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Session Authorization for RSVP

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Status of this Memo

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Abstract

This document describes the representation of session authorization information in the POLICY_DATA object [POL-EXT] for supporting policy-based per-session authorization and admission control in RSVP. The goal of session authorization is to allow the exchange of information between network elements in order to authorize the use of resources for a service and to co-ordinate actions between the signaling and transport planes. This document describes how a

process on a system authorizes the reservation of resources by a host and then provides that host with a session authorization policy element which can be inserted into the RSVP PATH message to facilitate proper and secure reservation of those resources within the network. We describe the encoding of media authorization information as RSVP policy elements and provide details relating to operations, processing rules and error scenarios.

1. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119].

2. Introduction

RSVP [RFC-2205] is a resource reservation setup protocol designed for an integrated services [RFC-1633] or DiffEdge [RFC-2998] Internet. The RSVP protocol is used by a host to request specific qualities of service from the network for particular application data streams or flows. RSVP is also used by routers to deliver quality-of-service (QoS) requests to all nodes along the path(s) of the flows and to establish and maintain state to provide the requested service. RSVP requests will generally result in resources being reserved in each node along the data path. RSVP allows users to obtain preferential access to network resources, under the control of an admission control mechanism. Such admission control is often based on user or application identity [I-REP], however, it is also valuable to provide the ability for per-session admission control.

In order to allow for per-session admission control, it is necessary to provide a mechanism for ensuring an RSVP request from a host has been properly pre-authorized before allowing the reservation of resources. In order to meet this requirement, there must be information in the RSVP message which may be used to verify the validity of the RSVP request. This may be done by providing the host with a token upon authorization which may be inserted into the RSVP PATH message and verified by the network.

We describe the session authorization element (AUTH_SESSION)

contained in the POLICY_DATA object. The user process must obtain an AUTH_SESSION object from an authorizing entity, which it may then pass to the RSVP process (service) on the originating host. The RSVP service then inserts the AUTH_SESSION object into the RSVP PATH message to allow verification of the network resource request. Network elements, such as routers, verify the request and then admit the RSVP message based on admission policy.

[S-AUTH] describes a framework in which a session authorization policy element may be utilized to contain information relevant to the network's decision to grant a reservation request.

3. Policy Element for Session Authorization Data

3.1 Policy Data Object Format

POLICY_DATA objects contain policy information and are carried by RSVP messages. A detail description of the format of POLICY_DATA object can be found in "RSVP Extensions for Policy Control" [POL-EXT].

3.2 Session Authorization Data Policy Element

In this section we describe a policy element (PE) called session authorization data (AUTH_SESSION). The AUTH_SESSION policy element contains a list of fields which describe the session, along with other attributes.



Length
The length of the policy element (including the Length and P-Type) is in number of octets (MUST be in multiples of 4) and indicates the end of the session authorization information block.

P-Type (Session Authorization Type)
The Policy element type (P-type) of this element. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) acts as a registry for policy element types for identity as described in [POL-EXT]. The definition for AUTH_SESSION is currently to be defined.

Session Authorization Attribute List
The session authorization attribute list is a collection of objects which describes the session and provides other information necessary to verify the RSVP request.

3.3 Session Authorization Attributes

A session authorization attribute may contain a variety of information and has both an attribute type and subtype. The attribute itself MUST be a multiple of 4 octets in length, and any attributes that are not a multiple of 4 octets long MUST be padded to a 4-octet boundary.



Length
The length field is two octets and indicates the actual length of the attribute (including Length, S-Type and SubType fields) in number of octets. The length does NOT include any bytes

padding to the value field to make the attribute a multiple of 4 octets long.

S-Type

Session authorization attribute type (S-Type) field is one octet. IANA SHALL act as a registry for S-Types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following S-Types:

1	AUTH_ENT_ID	The unique identifier of the entity which authorized the session.
2	AUTH_ENT_CRED	The credentials of the authorizing entity, such as a digital certificate.
3	SESSION_ID	Unique identifier for this session.
4	SOURCE_ADDR	Address specification for the session originator.
5	DEST_ADDR	Address specification for the session end-point.
6	START_TIME	The starting time for the session.
7	END_TIME	The end time for the session.
8	RESOURCES	The resources which the user is authorized to request.
9	DIGITAL_SIGNATURE	Digital signature of the session authorization policy element.

SubType

Session authorization attribute sub-type is one octet in length. The value of the SubType depends on the S-Type.

Value

The attribute specific information.

3.3.1 Authorizing Entity Identifier

AUTH_ENT_ID is used to identify the entity which authorized the initial service request and generated the session authorization policy element. The AUTH_ENT_ID may be represented in various formats, and the SubType is used to define the format for the ID. The format for AUTH_ENT_ID is as follows:



Length
: Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 4.

S-Type
: AUTH_ENT_ID

SubType
: The following sub-types for AUTH_ENT_ID are defined. IANA SHALL act as a registry for AUTH_ENT_ID sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub-types of AUTH_ENT_ID:

1	IPV4_ADDRESS	IPv4 address
2	IPV6_ADDRESS	IPv6 address
3	FQDN	Fully Qualified Domain Name
4	ASCII_DN	X.500 Distinguished name as defined in RFC-2253 as an ASCII string.
5	UNICODE_DN	X.500 Distinguished name as defined in RFC-2253 as a UNICODE string.
6	URI	Universal Resource Identifier, as defined in RFC-2396.
7	KRB_PRINCIPAL	Kerberos principal name as defined in RFC-1510.
8	KRB_REALM	Kerberos realm as defined in RFC-1510.

OctetString
: Contains the authorizing entity identifier.

3.3.2 Authorizing Entity Credentials

AUTH_ENT_CRED contains the credentials of the authorizing entity, which can then be used by the network to ensure that the entity which generated this session authorization policy element is a valid trusted entity.



Length
Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 4.

S-Type
AUTH_ENT_CRED

SubType
The type of credentials contained in this attribute. IANA SHALL act as a registry for AUTH_ENT_CRED sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub-types:

1	ASCII_ID	The authorizing entity identification in a plain ASCII text string.
2	UNICODE_ID	The authorizing entity identification in a plain UNICODE text string.
3	X509_V3_CERT	A chain of authorizing entity's X.509 V3 digital certificates.
4	PGP_CERT	The PGP digital certificate of the authorizing entity.

OctetString

Contains the authorizing entity credentials.

3.3.3 Session Identifier

SESSION_ID is a unique identifier for this session. It may be used for a number of purposes, including replay detection, or even mapping this request to a policy decision entry made by the authorizing entity. The SESSION_ID can be based on simple sequence number or on a standard NTP timestamp.



Length
Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 4.
Dependant on the environment, the session identifier will have different lengths in order to ensure uniqueness during the lifetime of a token (equal to the lifetime of the session). We recommend using an octet string of a minimum of 32 bit, but a value of 64 bit may be required in some environments.

S-Type
SESSION_ID

SubType
The following sub-types for SESSION_ID are defined. IANA SHALL act as a registry for SESSION_ID sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub-types of SESSION_ID:

1	ASCII_ID	Simple plain ASCII string identifier.
2	UNICODE_ID	Simple plain UNICODE string identifier.
3	OCTET_ID	Raw octet string identifier.
4	NTP_TIMESTAMP	NTP Timestamp Format as defined in RFC-1305.

OctetString
Contains the actual session identifier.

3.3.4 Source Address

SOURCE_ADDR is used to identify the source address specification of the authorized session. This S-Type MAY be useful in some scenarios to make sure the resource request has been authorized for that particular source IP address and/or port.



Length
Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 4.

S-Type
SOURCE_ADDR

SubType
The following sub types for SOURCE_ADDR are defined. IANA SHALL act as a registry for SOURCE_ADDR sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub types for SOURCE_ADDR:

1	IPV4_ADDRESS	IPv4 address
2	IPV6_ADDRESS	IPv6 address

3	UDP_PORT	UDP port specification
4	TCP_PORT	TCP port specification

OctetString
The OctetString contains the source address information.

3.3.5 Destination Address

DEST_ADDR is used to identify the destination address of the authorized session. This S-Type MAY be useful in some scenarios to make sure the resource request has been authorized for that particular destination IP address and/or port.



Length
Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 4.

S-Type
DEST_ADDR

SubType
The following sub types for DEST_ADDR are defined. IANA SHALL act as a registry for DEST_ADDR sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub types for DEST_ADDR:

1	IPV4_ADDRESS	IPv4 address
2	IPV6_ADDRESS	IPv6 address
3	UDP_PORT	UDP port specification
4	TCP_PORT	TCP port specification

OctetString
The OctetString contains the destination address specification.

3.3.6 Start time

START_TIME is used to identify the start time of the authorized session. This S-Type MAY be useful in some scenarios to specify a start time for the authorized session.





Length
Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 4.

S-Type
START_TIME

SubType
The following sub types for START_TIME are defined. IANA SHALL act as a registry for START_TIME sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub types for START_TIME:

1	NTP_TIMESTAMP	NTP Timestamp Format as defined in RFC-1305.

OctetString
The OctetString contains the start time.

3.3.7 End time

END_TIME is used to identify the end time of the authorized session. This S-Type MAY be useful in some scenarios to specify a end time for the authorized session.



Length
Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 4.

S-Type
END_TIME

SubType
The following sub types for END_TIME are defined. IANA SHALL act as a registry for END_TIME sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub types for END_TIME:

1	NTP_TIMESTAMP	NTP Timestamp Format as defined in RFC-1305.

OctetString
The OctetString contains the end time.

3.3.8 Resources Authorized

RESOURCES is used to define the characteristics of the authorized session. This S-Type MAY be useful in some scenarios to specify the specific resources authorized to ensure the request fits the authorized specifications.



Length
Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 4.

S-Type
RESOURCES

SubType
The following sub-types for RESOURCES are defined. IANA SHALL act as a registry for RESOURCES sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub types for RESOURCES:

1	BANDWIDTH	Maximum bandwidth (kbps) authorized.
2	FLOW_SPEC	Flow spec specification as defined in RFC-2205.
3	SDP	SDP Media Descriptor as defined in RFC-2327.
4	DSCP	Differentiated services codepoint as defined in RFC-2474.

OctetString
The OctetString contains the resources specification.

3.3.9 Digital Signature

The DIGITAL_SIGNATURE attribute contains the digital signature of the AUTH_SESSION policy element and signs all the data in the policy element up to the DIGITAL_SIGNATURE. If the DIGITAL_SIGNATURE attribute has been included in the AUTH_SESSION policy element, it MUST be the last attribute in the list.

A summary of DIGITAL_SIGNATURE attribute format is described below.



Length
Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 4.

S-Type
DIGITAL_SIGNATURE

SubType
The following sub-types for DIGITAL_SIGNATURE are defined. IANA SHALL act as a registry for DIGITAL_SIGNATURE sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub types for DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:

1	DSA_SHA1	DSA signature using SHA1 [X.509].
2	RSA_SHA1	RSA signature using SHA1 [X.509].
3	RSA_MD5	RSA signature using MD5 [X.509].
4	HMAC_SHA1	HMAC with SHA1 [RFC 2104].
5	HMAC_MD5	HMAC with MD5 [RFC 2104].

OctetString
OctetString contains the digital signature of the AUTH_SESSION.

4. Framework

[S-AUTH] describes a framework in which the session authorization policy element may be utilized to transport information for use in authorizing resource reservation for media flows.

5. Message Processing Rules

5.1 Message Generation (RSVP Host)

An RSVP message is created as specified in [RFC-2205] with following modifications.

1. RSVP message MUST contain at most one AUTH_SESSION policy element.

2. A Session Authorization policy element (AUTH_SESSION) is created and the IdentityType field is set to indicate the identity type in the policy element. Only the required Session Authorization attributes are added.

3. POLICY_DATA object (containing the AUTH_SESSION policy element) is inserted in the RSVP message in the appropriate place.

5.2 Message Reception (Router)

RSVP message is processed as specified in [RFC-2205] with following modifications.

1. If router is policy aware then it SHOULD send the RSVP message to the PDP and wait for response. If the router is policy unaware then it ignores the policy data objects and continues processing the RSVP message.

2. Reject the message if the response from the PDP is negative.

3. Continue processing the RSVP message.

5.3 Authorization (Router/PDP)

1. Retrieve the AUTH_SESSION policy element. Check the PE type field and return an error if the identity type is not supported.

2. Verify the authorizing entity credentials and message integrity.

   - Pre-shared key authentication: Get entity ID, identify appropriate pre-shared key for the authorizing entity, and validate signature.

   - Public Key: Validate the certificate chain against trusted Certificate Authority (CA) and valide the message signature using the public key.

   - Kerberos Ticket: Request a ticket for the authorizing entity from the local KDC. Use the ticket to access the authorizing entity and obtain authentication data for the message (e.g. the signing key) or the data itself.

3. Verify the requested QoS does not exceed the authorized QoS.

6. Error Signaling

If PDP fails to verify the AUTH_SESSION policy element then it MUST return policy control failure (Error Code = 02) to the PEP. The error values are described in [RFC-2205] and [POL-EXT]. Also PDP SHOULD supply a policy data object containing an AUTH_DATA Policy Element with A-Type=POLICY_ERROR_CODE containing more details on the Policy Control failure [I-REP]. The PEP will include this Policy Data object in the outgoing RSVP Error

message.

7. IANA Considerations

Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], session authorization attribute types (S-Type)in the range 0-127 are allocated through an IETF Consensus action, S-Type values between 128-255 are reserved for Private Use and are not assigned by IANA.

Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], AUTH_ENT_ID, AUTH_ENT_CRED, SESSION_ID, START_TIME, STOP_TIME, SOURCE_IP, DEST_IP, RESOURCES and DIGITAL_SIGNATURE SubType values in the range 0-127 are allocated through an IETF Consensus action, SubType values between 128-255 are reserved for Private Use and are not assigned by IANA.

8. Security Considerations

The purpose of this draft is to describe a mechanism for session authorization to prevent theft of service.

In order to ensure that the integrity of the token is preserved in some environments, the digital signature attribute SHOULD be used. In fact, since the token is to be relayed through the end host, which is usually considered untrusted, we strongly recommend the use of the digital signature attribute.

Simple authentication (e.g. plain ASCII or UNICODE) does not contain credential that can be securely authenticated and is inherently less secured.

The Kerberos authentication mechanism is reasonably well secured. Kerberos is more efficient than the PKI mechanism from computational point of view.

PKI authentication option should provide highest level of security and good scalability, however it requires infrastructure support and may have performance impacts.

9. Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Francois Audet, Don Wade, Hamid Syed, Kwok Ho Chan and many others for their valuable comments.

In addition, we would like to thank S. Yadav, et al, for their efforts on RFC 3182, as this document borrows from their work.

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12. Full Copyright Statement

Expiration Date

This memo is filed as <draft-ietf-rap-rsvp-authsession-02.txt>, and expires August 31, 2002.