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Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)

Status of this Memo

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A revised version of this draft document will be submitted to the RFC editor as a Standards Track RFC for the Internet Community. Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested. Distribution of this draft is unlimited.

When published as an RFC this document will obsolete [RFC 2222](#).

1. Abstract

The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) provides a method for adding authentication support with an optional security layer to connection-based protocols. It also describes a structure for authentication mechanisms. The result is an abstraction layer between protocols and authentication mechanisms such that any SASL-compatible authentication mechanism can be used with any SASL-compatible protocol.

This document describes how a SASL authentication mechanism is structured, describes how a protocol adds support for SASL, defines the protocol for carrying a security layer over a connection, and defines the EXTERNAL SASL authentication mechanism.

2. Organization of this document

2.1. How to read this document

This document is written to serve several different audiences, protocol designers using this specification to support authentication in their protocol, mechanism designers that define new SASL mechanisms, and implementors of clients or servers for those protocols using this specification.

The sections "Overview", "Authentication Mechanisms", "Protocol Profile Requirements", "Specific Issues", and "Security Considerations" cover issues that protocol designers need to understand and address in profiling this specification for use in a specific protocol.

The sections "Overview", "Authentication Mechanisms", "Mechanism Profile Requirements" and "Security Considerations" cover issues that mechanism designers need to understand and address in designing new SASL mechanisms.

Implementors of a protocol using this specification need the protocol-specific profiling information in addition to the information in this document.

2.2. Conventions used in this document

In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and server respectively.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as defined in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [[KEYWORDS](#)].


Character names in this document use the notation for code points and names from the Unicode Standard [[Unicode](#)]. For example, the letter "a" may be represented as either <U+0061> or <LATIN SMALL LETTER A>.

This document uses terms "integrity protection" and "confidentiality protection". The former references to a security layer that is able to detect data modification by using some kind of hash. However, integrity protection doesn't make the data unreadable to an attacker. Confidentiality protection is a security layer that is able to make the data unreadable to an attacker by using encryption. Confidentiality protection usually implies integrity protection.

3. Overview

The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a method for adding authentication support to connection-based protocols.

The SASL specification has three layers, as indicated in the diagram below. At the top, a protocol definition using SASL specifies a profile, including a command for identifying and authenticating a user to a server and for optionally negotiating a security layer for subsequent protocol interactions. At the bottom, a SASL mechanism definition specifies an authentication mechanism. The SASL framework, specified by this document, constrains the behavior of protocol profiles and mechanisms, separating protocol from mechanism and defining how they interact.



This separation between the definition of protocols and the definition of authentication mechanisms is crucial. It permits an authentication mechanism to be defined once, making it usable by any SASL protocol profile. In many implementations, the same SASL mechanism code is used for multiple protocols.

4. Authentication mechanisms

SASL mechanisms are named by strings, from 1 to 20 characters in length, consisting of ASCII [[ASCII](#)] upper-case letters, digits,

hyphens, and/or underscores. SASL mechanism names must be registered with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). IETF standards track documents may direct the IANA to reserve a portion of the SASL mechanism namespace and may specify different registration criteria for the reserved portion; the GSSAPI mechanism specification [[SASL-GSSAPI](#)] does this. Procedures for registering new SASL mechanisms are given in [section 8](#).

The "sasl-mech" production below defines the syntax of a SASL mechanism name. This uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation as specified in [[ABNF](#)] and the ABNF core rules as specified in [Appendix A](#) of the ABNF specification [[ABNF](#)].

```
sasl-mech      = 1*20mech-char
mech-char      = %x41-5A / DIGIT / "-" / "_"
                ; mech names restricted to ASCII uppercase letters,
                ; digits, "-" and "_"
```

[4.1.1](#). Authentication protocol exchange

A SASL mechanism is responsible for conducting an authentication protocol exchange. This consists of a series of server challenges and client responses, the contents of which are specific to and defined by the mechanism. To the protocol, the challenges and responses are opaque binary tokens of arbitrary length. The protocol's profile then specifies how these binary tokens are then encoded for transfer over the connection.

After receiving an authentication command or any client response, a server mechanism may issue a challenge, indicate failure, or indicate completion. The server mechanism may return additional data with a completion indication. The protocol's profile specifies how each of these is then represented over the connection.

After receiving a challenge, a client mechanism may issue a response or abort the exchange. The protocol's profile specifies how each of these is then represented over the connection.

During the authentication protocol exchange, the mechanism performs authentication, transmits an authorization identity (frequently known as a userid) from the client to server, and negotiates the use of a mechanism-specific security layer. If the use of a security layer is agreed upon, then the mechanism must also define or negotiate the maximum security layer buffer size that each side is able to receive.

4.2. Authorization and authentication identities

SASL authentication deals with two identities: the authorization identity and the authentication identity. The transmitted authorization identity may be an empty string (zero length), but the transmitted authentication identity may not be an empty string.

A mechanisms which are incapable of transmitting an authorization identity must be treated as if it always transmits an authorization identity of an empty string.

Authentication identity is the identity derived from the client's authentication credentials.

The authorization identity is used by the server as the primary identity for making access policy decisions.

4.2.1. Authorization identities and proxy authentication

With any mechanism, transmitting an authorization identity of the empty string directs the server to derive the authorization identity from the client's authentication identity.

If the authorization identity transmitted during the authentication protocol exchange is not the empty string, this is typically referred to as "proxy authentication". This feature permits agents such as proxy servers to authenticate using their own credentials, yet request the access privileges of the identity for which they are proxying.

The server makes an implementation defined policy decision as to whether the authentication identity is permitted to have the access privileges of the authorization identity and whether the authorization identity is permitted to receive service. If it is not, the server indicates failure of the authentication protocol exchange.

As a client might not have the same information as the server, clients SHOULD NOT derive authorization identities from authentication identities. Instead, clients SHOULD provide no (or empty) authorization identity when the user has not provided an authorization identity.

The server SHOULD verify that a received authorization identity is in the correct form. Profiles whose authorization identities are simple user names (e.g. IMAP [[RFC 3501](#)]) SHOULD use "SASLprep" profile [[SASLprep](#)] of the "stringprep" algorithm [StringPrep] to prepare these names for matching. The profiles MAY use a stringprep profile

that is more strict than "SASLprep". If the preparation of the authorization identity fails or results in an empty string, the server MUST fail the authentication exchange. The only exception to this rule is when the received authorization identity is already the empty string.

4.2.2. Authorization Identity Format

An authorization identity is a string of zero or more Unicode [[Unicode](#)] coded characters. The NUL <U+0000> character is not permitted in authorization identities.

The character encoding scheme used for transmitting an authorization identity over the protocol is specified in each authentication mechanism. All IETF-defined mechanisms MUST, and all other mechanisms SHOULD, use UTF-8 [[UTF-8](#)]. (See [[CHARSET-POLICY](#)] for IETF policy regarding character sets and encoding schemes.)

Mechanisms are expected to be capable of carrying the entire Unicode repertoire (with the exception of the NUL character). An authorization identity of the empty string and an absent authorization identity MUST be treated as equivalent. A mechanism which provides an optional field for an authorization identity, SHOULD NOT allow that field, when present, to be empty. The meaning of the empty string as an authorization identity is described in the previous section.

4.3. Security layers

If use of a security layer is negotiated by the authentication protocol exchange, the security layer is applied to all subsequent data sent over the connection (until another security layer is negotiated; see also [section 6.3](#)). The security layer takes effect immediately following the last response of the authentication exchange for data sent by the client and the completion indication for data sent by the server.

Note that all SASL mechanisms that are unable to negotiate a security layer automatically select no security layer.

Once the security layer is in effect the protocol stream is processed by the security layer into buffers of security encoded data. Each buffer of security encoded data is transferred over the connection as a stream of octets prepended with a four octet field in network byte order that represents the length of the following buffer. The length of the security encoded data buffer MUST be no larger than the maximum size that was either defined in the mechanism specification or negotiated by the other side during the authentication protocol

exchange. Upon the receipt of a data buffer which is larger than the defined/negotiated maximal buffer size the receiver SHOULD close the connection. This might be a sign of an attack or a buggy implementation.

5. Protocol and mechanism profiles

5.1. Protocol profile requirements

In order to use this specification, a protocol definition MUST supply the following information:

- 1) A service name, to be selected from the IANA registry of "service" elements for the GSSAPI host-based service name form [[GSSAPI](#)]. This service name is made available to the authentication mechanism.

The registry is available at the URL

<<http://www.iana.org/assignments/gssapi-service-names>>.

- 2) A definition of the command to initiate the authentication protocol exchange. This command must have as a parameter the name of the mechanism being selected by the client.

The command SHOULD have an optional parameter giving an initial response. If the protocol allows for the initial response, the protocol profile SHOULD also describe how an empty initial response is encoded. This optional parameter allows the client to avoid a round trip when using a mechanism which is defined to have the client send data first. When this initial response is sent by the client and the selected mechanism is defined to have the server start with an initial challenge, the command fails. See [section 6.1](#) of this document for further information.

- 3) A definition of the method by which the authentication protocol exchange is carried out, including how the challenges and responses are encoded, how the server indicates completion or failure of the exchange, how the client aborts an exchange, and how the exchange method interacts with any line length limits in the protocol.

The exchange method SHOULD allow the server to include an optional data ("optional challenge") with a success notification. This allows the server to avoid a round trip when using a mechanism which is defined to have the server send additional data along with the indication of successful completion. See [section 6.2](#) of this document for further information.

- 4) A protocol profile SHOULD specify a mechanism through which a client may obtain the names of the SASL mechanisms available to it.

This is typically done through the protocol's extensions or capabilities mechanism.

- 5) Identification of the octet where any negotiated security layer starts to take effect, in both directions.
- 6) Specify if the protocol profile supports "multiple authentications" (see [section 6.3](#)).
- 7) If both TLS and SASL security layer are allowed to be negotiated by the protocol, the protocol profile MUST define in which order they are applied to a cleartext data sent over the connection.
- 8) A protocol profile MAY further refine the definition of an authorization identity by adding additional syntactic restrictions and protocol-specific semantics. A protocol profile MUST specify the form of the authorization identity (since it is protocol specific, as opposed to the authentication identity, which is mechanism specific) and how authorization identities are to be compared. Profiles whose authorization identities are simple user names (e.g. IMAP [[RFC 3501](#)]) SHOULD use "SASLprep" profile [[SASLprep](#)] of the "stringprep" algorithm [StringPrep] to prepare these names for matching. The profiles MAY use a stringprep profile that is more strict than SASLprep.

A protocol profile SHOULD NOT attempt to amend the definition of mechanisms or make mechanism-specific encodings. This breaks the separation between protocol and mechanism that is fundamental to the design of SASL. Likewise, SASL mechanisms SHOULD be profile neutral.

[5.2.](#) Mechanism profile guidelines

Designers of new SASL mechanism should be aware of the following issues:

- 1) Authorization identity.

While some legacy mechanisms are incapable of transmitting an authorization identity (which means that for these mechanisms the authorization identity is always the empty string), newly defined mechanisms SHOULD be capable of transmitting a non-empty authorization identity. See also [section 4.2](#).

- 2) Character string issues

Authentication mechanisms SHOULD encode character strings in UTF-8 [[UTF-8](#)] (see [[CHARSET-POLICY](#)] for IETF policy regarding character

sets in IETF protocols). In order to avoid interoperability problems due to differing normalizations, when a mechanism specifies that character data is to be used as input to a cryptographic and/or comparison function, the mechanism specification **MUST** detail how the data is to be represented, including any normalizations or other preparations, to ensure proper function. Designers of mechanisms **SHOULD** use the "SASLprep" profile [[SASLprep](#)] of the "stringprep" algorithm [StringPrep] where applicable.

The preparation can be potentially performed on the client end (upon getting user input or retrieving a value from configuration) or on the server end (upon receiving the value from the client, retrieving a value from its authentication database or generating a new value in order to store in in the authentication database). SASL mechanisms must define which entity (or entities) must perform the preparation. If preparation fails or results in an empty string, the entity doing the preparation **SHALL** fail the authentication exchange.

Implementation note: A server end can be represented by multiple processes. For example, it may consist of the server process itself that communicated with a client, and a command line utility (a server agent) that is able to store passwords/hashes in a database that can be later used by the server. For the server agent the requirement to "fail the authentication exchange" should be interpreted as a requirement to refuse to store the data in the database.

6. Specific issues

6.1. Client sends data first

Some mechanisms specify that the first data sent in the authentication protocol exchange is from the client to the server.

If a protocol's profile permits the command which initiates an authentication protocol exchange to contain an initial client response, this parameter **SHOULD** be used with such mechanisms.

If the initial client response parameter is not given, or if a protocol's profile does not permit the command which initiates an authentication protocol exchange to contain an initial client response, then the server issues a challenge with no data. The client's response to this challenge is then used as the initial client response. (The server then proceeds to send the next challenge, indicates completion, or indicates failure.)

6.1.1. Client sends data first examples

The following are two examples of an SECURID authentication [SASL-SECURID] in the SMTP protocol [[SMTP](#)]. In the first example below, the client is trying fast reauthentication by sending the initial response:

```
S: 220-smtp.example.com ESMTP Server
C: EHLO client.example.com
S: 250-smtp.example.com Hello client.example.com, pleased to meet you
S: 250-AUTH GSSAPI SECURID
S: 250 DSN
C: AUTH SECURID AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA=
S: 235 Authentication successful
```

The example below is almost identical to the previous, but here the client chooses not to use the initial response parameter.

```
S: 220-smtp.example.com ESMTP Server
C: EHLO client.example.com
S: 250-smtp.example.com Hello client.example.com, pleased to meet you
S: 250-AUTH GSSAPI SECURID
S: 250 DSN
C: AUTH SECURID
S: 334
C: AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA=
S: 235 Authentication successful
```

[Section 7.2](#) contains an additional example.

6.2. Server returns success with additional data

Some mechanisms may specify that additional data be sent to the client along with an indication of successful completion of the exchange. This data would, for example, authenticate the server to the client.

If a protocol's profile does not permit this additional data to be returned with a success indication, then the server issues the data as a server challenge, without an indication of successful completion. The client then responds with no data. After receiving this empty response, the server then indicates successful completion (with no additional data).

Client implementors should be aware of an additional failure case that might occur when the profile supports sending the additional data with success. Imagine that an active attacker is trying to

impersonate the server and sends faked data, which should be used to authenticate the server to the client, with success. (A similar situation can happen when either the server and/or the client has a bug and they calculate different responses.) After checking the data, the client will think that the authentication exchange has failed, however the server will think that the authentication exchange has completed successfully. At this point the client can not abort the authentication exchange; it SHOULD close the connection instead. However, if the profile did not support sending of additional data with success, the client could have aborted the exchange at the very last step of the authentication exchange.

6.2.1. Server returns success with additional data examples

The following are two examples of a DIGEST-MD5 authentication [SASL-DIGEST] in the XMPP protocol [XMPP]. In the first example below, the server is sending mutual authentication data with success.

```
C: <stream:stream
  xmlns='jabber:client'
  xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
  to='example.com'
  version='1.0'>
S: <stream:stream
  xmlns='jabber:client'
  xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
  id='c2s_234'
  from='example.com'
  version='1.0'>
S: <stream:features>
  <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
    <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
    <mechanism>CRAM-MD5</mechanism>
  </mechanisms>
</stream:features>
C: <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
  mechanism='DIGEST-MD5' />
S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
  cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWZsbSIsbm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRfUdtMmhoIixxb3A9ImF1dGgi
  LGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgsYWxnb3JpdGhtPW1kNS1zZXNzCg==
</challenge>
C: <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
  dXNlcm5hbWU9InNvbWVub2RlIixyZWZsbT0ic29tZXJlYxtIixub25jZT0i
  T0E2TUc5dEVRR20yaGgiLGhub25jZT0iT0E2TUhYaDZwcVRyUmsiLG5jPTAw
  MDAwMDAxLHFvcD1hdXRoLGRpZ2VzdC11cmk9InhtcHAvZXhhbXBsZS5jb20i
  LHJlc3BvbnNlPQwzODhkYWQ5MGQ0YmJkNzYwYTE1MjMyMWYyMTQzYWY3LGNo
  YXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgK
```



```

    </response>
S: <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
    cnNwYXV0aD1lYTQwZjYwMzM1YzQyN2I1NTI3Yjg0ZGJhYmNkZmZmZAo=
    </success>

```

The example below is almost identical to the previous, but here the server chooses not to use the additional data with success.

```

C: <stream:stream
    xmlns='jabber:client'
    xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
    to='example.com'
    version='1.0'>
S: <stream:stream
    xmlns='jabber:client'
    xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
    id='c2s_234'
    from='example.com'
    version='1.0'>
S: <stream:features>
    <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
        <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
        <mechanism>CRAM-MD5</mechanism>
    </mechanisms>
</stream:features>
C: <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
    mechanism='DIGEST-MD5' />
S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
    cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWZsbSI9bm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRFRUdtMmhoIixxb3A9ImF1dGgi
    LGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgsYXxnb3JpdGhtPW1kNS1zZXNzCg==
</challenge>
C: <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
    dXNlcm5hbWU9InNvbWVub2RlIixyZWZsbT0ic29tZXJlYXxtIixub25jZT0i
    T0E2TUc5dEVRR20yaGgiLGhub25jZT0iT0E2TUhYaDZwcVRyUmsiLG5jPTAw
    MDAwMDAxLHFvcD1hdXR0LGRpZ2VzdC11cmk9InhtcHAvZXhhbXBsZS5jb20i
    LHJlc3BvbnNlPWQzODhkYWQ5MGQ0YmJkNzYwYTE1MjMyMWYyMTQzYWY3LGNo
    YXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgK
</response>
S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
    cnNwYXV0aD1lYTQwZjYwMzM1YzQyN2I1NTI3Yjg0ZGJhYmNkZmZmZAo=
</challenge>
C: <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl' />
S: <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl' />

```

6.3. Multiple authentications

Unless otherwise stated by the protocol's profile, only one successful SASL negotiation may occur in a protocol session. In this

case, once an authentication protocol exchange has successfully completed, further attempts to initiate an authentication protocol exchange fail.

If a profile explicitly permits multiple successful SASL negotiations to occur, then in no case may multiple security layers be simultaneously in effect. If a security layer is in effect and a subsequent SASL negotiation selects a second security layer, then the second security layer replaces the first. If a security layer is in effect and a subsequent SASL negotiation selects no security layer, the original security layer remains in effect.


Note that keeping the original security layer is a subject to a class of security attack described in [section 6.3.1](#). However, at the time of the writing of this document the Working Group consensus is not to change SASL handling of security layers, as the risk of such attacks is considered to be low and specific to only certain classes of implementations. The protocol profiles that allow for reauthentication SHOULD recommend that another security layer is negotiated once a security layer was installed.

Also note, that if a subsequent authentication fails, the protocol profile MAY allow the connection state to return to non-authenticated, however the previously negotiated security layer MUST NOT be removed. Only a successful reauthentication is able replace/remove the previously negotiated security layer.

[6.3.1](#). Description of Multiple Authentication attack

Let's assume that the protected resources on a server are partitioned into a set of protection spaces, each with its own authentication mechanisms and/or authorization database. Let's use the term "partition" to reference any such protected space. An example of a partition might be an HTTP "realm". Also a proxy/frontend can use different partitions for different servers/backends it represents.

Now consider the following scenario. A client has already authenticated and established a security layer with "Partition A" which is managed by the server AA. Now the same client authenticates to "Partition B" (managed by the server BB) without negotiating a new security layer, while the security layer negotiated with "Partition A" remains in effect. The server BB is now able to observe how known cleartext is encrypted. This scenario enables the server BB to make guesses about previously observed ciphertext between the client and the server AA using the server's SASL engine as an oracle. This scenario is illustrated below:



<<Some text about trust relationship here.

Where this situation cannot be managed through trust relationship, it may be appropriate for the server implementation to not support multiple authentications. >>

7. The EXTERNAL mechanism

The mechanism name associated with external authentication is "EXTERNAL".

The client sends an initial response with the UTF-8 encoding of the authorization identity. The form of the authorization identity is further restricted by the application-level protocol's SASL profile.

The server uses information, external to SASL, to determine whether the client is authorized to authenticate as the authorization identity. If the client is so authorized, the server indicates successful completion of the authentication exchange; otherwise the

server indicates failure.

The system providing this external information may be, for example, IPsec or TLS. However, the client can make no assumptions as to what information the server can use in determining client authorization. For example, just because TLS was established, doesn't mean that the server will use the information provided by TLS.

If the client sends the empty string as the authorization identity, the authorization identity is to be derived from authentication credentials which exist in the system that is providing the external authentication.

7.1. Formal syntax

The following syntax specification uses the augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) notation as specified in [\[ABNF\]](#). This uses the ABNF core rules as specified in [Appendix A](#) of the ABNF specification [\[ABNF\]](#). Non-terminals referenced but not defined below are as defined by [\[UTF-8\]](#).

The "extern-init-resp" rule below defines the initial response sent from client to server.

```
extern-init-resp = *( UTF8-char-no-nul )
```

```
UTF8-char-no-nul = UTF8-1-no-nul / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4
```

```
UTF8-1-no-nul    = %x01-7F
```

7.2. Example

The following is an example of an EXTERNAL authentication in the SMTP protocol [\[SMTP\]](#). In this example, the client is proxy authenticating, sending the authorization identity "fred" using in the (optional) initial response. The server has determined the client's identity through IPsec and has a security policy that permits that identity to proxy authenticate as any other identity.

To the protocol profile, the four octet sequence "fred" is an opaque binary data. The SASL protocol profile for SMTP [\[SMTP-AUTH\]](#) specifies that server challenges and client responses are encoded in BASE64 [\[BASE64\]](#); the BASE64 encoding of "fred" is "ZnJlZA==".

```
S: 220 smtp.example.com ESMTP server ready
C: EHLO jgm.example.com
S: 250-smtp.example.com
```



```
S: 250 AUTH DIGEST-MD5 EXTERNAL
C: AUTH EXTERNAL ZnJlZA==
S: 235 Authentication successful.
```

The following example is almost identical to the one above, but the client doesn't use proxy authentication.

```
S: 220 smtp.example.com ESMTP server ready
C: EHLO jgm.example.com
S: 250-smtp.example.com
S: 250 AUTH DIGEST-MD5 EXTERNAL
C: AUTH EXTERNAL
S: 235 Authentication successful.
```

8. IANA Considerations

8.1. Guidelines for IANA

It is requested that IANA updates the SASL mechanisms registry as follows:

Change the "Intended usage" of the KERBEROS_V4 and SKEY mechanism registrations to OBSOLETE. Change the "Published specification" of the EXTERNAL mechanism to this document. Updated registration is provided in [Section 8.6](#).

8.2. Registration procedure

Registration of a SASL mechanism is done by filling in the template in [section 8.5](#) and sending it via electronic mail to <iana@iana.org>. IANA has the right to reject obviously bogus registrations, but will perform no review of claims made in the registration form. SASL mechanism registrations are currently available at the URL <http://www.iana.org/assignments/sasl-mechanisms>.

There is no naming convention for SASL mechanisms; any name that conforms to the syntax of a SASL mechanism name can be registered. An IETF Standards Track document may reserve a portion of the SASL mechanism namespace ("family of SASL mechanisms") for its own use, amending the registration rules for that portion of the namespace. Each family of SASL mechanisms MUST be identified by a prefix.

While the registration procedures do not require it, authors of SASL

mechanisms are encouraged to seek community review and comment whenever that is feasible. Authors may seek community review by posting a specification of their proposed mechanism as an Internet-Draft. SASL mechanisms intended for widespread use should be standardized through the normal IETF process, when appropriate.

8.3. Comments on SASL mechanism registrations

Comments on registered SASL mechanisms should first be sent to the "owner" of the mechanism and/or to the SASL WG mailing list. Submitters of comments may, after a reasonable attempt to contact the owner, request IANA to attach their comment to the SASL mechanism registration itself. If IANA approves of this, the comment will be made accessible in conjunction with the SASL mechanism registration itself.

8.4. Change control

Once a SASL mechanism registration has been published by IANA, the author may request a change to its definition. The change request follows the same procedure as the registration request.

The owner of a SASL mechanism may pass responsibility for the SASL mechanism to another person or agency by informing IANA; this can be done without discussion or review.

The IESG may reassign responsibility for a SASL mechanism. The most common case of this will be to enable changes to be made to mechanisms where the author of the registration has died, moved out of contact or is otherwise unable to make changes that are important to the community.

SASL mechanism registrations may not be deleted; mechanisms which are no longer believed appropriate for use can be declared OBSOLETE by a change to their "intended use" field; such SASL mechanisms will be clearly marked in the lists published by IANA.

The IESG is considered to be the owner of all SASL mechanisms which are on the IETF standards track.

8.5. Registration template

Subject: Registration of SASL mechanism X

Family of SASL mechanisms: (YES or NO)

SASL mechanism name (or prefix for the family):

Security considerations:

Published specification (optional, recommended):

Person & email address to contact for further information:

Intended usage:

(One of COMMON, LIMITED USE or OBSOLETE)

Owner/Change controller:

(Any other information that the author deems interesting may be added below this line.)

8.6. The EXTERNAL mechanism registration

It is requested that the SASL Mechanism registry [[IANA-SASL](#)] entry for the EXTERNAL mechanism be updated to reflect that this document now provides its technical specification.

Subject: Updated Registration of SASL mechanism EXTERNAL

Family of SASL mechanisms: NO

SASL mechanism name: EXTERNAL

Security considerations: See RFC XXXX, [section 9](#).

Published specification (optional, recommended): RFC XXXX

Person & email address to contact for further information:
Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>

Intended usage: COMMON

Owner/Change controller: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>

Note: Updates existing entry for EXTERNAL

9. Security considerations

Security issues are discussed throughout this memo.

The mechanisms that support integrity protection are designed such that the negotiation of the security layer and authorization identity

is integrity protected. When the client selects a security layer with at least integrity protection, this protects against an active attacker hijacking the connection and modifying the authentication exchange to negotiate a plaintext connection.

When a server or client supports multiple authentication mechanisms, each of which has a different security strength, it is possible for an active attacker to cause a party to use the least secure mechanism supported. To protect against this sort of attack, a client or server which supports mechanisms of different strengths should have a configurable minimum strength that it will use. It is not sufficient for this minimum strength check to only be on the server, since an active attacker can change which mechanisms the client sees as being supported, causing the client to send authentication credentials for its weakest supported mechanism.

The client's selection of a SASL mechanism is done in the clear and may be modified by an active attacker. It is important for any new SASL mechanisms to be designed such that an active attacker cannot obtain an authentication with weaker security properties by modifying the SASL mechanism name and/or the challenges and responses.

In order to detect Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks the client MAY list available SASL mechanisms both before and after the SASL security layer is negotiated. This allows the client to detect active attacks that remove mechanisms from the server's list of supported mechanisms, and allows the client to ensure that it is using the best mechanism supported by both client and server. New protocol profiles SHOULD require servers to make the list of SASL mechanisms available for the initial authentication available to the client after security layers are established. Some older protocols do not require this (or don't support listing of SASL mechanisms once authentication is complete); for these protocols clients MUST NOT treat an empty list of SASL mechanisms after authentication as a MITM attack.

Any protocol interactions prior to authentication are performed in the clear and may be modified by an active attacker. In the case where a client selects integrity protection, it is important that any security-sensitive protocol negotiations be performed after authentication is complete. Protocols should be designed such that negotiations performed prior to authentication should be either ignored or revalidated once authentication is complete.

When use of a security layer is negotiated by the authentication protocol exchange, the receiver should handle gracefully any security encoded data buffer larger than the defined/negotiated maximal size. In particular, it must not blindly allocate the amount of memory

specified in the buffer size field, as this might cause the "out of memory" condition. If the receiver detects a large block, it SHOULD close the connection.

Distributed server implementations need to be careful in how they trust other parties and, in particular, authentication secrets should only be disclosed to other parties that are trusted to manage and use those secrets in manner acceptable to disclosing party. It should be noted that, where those secrets are used to provide data confidentiality protections, if a third party (other than the discloser/disclosee) has knowledge of some portion of the protected information, it can use this knowledge in an attack upon other portions of the protected information.

[Section 6.3.1](#) contains a description of a potential class of attack on a distributed server implementation. The section also gives some recommendations about mitigating such attacks.

"stringprep" and Unicode security considerations apply to authentication identities, authorization identities and passwords.

The EXTERNAL mechanism provides no security protection; it is vulnerable to spoofing by either client or server, active attack, and eavesdropping. It should only be used when external security mechanisms are present and have sufficient strength.

[10.](#) References

[10.1.](#) Normative References

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Magnus Nystrom provided the ASCII art used in [Section 6.3](#).

Definition of partition was extracted from [RFC 2617](#) ("HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication").

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[Appendix A](#). Relation of SASL to transport security

Questions have been raised about the relationship between SASL and various services (such as IPsec and TLS) which provide a secured connection.

Two of the key features of SASL are:

The separation of the authorization identity from the identity in the client's credentials. This permits agents such as proxy servers to authenticate using their own credentials, yet request the access privileges of the identity for which they are proxying.

Upon successful completion of an authentication exchange, the server knows the authorization identity the client wishes to use. This allows servers to move to a "user is authenticated" state in the protocol.

These features are extremely important to some application protocols, yet Transport Security services do not always provide them. To define SASL mechanisms based on these services would be a very messy task, as the framing of these services would be redundant with the framing of SASL and some method of providing these important SASL features would have to be devised.

Sometimes it is desired to enable within an existing connection the use of a security service which does not fit the SASL model. (TLS is an example of such a service.) This can be done by adding a command, for example "STARTTLS", to the protocol. Such a command is outside the scope of SASL, and should be different from the command which starts a SASL authentication protocol exchange.

In certain situations, it is reasonable to use SASL underneath one of these Transport Security services. The transport service would secure the connection, either service would authenticate the client, and SASL would negotiate the authorization identity. The SASL negotiation would be what moves the protocol from "unauthenticated" to "authenticated" state. The "EXTERNAL" SASL mechanism is explicitly intended to handle the case where the transport service secures the connection and authenticates the client and SASL negotiates the authorization identity.

Appendix B. Changes since [RFC 2222](#)

The GSSAPI mechanism was removed. It is now specified in a separate document [[SASL-GSSAPI](#)].

The "KERBEROS_V4" mechanism defined in [RFC 2222](#) is obsolete and has been removed.

The "SKEY" mechanism described in [RFC 2222](#) is obsolete and has been removed. It has been replaced by the OTP mechanism [[SASL-OTP](#)].

The overview has been substantially reorganized and clarified.

Clarified the definition and semantics of the authorization identity.

Prohibited the NUL character in authorization identities.

Added a section on character string issues.

The word "must" in the first paragraph of the "Protocol profile requirements" section was changed to "MUST".

Specified that protocol profiles SHOULD provide a way for clients to discover available SASL mechanisms.

Made the requirement that protocol profiles specify the semantics of the authorization identity optional to the protocol profile. Clarified that such a specification is a refinement of the definition in the base SASL spec.

Added a requirement discouraging protocol profiles from breaking the separation between protocol and mechanism.

Mentioned that standards track documents may carve out their own portions of the SASL mechanism namespace and may amend registration rules for the portion. However registration of individual SASL mechanisms is still required.

Specified that the authorization identity in the EXTERNAL mechanism is encoded in UTF-8.

Added a statement that a protocol profile SHOULD allow challenge data to be sent with a success indication.

Added a security consideration for the EXTERNAL mechanism.

Clarified sections concerning success with additional data.

Cleaned up IANA considerations/registrations and assembled them in one place.

Updated references and split them into Informative and Normative.

Added text to the Security Considerations section regarding handling of extremely large SASL blocks.

Replaced UTF-8 ABNF with the reference to the UTF-8 document.

Added text about SASLprep for authentication identities and passwords. Described where SASLprep preparation should take place.

Added paragraph about verifying authorization identities.

Added a protocol profile requirement to specify interaction between SASL and TLS security layers.

Added a protocol profile requirement to specify if it supports reauthentication.

Removed the text that seemed to suggest that SASL security layer must not be used when TLS is available.

Created two subsections in 4.2 to talk separately about proxy authorization and format of the authorization identities.

Made requirement to verify that an authorization identity is correct by performing SASLprep a SHOULD, instead of a MUST.

Clarified that each SASL mechanism must decide where SASLprep is taking place.

Added 4 new examples for initial response and additional data with success.

Added text on checking the list of available SASL mechanisms after negotiating a security layer.

Added definition of "integrity protection" and "confidentiality protection".

Added warning about negotiating no layer once a security layer is negotiated.

Added new section with guidelines to a SASL mechanism designer.

Added a requirement to specify how an empty initial challenge is encoded if initial response is supported by a protocol.

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