific proxy rules and security policies. We suggest using NAS-Identifier for this purpose.

Each client subsystem can include a subsystem-specific NAS-Identifier in each request. The format of this attribute is implementation-specific. The proxy **SHOULD** verify that the request originated from the local system, ideally via a loopback address. The proxy **MUST** then re-write any subsystem-specific NAS-Identifier to a NAS-Identifier which identifies the client as a whole. Or, remove NAS-Identifier entirely and replace it with NAS-IP-Address or NAS-IPv6-Address.

In traditional RADIUS, the cost to set up a new "session" between a client and server was minimal. The client subsystem could simply

open a port, send a packet, wait for the response, and then close the

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port. With RADIUS/DTLS, the connection setup is significantly more expensive. In addition, there may be a requirement to use DTLS in order to communicate with a server, so that traditional RADIUS would be ignored by that server. The knowledge of what protocol to use is best managed by a dedicated RADIUS subsystem, rather than by each individual subsystem on the client.

## 6.2. Server Implementations

RADIUS/DTLS servers SHOULD NOT use connected sockets to read DTLS packets from a client. This recommendation is because a connected UDP socket will accept packets only from one source IP address and port. This limitation would prevent the server from accepting packets from multiple clients on the same port.

## 7. Implementation Experience

Two implementations of RADIUS/DTLS exist, Radsecproxy, and jradius (<http://www.coova.org/JRadius>). Some experimental tests have been performed, but there are at this time no production implementations using RADIUS/DTLS.

[Section 4.2 of \[RFC6421\]](#) makes a number of recommendations about security properties of new RADIUS proposals. All of those recommendations are satisfied by using DTLS as the transport layer.

[Section 4.3 of \[RFC6421\]](#) makes a number of recommendations about backwards compatibility with RADIUS. [Section 3](#), above, addresses these concerns in detail.

[Section 4.4 of \[RFC6421\]](#) recommends that change control be ceded to the IETF, and that interoperability is possible. Both requirements are satisfied.

[Section 4.5 of \[RFC6421\]](#) requires that the new security methods apply to all packet types. This requirement is satisfied by allowing DTLS to be used for all RADIUS traffic. In addition, [Section 3](#), above, addresses concerns about documenting the transition from legacy RADIUS to crypto-agile RADIUS.

[Section 4.6 of \[RFC6421\]](#) requires automated key management. This requirement is satisfied by leveraging DTLS.

## [8.](#) Diameter Considerations

This specification defines a transport layer for RADIUS. It makes no other changes to the RADIUS protocol. As a result, there are no Diameter considerations.

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## [9.](#) IANA Considerations

This specification does not create any new registries, nor does it require assignment of any protocol parameters.

## [10.](#) Security Considerations

This entire specification is devoted to discussing security considerations related to RADIUS. However, we discuss a few additional issues here.

This specification relies on the existing DTLS, RADIUS/UDP, and RADIUS/TLS specifications. As a result, all security considerations for DTLS apply to the DTLS portion of RADIUS/DTLS. Similarly, the TLS and RADIUS security issues discussed in [\[RFC6614\]](#) also apply to this specification. All of the security considerations for RADIUS apply to the RADIUS portion of the specification.

However, many security considerations raised in the RADIUS documents are related to RADIUS encryption and authorization. Those issues are largely mitigated when DTLS is used as a transport method. The issues that are not mitigated by this specification are related to the RADIUS packet format and handling, which is unchanged in this specification.

The only new portion of the specification that could have security implications is a servers ability to accept both RADIUS and DTLS packets on the same port. The filter that disambiguates the two protocols is simple, and is just a check for the value of one octet. We do not expect this check to have any security issues.

We also note that nothing prevents malicious clients from sending DTLS packets to existing RADIUS implementations, or RADIUS packets to

existing DTLS implementations. There should therefore be no issue with clients sending RADIUS/DTLS packets to legacy servers that do not support the protocol. These packets will be silently discarded, and will not change the security profile of the server.

#### 10.1. Legacy RADIUS Security

We reiterate here the poor security of the legacy RADIUS protocol. It is RECOMMENDED that all RADIUS clients and servers implement this specification. New attacks on MD5 have appeared over the past few years, and there is a distinct possibility that MD5 may be completely broken in the near future.

The existence of fast and cheap attacks on MD5 could result in a loss of all network security which depends on RADIUS. Attackers could

obtain user passwords, and possibly gain complete network access. We cannot overstate the disastrous consequences of a successful attack on RADIUS.

We also caution implementors (especially client implementors) about using RADIUS/DTLS. It may be tempting to use the shared secret as the basis for a TLS pre-shared key (PSK) method, and to leave the user interface otherwise unchanged. This practice **MUST NOT** be used. The administrator **MUST** be given the option to use DTLS. Any shared secret used for RADIUS/UDP **MUST NOT** be used for DTLS. Re-using a shared secret between RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/DTLS would negate all of the benefits found by using DTLS.

RADIUS/DTLS client implementors **MUST** expose a configuration that allows the administrator to choose the cipher suite. Where certificates are used, RADIUS/DTLS client implementors **MUST** expose a configuration which allows an administrator to configure all certificates necessary for certificate-based authentication. These certificates include client, server, and root certificates.

TLS-PSK methods are susceptible to dictionary attacks. [Section 6](#), above, recommends deriving TLS-PSK keys from a CSPRNG, which makes dictionary attacks significantly more difficult. Servers **SHOULD** track failed client connections by TLS-PSK ID, and block TLS-PSK IDs which seem to be attempting brute-force searches of the keyspace.

The previous RADIUS practice of using shared secrets that are minor variations of words is NOT RECOMMENDED, as it would negate all of the security of DTLS.

## [10.2.](#) Resource Exhaustion

The use of DTLS allows DoS attacks, and resource exhaustion attacks which were not possible in RADIUS/UDP. These attacks are the similar to those described in [\[RFC6614\] Section 6](#), for TCP.

Session tracking as described in [Section 5.1](#) can result in resource exhaustion. Servers MUST therefore limit the absolute number of sessions that they track. Servers MUST limit the number of partially open DTLS sessions. These limits SHOULD be exposed to the administrator as configurable settings.

## [10.3.](#) Network Address Translation

Network Address Translation (NAT) is fundamentally incompatible with RADIUS/UDP. RADIUS/UDP uses the source IP address to determine the shared secret for the client, and NAT hides many clients behind one source IP address.

The migration flag described above in [Section 3](#) is also tracked per source IP address. Using a NAT in front of many RADIUS clients negates the function of the flag, making it impossible to migrate multiple clients in a secure fashion.

In addition, port re-use on a NAT gateway means that packets from different clients may appear to come from the same source port on the NAT. That is, a RADIUS server may receive a RADIUS/DTLS packet from a client IP/port combination, followed by the reception of a RADIUS/UDP packet from that same client IP/port combination. If this behavior is allowed, it would permit a downgrade attack to occur, and would negate all of the security added by RADIUS/DTLS.

As a result, RADIUS clients SHOULD NOT be located behind a NAT gateway. If clients are located behind a NAT gateway, then a secure transport such as DTLS MUST be used. As discussed below, a method for uniquely identifying each client MUST be used.

## [10.4.](#) Wildcard Clients

Some RADIUS server implementations allow for "wildcard" clients. That is, clients with an IPv4 netmask of other than 32, or an IPv6 netmask of other than 128. That practice is NOT RECOMMENDED for RADIUS/UDP, as it means multiple clients use the same shared secret.

When a client is a "wildcard", then RADIUS/DTLS MUST be used. Clients MUST be uniquely identified, and any certificate or PSK used MUST be unique to each client.

#### [10.5.](#) Session Closing

[Section 5.1.1](#) above requires that DTLS sessions be closed when the transported RADIUS packets are malformed, or fail various authenticator checks. This requirement is due to security considerations.

When an implementation has a DTLS connection, it is expected that the connection be used to transport RADIUS. Any non-RADIUS traffic on that connection means the other party is misbehaving, and a potential security risk. Similarly, any RADIUS traffic failing validation means that two parties do not share the same security parameters, and the session is therefore a security risk.

We wish to avoid the situation where a third party can send well-formed RADIUS packets which cause a DTLS connection to close. Therefore, in other situations, the session may remain open in the face of non-conformant packets.

#### [10.6.](#) Clients Subsystems

Many traditional clients treat RADIUS as subsystem-specific. That is, each subsystem on the client has its own RADIUS implementation and configuration. These independent implementations work for simple systems, but break down for RADIUS when multiple servers, fail-over, and load-balancing are required. They have even worse issues when DTLS is enabled.

As noted in [Section 6.1](#), above, clients SHOULD use a local proxy which arbitrates all RADIUS traffic between the client and all servers. This proxy will encapsulate all knowledge about servers,

including security policies, fail-over, and load-balancing. All client subsystems SHOULD communicate with this local proxy, ideally over a loopback address. The requirements on using strong shared secrets still apply.

The benefit of this configuration is that there is one place in the client which arbitrates all RADIUS traffic. Subsystems which do not implement DTLS can remain unaware of DTLS. DTLS connections opened by the proxy can remain open for long periods of time, even when client subsystems are restarted. The proxy can do RADIUS/UDP to some servers, and RADIUS/DTLS to others.

Delegation of responsibilities and separation of tasks are important security principles. By moving all RADIUS/DTLS knowledge to a DTLS-aware proxy, security analysis becomes simpler, and enforcement of correct security becomes easier.

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Parts of the text in [Section 3](#) defining the Request and Response Authenticators were taken with minor edits from [\[RFC2865\] Section 3](#).

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