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## **Operations, Administration and Maintenance (OAM) features for RAW draft-ietf-raw-oam-support-00**

### Abstract

Some critical applications may use a wireless infrastructure. However, wireless networks exhibit a bandwidth of several orders of magnitude lower than wired networks. Besides, wireless transmissions are lossy by nature; the probability that a packet cannot be decoded correctly by the receiver may be quite high. In these conditions, guaranteeing the network infrastructure works properly is particularly challenging, since we need to address some issues specific to wireless networks. This document lists the requirements of the Operation, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) features recommended to construct a predictable communication infrastructure on top of a collection of wireless segments. This document describes the benefits, problems, and trade-offs for using OAM in wireless networks to achieve Service Level Objectives (SLO).

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## 1. Introduction

Reliable and Available Wireless (RAW) is an effort that extends DetNet to approach end-to-end deterministic performances over a network that includes scheduled wireless segments. In wired networks, many approaches try to enable Quality of Service (QoS) by implementing traffic differentiation so that routers handle each type of packets differently. However, this differentiated treatment was expensive for most applications.

Deterministic Networking (DetNet) [[RFC8655](#)] has proposed to provide a bounded end-to-end latency on top of the network infrastructure, comprising both Layer 2 bridged and Layer 3 routed segments. Their work encompasses the data plane, OAM, time synchronization, management, control, and security aspects.

However, wireless networks create specific challenges. First of all, radio bandwidth is significantly lower than for wired networks. In these conditions, the volume of signaling messages has to be very limited. Even worse, wireless links are lossy: a layer 2 transmission may or may not be decoded correctly by the receiver, depending on a broad set of parameters. Thus, providing high reliability through wireless segments is particularly challenging.

Wired networks rely on the concept of `_links_`. All the devices attached to a link receive any transmission. The concept of a link in wireless networks is somewhat different from what many are used to in wireline networks. A receiver may or may not receive a transmission, depending on the presence of a colliding transmission, the radio channel's quality, and the external interference. Besides, a wireless transmission is broadcast by nature: any `_neighboring_` device may be able to decode it. The document includes detailed information on what the implications for the OAM features are.

Last but not least, radio links present volatile characteristics. If the wireless networks use an unlicensed band, packet losses are not anymore temporally and spatially independent. Typically, links may exhibit a very bursty characteristic, where several consecutive packets may be dropped. Thus, providing availability and reliability on top of the wireless infrastructure requires specific Layer 3 mechanisms to counteract these bursty losses.

Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) Tools are of primary importance for IP networks [[RFC7276](#)]. It defines a toolset for fault detection, isolation, and performance measurement.

The primary purpose of this document is to detail the specific requirements of the OAM features recommended to construct a



predictable communication infrastructure on top of a collection of wireless segments. This document describes the benefits, problems, and trade-offs for using OAM in wireless networks to provide availability and predictability.

In this document, the term OAM will be used according to its definition specified in [[RFC6291](#)]. We expect to implement an OAM framework in RAW networks to maintain a real-time view of the network infrastructure, and its ability to respect the Service Level Objectives (SLO), such as delay and reliability, assigned to each data flow.

### **1.1. Terminology**

We re-use here the same terminology as [[detnet-oam](#)]:

- o OAM entity: a data flow to be controlled;
- o Maintenance End Point (MEP): OAM devices crossed when entering/exiting the network. In RAW, it corresponds mostly to the source or destination of a data flow. OAM message can be exchanged between two MEPs;
- o Maintenance Intermediate endPoint (MIP): OAM devices along the flow; OAM messages can be exchanged between a MEP and a MIP;
- o control/data plane: while the control plane expects to configure and control the network (long-term), the data plane takes the individual decision;
- o passive / active methods (as defined in [[RFC7799](#)]): active methods send additional control information (inserting novel fields, generating novel control packets). Passive methods infer information just by observing unmodified existing flows.
- o active methods may implement one of these two strategies:
  - \* In-band: control information follows the same path as the data packets. In other words, a failure in the data plane may prevent the control information to reach the destination (e.g., end-device or controller).
  - \* out-of-band: control information is sent separately from the data packets. Thus, the behavior of control vs. data packets may differ;

We also adopt the following terminology, which is particularly relevant for RAW segments.



- o piggybacking vs. dedicated control packets: control information may be encapsulated in specific (dedicated) control packets. Alternatively, it may be piggybacked in existing data packets, when the MTU is larger than the actual packet length. Piggybacking makes specifically sense in wireless networks: the cost (bandwidth and energy) is not linear with the packet size.
- o router-over vs. mesh under: a control packet is either forwarded directly to the layer-3 next hop (mesh under) or handled hop-by-hop by each router. While the latter option consumes more resource, it allows to collect additionnal intermediary information, particularly relevant in wireless networks.
- o Defect: a temporary change in the network (e.g., a radio link which is broken due to a mobile obstacle);
- o Fault: a definite change which may affect the network performance, e.g., a node runs out of energy.

## **1.2. Acronyms**

OAM Operations, Administration, and Maintenance

DetNet Deterministic Networking

SLO Service Level Objective

QoS Quality of Service

SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol

SDN Software-Defined Network

## **1.3. Requirements Language**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## **2. Role of OAM in RAW**

RAW networks expect to make the communications reliable and predictable on top of a wireless network infrastructure. Most critical applications will define an SLO to be required for the data flows it generates. RAW considers network plane protocol elements



such as OAM to improve the RAW operation at the service and the forwarding sub-layers.

To respect strict guarantees, RAW relies on an orchestrator able to monitor and maintain the network. Typically, a Software-Defined Network (SDN) controller is in charge of scheduling the transmissions in the deployed network, based on the radio link characteristics, SLO of the flows, the number of packets to forward. Thus, resources have to be provisioned a priori to handle any defect. OAM represents the core of the pre-provisioning process and maintains the network operational by updating the schedule dynamically.

Fault-tolerance also assumes that multiple paths have to be provisioned so that an end-to-end circuit keeps on existing whatever the conditions. The Packet Replication and Elimination Function ([[PREF-draft](#)]) on a node is typically controlled by a central controller/orchestrator. OAM mechanisms can be used to monitor that PREOF is working correctly on a node and within the domain.

To be energy-efficient, reserving some dedicated out-of-band resources for OAM seems idealistic, and only in-band solutions are considered here.

RAW supports both proactive and on-demand troubleshooting.

The specific characteristics of RAW are discussed below.

### **2.1. Link concept and quality**

In wireless networks, a `_link_` does not exist physically. A common convention is to define a wireless link as a pair of devices that have a non-null probability of exchanging a packet that the receiver can decode. Similarly, we designate as `*neighbor*` any device with a radio link with a specific transmitter.

Each wireless link is associated with a link quality, often measured as the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), i.e., the probability that the receiver can decode the packet correctly. It is worth noting that this link quality depends on many criteria, such as the level of external interference, the presence of concurrent transmissions, or the radio channel state. This link quality is even time-variant.

### **2.2. Broadcast Transmissions**

In modern switching networks, the unicast transmission is delivered uniquely to the destination. Wireless networks are much closer to the ancient `*shared access*` networks. Practically, unicast and broadcast frames are handled similarly at the physical layer. The



link layer is just in charge of filtering the frames to discard irrelevant receptions (e.g., different unicast MAC address).

However, contrary to wired networks, we cannot be sure that a packet is received by *\*all\** the devices attached to the layer-2 segment. It depends on the radio channel state between the transmitter(s) and the receiver(s). In particular, concurrent transmissions may be possible or not, depending on the radio conditions (e.g., do the different transmitters use a different radio channel or are they sufficiently spatially separated?)

### **2.3. Complex Layer 2 Forwarding**

Multiple neighbors may receive a transmission. Thus, anycast layer-2 forwarding helps to maximize the reliability by assigning multiple receivers to a single transmission. That way, the packet is lost only if *\*none\** of the receivers decode it. Practically, it has been proven that different neighbors may exhibit very different radio conditions, and that reception independency may hold for some of them [[anycast-property](#)].

## **3. Operation**

OAM features will enable RAW with robust operation both for forwarding and routing purposes.

### **3.1. Information Collection**

The model to exchange information should be the same as for detnet network, for the sake of inter-operability. YANG may typically fulfill this objective.

However, RAW networks imply specific constraints (e.g., low bandwidth, packet losses, cost of medium access) that may require to minimize the volume of information to collect. Thus, we discuss in [Section 4.2](#) the different ways to collect information, i.e., transfer physically the OAM information from the emitter to the receiver.

### **3.2. Continuity Check**

Similarly to detnet, we need to verify that the source and the destination are connected (at least one valid path exists)

### **3.3. Connectivity Verification**

As in detnet, we have to verify the absence of misconnection. We will focus here on the RAW specificities.



Because of radio transmissions' broadcast nature, several receivers may be active at the same time to enable anycast Layer 2 forwarding. Thus, the connectivity verification must test any combination. We also consider priority-based mechanisms for anycast forwarding, i.e., all the receivers have different probabilities of forwarding a packet. To verify a delay SLO for a given flow, we must also consider all the possible combinations, leading to a probability distribution function for end-to-end transmissions. If this verification is implemented naively, the number of combinations to test may be exponential and too costly for wireless networks with low bandwidth.

### **3.4. Route Tracing**

Wireless networks are meshed by nature: we have many redundant radio links. These meshed networks are both an asset and a drawback: while several paths exist between two endpoints, and we should choose the most efficient one(s), concerning specifically the reliability, and the delay.

Thus, multipath routing can be considered to make the network fault-tolerant. Even better, we can exploit the broadcast nature of wireless networks to exploit meshed multipath routing: we may have multiple Maintenance Intermediate Endpoints (MIE) for each hop in the path. In that way, each Maintenance Intermediate Endpoint has several possible next hops in the forwarding plane. Thus, all the possible paths between two maintenance endpoints should be retrieved, which may quickly become untractable if we apply a naive approach.

### **3.5. Fault Verification/detection**

Wired networks tend to present stable performances. On the contrary, wireless networks are time-variant. We must consequently make a distinction between `_normal_` evolutions and malfunction.

### **3.6. Fault Isolation/identification**

The network has isolated and identified the cause of the fault. While detnet already expects to identify malfunctions, some problems are specific to wireless networks. We must consequently collect metrics and implement algorithms tailored for wireless networking.

For instance, the decrease in the link quality may be caused by several factors: external interference, obstacles, multipath fading, mobility. It is fundamental to be able to discriminate the different causes to make the right decision.



#### **4. Administration**

The RAW network has to expose a collection of metrics to support an operator making proper decisions, including:

- o Packet losses: the time-window average and maximum values of the number of packet losses have to be measured. Many critical applications stop to work if a few consecutive packets are dropped;
- o Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) is a very common metric in wireless to denote the link quality. The radio chipset is in charge of translating a received signal strength into a normalized quality indicator;
- o Delay: the time elapsed between a packet generation / enqueueing and its reception by the next hop;
- o Buffer occupancy: the number of packets present in the buffer, for each of the existing flows.

These metrics should be collected per device, virtual circuit, and path, as detnet already does. However, we have to face in RAW to a finer granularity:

- o per radio channel to measure, e.g., the level of external interference, and to be able to apply counter-measures (e.g., blacklisting).
- o per link to detect misbehaving link (assymetrical link, fluctuating quality).
- o per resource block: a collision in the schedule is particularly challenging to identify in radio networks with spectrum reuse. In particular, a collision may not be systematic (depending on the radio characteristics and the traffic profile)

##### **4.1. Worst-case metrics**

RAW inherits the same requirements as detnet: we need to know the distribution of a collection of metrics. However, wireless networks are known to be highly variable. Changes may be frequent, and may exhibit a periodical pattern. Collecting and analyzing this amount of measurements is challenging.

Wireless networks are known to be lossy, and RAW has to implement strategies to improve reliability on top of unreliable links. Hybrid Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) has typically to enable



retransmissions based on the end-to-end reliability and latency requirements.

#### **4.2. Efficient data retrieval**

We have to minimize the number of statistics / measurements to exchange:

- o energy efficiency: low-power devices have to limit the volume of monitoring information since every bit consumes energy.
- o bandwidth: wireless networks exhibit a bandwidth significantly lower than wired, best-effort networks.
- o per-packet cost: it is often more expensive to send several packets instead of combining them in a single link-layer frame.

In conclusion, we have to take care of power and bandwidth consumption. The following techniques aim to reduce the cost of such maintenance:

on-path collection: some control information is inserted in the data packets if they do not fragment the packet (i.e., the MTU is not exceeded). Information Elements represent a standardized way to handle such information;

flags/fields: we have to set-up flags in the packets to monitor to be able to monitor the forwarding process accurately. A sequence number field may help to detect packet losses. Similarly, path inference tools such as [[ipath](#)] insert additional information in the headers to identify the path followed by a packet a posteriori.

hierarchical monitoring; localized and centralized mechanisms have to be combined together. Typically, a local mechanism should continuously monitor a set of metrics and trigger distant OAM exchanges only when a fault is detected (but possibly not identified). For instance, local temporary defects must not trigger expensive OAM transmissions.

### **5. Maintenance**

RAW needs to implement a self-healing and self-optimization approach. The network must continuously retrieve the state of the network, to judge about the relevance of a reconfiguration, quantifying:

the cost of the sub-optimality: resources may not be used optimally (e.g., a better path exists);



the reconfiguration cost: the controller needs to trigger some reconfigurations. For this transient period, resources may be twice reserved, and control packets have to be transmitted.

Thus, reconfiguration may only be triggered if the gain is significant.

### **5.1. Dynamic Resource Reservation**

Wireless networks exhibit time-variant characteristics. Thus, the network has to provide additional resources along the path to fit the worst-case performance. This time-variant characteristics make the resource reservation very challenging: over-reaction waste radio and energy resources. Inversely, under-reaction jeopardize the network operations, and some SLO may be violated.

### **5.2. Reliable Reconfiguration**

Wireless networks are known to be lossy. Thus, commands may be received or not by the node to reconfigure. Unfortunately, inconsistent states may create critical misconfigurations, where packets may be lost along a path because it has not been properly configured.

We have to propose mechanisms to guarantee that the network state is always consistent, even if some control packets are lost. Timeouts and retransmissions are not sufficient since the reconfiguration duration would be, in that case, unbounded.

## **6. IANA Considerations**

This document has no actionable requirements for IANA. This section can be removed before the publication.

## **7. Security Considerations**

This section will be expanded in future versions of the draft.

## **8. Acknowledgments**

TBD

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