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A Model for Reputation Reporting draft-ietf-repute-model-06

Abstract

This document describes a general architecture for a reputation-based service and a model for requesting reputation-related data over the Internet, where "reputation" refers to predictions or expectations about an entity or an identifier such as a domain name. The document roughly follows the recommendations of RFC4101 for describing a protocol model.

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1. Introduction

Historically, many Internet protocols have operated between unauthenticated entities. For example, an email message's author field (From) [MAIL] can contain any display name or address and is not verified by the recipient or other agents along the delivery path. Similarly, a sending email server using [SMTP] trusts that the [DNS] has led it to the intended receiving server. Both kinds of trust are easily betrayed, opening the operation to subversion of some kind, which leads to spam, phishing, and other attacks.

In recent years, explicit identity authentication mechanisms have begun to see wider deployment. For example, the [DKIM] protocol permits associating a validated identifier to a message. This association is cryptographically strong, and is an improvement over the prior state of affairs, but it does not distinguish between identifiers of good actors and bad. Even when it is possible to validate the domain name in an author field (e.g. "trustworthy.example.com" in "john.doe@trustworthy.example.com") there is no basis for knowing whether it is associated with a good actor worthy of trust. As a practical matter, both bad actors and good adopt basic authentication mechanisms like DKIM. In fact, bad actors tend to adopt them even more rapidly than the good actors do in the hope that some receivers will confuse identity authentication with identity assessment. The former merely means that the name is being used by its owner or their agent, while the latter makes a statement about the quality of the owner.

With the advent of these authentication protocols, it is possible to statisfy the requirement for a mechanism by which mutually trusted parties can exchange assessment information about other actors. For these purposes, we may usefully define "reputation" as "the estimation in which an identifiable actor is held, especially by the community or the Internet public generally". We may call an aggregation of individual assessments "reputation input."

While the need for reputation services has been perhaps especially clear in the email world, where abuses are commonplace, other Internet services are coming under attack and may have a similar need. For instance, a reputation mechanism could be useful in rating the security of web sites, the quality of service of an Internet Service Provider (ISP), or an Application Service Provider (ASP). More generally, there are many different opportunities for use of reputation services, such as customer satisfaction at e-commerce sites, and even things unrelated to Internet protocols, such as plumbers, hotels, or books. Just as human beings traditionally rely on the recommendations of trusted parties in the physical world, so too they can be expected to make use of such reputation services in a

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variety of applications on the Internet.

A full trust architecture encompasses a range of actors and activities, to enable an end-to-end service for creating, exchanging, and consuming trust-related information. One component of that is a query mechanism, to permit retrieval of a reputation. Not all such reputation services will need to convey the same information. Some need only produce a basic rating, while others need to provide underlying detail. This is akin to the difference between check approval versus a credit report.

An overall reckoning of goodness versus badness can be defined generically, but specific applications are likely to want to describe reputations for multiple attributes: an e-commerce site might be rated on price, speed of delivery, customer service, etc., and might receive very different ratings on each. Therefore, the model defines a generic query mechanism and basic format for reputation retrieval, but allows extensions for each application.

Omitted from this model is the means by which a reputation-reporting agent goes about collecting such data and the method for creating an evaluation. The mechanism defined here merely enables asking a question and getting an answer; the remainder of an overall service provided by such a reputation agent is specific to the implementation of that service and is out of scope here.

2. Overview

The basic premise of this reputation system involves a client that is seeking to evaluate content based on an identifier associated with the content, and a reputation service provider that collects, aggregates, and makes available for consumption, scores based on the collected data. Typically client and service operators enter into some kind of agreement during which some parameters are exchanged such as the location at which the reputation service can be reached, the nature of the reputation data being offered, possibly some client authentication details, and the like.

Upon receipt of some content the client operator wishes to evaluate (an Internet message, for example), the client extracts from the content one or more identifiers of interest to be evaluated. Examples of this include the domain name found in the From: field of a message, or the domain name extracted from a valid DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) signature.

Next, the goal is to ask the reputation service provider what the reputation of the extracted identifier is. This is a two-stage

query. The first query is to the reputation service provider at a well-known resource location to download a template. The template is a string into which various parameters about the query, including the identifier to be evaluated, are substituted. The result is a second resource location, and a query to this location is the actual reputation request.

The client then issues a query to the second location to request the reputation score associated with the extracted identifier. The client typically folds this information into whatever local evaluation logic it applies to decide what disposition the content deserves.

3. High-Level Architecture

A reputation mechanism functions as a component of an overall service. A current example is that of an email system that uses DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM; see [DKIM]) to affix a stable identifier to a message and then uses that as a basis for evaluation:




Figure 1: Actors in a Trust Sequence Using DKIM

(See [EMAIL-ARCH] for a general description of the Internet messaging architecture.) In this figure, the solid lines indicate the flow of a message; the dotted line indicates transfer of validated identifiers within the message content; and the double line shows the query and response of the reputation information.

Here, the DKIM Service provides one or more stable identifiers that is the basis for the reputation query. On receipt of a message from an MTA, the DKIM Service provides a (possibly empty) set of validated identifiers -- domain names, in this case -- which are the subjects of reputation queries made by the Identity Assessor. The Identity Assessor queries a Reputation Service to determine the reputation of

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the provided identifiers, and delivers the identifiers and their reputations to the Handling Filter. The Handling Filter makes a decision about whether and how to deliver the message to the recipient based on these and other inputs about the message, possibly including evaluation mechansisms in addition to DKIM.

This document outlines the reputation query and response mechanism. It provides the following definitions:

- o Vocabulary for the current work and work of this type;
- o The types and content of queries that can be supported;
- o The extensible range of response information that can be provided;
- o A query/response protocol;
- o Query/response transport conventions.

It provides an extremely simple query/response model that can be carried over a variety of transports, including the Domain Name System. (Although not typically thought of as a 'transport', the DNS provides generic capabilities and can be thought of as a mechanism for transporting queries and responses that have nothing to do with Internet addresses, such as is one with a DNS BlockList [DNSBL].) Each specification for Repute transport is independent of any other specification. A diagram of the basic query service is found in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Basic Reputation Query Service

The precise syntaxes of both the query and response are applicationspecific. An application of the model defines the parameters available to queries of that type, and also defines the data returned in response to any query.

4. Terminology and Definitions

This section defines terms used in the rest of the document.

4.1. Response Set

A "Response Set" comprises those data that are returned in response to a reputation query about a particular entity. The types of data are specific to an application; the data returned in the evaluation of email senders would be different than the reputation data returned about a movie or a baseball player.

Response Sets have symbolic names, and these have to be registered with IANA, in the Reputation Applications Registry, to prevent name collisions. IANA registries are created in a separate document. Each definition of a Response Set also needs to define its registry entry.

4.2. Reputon

A "reputon" is an object that comprises the basic response to a reputation query. It contains the response set relevant to the subject of the query. Its specific encoding is left to documents that implement this model.

5. Information Represented in a Response Set

The basic information to be represented in the protocol is fairly simple, and includes the following:

- o the identity of the entity providing the reputation information;
- o the identity of the entity being rated;
- o the application context for the query (e.g., email address evaluation);
- o the overall rating score for that entity;
- o the level of confidence in the accuracy of that rating; and
- o the number of data points underlying that score.

Beyond this, arbitrary amounts of additional information might be provided for specific uses of the service. The entire collection is the Response Set for that application. The query/response protocol defines a syntax for representing such Response Sets, but each application defines its own Response Set. Thus, the basic information also includes the name of the application for which the reputation data is being expressed.

Each application requires its own specification of the Response Set. For example, a specification might be needed for a reputation Response Set for an "email-sending-domain"; the Response Set might include information on how often spam was received from that domain. Additional documents define a [MIME] type for reputation data, and protocols for exchanging such data.

6. Information Flow in the Reputation Query Protocol

The basic Response Set could be wrapped into a new MIME media type [MIME] or a DNS RR, and transported accordingly. It also could be the integral payload of a purpose-built protocol. For a basic request/response scenario, one entity (the Client) will ask a second

entity (the Server) for reputation data about a third entity (the Target), and the second entity will respond with that data.

An application might benefit from an extremely lightweight mechanism, supporting constrained queries and responses, while others might need to support larger and more complex responses.

7. IANA Considerations

This document presents no actions for IANA.

[RFC Editor: Please remove this section prior to publication.]

8. Privacy Considerations

8.1. Data In Transit

Some kinds of reputation data are sensitive, and should not be shared publicly. For cases that have such sensitivity, it is imperative to protect the information from unauthorized access and viewing. The model described here neither suggests nor precludes any particular transport mechanism for the data. However, for the purpose of illustration, a reputation service that operates over HTTP might employ any of its well-known mechanisms to solve these problems, which include OpenPGP [OPENPGP], Transport Layer Security [TLS], and S/MIME [SMIME].

8.2. Collection Of Data

The basic notion of collection and storage of reputation data is obviously a privacy issue in that the opinions of one party about another are likely to be sensitive. Inadvertent or unauthorized exposure of those data can lead to personal or commercial damage.

9. Security Considerations

This document introduces an overall protocol model, but no implementation details. As such, the security considerations presented here are very high-level. The detailed analyses of the various specific components of the protocol can be found the documents that instantiate this model.

9.1. Biased Reputation Agents

As with [VBR], an agent seeking to make use of a reputation reporting service is placing some trust that the service presents an unbiased "opinion" of the object about which reputation is being returned. The result of trusting the data is, presumably, to guide action taken by the reputation client. It follows, then, that bias in the reputation service can adversely affect the client. Clients therefore need to be aware of this possibility and the effect it might have. For example, a biased system returning a reputation about a DNS domain found in email messages could result in the admission of spam, phishing or malware through a mail gateway (by rating the domain name more favourably than warranted) or could result in the needless rejection or delay of mail (by rating the domain more unfavourably than warranted). As a possible mitigation strategy, clients might seek to interact only with reputation services that offer some disclosure of the computation methods for the results they return. Such disclosure and evaluation is beyond the scope of the present document.

Similarly, a client placing trust in the results returned by such a service might suffer if the service itself is compromised, returning biased results under the control of an attacker without the knowledge of the agency providing the reputation service. This might result from an attack on the data being returned at the source, or from a man-in-the-middle attack. Protocols, therefore, need to be designed so as to be as resilient against such attacks as possible.

9.2. Malformed Messages

Both clients and servers of reputation systems need to be resistant to attacks that involve malformed messages, deliberate or otherwise. Malformations can be used to confound clients and servers alike in terms of identifying the party or parties responsible for the content under evaluation. This can result in delivery of undesirable or even dangerous content.

9.3. Further Discussion

Numerous other topics related to use and management of reputation systems can be found in [I-D.REPUTE-CONSIDERATIONS].

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Appendix A. Public Discussion

Public discussion of this suite of documents takes place on the domainrep@ietf.org mailing list. See https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/domainrep.

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