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## Failure Detection and Locator Pair Exploration Protocol for IPv6 Multihoming draft-ietf-shim6-failure-detection-13

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## Abstract

This document specifies how the level 3 multihoming shim protocol (SHIM6) detects failures between two communicating hosts. It also specifies an exploration protocol for switching to another pair of interfaces and/or addresses between the same hosts if a failure occurs and an operational pair can be found.

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### **<u>1</u>**. Introduction

The SHIM6 protocol [<u>I-D.ietf-shim6-proto</u>] extends IPv6 to support multihoming. It is an IP layer mechanism that hides multihoming from applications. A part of the SHIM6 solution involves detecting when a currently used pair of addresses (or interfaces) between two communication hosts has failed, and picking another pair when this occurs. We call the former failure detection, and the latter locator pair exploration.

This document specifies the mechanisms and protocol messages to achieve both failure detection and locator pair exploration. This part of the SHIM6 protocol is called the REAchability Protocol (REAP).

Failure detection is made as light weight as possible. Data traffic in both direction is observed, and in the case where there is no traffic because the communication is idle, failure detection is also idle and doesn't generate any packets. When data traffic is flowing in both directions, there is no need to send failure detection packets, either. Only when there is traffic in one direction, the failure detection mechanism generates keepalives in the other direction. As a result, whenever there is outgoing traffic and no incoming return traffic or keepalives, there must be failure, at which point the locator pair exploration is performed to find a working address pair for each direction.

The document is structured as follows: <u>Section 3</u> defines a set of useful terms, <u>Section 4</u> gives an overview of REAP, and <u>Section 5</u> specifies the message formats and behaviour in detail. <u>Section 8</u> discusses the security considerations of REAP.

In this specification, we consider an address to be synonymous with a locator. Other parts of the SHIM6 protocol ensure that the different locators used by a node actually belong together. That is, REAP is not responsible for ensuring that it ends up with a legitimate locator.

REAP has been designed to be used with SHIM6, and is therefore tailored to an environment where it runs on hosts, uses widely varying types of paths and is unaware of application context. As a result, REAP attempts to be as self-configuring and unobtrusive as possible. In particular, it avoids sending any packets except where absolutely required and employs exponential back-off to avoid congestion. The downside is that it cannot offer the same granularity of detecting problems as mechanisms that have more application context and ability to negotiate or configure parameters. Future versions of this specification may consider extensions with

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such capabilities, for instance through inheriting some mechanisms from Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) protocol [<u>I-D.ietf-bfd-base</u>].

## **<u>2</u>**. Requirements language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [<u>RFC2119</u>].

### 3. Definitions

This section defines terms useful for discussing failure detection and locator pair exploration.

## <u>3.1</u>. Available Addresses

SHIM6 nodes need to be aware of what addresses they themselves have. If a node loses the address it is currently using for communications, another address must replace this address. And if a node loses an address that the node's peer knows about, the peer must be informed. Similarly, when a node acquires a new address it may generally wish the peer to know about it.

Definition. Available address - an address is said to be available if all the following conditions are fulfilled:

- o The address has been assigned to an interface of the node.
- o The valid lifetime of the prefix (<u>RFC 4861</u> [<u>RFC4861</u>] <u>Section</u> <u>4.6.2</u>) associated with the address has not expired.
- o The address is not tentative in the sense of <u>RFC 4862</u> [<u>RFC4862</u>]. In other words, the address assignment is complete so that communications can be started.

Note that this explicitly allows an address to be optimistic in the sense of Optimistic DAD [RFC4429] even though implementations may prefer using other addresses as long as there is an alternative.

o The address is a global unicast or unique local address [<u>RFC4193</u>]. That is, it is not an IPv6 site-local or link-local address.

With link-local addresses, the nodes would be unable to determine on which link the given address is usable.

o The address and interface is acceptable for use according to a local policy.

Available addresses are discovered and monitored through mechanisms outside the scope of SHIM6. SHIM6 implementations MUST be able to employ information provided by IPv6 Neighbor Discovery [<u>RFC4861</u>], Address Autoconfiguration [<u>RFC4862</u>], and DHCP [<u>RFC3315</u>] (when DHCP is implemented). This information includes the availability of a new address and status changes of existing addresses (such as when an address becomes invalid).

### 3.2. Locally Operational Addresses

Two different granularity levels are needed for failure detection. The coarser granularity is for individual addresses:

Definition. Locally Operational Address - an available address is said to be locally operational when its use is known to be possible locally: the interface is up, a default router (if needed) suitable for this address is known to be reachable, and no other local information points to the address being unusable.

Locally operational addresses are discovered and monitored through mechanisms outside the SHIM6 protocol. SHIM6 implementations MUST be able to employ information provided from Neighbor Unreachability Detection [<u>RFC4861</u>]. Implementations MAY also employ additional, link layer specific mechanisms.

Note 1: A part of the problem in ensuring that an address is operational is making sure that after a change in link layer connectivity we are still connected to the same IP subnet. Mechanisms such as DNA CPL [<u>I-D.ietf-dna-cpl</u>] or DNAv6 [<u>I-D.ietf-dna-protocol</u>] can be used to ensure this.

Note 2: In theory, it would also be possible for hosts to learn about routing failures for a particular selected source prefix, if only suitable protocols for this purpose existed. Some proposals in this space have been made, see, for instance [I-D.bagnulo-shim6-addr-selection] and [I-D.huitema-multi6-addr-selection], but none have been standardized to date.

## 3.3. Operational Address Pairs

The existence of locally operational addresses are not, however, a guarantee that communications can be established with the peer. A failure in the routing infrastructure can prevent packets from reaching their destination. For this reason we need the definition of a second level of granularity, for pairs of addresses:

Definition. Bidirectionally operational address pair - a pair of locally operational addresses are said to be an operational address pair when bidirectional connectivity can be shown between the addresses. That is, a packet sent with one of the addresses in the source field and the other in the destination field reaches the destination, and vice versa.

Unfortunately, there are scenarios where bidirectionally operational address pairs do not exist. For instance, ingress filtering or

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network failures may result in one address pair being operational in one direction while another one is operational from the other direction. The following definition captures this general situation:

Definition. Unidirectionally operational address pair - a pair of locally operational addresses are said to be an unidirectionally operational address pair when packets sent with the first address as the source and the second address as the destination reaches the destination.

SHIM6 implementations MUST support the discovery of operational address pairs through the use of explicit reachability tests and Forced Bidirectional Communication (FBD), described later in this specification. Future extensions of SHIM6 may specify additional mechanisms. Some ideas of such mechanisms are listed below, but not fully specified in this document:

o Positive feedback from upper layer protocols. For instance, TCP can indicate to the IP layer that it is making progress. This is similar to how IPv6 Neighbor Unreachability Detection can in some cases be avoided when upper layers provide information about bidirectional connectivity [RFC4861].

In the case of unidirectional connectivity, the upper layer protocol responses come back using another address pair, but show that the messages sent using the first address pair have been received.

- o Negative feedback from upper layer protocols. It is conceivable that upper layer protocols give an indication of a problem to the multihoming layer. For instance, TCP could indicate that there's either congestion or lack of connectivity in the path because it is not getting ACKs.
- o ICMP error messages. Given the ease of spoofing ICMP messages, one should be careful to not trust these blindly, however. One approach would be to use ICMP error messages only as a hint to perform an explicit reachability test or move an address pair to a lower place in the list of address pairs to be probed, but not as a reason to disrupt ongoing communications without other indications of problems. The situation may be different when certain verifications of the ICMP messages are being performed, as explained by Gont in [I-D.ietf-tcpm-icmp-attacks]. These verifications can ensure that (practically) only on-path attackers can spoof the messages.

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### <u>3.4</u>. Primary Address Pair

The primary address pair consists of the addresses that upper layer protocols use in their interaction with the SHIM6 layer. Use of the primary address pair means that the communication is compatible with regular non-SHIM6 communication and no context ID needs to be present.

## 3.5. Current Address Pair

SHIM6 needs to avoid sending packets which belong to the same transport connection concurrently over multiple paths. This is because congestion control in commonly used transport protocols is based upon a notion of a single path. While routing can introduce path changes as well and transport protocols have means to deal with this, frequent changes will cause problems. Effective congestion control over multiple paths is considered a research topic at the time this specification is written. SHIM6 does not attempt to employ multiple paths simultaneously.

Note: SCTP and future multipath transport protocols are likely to require interaction with SHIM6, at least to ensure that they do not employ SHIM6 unexpectedly.

For these reasons it is necessary to choose a particular pair of addresses as the current address pair which is used until problems occur, at least for the same session.

It is theoretically possible to support multiple current address pairs for different transport sessions or SHIM6 contexts. However, this is not supported in this version of the SHIM6 protocol.

A current address pair need not be operational at all times. If there is no traffic to send, we may not know if the primary address pair is operational. Nevertheless, it makes sense to assume that the address pair that worked previously continues to be operational for new communications as well.

### 4. Protocol Overview

This section discusses the design of the reachability detection and full reachability exploration mechanisms, and gives on overview of the REAP protocol.

Exploring the full set of communication options between two hosts that both have two or more addresses is an expensive operation as the number of combinations to be explored increases very quickly with the number of addresses. For instance, with two addresses on both sides, there are four possible address pairs. Since we can't assume that reachability in one direction automatically means reachability for the complement pair in the other direction, the total number of twoway combinations is eight. (Combinations = nA \* nB \* 2.)

An important observation in multihoming is that failures are relatively infrequent, so that an operational pair that worked a few seconds ago is very likely to be still operational. So it makes sense to have a light-weight protocol that confirms existing reachability, and only invoke heavier exploration when a there is a suspected failure.

#### **4.1**. Failure Detection

Failure detection consists of three parts: tracking local information, tracking remote peer status, and finally verifying reachability. Tracking local information consists of using, for instance, reachability information about the local router as an input. Nodes SHOULD employ techniques listed in <u>Section 3.1</u> and <u>Section 3.2</u> to track the local situation. It is also necessary to track remote address information from the peer. For instance, if the peer's currently used address is no longer in use, a mechanism to relay that information is needed. The Update Request message in the SHIM6 protocol is used for this purpose [<u>I-D.ietf-shim6-proto</u>]. Finally, when the local and remote information indicates that communication should be possible and there are upper layer packets to be sent, reachability verification is necessary to ensure that the peers actually have an operational address pair.

A technique called Forced Bidirectional Detection (FBD, originally defined in an earlier SHIM6 document [<u>I-D.ietf-shim6-reach-detect</u>]) is employed for the reachability verification. Reachability for the currently used address pair in a SHIM6 context is determined by making sure that whenever there is data traffic in one direction, there is also traffic in the other direction. This can be data traffic as well, but also transport layer acknowledgments or a REAP reachability keepalive if there is no other traffic. This way, it is no longer possible to have traffic in only one direction, so whenever

there is data traffic going out, but there are no return packets, there must be a failure, so the full exploration mechanism is started.

A more detailed description of the current pair reachability evaluation mechanism:

 To avoid the other side from concluding there is a reachability failure, it's necessary for a host implementing the failure detection mechanism to generate periodic keepalives when there is no other traffic.

FBD works by generating REAP keepalives if the node is receiving packets from its peer but not sending any of its own. The keepalives are sent at certain intervals so that the other side knows there is a reachability problem when it doesn't receive any incoming packets for its Send Timeout period. The host communicates its Send Timeout value to the peer as an Keepalive Timeout Option (<u>section 5.3</u>) in the I2, I2bis, R2, or UPDATE messages. The peer then maps this value to its Keepalive Timeout value.

The interval after which keepalives are sent is named Keepalive Interval. The RECOMMENDED approach is sending keepalives at onehalf to one-third of the Keepalive Timeout interval, so that multiple keepalives are generated and have time to reach the correspondent before it times out.

2. Whenever outgoing data packets are generated, a timer is started to reflect the requirement that the peer should generate return traffic from data packets. The timeout value is set to the value of Send Timeout.

For the purposes of this specification, "data packet" refers to any packet that is part of a SHIM6 context, including both upper layer protocol packets and SHIM6 protocol messages except those defined in this specification.

3. Whenever incoming data packets are received, the timer associated with the return traffic from the peer is stopped, and another timer is started to reflect the requirement for this node to generate return traffic. This timeout value is set to the value of Keepalive Timeout.

These two timers are mutually exclusive. In other words, either the node is expecting to see traffic from the peer based on the traffic that the node sent earlier or the node is expecting to respond to the peer based on the traffic that the peer sent

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earlier (or the node is in an idle state).

- 4. The reception of a REAP keepalive packet leads to stopping the timer associated with the return traffic from the peer.
- Keepalive Interval seconds after the last data packet has been 5. received for a context, and if no other packet has been sent within this context since the data packet has been received, a REAP keepalive packet is generated for the context in question and transmitted to the correspondent. A host may send the keepalive sooner than Keepalive Interval seconds if implementation considerations warrant this, but should take care to avoid sending keepalives at an excessive rate. REAP keepalive packets SHOULD continue to be sent at the Keepalive Interval until either a data packet in the SHIM6 context has been received from the peer or the Keepalive Timeout expires. Keepalives are not sent at all if data was sent within the keep-alive interval. A recommended value range for Keepalive Interval is specified in Section 7. The actual value SHOULD be randomized in order to prevent synchronization.
- Send Timeout seconds after the transmission of a data packet with no return traffic on this context, a full reachability exploration is started.

<u>Section 7</u> provides some suggested defaults for these timeout values. Experience from the deployment of the SHIM6 protocol is needed in order to determine what values are most suitable.

#### <u>4.2</u>. Full Reachability Exploration

As explained in previous sections, the currently used address pair may become invalid either through one of the addresses being becoming unavailable or nonoperational, or the pair itself being declared nonoperational. An exploration process attempts to find another operational pair so that communications can resume.

What makes this process hard is the requirement to support unidirectionally operational address pairs. It is insufficient to probe address pairs by a simple request - response protocol. Instead, the party that first detects the problem starts a process where it tries each of the different address pairs in turn by sending a message to its peer. These messages carry information about the state of connectivity between the peers, such as whether the sender has seen any traffic from the peer recently. When the peer receives a message that indicates a problem, it assists the process by starting its own parallel exploration to the other direction, again sending information about the recently received payload traffic or

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signaling messages.

Specifically, when A decides that it needs to explore for an alternative address pair to B, it will initiate a set of Probe messages, in sequence, until it gets an Probe message from B indicating that (a) B has received one of A's messages and, obviously, (b) that B's Probe message gets back to A. B uses the same algorithm, but starts the process from the reception of the first Probe message from A.

Upon changing to a new address pair, the network path traversed most likely has changed, so that the ULP SHOULD be informed. This can be a signal for the ULP to adapt due to the change in path so that, for example, TCP could initiate a slow start procedure, although it's likely that the circumstances that led to the selection of a new path already caused enough packet loss to trigger slow start.

REAP is designed to support failure recovery even in the case of having only unidirectionally operational address pairs. However, due to security concerns discussed in <u>Section 8</u>, the exploration process can typically be run only for a session that has already been established. Specifically, while REAP would in theory be capable of exploration even during connection establishment, its use within the SHIM6 protocol does not allow this.

### 4.3. Exploration Order

The exploration process assumes an ability to choose address pairs for testing. An overview of the choosing process used by REAP is as follows:

- o As an input to start the process, the node has knowledge of its own addresses and has been told via SHIM6 protocol messages what the addresses of the peer are. A list of possible pairs of addresses can be constructed by combining the two pieces of information.
- o By employing standard IPv6 address selection rules, the list is pruned by removing combinations that are inappropriate, such as attempting to use a link local address when contacting a peer that uses a global unicast address.
- o Similarly, standard IPv6 address selection rules provide a basic priority order for the pairs.
- o Local preferences may be applied for some additional tuning of the order in the list. The mechanisms for local preference settings are not specified, but can involve, for instance, configuration

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that sets the preference for using one interface over another.

 As a result, the node has a prioritized list of address pairs to try. However, the list may still be long, as there may be a combinatorial explosion when there are many addresses on both sides. REAP employs these pairs sequentially, however, and uses a back-off procedure is to avoid a "signaling storm". This ensures that the exploration process is relatively conservative or "safe". The tradeoff is that fnding a working path may take time if there are many addresses on both sides.

In more detail, the process is as follows. Nodes first consult the RFC 3484 default address selection rules [RFC3484] to determine what combinations of addresses are allowed from a local point of view, as this reduces the search space. RFC 3484 also provides a priority ordering among different address pairs, making the search possibly faster. (Additional mechanisms may be defined in the future for arriving at an initial ordering of address pairs before testing starts [I-D.ietf-shim6-locator-pair-selection].) Nodes may also use local information, such as known quality of service parameters or interface types to determine what addresses are preferred over others, and try pairs containing such addresses first. The SHIM6 protocol also carries preference information in its messages.

Out of the set of possible candidate address pairs, nodes SHOULD attempt to test through all of them until an operational pair is found, and retrying the process as is necessary. However, all nodes MUST perform this process sequentially and with exponential back-off. This sequential process is necessary in order to avoid a "signaling storm" when an outage occurs (particularly for a complete site). However, it also limits the number of addresses that can in practice be used for multihoming, considering that transport and application layer protocols will fail if the switch to a new address pair takes too long.

<u>Section 7</u> suggests default values for the timers associated with the exploration process. The value Initial Probe Timeout (0.5 seconds) specifies the interval between initial attempts to send probes; Number of Initial Probes (4) specifies how many initial probes can be sent before the exponential backoff procedure needs to be employed. This process increases the time between every probe if there is no response. Typically, each increase doubles the time but this specification does not mandate a particular increase.

Note: The rationale for sending four packets at a fixed rate before the exponential backoff is employed is to avoid having to send these packets excessively fast. Without this, having 0.5 seconds between the third and fourth probe means that the time

between the first and second probe would have to be 0.125 seconds, which gives very little time for a reply to the first packet to arrive. Also, this means that the first four packets are sent within 0.875 seconds rather than 2 seconds, increasing the potential for congestion if a large number of shim contexts need to send probes at the same time after a failure.

Finally, Max Probe Timeout (60 seconds) specifies a limit beyond which the probe interval may not grow. If the exploration process reaches this interval, it will continue sending at this rate until a suitable response is triggered or the SHIM6 context is garbage collected, because upper layer protocols using the SHIM6 context in question are no longer attempting to send packets. Reaching the Max Probe Timeout may also serve as a hint to the garbage collection process that the context is no longer usable.

## 5. Protocol Definition

#### <u>5.1</u>. Keepalive Message

The format of the keepalive message is as follows:

0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len |0| Type = 66 | Reserved1 |0| Checksum |R| Receiver Context Tag Reserved2 + Options + 

Next Header, Hdr Ext Len, 0, 0, Checksum

These are as specified in <u>Section 5.3</u> of the SHIM6 protocol description [<u>I-D.ietf-shim6-proto</u>].

## Туре

This field identifies the Keepalive message and MUST be set to 66 (Keepalive).

### Reserved1

This is a 7-bit field reserved for future use. It is set to zero on transmit, and MUST be ignored on receipt.

#### R

This is a 1-bit field reserved for future use. It is set to zero on transmit, and MUST be ignored on receipt.

#### Receiver Context Tag

This is a 47-bit field for the Context Tag the receiver has allocated for the context.

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#### Reserved2

This is a 32-bit field reserved for future use. It is set to zero on transmit, and MUST be ignored on receipt.

#### **Options**

This MAY contain one or more SHIM6 options.The inclusion of the latter options is not necessary, however, as there are currently no defined options that are useful in a Keepalive message. These options are provided only for future extensibility reasons.

A valid message conforms to the format above, has a Receiver Context Tag that matches to context known by the receiver, is valid shim control message as defined in <u>Section 12.2</u> of the SHIM6 protocol description [<u>I-D.ietf-shim6-proto</u>], and its shim context state is ESTABLISHED. The receiver processes a valid message by inspecting its options, and executing any actions specified for such options.

The processing rules for this message are the given in more detail in <u>Section 6</u>.

### 5.2. Probe Message

This message performs REAP exploration. Its format is as follows:

0 2 1 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len |0| Type = 67 | Reserved |0| Checksum |R| Receiver Context Tag | Precvd| Psent |Sta| Reserved2 First probe sent + + Source address ++ + + +First probe sent +

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Destination address + + + First probe nonce First probe data Nth probe sent Source address Nth probe sent + Destination address + Nth probe nonce Nth probe data First probe received Source address + + + + First probe received + + Destination address + First probe nonce First probe data

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+ Nth probe receive	ed +
+ Destination addre	ess +
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Nth probe nonce	
+-	+-+-+-+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Nth probe data	
+-	+-+-+-+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ Options	+
+-	+-
+ Options	+
+-	+-+-+-+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Next Header, Hdr Ext Len, 0, 0, Checksum	Π
These are as specified in Section 5.3	of the SHIM6 protocol

o hu description [I-D.ietf-shim6-proto].

Туре

This field identifies the Probe message and MUST be set to 67 (Probe).

# Reserved

This is a 7-bit field reserved for future use. It is set to zero on transmit, and MUST be ignored on receipt.

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## R

This is a 1-bit field reserved for future use. It is set to zero on transmit, and MUST be ignored on receipt.

#### Receiver Context Tag

This is a 47-bit field for the Context Tag the receiver has allocated for the context.

#### Psent

This is a 4-bit field that indicates the number of sent probes included in this probe message. The first set of probe fields pertains to the current message and MUST be present, so the minimum value for this field is 1. Additional sent probe fields are copies of the same fields sent in (recent) earlier probes and may be included or omitted as per any logic employed by the implementation.

#### Precvd

This is a 4-bit field that indicates the number of received probes included in this probe message. Received probe fields are copies of the same fields in earlier received probes that arrived since the last transition to state Exploring. When a sender is in state InboundOk it MUST include copies of the fields of at least one of the inbound probes. A sender MAY include additional sets of these received probe fields in any state as per any logic employed by the implementation.

The fields probe source, probe destination, probe nonce and probe data may be repeated, depending on the value of Psent and Preceived.

### Sta (State)

This 2-bit State field is used to inform the peer about the state of the sender. It has three legal values:

0 (Operational) implies that the sender both (a) believes it has no problem communicating and (b) believes that the recipient also has no problem communicating.

1 (Exploring) implies that the sender has a problem communicating with the recipient, e.g., it has not seen any traffic from the recipient even when it expected some.

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2 (InboundOk) implies that the sender believes it has no problem communicating, i.e., it at least sees packets from the recipient, but that the recipient either has a problem or has not yet confirmed to the sender that the problem has been solved.

#### Reserved2

MUST be set to 0 upon transmission and MUST be ignored upon reception.

## Probe source

This 128-bit field contains the source IPv6 address used to send the probe.

### Probe destination

This 128-bit field contains the destination IPv6 address used to send the probe.

# Probe nonce

This is a 32-bit field that is initialized by the sender with a value that allows it to determine which sent probes a received probe correlates with. It is highly RECOMMENDED that the nonce field is at least moderately hard to guess so that even on-path attackers can't deduce the next nonce value that will be used. This value SHOULD be generated using a random number generator that is known to have good randomness properties as outlined in RFC 4086 [RFC4086].

## Probe data

This is a 32-bit field with no fixed meaning. The probe data field is copied back with no changes. Future flags may define a use for this field.

#### **Options**

For future extensions.

#### **<u>5.3</u>**. Keepalive Timeout Option Format

Either side of a SHIM6 context can notify the peer of the value that it would prefer the peer to use as its Keepalive Timeout value. If the host is using a non-default Send Timeout value, it SHOULD communicate this value as a Keepalive Timeout value to the peer in the below option. This option MAY be sent in the I2, I2bis, R2, or

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UPDATE messages. The option SHOULD only need to be sent once in a given shim6 association. If a host receives this option it SHOULD update its Keepalive Timeout value for the correspondent.

0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 Type = 10 |0| Length = 4 | + Reserved | Keepalive Timeout | 

#### Fields:

#### Туре

This field identifies the option and MUST be set to 10 (Keepalive Timeout).

## Length

This field MUST be set as specified in Section 5.14 of the SHIM6 protocol description [I-D.ietf-shim6-proto]. That is, it is set to 4.

### Reserved

16-bit field reserved for future use. Set to zero upon transmit and MUST be ignored upon receipt.

# Keepalive Timeout

Value in seconds corresponding to suggested Keepalive Timeout value for the peer.

### 6. Behaviour

The required behaviour of REAP nodes is specified below in the form of a state machine. The externally observable behaviour of an implementation MUST conform to this state machine, but there is no requirement that the implementation actually employs a state machine. Intermixed with the following description we also provide a state machine description in a tabular form. That form is only informational, however.

On a given context with a given peer, the node can be in one of three states: Operational, Exploring, or InboundOK. In the Operational state the underlying address pairs are assumed to be operational. In the Exploring state this node has observed a problem and has currently not seen any traffic from the peer. Finally, in the InboundOK state this node sees traffic from the peer, but peer may not yet see any traffic from this node so that the exploration process needs to continue.

The node maintains also the Send timer (Send Timeout seconds) and Keepalive timer (Keepalive Timeout seconds). The Send timer reflects the requirement that when this node sends a payload packet there should be some return traffic (either payload packets or Keepalive messages) within Send Timeout seconds. The Keepalive timer reflects the requirement that when this node receives a payload packet there should a similar response towards the peer. The Keepalive timer is only used within the Operational state, and the Send timer in the Operational and InboundOK states. No timer is running in the Exploring state. As explained in <u>Section 4.1</u>, the two timers are mutually exclusive. That is, either the Keepalive timer is running or the Send timer is running (or no timer is running).

Note that <u>Appendix A</u> gives some examples of typical protocol runs to illustrate the behaviour.

#### 6.1. Incoming payload packet

Upon the reception of a payload packet in the Operational state, the node starts the Keepalive timer if it is not yet running, and stops the Send timer if it was running.

If the node is in the Exploring state it transitions to the InboundOK state, sends a Probe message, and starts the Send timer. It fills the Psent and corresponding Probe source address, Probe destination address, Probe nonce, and Probe data fields with information about recent Probe messages that have not yet been reported as seen by the peer. It also fills the Precvd and corresponding Probe source address, Probe destination address, Probe destination address, Probe destination address, Probe destination address, Probe nonce, and Probe source address, Probe destination address, Probe nonce, and Probe data

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fields with information about recent Probe messages it has seen from the peer. When sending a Probe message, the State field MUST be set to a value that matches the conceptual state of the sender after sending the Probe. In this case the node therefore sets the Sta field to 2 (InboundOk). The IP source and and destination addresses for sending the Probe message are selected as discussed in Section 4.3.

In the InboundOK state the node stops the Send timer if it was running, but does not do anything else.

The reception of SHIM6 control messages other than the Keepalive and Probe messages are treated similarly with payload packets.

While the Keepalive timer is running, the node SHOULD send Keepalive messages to the peer with an interval of Keepalive Interval seconds. Conceptually, a separate timer is used to distinguish between the interval between Keepalive messages and the overall Keepalive Timeout interval. However, this separate timer is not modelled in the tabular or graphical state machines. When sent, the Keepalive message is constructed as described in <u>Section 5.1</u>. It is sent using the current address pair.

Operational	Exploring	Inbound0k
STOP Send; START Keepalive	SEND Probe InboundOk; START Send;	STOP Send
	GOTO InboundOk	

#### <u>6.2</u>. Outgoing payload packet

Upon sending a payload packet in the Operational state, the node stops the Keepalive timer if it was running and starts the Send timer if it was not running. In the Exploring state there is no effect, and in the InboundOK state the node simply starts the Send timer if it was not yet running. (The sending of SHIM6 control messages is again treated similarly here.)

Operational	Exploring	Inbound0k
START Send;	-	START Send
STOP Keepalive		

#### <u>6.3</u>. Keepalive timeout

Upon a timeout on the Keepalive timer, the node sends one last Keepalive message. This can only happen in the Operational state.

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The Keepalive message is constructed as described in <u>Section 5.1</u>. It is sent using the current address pair.

Operational Exploring InboundOk SEND Keepalive - -

#### 6.4. Send timeout

Upon a timeout on the Send timer, the node enters the Exploring state and sends a Probe message. The Probe message is constructed as explained in <u>Section 6.1</u>, except that the Sta field is set to 1 (Exploring).

Operational	Exploring	Inbound0k
SEND Probe Exploring;	-	SEND Probe Exploring;
GOTO Exploring		GOTO Exploring

## <u>6.5</u>. Retransmission

While in the Exploring state the node keeps retransmitting its Probe messages to different (or same) addresses as defined in <u>Section 4.3</u>. A similar process is employed in the InboundOk state, except that upon such retransmission the Send timer is started if it was not running already.

The Probe messages are constructed as explained in <u>Section 6.1</u>, except that the Sta field is set to 1 (Exploring) or 2 (InboundOk), depending on which state the sender is in.

Operational Exploring InboundOk - SEND Probe Exploring SEND Probe InboundOk START Send

## <u>6.6</u>. Reception of the Keepalive message

Upon the reception of a Keepalive message in the Operational state, the node stops the Send timer, if it was running. If the node is in the Exploring state it transitions to the InboundOK state, sends a Probe message, and starts the Send timer. The Probe message is constructed as explained in <u>Section 6.1</u>.

In the InboundOK state the Send timer is stopped, if it was running.

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Operational Exploring Inbound0k \_\_\_\_\_ SEND Probe InboundOk; STOP Send STOP Send START Send; GOTO InboundOk

## 6.7. Reception of the Probe message State=Exploring

Upon receiving a Probe with State set to Exploring, the node enters the InboundOK state, sends a Probe as described in Section 6.1, stops the Keepalive timer if it was running, and restarts the Send timer.

Operational	Exploring	Inbound0k
SEND Probe InboundOk;	SEND Probe InboundOk;	SEND Probe
STOP Keepalive;	START Send;	Inbound0k;
RESTART Send;	GOTO InboundOk	RESTART Send
GOTO InboundOk		

#### 6.8. Reception of the Probe message State=InboundOk

Upon the reception of a Probe message with State set to InboundOk, the node sends a Probe message, restarts the Send timer, stops the Keepalive timer if it was running, and transitions to the Operational state. New current address pair is chosen for the connection, based on the reports of received probes in the message that we just received. If no received probes have been reported, the current address pair is unchanged.

The Probe message is constructed as explained in Section 6.1, except that the Sta field is set to 0 (Operational).

Operational	Exploring	Inbound0k
SEND Probe Operational;	SEND Probe Operational;	SEND Probe
RESTART Send;	RESTART Send;	Operational;
STOP Keepalive	GOTO Operational	RESTART Send;
		GOTO Operational

#### 6.9. Reception of the Probe message State=Operational

Upon the reception of a Probe message with State set to Operational, the node stops the Send timer if it was running, starts the Keepalive timer if it was not yet running, and transitions to the Operational state. The Probe message is constructed as explained in Section 6.1, except that the Sta field is set to 0 (Operational).

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Note: This terminates the exploration process when both parties are happy and know that their peer is happy as well.

Operational	Exploring	Inbound0k
STOP Send START Keepalive	STOP Send; START Keepalive	STOP Send; START Keepalive
	GOTO Operational	GOTO Operational

The reachability detection and exploration process has no effect on payload communications until a new operational address pairs have actually been confirmed. Prior to that the payload packets continue to be sent to the previously used addresses.

## 6.10. Graphical Representation of the State Machine

In the PDF version of this specification, an informational drawing illustrates the state machine. Where the text and the drawing differ, the text takes precedence.

## 7. Protocol Constants

The following protocol constants are defined:

Send Timeout	15 seconds
Keepalive Interval	X seconds, where X is
	one third to one half of
	the Keepalive Timeout value
	(see <u>Section 4.1</u> )
Initial Probe Timeout	0.5 seconds
Number of Initial Probes	4 probes
Max Probe Timeout	60 seconds

Alternate values of the Send Timeout may be selected by a host and communicated to the peer in the Keepalive Timeout Option. A very small value of Send Timeout may affect the ability to exchange keepalives over a path that has a long roundtrip delay. Similarly, it may cause SHIM6 to react to temporary failures more often than necessary. As a result, it is RECOMMENDED that an alternate Send Timeout value not be under 10 seconds. Choosing a higher value than the one recommended above is also possible, but there is a relationship between Send Timeout and the ability of REAP to discover and correct errors in the communication path. In any case, in order for SHIM6 to be useful, it should detect and repair communication problems far before upper layers give up. For this reason, it is RECOMMENDED that Send Timeout be at most 100 seconds (default TCP R2 timeout [<u>RFC1122</u>]).

Note that it is not expected that the Send Timeout or other values need to be estimated based on experienced roundtrip times. Signaling exchanges are performed based on exponential backoff. The keepalive processes send packets only in the relatively rare condition that all traffic is unidirectional. Finally, because Send Timeout is far greater than usual roundtrip times, it merely divides the traffic into periods that SHIM6 looks at to decide whether to act.

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### **<u>8</u>**. Security Considerations

Attackers may spoof various indications from lower layers and the network in an effort to confuse the peers about which addresses are or are not operational. For example, attackers may spoof ICMP error messages in an effort to cause the parties to move their traffic elsewhere or even to disconnect. Attackers may also spoof information related to network attachments, router discovery, and address assignments in an effort to make the parties believe they have Internet connectivity when in reality they do not.

This may cause use of non-preferred addresses or even denial-ofservice.

This protocol does not provide any protection of its own for indications from other parts of the protocol stack. Unprotected indications SHOULD NOT be taken as a proof of connectivity problems. However, REAP has weak resistance against incorrect information even from unprotected indications in the sense that it performs its own tests prior to picking a new address pair. Denial-of- service vulnerabilities remain, however, as do vulnerabilities against on path attackers.

Some aspects of these vulnerabilities can be mitigated through the use of techniques specific to the other parts of the stack, such as properly dealing with ICMP errors [I-D.ietf-tcpm-icmp-attacks], link layer security, or the use of SEND [RFC3971] to protect IPv6 Router and Neighbor Discovery.

Other parts of the SHIM6 protocol ensure that the set of addresses we are switching between actually belong together. REAP itself provides no such assurances. Similarly, REAP provides some protection against third party flooding attacks [AURA02]; when REAP is run its Probe nonces can be used as a return routability check that the claimed address is indeed willing to receive traffic. However, this needs to be complemented with another mechanism to ensure that the claimed address is also the correct host. SHIM6 does this by performing binding of all operations to context tags.

The keepalive mechanism in this specification is vulnerable to spoofing. On path-attackers that can see a SHIM6 context tag can send spoofed Keepalive messages once per Send Timeout interval, to prevent two SHIM6 nodes from sending Keepalives themselves. This vulnerability is only relevant to nodes involved in a one-way communication. The result of the attack is that the nodes enter the exploration phase needlessly, but they should be able to confirm connectivity unless, of course, the attacker is able to prevent the exploration phase from completing. Off-path attackers may not be

able to generate spoofed results, given that the context tags are 47bit random numbers.

To protect against spoofed keepalive packets, a host implementing both shim6 and IPsec MAY ignore incoming REAP keepalives if it has good reason to assume that the other side will be sending IPsecprotected return traffic. I.e., if a host is sending TCP data, it can reasonably expect to receive TCP ACKs in return. If no IPsecprotected ACKs come back but unprotected keepalives do, this could be the result from an attacker trying to hide broken connectivity.

To protect against spoofed keepalive packets, a host implementing both shim6 and IPsec MAY ignore incoming REAP keepalives if it has good reason to assume that the other side will be sending IPsecprotected return traffic. I.e., if a host is sending TCP data, it can reasonably expect to receive TCP ACKs in return. If no IPsecprotected ACKs come back but unprotected keepalives do, this could be the result from an attacker trying to hide broken connectivity.

The exploration phase is vulnerable to attackers that are on the path. Off-path attackers would find it hard to guess either the context tag or the correct probe identifiers. Given that IPsec operates above the shim layer, it is not possible to protect the exploration phase against on-path attackers. This is similar to the ability to protect other Shim6 control exchanges. There are mechanisms in place to prevent the redirection of communications to wrong addresses, but on-path attackers can cause denial-of-service, move communications to less-preferred address pairs, and so on.

Finally, the exploration itself can cause a number of packets to be sent. As a result it may be used as a tool for packet amplification in flooding attacks. In order to prevent this it is required that the protocol employing REAP has built-in mechanisms to prevent this. For instance, in SHIM6 contexts are created only after a relatively large number of packets has been exchanged, a cost which reduces the attractiveness of using SHIM6 and REAP for amplification attacks. However, such protections are typically not present at connection establishment time. When exploration would be needed for connection vulnerability. As a result, SHIM6 does not support the use of REAP in connection establishment stage.

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### 9. Operational Considerations

When there are no failures, the failure detection mechanism (and SHIM6 in general) are light-weight: keepalives are not sent when a SHIM6 context is idle or when there is traffic in both directions. So in normal TCP or TCP-like operation, there would only be one or two keepalives when a session transitions from active to idle.

Only when there are failures, there is significant failure detection traffic, and then especially in the case where a link goes down that is shared by many active sessions and by multiple hosts. When this happens, one keepalive is sent and then a series of probes. This happens per active (traffic generating) context, which will all timeout within 10 seconds after the failure. This makes the peak traffic that SHIM6 generates after a failure around one packet per second per context. Presumably, the sessions that run over those contexts were sending at least that much traffic and most likely more, but if the backup path is significantly lower bandwidth than the failed path, this could lead to temporary congestion.

However, note that in the case of multihoming using BGP, if the failover is fast enough that TCP doesn't go into slow start, the full data traffic that flows over the failed path is switched over to the backup path, and if this backup path is of a lower capacity, there will be even more congestion in that case.

Although the failure detection probing does not perform congestion control as such, the exponential backoff makes sure that the number of packets sent quickly goes down and eventually reaches one per context per minute, which should be sufficiently conservative even on the lowest bandwidth links.

<u>Section 7</u> specifies a number of protocol parameters. Possible tuning of these parameters and others that are not mandated in this specification may affect these properties. It is expected that further revisions of this specification provide additional information after sufficient deployment experience has been obtained from different environments.

Implementations may provide means to monitor their performance and send alarms about problems. Their standardization is, however, subject of future specifications. In general, SHIM6 is most applicable for small sites and hosts, and it is expected that monitoring requirements on such deployments are relatively modest. In any case, where the host is associated with a management system, it is RECOMMENDED that detected failures and failover events are reported via asynchronous notifications to the management system. Similarly, where logging mechanisms are available on the host, these

events should be recorded in event logs.

SHIM6 uses the same header for both signaling and the encapsulation of data packets after a rehoming event. This way, fate is shared between the two types of packets, so the situation where reachability probes or keepalives can be transmitted successfully, but data packets can not, is largely avoided: either all SHIM6 packets make it through, so SHIM6 functions as intended, or none do, and no SHIM6 state is negotiated. Even in the situation where some packets make it through and other do not, SHIM6 will generally either work as intended or provide a service that is no worse than in the absense of SHIM6, apart from the possible generation a a small amount of signaling traffic.

Sometimes data packets and possibly data packets encapsulated in the SHIM6 header do not make it through, but signaling and keepalives do. This situation can occur when there is a path MTU discovery black hole on one of the paths. If only large packets are sent at some point, then reachability exploration will be turned on and REAP will likely select another path, which may or may not be affected by the PMTUD black hole.

## **10**. IANA Considerations

No IANA actions are required. The number assignments necessary for the messages defined in this document appear together with all the other IANA assignments in the main SHIM6 specification [<u>I-D.ietf-shim6-proto</u>].

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## Appendix A. Example Protocol Runs


This appendix has examples of REAP protocol runs in typical scenarios. We start with the simplest scenario of two hosts, A and B, that have a SHIM6 connection with each other but are not currently sending any data. As neither side sends anything, they also do not expect anything back, so there are no messages at all:

### EXAMPLE 1: No communications




Our second example involves an active connection with bidirectional payload packet flows. Here the reception of data from the peer is taken as an indication of reachability, so again there are no extra packes:

## EXAMPLE 2: Bidirectional communications



The third example is the first one that involves an actual REAP message. Here the hosts communicate in just one direction, so REAP messages are needed to indicate to the peer that sends payload packets that its packets are getting through:

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EXAMPLE 3: Unidirectional communications

The next example involves a failure scenario. Here A has addresses A and B has addresses B1 and B2. The currently used address pairs are (A, B1) and (B1, A). All connections via B1 become broken, which leads to an exploration process:

### EXAMPLE 4: Failure scenario

Peer B Peer A State: | State: Operational | Operational (A,B1) payload packet |----->| (B1,A) payload packet <-----| At time T1 | path A<->B1 | becomes (A,B1) payload packet -----/ | broken ( B1,A) payload packet -----(A,B1) payload packet -----/ (B1,A) payload packet

/----(A,B1) payload packet -----/ | Send Timeout | seconds after | T1, B happens to | see the problem | first and sends a (B1,A) Probe id=p, state=exploring | complaint that /-----| it is not rec-| eiving anything | State: | Exploring (B2,A) Probe id=q, state=exploring | But its lost, -----| retransmission |<-----| uses another pair A realizes that it needs to start the exploration. It picks B2 as the most likely candidate, as it appeared in the Probe State: InboundOk (A, B2) Probe id=r, state=inboundok, received probe q | This one gets ----->| through. | State: | Operational (B2,A) Probe id=s, state=operational, | B now knows received probe r | that A has no -----| problem to receive | its packets State: Operational (A,B2) payload packet ----->| Payload packets | flow again

| (B2,A) payload packet | |<-----|

The next example shows when the failure for the current locator pair is in the other direction only. A has addresses A1 and A2, and B has addresses B1 and B2. The current communication is between A1 and B1, but A's packets no longer reach B using this pair.

EXAMPLE 5: One-way failure

Peer A Peer B State: | State: Operational | Operational (A1,B1) payload packet ----->| (B1,A1) payload packet |<-----| (A1,B1) payload packet | At time T1 |-----/ | path A1->B1 | becomes | broken (B1,A1) payload packet -----| (A1,B1) payload packet -----/ (B1,A1) payload packet (A1,B1) payload packet -----/ | Send Timeout | seconds after | T1, B notices | the problem and (B1,A1) Probe id=p, | sends a comstate=exploring | plaint that l<-----| it is not rec-</pre> | eiving anything A responds | State: Exploring State: InboundOk 

(A1, B1) Probe id=q, state=inboundok, received probe p |-----/ | But A's response | is lost (B2,A2) Probe id=r, state=exploring | Next try different |<-----| locator pair</pre> (A2, B2) Probe id=s, state=inboundok, received probes p, r | This one gets |----->| through | State: Operational | B now knows | that A has no (B2,A2) Probe id=t, | problem to receive state=operational, | its packets, and received probe s | that A's probe . |<-----| gets to B. It | sends a State: Operational | confirmation to A (A2,B2) payload packet |----->| Payload packets | flow again (B1,A1) payload packet |<-----|

## <u>Appendix B</u>. Contributors

This draft attempts to summarize the thoughts and unpublished contributions of many people, including the MULTI6 WG design team members Marcelo Bagnulo Braun, Erik Nordmark, Geoff Huston, Kurtis Lindqvist, Margaret Wasserman, and Jukka Ylitalo, the MOBIKE WG contributors Pasi Eronen, Tero Kivinen, Francis Dupont, Spencer Dawkins, and James Kempf, and HIP WG contributors such as Pekka Nikander. This draft is also in debt to work done in the context of SCTP [<u>RFC4960</u>] and HIP multihoming and mobility extension [<u>I-D.ietf-hip-mm</u>].

## <u>Appendix C</u>. Acknowledgements

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