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Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)

Status of this Memo

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A revised version of this draft document will be submitted to the RFC editor as a Standards Track RFC for the Internet Community. Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested. Distribution of this draft is unlimited.

When published as an RFC this document will obsolete RFC 2222.

Abstract

The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a framework for providing authentication and data security services in connection-oriented protocols via replaceable mechanisms. It provides a structured interface between protocols and mechanisms. The resulting framework allows new protocols to reuse existing mechanisms and allows old protocols to make use of new mechanisms. The framework also provides a protocol for securing subsequent protocol exchanges within a data security layer.

This document describes how a SASL mechanism is structured, describes how protocols add support for SASL, and defines the protocol for carrying a data security layer over a connection. Additionally, this document defines one SASL mechanism, the EXTERNAL mechanism.

1. Conventions used in this document

In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and server respectively.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as defined in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [KEYWORDS].

Character names in this document use the notation for code points and names from the Unicode Standard [Unicode]. For example, the letter "a" may be represented as either <U+0061> or <LATIN SMALL LETTER A>.

This document uses terms "integrity protection" and "confidentiality protection". The former refers to a security layer (see Section "Introduction" below for the definition) designed to provide "data integrity service" as defined in [Sec-Glossary]. Confidentiality protection is a security layer that provides "data confidentiality service" as defined in [Sec-Glossary]. The term "confidentiality protection" implies "integrity protection". Security layers may offer other kinds of security services.

2. Introduction

The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a framework for providing authentication and data security services in connection-oriented protocols via replaceable mechanisms. SASL provides a structured interface between protocols and mechanisms. SASL also provides a protocol for securing subsequent protocol exchanges within a data security layer.

SASL's design is intended to allow new protocols to reuse existing mechanisms without requiring redesign of the mechanisms and allows existing protocols to make use of new mechanisms without redesign of protocols.

The SASL is conceptually a framework which provides a layer between protocols and mechanisms, as illustrated in the following diagram.



It is through the interfaces of this layer that the framework allows any protocol to be utilized with any mechanism. While the layer does generally hide the particulars of protocols from mechanisms and the particulars of mechanisms from protocols, the layer does not generally hide the particulars of mechanisms from protocol implementations. For example, different mechanisms require different information to operate, some of them use password based authentication, some of then require realm information, others make use of Kerberos tickets, certificates, etc. Also, in order to perform authorization, server implementations have to implement a mapping from a mechanism-specific authentication identity format to a protocol-specific format.

It is possible to design and implement this framework in ways which do abstract away particulars of similar mechanisms. Such implementation could also be designed to be shared by multiple implementations of various protocols.

As illustrated above, the SASL framework interfaces with both protocols and mechanisms.

To use SASL, a protocol includes a command for identifying and authenticating a user to a server and for optionally negotiating a security layer for subsequent protocol interactions. If the use of a security layer is negotiated, that security layer is inserted between the protocol and the connection. Section 4 ("Protocol profile requirements") profiles the requirements that a protocol specification must fulfill to make use of SASL. A SASL protocol profile is a part of the protocol specification that satisfies the

requirements of Section 4.

A SASL mechanism is a series of server challenges and client responses specific to the mechanism. Each SASL mechanism is identified by a registered name. Section 5 ("Mechanism profile guidelines") profiles the requirements that a mechanism specification must fulfill to define a SASL mechanism.

This document is written to serve several different audiences:

- protocol designers using this specification to support authentication in their protocol,

- mechanism designers that define new SASL mechanisms, and

- implementors of clients or servers for those protocols using this specification.

The sections "Authentication mechanisms", "Protocol profile requirements", "Specific issues", and "Security considerations" cover issues that protocol designers need to understand and address in profiling this specification for use in a specific protocol.

The sections "Authentication mechanisms", "Mechanism profile guidelines", "Security considerations" and "Registration procedure" cover issues that mechanism designers need to understand and address in designing new SASL mechanisms.

The sections "Authentication mechanisms", "Protocol profile requirements", "Specific issues" and "Security considerations" cover issues that implementors of a protocol that uses SASL framework need to understand. The implementors will also need to understand a specification of a SASL profile specific to the protocol, as well as aspects of mechanism specifications they intend to use (regardless of whether they are implementing the mechanisms themselves or using an existing implementation) to understand, for instance, the mechanism-specific authentication identity forms, the offered services, and security and other considerations.

2.1. Relationship to other documents

This document obsoletes RFC 2222. It replaces all portions of RFC 2222 excepting sections 7.1 (Kerberos version 4 mechanism), 7.2 (GSSAPI mechanism), 7.3 (S/Key mechanism). The Kerberos version 4 (KERBEROS_IV) and S/Key (SKEY) mechanisms are now viewed as obsolete. The GSSAPI mechanism is now separately specified [SASL-GSSAPI].

3. Authentication mechanisms

SASL mechanisms are named by strings, from 1 to 20 characters in length, consisting of ASCII [ASCII] upper-case letters, digits, hyphens, and/or underscores. Names of SASL mechanisms or families of mechanisms must be registered with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) as described in section 8.2.

The "sasl-mech" ABNF production below defines the syntax of a SASL mechanism name. This uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation as specified in [ABNF].

```
sasl-mech    = 1*20mech-char
mech-char    = UPPER-ALPHA / DIGIT / HYPHEN / UNDERSCORE
               ; mech-char is restricted to "A"-"Z", "0"-"9", "-",
               ; and "_" from ASCII character set.

UPPER-ALPHA  = %x41-5A
               ; "A"-"Z"

DIGIT        = %x30-39
               ; "0"-"9"

HYPHEN       = %x2D
               ; "-"

UNDERSCORE   = %x5F
               ; "_"
```

3.1. Authentication Exchange

A SASL mechanism is responsible for conducting an authentication exchange. This consists of a series of server challenges and client responses, the contents of which are specific to and defined by the mechanism. To the application protocol, the challenges and responses are opaque binary tokens of arbitrary length (including 0-length). The protocol's profile then specifies how these binary tokens are encoded for transfer over the connection.

After receiving an authentication command or any client response, a server mechanism may issue a challenge, indicate failure, or indicate completion. The server mechanism may return additional data with a completion indication. The protocol's profile specifies how each of these is then represented over the connection.

After receiving a challenge, a client mechanism may issue a response or abort the exchange. The protocol's profile specifies how each of

these are then represented over the connection.

During the authentication exchange, the mechanism performs authentication, transmits an authorization identity (sometimes known as a username<<>>) from the client to server, and may negotiate the use of a mechanism-specific security layer. If the use of a security layer is agreed upon, then the mechanism must also define or negotiate the maximum security layer buffer size that each side is able to receive.

3.2. Identity Concepts

Conceptually, SASL framework involves two identities:
1) an identity associated with the authentication credentials (termed the authentication identity), and
2) an identity to act as (termed the authorization identity).

The client provides its credentials and, optionally, a string representing the requested authorization identity as part of the SASL exchange. When this string is omitted or empty, the client is requesting to act as the identity associated with the credentials (e.g., the user is requesting to act as the authentication identity).

The server is responsible for verifying the client's credentials and verifying that the client is allowed to act as the authorization identity. A SASL exchange fails if either (or both) of these verifications fails.

SASL mechanism specifications describe the form of credentials used to authenticate clients, and SASL application profiles describe the form of authorization identities transferred as part of authentication exchange. However, the precise form(s) of the authentication identities (used within the server in its verifications, or otherwise) and the precise form(s) of the authorization identities (used in making authorization decisions, or otherwise) is beyond the scope of the SASL and this specification. In some circumstances, the precise identity forms used outside of the SASL exchange may be dictated by other specifications. For instance, the authorization policy specification for an application protocol may dictate the precise form that an authorization identity is to be represented in the authorization policy.

<<Need to address few issues in the two remaining paragraphs>>
Any normalization of the authentication identity (for the purposes of conducting authentication exchange) is defined by a particular SASL mechanism, the protocol profile doesn't influence it.
Note, that the mechanism specification doesn't control how authentication identity information is represented elsewhere <<need to add few examples>>.

The mechanism MUST preserve Unicode codepoints when transferring authorization identity (e.g. the mechanism can't apply any form of normalization).

3.2.1. Authorization identities and proxy authentication

A mechanism which is incapable of transmitting an authorization identity must be treated as if it always transmits an authorization identity of an empty string. <<Is this redundant?>>

If the authorization identity transmitted during the authentication exchange is not the empty string, this is typically referred to as "proxy authentication". This feature permits agents such as proxy servers to authenticate using their own credentials, yet request the access privileges of the identity for which they are proxying.

The server makes an implementation-defined policy decision as to whether the authentication identity is permitted to have the access privileges of the authorization identity and whether the authorization identity is permitted to receive service. If it is not, the server indicates failure of the authentication exchange.

As a client might not have the same information as the server, clients SHOULD NOT derive authorization identities from authentication identities. Instead, clients SHOULD provide no (or empty) authorization identity when the user<<client?>> has not provided an authorization identity.

The server SHOULD verify that a received authorization identity is in the correct form. Protocol profiles whose authorization identities are simple user names (e.g. IMAP [RFC 3501]) SHOULD use "SASLprep" profile [SASLprep] of the "stringprep" algorithm [StringPrep] to prepare these names for matching. The profiles MAY use a stringprep profile that is more strict than "SASLprep". If the preparation of the authorization identity fails or results in an empty string, the server MUST fail the authentication exchange. The only exception to this rule is when the received authorization identity is already the empty string.

3.2.2. Authorization Identity Format

An authorization identity is a string of zero or more Unicode [Unicode] coded characters. The NUL <U+0000> character is prohibited in authorization identities.

The character encoding scheme used for transmitting an authorization identity over the protocol is specified in each authentication mechanism. All IETF-defined mechanisms MUST, and all other mechanisms SHOULD, use UTF-8 [UTF-8]. (See [CHARSET-POLICY] for IETF policy regarding character sets and encoding schemes.)

Mechanisms are expected to be capable of carrying the entire Unicode repertoire (with the exception of the NUL character). An authorization identity of the empty string and an absent authorization identity MUST be treated as equivalent. A mechanism which provides an optional field for an authorization identity, SHOULD NOT allow that field, when present, to be empty. The meaning of the empty string as an authorization identity is described in Section 3.2.

3.3. Security layers

If use of a security layer is negotiated by the authentication protocol exchange, the security layer is applied to all subsequent data sent over the connection (until another security layer is negotiated (see also section 6.3) or underlying connection is closed). The security layer takes effect immediately following the last response of the authentication exchange for data sent by the client and the completion indication for data sent by the server. The exact position MUST be defined by the protocol profile (see section 4 part 5).

Once the security layer is in effect the protocol stream is processed by the security layer into buffers of protected data. If the security layer is not able to produce a buffer, the connection MUST be closed. If the security layer is not able to decode a received buffer, the connection MUST be closed. In both cases the underlying connection SHOULD be closed gracefully.

Each buffer of protected data is transferred over the connection as a stream of octets prepended with a four octet field in network byte order that represents the length of the buffer. The length of the protected data buffer MUST be no larger than the maximum size that was either defined in the mechanism specification or negotiated by the other side during the authentication exchange.

Upon the receipt of a data buffer which is larger than the defined/ negotiated

maximal buffer size the receiver SHOULD close the connection, as this might be a sign of an attack.

SASL mechanisms which are unable to negotiate a security layer are treated as selecting no security layer.

4. Protocol profile requirements

In order to use this specification, a protocol definition MUST supply the following information:

1) A service name, to be selected from the IANA registry of "service" elements for the GSSAPI host-based service name form [GSSAPI]. This service name is made available to the authentication mechanism.

The registry is available at the URL <http://www.iana.org/assignments/gssapi-service-names>.

2) A definition of the command to initiate the authentication protocol exchange. This command must have as a parameter the name of the mechanism being selected by the client.

The command SHOULD have an optional parameter giving an initial response. If the protocol allows for the initial response, the protocol profile MUST also describe how an empty initial response is encoded. This optional parameter allows the client to avoid a round trip when using a mechanism which is defined to have the client send data first. When this initial response is sent by the client and the selected mechanism is defined to have the server start with an initial challenge, the command fails. See section 6.1 of this document for further information.

3) A definition of the method by which the authentication protocol exchange is carried out, including how the challenges and responses are encoded, how the server indicates completion or failure of the exchange, how the client aborts an exchange, and how the exchange method interacts with any line length limits in the protocol.

The exchange method SHOULD allow the server to include an optional data ("optional challenge") with a success notification. This allows the server to avoid a round trip when using a mechanism which is defined to have the server send additional data along with the indication of successful completion. Note that if additional data is sent with success, it can not be empty. See section 6.2 of this document for further information.

4) A protocol profile SHOULD specify a mechanism through which a client may obtain the names of the SASL mechanisms available

to it. This is typically done through the protocol's extensions or

capabilities mechanism.

5) Identification of the octet where any negotiated security layer starts to take effect, in both directions.

6) Specify if the protocol profile supports "multiple authentications" (see section 6.3).

7) If both a Transport Layer Security [TLS] and a SASL security layer are allowed to be negotiated by
the protocol, the protocol profile MUST define in which order they are applied to a cleartext data sent over the connection.

8) A protocol profile MAY further refine the definition of an authorization identity by adding additional syntactic restrictions and protocol-specific semantics. A protocol profile MUST specify the form of the authorization identity (since it is protocol-specific, as opposed to the authentication identity, which is mechanism-specific) and how authorization identities are to be compared. Profiles whose authorization identities are simple user names (e.g. IMAP [RFC 3501]) SHOULD use "SASLprep" profile [SASLprep] of the "stringprep" algorithm [StringPrep] to prepare these names for matching. The profiles MAY use a stringprep profile
that is more strict than SASLprep.

9) Where the application-layer protocol does not precisely state how identities established through SASL relate to identities used elsewhere (e.g., access controls) in the application-layer protocol, it may be useful for the application-layer protocol to provide a facility which the client may use to discover the identity used.

A protocol profile SHOULD NOT attempt to amend the definition of mechanisms or create mechanism-specific encodings. This breaks the separation between protocol and mechanism that is fundamental to the design of SASL. (Likewise, SASL mechanisms are intended to be profile neutral.)

5. Mechanism profile guidelines

Designers of new SASL mechanism should be aware of the following issues:

1) Authorization identity

While some legacy mechanisms are incapable of transmitting an authorization identity (which means that for these mechanisms the authorization identity is always the empty string), newly defined mechanisms SHOULD be

capable of transmitting a non-empty authorization identity. See also section 3.2.

2) Character string issues

Authentication mechanisms SHOULD encode character strings in UTF-8 [UTF-8] (see [CHARSET-POLICY] for IETF policy regarding character sets in IETF protocols).
In order to avoid interoperability problems due to differing normalizations, when a mechanism specifies that character data is to be used as input to a cryptographic and/or comparison function, the mechanism specification MUST detail how the data is to be represented, including any normalizations or other preparations, to ensure proper function. Designers of mechanisms SHOULD use
the "SASLprep" profile [SASLprep] of the "stringprep" algorithm [StringPrep] where applicable.
This recommendation does not apply to authorization identities as their handling is protocol-specific.

The preparation can be potentially performed on the client side (upon getting user input
or retrieving a value from configuration) or on the server side (upon receiving the value
from the client, retrieving a value from its authentication database or generating a
new value in order to store in in the authentication database).
SASL mechanisms MUST define which entity (or entities) must perform the preparation. If preparation fails or turns a non-empty string into the empty string, the entity
doing the preparation MUST fail the authentication exchange.

Implementation note:
A server side can be represented by multiple processes. For example, the server side may
consist of the server process itself that communicated with a client and a utility (a server agent) that is able to store passwords/hashes (or derivitives) in a
database that can be later used by the server. For the server agent the requirement to "fail the authentication exchange" should be interpreted as a requirement to refuse to store the data in the database.

3) If the underlying cryptographic technology used by a mechanism supports data integrity, then the mechanism specification MUST integrity protect the transmission of an authorization identity and the negotiation of the security layer.

4) The mechanism SHOULD NOT use the authorization identity in generation of any
long-term cryptographic keys/hashes. The reason is that different protocols (and sometimes even different implementations of the same protocol) may use multiple forms of an authorization identity that are semantically equivalent

and some clients may use one form while other clients use a different form.

5) SASL mechanisms should be designed to minimize the number of round trips required, because SASL can be used with protocols where connections are short-lived.

6) SASL does not provide for re-keying (see Section 9.1), but SASL mechanisms may.

<<Original Nico's text follows:>>
SASL mechanisms that support re-keying SHOULD:
- indicate that re-keying is or will be needed immediately; <<Alexey: HOW?
>>

- provide re-keying messages or transparently include re-keying messages in the security layers; the latter can happen without application involvement, but only as long as the application is engaged in timely bidirectional exchanges with its peer.

<<Alternative text by Alexey:>>
A SASL mechanism supports re-keying if it is able to generate/process messages that request immediate re-keying and it is able to carry out re-keying exchange. (Note that the mechanism MAY use a single message type to do both). SASL mechanisms that support re-keying MAY also be able to indicate that re-keying will be needed in the future.
A re-keying exchange can be conducted transparently by the mechanism, or the mechanism should be able to provide/accept re-keying messages to/from the application. The former can happen without application involvement, but only as long as the application is engaged in timely bidirectional exchanges with its peer.

7) SASL mechanisms SHOULD be profile neutral.

6. Specific issues

6.1. Client sends data first

Some mechanisms specify that the first data sent in the authentication exchange is from the client to the server.

If a protocol's profile permits the command which initiates an authentication exchange to contain an initial client response, this parameter SHOULD be used with such mechanisms.

If the initial client response parameter is not given, or if a protocol's profile does not permit the command which initiates an authentication exchange to contain an initial client response, then the server issues a challenge with no data. The client's response to this challenge is then used as the initial client response. (The server then proceeds to send the next challenge, indicates completion, or indicates failure.)

6.1.1. Client sends data first examples

The following are two examples of the SECURID authentication [SASL-SECURID] in the SMTP
protocol [SMTP]. In the first example below, the client is trying fast reauthentication
by sending the initial response:

S: 220-smtp.example.com ESMTP Server
C: EHLO client.example.com

```
      S: 250-smtp.example.com Welcome client.example.com
```

```
S: 250-AUTH GSSAPI SECURID
S: 250 DSN
C: AUTH SECURID AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA=
S: 235 Authentication successful
```

The example below is almost identical to the previous, but here the client chooses not to use the initial response parameter.

```
S: 220-smtp.example.com ESMTP Server
C: EHLO client.example.com
S: 250-smtp.example.com Welcome client.example.com
S: 250-AUTH GSSAPI SECURID
S: 250 DSN
C: AUTH SECURID
S: 334
C: AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA=
S: 235 Authentication successful
```

Additonal examples that show usage of initial response can be found in section 7.2.

6.2. Server returns success with additional data

Some mechanisms may specify that additional data be sent to the client along with an indication of successful completion of the exchange. This data would, for example, authenticate the server to the client.

If a protocol's profile does not permit this additional data to be returned with a success indication, then the server issues the data as a server challenge, without an indication of successful completion. The client then responds with no data. After receiving this empty response, the server then indicates successful completion (with no additional data).

Client implementors should be aware of an additional failure case that might occur when the profile supports sending the additional data with success. Imagine that an active attacker is trying to impersonate the server and sends faked data, which should be used to authenticate the server to the client, with success. (A similar situation can happen when either the server and/or the client has a bug and they calculate different responses.) After checking the data, the client will think that the authentication exchange has failed, however the server will think that the authentication exchange has completed successfully. At this point the client can not abort the authentication exchange; it SHOULD close the connection instead. However, if the profile did not support sending of additional data

with success, the client could have aborted the exchange at the very last step of the authentication exchange.

6.2.1. Server returns success with additional data examples

The following are two examples of a DIGEST-MD5 authentication [SASL-DIGEST] in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol [XMPP]. In the first example below, the server is sending mutual authentication data with success.

```
C: <stream:stream
    xmlns='jabber:client'
    xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
    to='example.com'
    version='1.0'>
S: <stream:stream
    xmlns='jabber:client'
    xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
    id='c2s_234'
    from='example.com'
    version='1.0'>
S: <stream:features>
     <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
       <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
       <mechanism>CRAM-MD5</mechanism>
     </mechanisms>
   </stream:features>
C: <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
         mechanism='DIGEST-MD5'/>
S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
   cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWFsbSIsbm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRFUUdtMmhoIixxb3A9
   ImF1dGgiLGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgsYWxnb3JpdGhtPW1kNS1zZXNzCg==
   </challenge>
C: <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
   dXNlcm5hbWU9InNvbWVub2RlIixyZWFsbT0ic29tZXJlYWxtIixub25jZT0i
   T0E2TUc5dEVRR20yaGgiLGNub25jZT0iT0E2TUhYaDZWcVRyUmsiLG5jPTAw
   MDAwMDAxLHFvcD1hdXRoLGRpZ2VzdC11cmk9InhtcHAvZXhhbXBsZS5jb20i
   LHJlc3BvbnNlPWQzODhkYWQ5MGQ0YmJkNzYwYTE1MjMyMWYyMTQzYWY3LGNo
   YXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgK
   </response>
S: <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
   cnNwYXV0aD1lYTQwZjYwMzM1YzQyN2I1NTI3Yjg0ZGJhYmNkZmZmZAo=
   </success>
```

The example below is almost identical to the previous, but here the server chooses not to use the additional data with success.

```
C: <stream:stream
    xmlns='jabber:client'
    xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
    to='example.com'
    version='1.0'>
S: <stream:stream
    xmlns='jabber:client'
    xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
    id='c2s_234'
    from='example.com'
    version='1.0'>
S: <stream:features>
     <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
       <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
       <mechanism>CRAM-MD5</mechanism>
     </mechanisms>
   </stream:features>
C: <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
         mechanism='DIGEST-MD5'/>
S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
   cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWFsbSIsbm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRFUUdtMmhoIixxb3A9
   ImF1dGgiLGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgsYWxnb3JpdGhtPW1kNS1zZXNzCg==
   </challenge>
C: <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
   dXNlcm5hbWU9InNvbWVub2RlIixyZWFsbT0ic29tZXJlYWxtIixub25jZT0i
   T0E2TUc5dEVRR20yaGgiLGNub25jZT0iT0E2TUhYaDZWcVRyUmsiLG5jPTAw
   MDAwMDAxLHFvcD1hdXRoLGRpZ2VzdC11cmk9InhtcHAvZXhhbXBsZS5jb20i
   LHJlc3BvbnNlPWQzODhkYWQ5MGQ0YmJkNzYwYTE1MjMyMWYyMTQzYWY3LGNo
   YXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgK
   </response>
S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
   cnNwYXV0aD1lYTQwZjYwMzM1YzQyN2I1NTI3Yjg0ZGJhYmNkZmZmZAo=
   </challenge>
C: <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>
S: <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>
```

6.3. Multiple authentications

Unless otherwise stated by the protocol's profile, only one successful SASL negotiation may occur in a protocol session. In this case, once an authentication exchange has successfully completed, further attempts to initiate an authentication exchange fail.

If a profile explicitly permits multiple successful SASL negotiations to occur, then in no case may multiple security layers be simultaneously in effect. If a security layer is in effect and a subsequent SASL negotiation selects a second security layer, then the second security layer replaces the first; this can be used as a form

of re-keying, where SASL mechanisms that provide security layers fail to provide for re-keying, provided that the authenticated identity remains the same. If a security layer is in effect and a subsequent SASL negotiation selects no security layer, the original security layer remains in effect.

Where a protocol profile permits multiple successful SASL negotiations, the profile MUST detail the effect of a failed SASL negotiation upon the previously established authentication state. In particular, it MUST state whether the previously established authenticated state remains in force or whether the connection is to revert to an non-authenticated state. Regardless of the specified effect upon authentication state, the previously negotiated security layer remains in effect.

7. The EXTERNAL mechanism

The mechanism name associated with external authentication is "EXTERNAL".

The client sends a single message containing the UTF-8 encoding of the requested authorization identity. The message may be empty. The form of the authorization identity may be restricted by the application protocol's SASL profile.

Some system external to SASL must authenticate the client. If that succeeds, the server determines the authentication identity from information from this system. If the requested authorization identity is empty, the authorization identity is derived from the authentication identity. The server determines if the authentication identity is allowed to act as the authorization identity. If all that succeeds, the server indicates successful completion of the authentication exchange; otherwise it indicates failure.

The system providing this external information may be, for example, IPSec [IPSec] or TLS [TLS]. However, the client can make no assumptions as to what information the server can use in determining client authorization. For example, just because TLS was established, doesn't mean that the server will use the information provided by TLS.

7.1. Formal syntax

The following syntax specification uses the augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) notation as specified in [ABNF]. Non-terminals referenced but not defined below are as defined by [UTF-8].

The "extern-resp" rule below defines the message sent from client to

server.

```
extern-resp       = *( UTF8-char-no-nul )

UTF8-char-no-nul  = UTF8-1-no-nul / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4

UTF8-1-no-nul     = %x01-7F
```

7.2. Examples of SASL EXTERNAL

The following is an example of an EXTERNAL authentication in the SMTP protocol [SMTP]. In this example, the client is proxy authenticating, sending the authorization identity "fred@example.com" in the (optional) initial response. The server has obtained the client's (authentication) identity from an external service, such as IPsec, and has a security policy that permits that identity to assume the identity of the asserted authorization identity.

To the protocol profile, the sequence "fred@example.com" is an opaque binary data. The SASL protocol profile for SMTP [SMTP-AUTH] specifies that server challenges and client responses are encoded in BASE64 [BASE64, section 3]; the BASE64 encoding of "fred@example.com" is "ZnJlZEBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQ==".

```
S: 220 smtp.example.com ESMTP server ready
C: EHLO jgm.example.com
S: 250-smtp.example.com
S: 250 AUTH DIGEST-MD5 EXTERNAL
C: AUTH EXTERNAL ZnJlZEBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQ==
S: 235 Authentication successful.
```

The following example is almost identical to the one above, but the client doesn't request proxy authentication.

```
S: 220 smtp.example.com ESMTP server ready
C: EHLO jgm.example.com
S: 250-smtp.example.com
S: 250 AUTH DIGEST-MD5 EXTERNAL
C: AUTH EXTERNAL
S: 235 Authentication successful.
```

The following is an example of an EXTERNAL authentication in the IMAP4 protocol [IMAP]. IMAP4 doesn't support the initial response feature of SASL. As in the previous example, the client doesn't request proxy authentication.

```
S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server
```

```
C: C01 CAPABILITY
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4 IMAP4rev1 AUTH=DIGEST-MD5 AUTH=EXTERNAL
[...]
C: A01 AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL
(note that there is a space following the "+" in the following line)
S: +
C:
S: A01 OK Success
```

8. IANA Considerations

8.1. Guidelines for IANA

It is requested that IANA updates the SASL mechanisms registry as follows:

Change the "Intended usage" of the KERBEROS_V4 and SKEY mechanism registrations to OBSOLETE. Change the "Published specification" of the EXTERNAL mechanism to this document. Updated registration information is provided in Section 8.6.

8.2. Registration procedure

Registration of a SASL mechanism is done by filling in the template in section 8.5 and sending it via electronic mail to <iana@iana.org>. IANA has the right to reject obviously bogus registrations, but will perform no review of claims made in the registration form. SASL mechanism registrations are currently available at the URL <http://www.iana.org/assignments/sasl-mechanisms>.

There is no naming convention for SASL mechanisms; any name that conforms to the syntax of a SASL mechanism name can be registered. However an IETF Standards Track document may reserve a portion of the SASL mechanism namespace ("family of SASL mechanisms") for its own use, amending the registration rules for that portion of the namespace. Each family of SASL mechanisms MUST be identified by a prefix.

While the registration procedures do not require expert review, authors of SASL mechanisms are encouraged to seek community review and comment whenever that is feasible. Authors may seek community review by posting a specification of their proposed mechanism as an Internet-Draft. SASL mechanisms intended for widespread use should

be standardized through the normal IETF process, when appropriate.

8.3. Comments on SASL mechanism registrations

Comments on registered SASL mechanisms should first be sent to the "owner" of the mechanism and/or to the SASL WG mailing list. Submitters of comments may, after a reasonable attempt to contact the owner, request IANA to attach their comment to the SASL mechanism registration itself. If IANA approves of this, the comment will be made accessible in conjunction with the SASL mechanism registration itself.

8.4. Change control

Once a SASL mechanism registration has been published by IANA, the author may request a change to its definition. The change request follows the same procedure as the registration request.

The owner of a SASL mechanism may pass responsibility for the SASL mechanism to another person or agency by informing IANA; this can be done without discussion or review.

The IESG may reassign responsibility for a SASL mechanism. The most common case of this will be to enable changes to be made to mechanisms where the author of the registration has died, moved out of contact or is otherwise unable to make changes that are important to the community.

SASL mechanism registrations may not be deleted; mechanisms which are no longer believed appropriate for use can be declared OBSOLETE by a change to their "intended usage" field; such SASL mechanisms will be clearly marked in the lists published by IANA.

The IESG is considered to be the owner of all SASL mechanisms which are on the IETF standards track.

8.5. Registration template

Subject: Registration of SASL mechanism X

Family of SASL mechanisms: (YES or NO)

SASL mechanism name (or prefix for the family):

Security considerations:

Published specification (optional, recommended):

Person & email address to contact for further information:

Intended usage:

(One of COMMON, LIMITED USE or OBSOLETE)

Owner/Change controller:

(Any other information that the author deems interesting may be added below this line.)

8.6. The EXTERNAL mechanism registration

It is requested that the SASL Mechanism registry [IANA-SASL] entry for the EXTERNAL mechanism be updated to reflect that this document now provides its technical specification.

Subject: Updated Registration of SASL mechanism EXTERNAL

Family of SASL mechanisms: NO

SASL mechanism name: EXTERNAL

Security considerations: See RFC XXXX, section 9.

Published specification (optional, recommended): RFC XXXX

Person & email address to contact for further information:
Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>

Intended usage: COMMON

Owner/Change controller: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>

Note: Updates existing entry for EXTERNAL

9. Security considerations

Security issues are discussed throughout this memo.

When the client selects a security layer with at least integrity protection, this protects against an active attacker hijacking the connection and modifying the authentication exchange to negotiate a plaintext connection.

When a server or client supports multiple authentication mechanisms,

each of which has a different security strength, it is possible for an active attacker to cause a party to use the least secure mechanism supported. To protect against this sort of attack, a client or server which supports mechanisms of different strengths should have a configurable minimum strength that it will use. It is not sufficient for this minimum strength check to only be on the server, since an active attacker can change which mechanisms the client sees as being supported, causing the client to send authentication credentials for its weakest supported mechanism.

The client's selection of a SASL mechanism is done in the clear and may be modified by an active attacker. It is important for any new SASL mechanisms to be designed such that an active attacker cannot obtain an authentication with weaker security properties by modifying the SASL mechanism name and/or the challenges and responses.

In order to detect Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks the client MAY list available SASL mechanisms both before and after the SASL security layer is negotiated. This allows the client to detect active attacks that remove mechanisms from the server's list of supported mechanisms, and allows the client to ensure that it is using the best mechanism supported by both client and server. New protocol profiles SHOULD require servers to make the list of SASL mechanisms available for the initial authentication available to the client after security layers are established. Some older protocols do not require this (or don't support listing of SASL mechanisms once authentication is complete); for these protocols clients MUST NOT treat an empty list of SASL mechanisms after authentication as a MITM attack.

Any protocol interactions prior to authentication are performed in the clear and may be modified by an active attacker. In the case where a client selects integrity protection, it is important that any security-sensitive protocol negotiations be performed after authentication is complete. Protocols should be designed such that negotiations performed prior to authentication should be either ignored or revalidated once authentication is complete.

Clients should be admonished to validate TLS server IDs to prevent MITM attacks when using SASL-over-TLS. The same recommendation applies to other protocols providing security services.

When use of a security layer is negotiated by the authentication protocol exchange, the receiver should handle gracefully any protected data buffer larger than the defined/negotiated maximal size. In particular, it must not blindly allocate the amount of memory specified in the buffer size field, as this might cause the "out of memory" condition. If the receiver detects a large block, it

SHOULD close the connection.

Distributed server implementations need to be careful in how they trust other parties. In particular, authentication secrets should only be disclosed to other parties that are trusted to manage and use those secrets in manner acceptable to disclosing party. Applications using SASL assume that SASL security layers providing data confidentiality are secure even when an attacker chooses the text to be protected by the security layer. Similarly applications assume that the SASL security layer is secure even if the attacker can manipulate the ciphertext output of the security layer. New SASL mechanisms MUST meet these assumptions.

"stringprep" and Unicode security considerations apply to authentication identities, authorization identities and passwords.

The EXTERNAL mechanism provides no security protection; it is vulnerable to spoofing by either client or server, active attack, and eavesdropping. It should only be used when external security mechanisms are present and have sufficient strength.

9.1. Re-keying

The secure or administratively permitted lifetimes of SASL mechanisms' security layers are finite. Cryptographic keys weaken as they are used and as time passes; the more time and/or ciphertext that a cryptanalyst has after the first use of the a key, the easier it is for the cryptanalyst to mount attacks on the key.

Administrative limits on security layers lifetime may take the form of time limits expressed in x.509 certificates, Kerberos V tickets, or in directories, and are often desired. <<In practice one likely effect of administrative security layers lifetime limits is that applications may find that security layers stop working in the middle of application protocol operation, such as, perhaps, during large data transfers. As the result of this the connection will be closed (see section 3.3), which will result in unpleasant user experience.>>

Re-keying (key renegotiation process) is a<<>> way of addressing the weakening of cryptographic keys. SASL framework does not provide for re-keying. SASL mechanisms may; all future SASL mechanisms that provide security layers should provide for re-keying.

Applications that wish to re-key SASL security layers where the mechanism does not provide for re-keying should reauthenticate the same IDs and replace the expired or soon-to-expire security layers.

This approach requires support for re-keying in the application protocols. See section 6.3.

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10.1. Normative References

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12. Acknowledgments

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Appendix A. Relation of SASL to transport security

Questions have been raised about the relationship between SASL and various services (such as IPsec and TLS) which provide a secured connection.

Two of the key features of SASL are:

- The separation of the authorization identity from the identity in the client's credentials. This permits agents such as proxy servers to authenticate using their own credentials, yet request the access privileges of the identity for which they are proxying.

- Upon successful completion of an authentication exchange, the server knows the authorization identity the client wishes to use. This allows servers to move to a "user is authenticated" state in the protocol.

These features are extremely important to some application protocols, yet Transport Security services do not always provide them. To define SASL mechanisms based on these services would be a very messy task, as the framing of these services would be redundant with the framing of SASL and some method of providing these important SASL features would have to be devised.

Sometimes it is desired to enable within an existing connection the use of a security service which does not fit the SASL model. (TLS is an example of such a service.) This can be done by adding a command, for example "STARTTLS", to the protocol. Such a command is outside the scope of SASL, and should be different from the command which starts a SASL authentication protocol exchange.

In certain situations, it is reasonable to use SASL underneath one of these Transport Security services. The transport service would secure the connection, either service would authenticate the client, and SASL would negotiate the authorization identity. The SASL negotiation would be what moves the protocol from "unauthenticated" to "authenticated" state. The "EXTERNAL" SASL mechanism is explicitly intended to handle the case where the transport service secures the connection and authenticates the client and SASL negotiates the authorization identity.

Appendix B. Changes since RFC 2222

The GSSAPI mechanism was removed. It is now specified in a separate document [SASL-GSSAPI].

The "KERBEROS_V4" mechanism defined in RFC 2222 is obsolete and has been removed.

The "SKEY" mechanism described in RFC 2222 is obsolete and has been removed. It has been replaced by the OTP mechanism [SASL-OTP].

The introduction has been substantially reorganized and clarified.

Clarified the definition and semantics of the authorization identity.

Prohibited the NUL character in authorization identities.

Added a section on character string issues.

The word "must" in the first paragraph of the "Protocol profile requirements" section was changed to "MUST".

Specified that protocol profiles SHOULD provide a way for clients to discover available SASL mechanisms.

Made the requirement that protocol profiles specify the semantics of the authorization identity optional to the protocol profile. Clarified that such a specification is a refinement of the definition in the base SASL spec.

Added a requirement discouraging protocol profiles from breaking the separation between protocol and mechanism.

Mentioned that standards track documents may carve out their own portions of the SASL mechanism namespace and may amend registration rules for the portion. However registration of individual SASL mechanisms is still required.

Clarified that authorization identity should be encoded in UTF-8.

Specified that the authorization identity in the EXTERNAL mechanism is encoded in UTF-8.

Added a statement that a protocol profile SHOULD allow challenge data to be sent with a success indication.

Added a security consideration for the EXTERNAL mechanism.

Clarified sections concerning success with additional data.

Cleaned up IANA considerations/registrations and assembled them in one place.

Updated references and split them into Informative and Normative.

Added text to the Security considerations section regarding handling of extremely large SASL blocks.

Added text about SASLprep for authentication identities and passwords. Described where SASLprep preparation should take place.

Added paragraph about verifying authorization identities.

Added a protocol profile requirement to specify interaction between SASL and TLS security layers.

Added a protocol profile requirement to specify if it supports reauthentication.

Removed the text that seemed to suggest that SASL security layer must not be used when TLS is available.

Created two subsections in 3.2 to talk separately about proxy authorization and format of the authorization identities.

Made requirement to verify that an authorization identity is correct by performing SASLprep.

Clarified that each SASL mechanism must decide where SASLprep is taking place.

Added 4 new examples for initial response and additional data with success.

Added text on checking the list of available SASL mechanisms after negotiating a security layer.

Added definition of "integrity protection" and "confidentiality protection".

Added warning about negotiating no layer once a security layer is negotiated.

Added new section with guidelines to a SASL mechanism designer.

Added a requirement to specify how an empty initial challenge is encoded if initial response is supported by a protocol.

Clarified that empty "additional data with success" is not allowed.

Replaced "buffers of cipher-text" with "buffers of protected data" for clarity.

Clarified that SASL EXTERNAL can be used even with SASL profiles that don't support initial client response.

Changed "authentication protocol exchange" to "authentication exchange" everywhere.

Appendix C. Full Copyright Statement and Intellectual Property Statement

Full Copyright Statement

Acknowledgement

Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society.

Intellectual Property

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