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## **IKEv2 Extensions to Support Robust Header Compression over IPsec draft-ietf-rohc-ikev2-extensions-hcoipsec-12**

### **Abstract**

In order to integrate Robust Header Compression (ROHC) with IPsec, a mechanism is needed to signal ROHC channel parameters between end-points. Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is a mechanism which can be leveraged to exchange these parameters. This document specifies extensions to IKEv2 that will allow ROHC and its associated channel parameters to be signaled for IPsec security associations (SAs).

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## 1. Introduction

Increased packet header overhead due to IPsec [IPSEC] can result in the inefficient utilization of bandwidth. Coupling ROHC [ROHC] with IPsec offers an efficient way to transfer protected IP traffic.

ROHCoIPsec [ROHCOIPSEC] requires configuration parameters to be initialized at the compressor and decompressor. Current specifications for hop-by-hop ROHC negotiate these parameters through a link-layer protocol such as Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) (i.e. ROHC over PPP [ROHC-PPP]). Since key exchange protocols (e.g. IKEv2 [IKEV2]) can be used to dynamically establish parameters between IPsec peers, this document defines extensions to IKEv2 to signal ROHC parameters for ROHCoIPsec.

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## 2. Terminology

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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [BRA97].

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## 3. ROHC Channel Initialization for ROHCoIPsec

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The following subsections define extensions to IKEv2 which enables an initiator and a responder to signal parameters required to establish a ROHC channel for a ROHCoIPsec session.

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### 3.1. ROHC\_SUPPORTED Notify Message

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ROHC channel parameters MUST be signaled separately for each ROHC-enabled IPsec SA. Specifically, a new Notify message type MUST be included in the IKE\_AUTH and CREATE\_CHILD\_SA exchanges whenever a new ROHC-enabled IPsec SA is created, or an existing one is rekeyed. The Notify payload sent by the initiator MUST contain the channel parameters for the ROHC session. These parameters indicate the capabilities of the ROHC decompressor at the initiator. Upon receipt of the initiator's request, the responder will either ignore the payload (if it doesn't support ROHC or the proposed parameters) or respond with a Notify payload that contains its own ROHC channel parameters. Note that only one Notify payload is used to convey ROHC parameters. If multiple Notify payloads containing ROHC parameters are received, all but the first such Notify payload MUST be dropped. If the initiator

does not receive a Notify Payload with the responder's ROHC channel parameters, ROHC MUST NOT be enabled on the Child SA. A new Notify Message Type value, denoted ROHC\_SUPPORTED, indicates that the Notify payload is conveying ROHC channel parameters (Section 4). The Notify Payload (defined in RFC 4306 [IKEV2]) is illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Notify Payload format.

The fields of the Notify Payload are set as follows:

Next Payload (1 octet)

Identifier for the payload type of the next payload in the message. Further details can be found in RFC 4306 [IKEV2].

Critical (1 bit)

Since all IKEV2 implementations support the Notify Payload, this value MUST be set to zero.

Payload Length (2 octets)

As defined in RFC 4306 [IKEV2], this field indicates the length of the current payload, including the generic payload header.

Protocol ID (1 octet)

Since this Notification message is used during the creation of a Child SA, this field MUST be set to zero.

SPI Size (1 octet)



\*ROHC Attribute Type (15 bits) - Unique identifier for each type of ROHC attribute (Section 3.1.2).

\*ROHC Attribute Length (2 octets) - Length (in octets) of the Attribute Value. When the AF bit is a one (1), the ROHC Attribute Value is 2 octets and the ROHC Attribute Length field is not present.

\*ROHC Attribute Value (variable length) - Value of the ROHC Attribute associated with the ROHC Attribute Type. If the AF bit is a zero (0), this field's length is defined by the ROHC Attribute Length field. If the AF bit is a one (1), the length of the ROHC Attribute Value is 2 octets.

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### 3.1.2. ROHC Attribute Types

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This section describes five ROHC Attribute Types: MAX\_CID, ROHC\_PROFILE, ROHC\_INTEG, ROHC\_ICV\_LEN, and MRRU. The value allocated for each ROHC Attribute Type is specified in Section 4.

MAX\_CID (Maximum Context Identifier, AF = 1)

The MAX\_CID attribute is a mandatory attribute. Exactly one MAX\_CID attribute MUST be sent. The MAX\_CID field indicates the maximum value of a context identifier supported by the ROHCoIPsec decompressor. This attribute value is two octets in length. The range of values for MAX\_CID MUST be at least 0 and at most 16383. Since CIDs can take values between 0 and MAX\_CID, the actual number of contexts that can be used are MAX\_CID+1. If MAX\_CID is 0, this implies having one context. The recipient of the MAX\_CID Attribute MUST only use up to MAX\_CID context identifiers for compression.

Note that the MAX\_CID parameter is a one-way notification (i.e., the sender of the attribute indicates what it can handle to the other end); therefore, different values for MAX\_CID may be announced in each direction.

ROHC\_PROFILE (ROHC Profile, AF = 1)

The ROHC\_PROFILE attribute is a mandatory attribute. Each ROHC\_PROFILE attribute has a fixed length of 4 octets, and its attribute value is a two-octet long ROHC Profile Identifier [ROHCPROF]. There MUST be at least one ROHC\_PROFILE attribute included in the ROHC\_SUPPORTED Notify Message. If multiple ROHC\_PROFILE attributes are sent, the order is arbitrary. The recipient of a ROHC\_PROFILE attribute(s) MUST only use the profile(s) proposed for compression.

Several common profiles are defined in RFC 3095 [ROHCV1] and 5225 [ROHCV2]. Note, however, that two versions of the same profile MUST NOT be signaled. For example, if a ROHCoIPsec decompressor supports both ROHCV1 UDP (0x0002) and ROHCV2 UDP (0x0102), both profiles MUST NOT be signaled. This restriction is needed, as packets compressed by ROHC express only the 8 least significant bits of the profile identifier; since the 8 least significant bits for corresponding profiles in ROHCV1 and ROHCV2 are identical, the decompressor is not capable of determining the ROHC version that was used to compress the packet.

Note that the ROHC\_PROFILE attribute is a one-way notification; therefore, different values for ROHC\_PROFILE may be announced in each direction.

#### ROHC\_INTEG (Integrity Algorithm for Verification of Decompressed Headers, AF = 1)

The ROHC\_INTEG attribute is a mandatory attribute. There MUST be at least one ROHC\_INTEG attribute contained within the ROHC\_SUPPORTED Notify message. The attribute value contains the identifier of an integrity algorithm that is used to ensure the integrity of the decompressed packets (i.e. ensure that the decompressed packet headers are identical to the original packet headers prior to compression).

Authentication algorithms that MUST be supported are specified in the "Authentication Algorithms" table in section 3.1.1 ("ESP Encryption and Authentication Algorithms") of RFC 4835 [CRYPTO-ALG] (or its successor).

The integrity algorithm is represented by a two octet value that corresponds to the value listed in the IKEv2 Parameters registry [IKEV2-PARA] "For Transform Type 3 (Integrity Algorithm)" section. Upon receipt of the ROHC\_INTEG attribute(s), the responder MUST select exactly one of the proposed algorithms; the chosen value is sent back in the ROHC\_SUPPORTED Notify message returned by the responder to the initiator. The selected integrity algorithm MUST be used in both directions. If the responder does not accept any of the algorithms proposed by the initiator, ROHC MUST NOT be enabled on the SA.

It is noted that:

1. The keys (one for each direction) for this Integrity Algorithm are derived from the IKEv2 KEYMAT (see [IKEV2], Section 2.17). For the purposes of this key derivation, ROHC is considered to be an IPsec protocol. When a ROHC-enabled

CHILD\_SA is rekeyed, the key associated with this integrity algorithm is rekeyed as well.

2. A ROHCoIPsec initiator MAY signal a value of zero (0x0000) in a ROHC\_INTEG attribute. This corresponds to "NONE" in the Integrity Algorithm Transform ID registry. The ROHCoIPsec responder MAY select this value by responding to the initiator with a ROHC\_INTEG attribute of zero (0x0000). In this scenario, no integrity algorithm is applied in either direction.
3. The ROHC\_INTEG attribute is a parameter that is negotiated between two ends. In other words, the initiator indicates what it supports; the responder selects one of the ROHC\_INTEG values proposed, and sends the selected value to the initiator.

#### ROHC\_ICV\_LEN (Integrity Algorithm Length, AF = 1)

The ROHC\_ICV\_LEN attribute is an optional attribute. There MAY be zero or one ROHC\_ICV\_LEN attribute contained within the ROHC\_SUPPORTED Notify message. The attribute specifies the number of Integrity Check Value (ICV) octets the sender expects to receive on incoming ROHC packets. The ICV of the negotiated ROHC\_INTEG algorithms MUST be truncated to ROHC\_ICV\_LEN bytes by taking the first ROHC\_ICV\_LEN bytes of the output. Both the initiator and responder announce a single value for their own ICV length. The recipient of the ROHC\_ICV\_LEN attribute MUST truncate the ICV to the length contained in the message. If the value of the ROHC\_ICV\_LEN attribute is zero, then an ICV MUST NOT be sent. If no ROHC\_ICV\_LEN attribute is sent at all or the ROHC\_ICV\_LEN is larger than the length of the ICV of selected algorithm, then the full ICV length as specified by the ROHC\_INTEG algorithm MUST be sent.

Note that the ROHC\_ICV\_LEN attribute is a one-way notification; therefore, different values for ROHC\_ICV\_LEN may be announced in each direction.

#### MRRU (Maximum Reconstructed Reception Unit, AF = 1)

The MRRU attribute is an optional attribute. There MAY be zero or one MRRU attribute contained within the ROHC\_SUPPORTED Notify message. The attribute value is two octets in length. The attribute specifies the size of the largest reconstructed unit in octets that the ROHCoIPsec decompressor is expected to reassemble from ROHC segments (see Section 5.2.5 of [ROHCv1]). This size includes the CRC, and the ROHC ICV. If MRRU is 0 or if no MRRU attribute is sent, segment headers MUST NOT be transmitted on the ROHCoIPsec channel.



Note that the MRRU attribute is a one-way notification; therefore, different values for MRRU may be announced in each direction.

If an unknown ROHC Attribute Type Value is received, it MUST be silently ignored.

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### 3.2. ROHC Channel Parameters that are Implicitly Set

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The following ROHC channel parameters MUST NOT be signaled:

\*LARGE\_CIDS: This value is implicitly determined by the value of MAX\_CID (e.g. if MAX\_CID is  $\leq 15$ , LARGE\_CIDS is assumed to be 0).

\*FEEDBACK\_FOR: When a pair of SAs are created (one in each direction), the ROHC channel parameter FEEDBACK\_FOR MUST be set implicitly to the other SA of the pair (i.e. the SA pointing in the reverse direction).

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## 4. Security Considerations

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The ability to negotiate the length of the ROHC ICV may introduce vulnerabilities to the ROHC/IPsec protocol. Specifically, the capability to signal a short ICV length may result in scenarios where erroneous packets are forwarded into the protected domain. This security consideration is documented in further detail in Section 6.1.4 of [ROHCOIPSEC] and Section 5 of [IPSEC-ROHC].

This security consideration can be mitigated by using longer ICVs, but this comes at the cost of additional overhead, which reduces the overall benefits offered by ROHC/IPsec.

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## 5. IANA Considerations

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This document defines a new Notify Message (Status Type). Therefore, IANA is requested to allocate one value from the IKEv2 Notify Message registry to indicate ROHC\_SUPPORTED. Note that, since this Notify Message is a Status Type, values ranging from 0 to 16383 must not be allocated for ROHC\_SUPPORTED.

In addition, IANA is requested to create a new "ROHC Attribute Types" registry in the IKEv2 Parameters Registry [IKEV2-PARA]. Within the

"ROHC Attribute Types" registry, this document allocates the following values:

Registry:

Value	ROHC Attribute Type	Format	Reference
0	RESERVED		[rfcThis]
1	Maximum Context Identifier (MAX_CID)	TV	[rfcThis]
2	ROHC Profile (ROHC_PROFILE)	TV	[rfcThis]
3	ROHC Integrity Algorithm (ROHC_INTEG)	TV	[rfcThis]
4	ROHC ICV Length in bytes (ROHC_ICV_LEN)	TV	[rfcThis]
5	Maximum Reconstructed Reception Unit (MRRU)	TV	[rfcThis]
6-16383	Unassigned		[rfcThis]
16384-32767	Private use		[rfcThis]

Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], the IANA policy for assigning new values for the ROHC Attribute Types registry shall be Expert Review.

For registration requests, the responsible IESG area director will appoint the Designated Expert. The Designated Expert will post a request to both the rohc and ipsec mailing lists (or a successor designated by the Area Director) for comment and review. The Designated Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and publish a notice of the decision to both mailing lists (or their successors), as well as informing IANA. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation.

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## 6. Acknowledgments

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