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## **Framework for session set-up with media authorization**

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### Abstract

Establishing multimedia streams must take into account requirements for end-to-end QoS, authorization of network resource usage and accurate accounting for resources used. During session set up, policies may be enforced to ensure that the media streams being requested lie within the bounds of the service profile established for the requesting host. Similarly, when a host requests resources to provide a certain QoS for a packet flow, policies may be enforced to ensure that the required resources lie within the bounds of the resource profile established for the requesting host.

To prevent fraud and to ensure accurate billing, we describe various

scenarios and mechanisms that provide the linkage required to verify that the resources being used to provide a requested QoS are in-line with the media streams requested (and authorized) for the session.

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## 1. Introduction

Establishing multimedia streams must take into account requirements for end-to-end QoS, authorization of network resource usage and accurate accounting for resources used. During session set up, policies may be enforced to ensure that the media streams being requested lie within the bounds of the service profile established for the requesting host. Similarly, when a host requests resources to provide a certain QoS for a packet flow, policies may be enforced to ensure that the required resources lie within the bounds of the resource profile established for the requesting host.

Mechanisms have been defined through which end hosts can use a session control protocol (e.g. SIP [9]) to indicate that QoS requirements must be met in order to successfully set up a session. However, a separate protocol (e.g. RSVP [10]) is used to request the resources required to meet the end-to-end QoS of the media stream. To prevent fraud and to ensure accurate billing, some linkage is required to verify that the resources being used to provide the requested QoS are in-line with the media streams requested (and authorized) for the session.

This document describes such a linkage through use of a "token" that provides capabilities similar to that of a gate in [7] and of a ticket in the push model of [2]. The token is generated by a policy server (or a session manager) and is transparently relayed through the end host to the edge router where it is used as part of the policy-controlled flow admission process.

In some environments, authorization of media streams can exploit the fact that pre-established relationships exist between elements of the network (e.g. session managers, edge routers, policy servers and end hosts). In other environments, however, such pre-established relationships may not exist either due to the complexity of creating these associations a priori (e.g. in a network with many elements), or due to the different business entities involved (e.g. service provider and access provider), or due to the dynamic nature of these associations (e.g. in a mobile environment).

In this document, we describe these various scenarios and the mechanisms used for exchanging information between network elements in order to authorize the use of resources for a service and to coordinate actions between the session and resource management entities. Specific extensions to session control protocols (e.g. SIP [9], H.323), to resource reservation protocols (e.g. RSVP [6], YESSIR) and to policy managements protocols (e.g. COPS-PR [12], COPS-RSVP [5]) required to realize these scenarios and mechanisms are beyond the scope of this document.

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## Framework for session set-up with media authorization

For clarity, this document will illustrate the media authorization concepts using SIP for session signalling, RSVP for resource reservation and COPS for interaction with the policy servers. Note, however, that the framework could be applied to a multimedia services scenario using different signalling protocols.

## **2. Conventions used in this document**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119](#) [1].



### 3. Definition of terms

Figure 1 introduces a generic model for session establishment, QoS and policy enforcement.




Figure 1: Generic media authorization network model

EH - End Host: The End Host is a device used by a subscriber to access network services. The End Host includes a client for requesting network services (e.g. through SIP) and a client for requesting network resources (e.g. through RSVP).

ER - Edge Router: The Edge Router is a network element connecting the end host to the rest of the Resource Control District. The Edge Router contains a PEP to enforce policies related to resource usage in the Resource Control District by the End Host. It also contains a

signalling agent (e.g. for RSVP) for handling resource reservation requests from the End Host.

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PDP - Policy Decision Point: The PDP is a logical entity located in the Policy Server that is responsible for authorizing or denying access to services and/or resources.

PEP - Policy Enforcement Point: The PEP is a logical entity that enforces policy decisions made by the PDP. Note that other PEPs may reside in other network elements not shown in the model of Figure 1, however they will not be discussed in this document.

PS - Policy Server: The Policy Server is a network element that includes a PDP. Note that there may be a PS in the Service Control District to control use of services and there may be a separate PS in the Resource Control District to control use of resources along the packet forwarding path. Note also that network topology may require multiple Policy Servers within either district, however they provide consistent policy decisions to offer the appearance of a single PDP in each district.

RCD - Resource Control District: The Resource Control District is a logical grouping of elements that provide connectivity along the packet forwarding paths to and from an End Host. The RCD contains ER and PS entities whose responsibilities include management of resources along the packet forwarding paths.

SCD - Service Control District: The Service Control District is a logical grouping of elements that offer applications and content to subscribers of their services. The Session Management Server resides in the SCD along with a PS.

SMS - Session Management Server: The Session Management Server is a network element providing session management services (e.g. telephony call control). The Session Management Server contains a PEP to enforce policies related to use of services by the End Host. It also contains a signalling agent or proxy (e.g. for SIP) for handling service requests from the End Host.



#### 4. The Coupled Model

In some environments, a pre-established trust relationship exists between elements of the network (e.g. session managers, edge routers, policy servers and end hosts). We refer to this as the "coupled model", indicating the tight relationship between entities that is presumed. The key aspects of this scenario are the following:

- Policy decisions, including media authorization, are made by a single Policy Server.
- The Edge Router, Session Manager and Policy Server involved in establishing the session are known a priori. For example, the End Host may be configured to use a Session Manager associated with the Edge Router to which the EH is connected.
- There are pre-defined trust relationships between the SMS and the PS and between the ER and the PS.




Figure 2: The Coupled Model

##### 4.1 Coupled Model Message Flows

In this model, it is assumed that there is one Policy Server serving both the Service Control and Resource Control districts and that there are pre-defined trust relationships between the PS and SMS and between the PS and ER. Communications between these entities are then possible as described below. Only the originating side flows

are described for simplicity. The same concepts apply to the terminating side.

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## Framework for session set-up with media authorization

1. The End Host issues a session set-up request (e.g. SIP INVITE) to the Session Manager indicating, among other things, the media streams to be used in the session. As part of this step, the End Host may authenticate itself to the Session Manager.
2. The Session Manager, possibly after waiting for negotiation of the media streams to be completed, sends a policy decision request (e.g. COPS REQ) to the Policy Server in order to determine if the session set-up request should be allowed to proceed.
3. The Policy Server sends a decision (e.g. COPS DEC) to the Session Manager, possibly after modifying the parameters of the media to be used. Included in this response is a "token" that can subsequently be used by the Policy Server to identify the session and the media it has authorized.
4. The Session Manager sends a response to the End Host (e.g. SIP 200 or 183) indicating that session set-up is complete or is progressing. Included in this response is a description of the negotiated media along with the token from the Policy Server.
5. The End Host issues a request (e.g. RSVP PATH) to reserve the resources necessary to provide the required QoS for the media stream. Included in this request is the token from the Policy Server provided via the Session Manager.
6. The Edge Router intercepts the reservation request and sends a policy decision request (e.g. COPS REQ) to the Policy Server in order to determine if the resource reservation request should be allowed to proceed. Included in this request is the token from the Policy Server provided by the End Host. The Policy Server uses this token to correlate the request for resources with the media authorization previously provided to the Session Manager.
7. The Policy Server sends a decision (e.g. COPS DEC) to the Edge Router, possibly after modifying the parameters of the resources to be reserved.
8. The Edge Router, possibly after waiting for end-to-end negotiation for resources to be completed, sends a response to the End Host (e.g. RSVP RESV) indicating that resource reservation is complete or is progressing.



## **4.2 Coupled Model Authorization Token**

In the Coupled Model, the Policy Server is the only network entity that needs to interpret the contents of the token. Therefore, in this model, the contents of the token are implementation dependent. Since the End Host is assumed to be untrusted, the Policy Server should take measures to ensure that the integrity of the token is preserved in transit; the exact mechanisms to be used are also implementation dependent.

## **4.3 Coupled Model Protocol Impacts**

The use of a media authorization token in the Coupled Model requires the addition of new fields to several protocols:

- Resource reservation protocol. A new protocol field or object must be added to the resource reservation protocol to transparently transport the token from the End Host to the Edge Router. The content and internal structure (if any) of this object should be opaque to the resource reservation protocol. For example, this is achieved in RSVP with the Policy Data object defined in [\[11\]](#).
- Policy management protocol. A new protocol field or object must be added to the policy management protocol to transparently transport the token from the Policy Server to the Session Management Server and from the Edge Router to the Policy Server. The content and internal structure (if any) of this object should be opaque to the policy management protocol. For example, this is achieved in COPS-RSVP with the Policy Data object defined in [\[11\]](#).
- Session management protocol. A new protocol field or object must be added to the session management protocol to transparently transport the media authorization token from the Session Management Server to the End Host. The content and internal structure (if any) of this object should be opaque to the session management protocol.



## 5. The Associated Model <<using One Policy Server>>

In this scenario, there are multiple instances of the Session Management Servers, Edge Routers and Policy Servers. This leads to a network of sufficient complexity that it precludes distributing knowledge of network topology to all network entities. The key aspects of this scenario are the following:

- Policy decisions, including media authorization, are made by the same Policy Server for both the Session Manager and the Edge Router. However, the Policy Server may change on per-transaction basis.
- The Edge Router, Session Manager and Policy Server involved in establishing the session are not known a priori. For example, the End Host may be dynamically configured to use one of a pool of Session Managers and each of the Session Managers may be statically configured to use one of a pool of Policy Servers.

In another example, the End Host may be mobile and continually changing the Edge Router that its point of attachment uses to communicate with the rest of the network.

- There are pre-defined trust relationships between the SMS and the PS and between the ER and the PS.




Figure 3: The Associated Model using One Policy Server



### **5.1 Associated Model Message Flows <<using One Policy Server>>**

In this model, it is assumed that a Policy Server can make decisions for both the Service Control and Resource Control districts and that there are pre-defined trust relationships between the PS and SMS and between the PS and ER. Communications between these entities are then possible as described below. Only the originating side flows are described for simplicity. The same concepts apply to the terminating side.

1. The End Host issues a session set-up request (e.g. SIP INVITE) to the Session Manager indicating, among other things, the media streams to be used in the session. As part of this step, the End Host may authenticate itself to the Session Manager.
2. The Session Manager, possibly after waiting for negotiation of the media streams to be completed, sends a policy decision request (e.g. COPS REQ) to the Policy Server in order to determine if the session set-up request should be allowed to proceed.
3. The Policy Server sends a decision (e.g. COPS DEC) to the Session Manager, possibly after modifying the parameters of the media to be used. Included in this response is a "token" that can subsequently be used by the Policy Server to identify the session and the media it has authorized.
4. The Session Manager sends a response to the End Host (e.g. SIP 200 or 183) indicating that session set-up is complete or is progressing. Included in this response is a description of the negotiated media along with the token from the Policy Server.
5. The End Host issues a request (e.g. RSVP PATH) to reserve the resources necessary to provide the required QoS for the media stream. Included in this request is the token from the Policy Server provided via the Session Manager.
6. The Edge Router intercepts the reservation request and inspects the token to learn which Policy Server authorized the media. It then sends a policy decision request to that Policy Server in order to determine if the resource reservation request should be allowed to proceed. Included in this request is the token from the Policy Server provided by the End Host. The Policy Server uses this token to correlate the request for resources with the media authorization previously provided to the Session Manager.
7. The Policy Server sends a decision to the Edge Router, possibly after modifying the parameters of the resources to be reserved.





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8. The Edge Router, possibly after waiting for end-to-end negotiation for resources to be completed, sends a response to the End Host (e.g. RSVP RESV) indicating that resource reservation is complete or is progressing.

## **5.2 Associated Model Authorization Token <<using One Policy Server>>**

Since the ER does not know which SMS and PS are involved in session establishment, the token must include:

- A correlation identifier. This is information that the Policy Server can use to correlate the resource reservation request with the media authorized during session set up. The Policy Server is the only network entity that needs to interpret the contents of the correlation identifier therefore, in this model, the contents of the correlation identifier are implementation dependent. Since the End Host is assumed to be untrusted, the Policy Server should take measures to ensure that the integrity of the correlation identifier is preserved in transit; the exact mechanisms to be used are also implementation dependent.
- The identity of the authorizing entity. This information is used by the Edge Router to determine which Policy Server should be used to solicit resource policy decisions.

In some environments, an Edge Router may have no means for determining if the identity refers to a legitimate Policy Server within its domain. In order to protect against redirection of authorization requests to a bogus authorizing entity, the token should also include:

- An authentication signature. This signature is calculated over all other fields of the token using an agreed mechanism. The Edge Router must be able to verify the signature using credentials of the signer to confirm a trust relationship. The mechanism used by the Edge Router is beyond the scope of this document.

The detailed semantics of an example token are defined in [\[6\]](#).

## **5.3 Associated Model Protocol Impacts <<using One Policy Server>>**

The use of a media authorization token in this version of the Associated Model requires the addition of new fields to several protocols:

- Resource reservation protocol. A new protocol field or object

must be added to the resource reservation protocol to  
transparently transport the token from the End Host to the Edge

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Router. The content and internal structure of this object must be specified so that the Edge Router can distinguish between the elements of the token described in [Section 5.2](#). For example, this is achieved in RSVP with the Policy Data object defined in [\[11\]](#).

- Policy management protocol. A new protocol field or object must be added to the policy management protocol to transparently transport the token -- or at least the correlation identifier -- from the Edge Router to the Policy Server. The content and internal structure of this object should be opaque to the policy management protocol. For example, this is achieved in COPS-RSVP with the Policy Data object defined in [\[11\]](#).
- Session management protocol. A new protocol field or object must be added to the session management protocol to transparently transport the media authorization token from the Session Management Server to the End Host. The content and internal structure of this object should be opaque to the session management protocol.

#### **[5.4](#) Associated Model Network Impacts <<using One Policy Server>>**

The use of a media authorization token in this version of the Associated Model requires that the Edge Router inspect the token to learn which Policy Server authorized the media. In some environments, it may not be possible for the Edge Router to perform this function; in these cases, an Associated Model using Two Policy Servers ([section 6](#)) is required.

This version of the Associated Model also requires that the Edge Router interact with multiple Policy Servers. Policy decisions are made by the same Policy Server for both the Session Manager and the Edge Router, however the Policy Server may change on per-transaction basis. Note that COPS does not currently allow PEPs to change PDP on a per-transaction basis. To use this model, a new framework and protocol must be defined for policy decision outsourcing. This model also implies that the Policy Servers are able to interact and/or make decisions for the Edge Router in a consistent manner (e.g. as though there is only a single RCD Policy Server). How this is accomplished is beyond the scope of this document.



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## 6. The Associated Model &lt;&lt;using Two Policy Servers&gt;&gt;

In this scenario, there are multiple instances of the Session Management Servers, Edge Routers and Policy Servers. This leads to a network of sufficient complexity that it precludes distributing knowledge of network topology to all network entities. The key aspects of this scenario are the following:

- Policy decisions, including media authorization, are made by Policy Servers.
- There is a PS in the Resource Control District that is separate from the PS in the Session Control District.
- The Edge Router, Session Manager and Policy Servers involved in establishing the session are not known a priori. For example, the End Host may be dynamically configured to use one of a pool of Session Managers or the End Host may be mobile and continually changing the Edge Router that it uses to communicate with the rest of the network.
- There is a pre-defined trust relationship between the SMS and the SCD PS.
- There is a pre-defined trust relationship between the ER and the RCD PS.
- There is a pre-defined trust relationship between the RCD and SCD Policy Servers.




Figure 4: The Associated Model using Two Policy Servers



### **6.1 Associated Model Message Flows <<using Two Policy Servers>>**

In this model, it is assumed that there is one Policy Server for the Service Control District and a different Policy Server for the Resource Control District. There are pre-defined trust relationships between the SCD PS and SMS, between the RCD PS and ER and between the RCD and SCD Policy Servers. Communications between these entities are then possible as described below. Only the originating side flows are described for simplicity. The same concepts apply to the terminating side.

1. The End Host issues a session set-up request (e.g. SIP INVITE) to the Session Manager indicating, among other things, the media streams to be used in the session. As part of this step, the End Host may authenticate itself to the Session Manager.
2. The Session Manager, possibly after waiting for negotiation of the media streams to be completed, sends a policy decision request (e.g. COPS REQ) to the SCD Policy Server in order to determine if the session set-up request should be allowed to proceed.
3. The SCD Policy Server sends a decision (e.g. COPS DEC) to the Session Manager, possibly after modifying the parameters of the media to be used. Included in this response is a "token" that can subsequently be used by the SCD Policy Server to identify the session and the media it has authorized.
4. The Session Manager sends a response to the End Host (e.g. SIP 200 or 183) indicating that session set-up is complete or is progressing. Included in this response is a description of the negotiated media along with the token from the SCD Policy Server.
5. The End Host issues a request (e.g. RSVP PATH) to reserve the resources necessary to provide the required QoS for the media stream. Included in this request is the token from the SCD Policy Server provided via the Session Manager.
6. The Edge Router intercepts the reservation request and sends a policy decision request (e.g. COPS REQ) to the RCD Policy Server in order to determine if the resource reservation request should be allowed to proceed. Included in this request is the token from the SCD Policy Server provided by the End Host.
7. The RCD Policy Server uses this token to learn which SCD Policy Server authorized the media. It then sends an authorization request [3] to that SCD Policy Server in order to determine if the resource reservation request should be allowed to proceed.

Included in this request is the token from the SCD Policy Server  
provided by the End Host.

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8. The SCD Policy Server uses this token to correlate the request for resources with the media authorization previously provided to the Session Manager. The SCD Policy Server sends a decision [3] to the RCD Policy Server on whether the requested resources are within the bounds authorized by the SCD Policy Server.
9. The RCD Policy Server sends a decision (e.g. COPS DEC) to the Edge Router, possibly after modifying the parameters of the resources to be reserved.
10. The Edge Router, possibly after waiting for end-to-end negotiation for resources to be completed, sends a response to the End Host (e.g. RSVP RESV) indicating that resource reservation is complete or is progressing

## **6.2 Associated Model Authorization Token <<using Two Policy Servers>>**

Since the RCD Policy Server does not know which SMS and SCD PS are involved in session establishment, the token must include:

- A correlation identifier. This is information that the SCD Policy Server can use to correlate the resource reservation request with the media authorized during session set up. The SCD Policy Server is the only network entity that needs to interpret the contents of the correlation identifier therefore, in this model, the contents of the correlation identifier are implementation dependent. Since the End Host is assumed to be untrusted, the SCD Policy Server should take measures to ensure that the integrity of the correlation identifier is preserved in transit; the exact mechanisms to be used are also implementation dependent.
- The identity of the authorizing entity. This information is used by the RCD Policy Server to determine which SCD Policy Server should be used to verify the contents of the resource reservation request.

In some environments, an RCD Policy Server may have no means for determining if the identity refers to a legitimate SCD Policy Server. In order to protect against redirection of authorization requests to a bogus authorizing entity, the token should include:

- An authentication signature. This signature is calculated over all other fields of the token using an agreed mechanism. The RCD Policy Server must be able to verify the signature using credentials of the signer to confirm a trust relationship. The mechanism used by the RCD Policy Server is beyond the scope of

this document.

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Note that the information in this token is the same as that in [Section 5.2](#) for the "One Policy Server" scenario.

The detailed semantics of an example token are defined in [\[6\]](#).

### **6.3 Associated Model Protocol Impacts <<using Two Policy Servers>>**

The use of a media authorization token in this version of the Associated Model requires the addition of new fields to several protocols:

- Resource reservation protocol. A new protocol field or object must be added to the resource reservation protocol to transparently transport the token from the End Host to the Edge Router. The content and internal structure of this object should be opaque to the resource reservation protocol. For example, this is achieved in RSVP with the Policy Data object defined in [\[11\]](#).
- Policy management protocol. A new protocol field or object must be added to the policy management protocol to transport the token from the SCD Policy Server to the Session Management Server and from the Edge Router to the RCD Policy Server. The content and internal structure of this object must be specified so that the Policy Servers can distinguish between the elements of the token described in [Section 6.2](#). For example, this is achieved in COPS-RSVP with the Policy Data object defined in [\[11\]](#).
- Session management protocol. A new protocol field or object must be added to the session management protocol to transparently transport the media authorization token from the Session Management Server to the End Host. The content and internal structure of this object should be opaque to the session management protocol.

Note that these impacts are the same as those discussed in [Section 5.3](#) for the "One Policy Server" scenario. However the use of two Policy Servers has one additional impact:

- Authorization protocol. A new protocol field or object must be added to the authorization protocol to transport the token from the RCD Policy Server to the SCD Policy Server. The content and internal structure of this object must be specified so that the Policy Servers can distinguish between the elements of the token described in [Section 6.2](#).



## 7. The Non-Associated Model

In this scenario, the Session Management Servers and Edge Routers are associated with different Policy Servers, the network entities do not have a priori knowledge of the topology of the network and there are no pre-established trust relationships between entities in the Resource Control District and entities in the Service Control District. The keys aspects of this scenario are the following:

- Policy decisions, including media authorization, are made by Policy Servers.
- The PS in the Resource Control District is separate from the PS in the Session Control District.
- There is a pre-defined trust relationship between the SMS and the SCD PS.
- There is a pre-defined trust relationship between the ER and the RCD PS.
- There are no pre-defined trust relationships between the ER and SMS or between the RCD and SCD Policy Servers.




Figure 5: The Non-Associated Model

### 7.1 Non-Associated Model Call Flow

In this model it is assumed that the policy servers make independent

decisions for their respective districts, obviating the need for  
information exchange between policy servers. This model also enables

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session authorization when communication between policy servers is not possible for various reasons. It may also be used as a means to speed up session setup and still ensure proper authorization is performed.

This model does not preclude the possibility that the policy servers may communicate at other times for other purposes (e.g. exchange of accounting information).

Communications between network entities in this model is described below. Only the originating side flows are described for simplicity. The same concepts apply to the terminating side.

1. The End Host issues a session set-up request (e.g. SIP INVITE) to the Session Manager indicating, among other things, the media streams to be used in the session. As part of this step, the End Host may authenticate itself to the Session Manager.
2. The Session Manager, possibly after waiting for negotiation of the media streams to be completed, sends a policy decision request (e.g. COPS REQ) to the SCD Policy Server in order to determine if the session set-up request should be allowed to proceed.
3. The SCD Policy Server sends a decision (e.g. COPS DEC) to the Session Manager, possibly after modifying the parameters of the media to be used. Included in this response is a "token" that can subsequently be used by the RCD Policy Server to determine what media has been authorized.
4. The Session Manager sends a response to the End Host (e.g. SIP 200 or 183) indicating that session set-up is complete or is progressing. Included in this response is a description of the negotiated media along with the token from the SCD Policy Server.
5. The End Host issues a request (e.g. RSVP PATH) to reserve the resources necessary to provide the required QoS for the media stream. Included in this request is the token from the SCD Policy Server provided via the Session Manager.
6. The Edge Router intercepts the reservation request and sends a policy decision request (e.g. COPS REQ) to the RCD Policy Server in order to determine if the resource reservation request should be allowed to proceed. Included in this request is the token from the SCD Policy Server provided by the End Host.
7. The RCD Policy Server uses this token to extract information about the media that was authorized by the SCD Policy Server. The RCD Policy Server uses this information in making its decision on

whether the resource reservation should be allowed to proceed.

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The Policy Server sends a decision (e.g. COPS DEC) to the Edge Router, possibly after modifying the parameters of the resources to be reserved.

8. The Edge Router, possibly after waiting for end-to-end negotiation for resources to be completed, sends a response to the End Host (e.g. RSVP RESV) indicating that resource reservation is complete or is progressing

## **7.2 Non-Associated Model Authorization Token**

In this model, the token must contain sufficient information to allow the RCD Policy Server to make resource policy decisions autonomously from the SCD Policy Server. The token is created using information about the session received by the SMS. The information in the token must include:

- Calling party IP address and port number (e.g. from SDP "c=" parameter).
- Called party IP address and port number (e.g. from SDP "c=" parameter).
- The characteristics of (each of) the media stream(s) authorized for this session (e.g. codecs, maximum bandwidth from SDP "m=" and/or "b=" parameters).
- The lifetime of (each of) the media stream(s) (e.g. from SDP "t=" parameter).
- The authorization lifetime (e.g. the token should be valid for only a few seconds after the start time of the session).
- The identity of the authorizing entity to allow for validation of the token.
- An authentication signature used to prevent tampering with the token and to provide the credentials of the authorizing entity. This signature is calculated over all other fields of the token using an agreed mechanism. The RCD Policy Server must be able to verify the signature using credentials of the signer to confirm a trust relationship. The mechanism used by the RCD Policy Server is beyond the scope of this document.

The detailed semantics of the token are defined in [\[6\]](#).

## **7.3 Non-Associated Model Protocol Impacts**



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The use of a media authorization token in the Non-Associated Model requires the addition of new fields to several protocols:

- Resource reservation protocol. A new protocol field or object must be added to the resource reservation protocol to transparently transport the token from the End Host to the Edge Router. The content and internal structure of this object should be opaque to the resource reservation protocol. For example, this is achieved in RSVP with the Policy Data object defined in [\[11\]](#).
- Policy management protocol. A new protocol field or object must be added to the policy management protocol to transport the token from the SCD Policy Server to the Session Management Server and from the Edge Router to the RCD Policy Server. The content and internal structure of this object must be specified so that the Policy Servers can distinguish between the elements of the token described in [Section 7.2](#). For example, this is achieved in COPS-RSVP with the Policy Data object defined in [\[11\]](#).
- Session management protocol. A new protocol field or object must be added to the session management protocol to transparently transport the media authorization token from the Session Management Server to the End Host. The content and internal structure of this object should be opaque to the session management protocol.

## 8. Conclusions

In this document we have defined three models for authorizing media during session establishment:

- The Coupled Model which assumes a priori knowledge of network topology and where pre-established trust relationships exist between network entities.
- The Associated Model where there are common or trusted policy servers but knowledge of the network topology is not known a priori.
- The Non-Associated Model where knowledge of the network topology is not known a priori, where there are different policy servers involved and where a trust relationship does not exist between the policy servers.

The Associated Model is applicable to environments where the network elements involved in establishing a session have a pre-determined trust relationship but where their identities must be determined

dynamically during session set up. The Non-Associated Model is applicable to environments where there is a complex network topology

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and/or where trust relationships between domains do not exist (e.g. when they are different business entities).

In any given network, one or more of these models may be applicable. Indeed, the model to be used may be chosen dynamically during session establishment based on knowledge of the end points involved in the call. In all cases, however, there is no need for the End Host, the Edge Router or the Session Management Server to understand or interpret the authorization token - to them it is an opaque protocol element that is simply copied from one container protocol to another.

Finally, the framework defined in this document is extensible to any kind of session management protocol coupled to any one of a number of resource reservation and/or policy management protocols.

## 9. Security Considerations

The purpose of this draft is to describe a mechanism for media authorization to prevent theft of service. It does not cover other possible security breaches such as IP spoofing.

This draft assumes that trust relationships exist between various network entities, as described in each of the models. The means for establishing these relationships are beyond the scope of this document.

For the authorization token to be effective, its integrity must be guaranteed as it passes through untrusted network entities such as the End Host. This can be achieved by using digital signatures.

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