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Abstract

This document describes an architecture for an infrastructure to support secure Internet routing. The foundation of this architecture is a public key infrastructure (PKI) that represents the allocation hierarchy of IP address space and Autonomous System Numbers;

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certificates from this PKI are used to verify signed objects that authorize autonomous systems to originate routes for specified IP address prefixes. The data objects that comprise the PKI, as well as other signed objects necessary for secure routing, are stored and disseminated through a distributed repository system. This document also describes at a high level how this architecture can be used to add security features to common operations such as IP address space allocation and route filter construction.

Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119](#) [1].

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[1. Introduction](#)

This document describes an architecture for an infrastructure to support improved security for BGP routing [\[2\]](#) for the Internet. The architecture encompasses three principle elements:

- . a public key infrastructure (PKI)
- . digitally-signed routing objects to support routing security
- . a distributed repository system to hold the PKI objects and the signed routing objects

The architecture described by this document supports, at a minimum, two aspects of routing security; it enables an entity to verifiably assert that it is the legitimate holder of a set of IP addresses or a set of Autonomous System (AS) numbers, and it allows the holder of IP address space to explicitly and verifiably authorize one or more ASes to originate routes to that address space. In addition to these initial applications, the infrastructure defined by this architecture also is intended to be able to support security protocols such as S-BGP [\[8\]](#) or soBGP [\[9\]](#). This architecture is applicable to the routing of both IPv4 and IPv6 datagrams. IPv4 and IPv6 are currently the only address families supported by this architecture. Thus, for example,

use of this architecture with MPLS labels is beyond the scope of this document.

In order to facilitate deployment, the architecture takes advantage of existing technologies and practices. The structure of the PKI element of the architecture corresponds to the existing resource allocation structure. Thus management of this PKI is a natural extension of the resource-management functions of the organizations that are already responsible for IP address and AS number resource

allocation. Likewise, existing resource allocation and revocation practices have well-defined correspondents in this architecture. To ease implementation, existing IETF standards are used wherever possible; for example, extensive use is made of the X.509 certificate profile defined by PKIX [3] and the extensions for IP Addresses and AS numbers representation defined in [RFC 3779](#) [5]. Also CMS [4] is used as the syntax for the newly-defined signed objects required by this infrastructure.

As noted above, the infrastructure is comprised of three main components: an X.509 PKI in which certificates attest to holdings of IP address space and AS numbers; non-certificate/CRL signed objects (Route Origination Authorizations and manifests) used by the infrastructure; and a distributed repository system that makes all of these signed objects available for use by ISPs in making routing decisions. These three basic components enable several security functions; this document describes how they can be used to improve route filter generation, and to perform several other common operations in such a way as to make them cryptographically verifiable.

[2.](#) PKI for Internet Number Resources

Because the holder of a block IP address space is entitled to define the topological destination of IP datagrams whose destinations fall within that block, decisions about inter-domain routing are inherently based on knowledge the allocation of the IP address space. Thus, a basic function of this architecture is to provide cryptographically verifiable attestations as to these allocations. In current practice, the allocation of IP address is hierarchic. The root of the hierarchy is IANA. Below IANA are five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), each of which manages address and AS number allocation within a defined geopolitical region. In some regions the

third tier of the hierarchy includes National Internet Registries and (NIRs) as well as Local Internet Registries (LIRs) and subscribers with so-called "portable" (provider-independent) allocations. (The term LIR is used in some regions to refer to what other regions define as an ISP. Throughout the rest of this document we will use the term LIR/ISP to simplify references to these entities.) In other regions the third tier consists only of LIRs/ISPs and subscribers with portable allocations.

In general, the holder of a set of IP addresses may sub-allocate portions of that set, either to itself (e.g., to a particular unit of the same organization), or to another organization, subject to contractual constraints established by the registries. Because of this structure, IP address allocations can be described naturally by

a hierarchic public-key infrastructure, in which each certificate attests to an allocation of IP addresses, and issuance of subordinate certificates corresponds to sub-allocation of IP addresses. The above reasoning holds true for AS number resources as well, with the difference that, by convention, AS numbers may not be sub-allocated except by regional or national registries. Thus allocations of both IP addresses and AS numbers can be expressed by the same PKI. Such a PKI is a central component of this architecture.

2.1. Role in the overall architecture

Certificates in this PKI are called Resource Certificates, and conform to the certificate profile for such certificates [6]. Resource certificates attest to the allocation by the (certificate) issuer of IP addresses or AS numbers to the subject. They do this by binding the public key contained in the Resource Certificate to the IP addresses or AS numbers included in the certificate's IP Address Delegation or AS Identifier Delegation Extensions, respectively, as defined in [RFC 3779](#) [5].

An important property of this PKI is that certificates do not attest to the identity of the subject. Therefore, the subject names used in certificates are not intended to be "descriptive." That is, this PKI is intended to provide authorization, but not authentication. This is in contrast to most PKIs where the issuer ensures that the descriptive subject name in a certificate is properly associated with the entity that holds the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Because issuers need not verify the right of an

entity to use a subject name in a certificate, they avoid the costs and liabilities of such verification. This makes it easier for these entities to take on the additional role of CA.

Most of the certificates in the PKI assert the basic facts on which the rest of the infrastructure operates. CA certificates within the PKI attest to IP address space and AS number holdings. End-entity (EE) certificates are issued by resource holder CAs to delegate the authority attested by their allocation certificates. The primary use for EE certificates is the validation of Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs). Additionally, signed objects called manifests will be used to help ensure the integrity of the repository system, and the signature on each manifest will be verified via an EE certificate.

[2.2](#). CA Certificates

Any holder of Internet resources who is authorized to sub-allocate them must be able to issue Resource Certificates to correspond to

these sub-allocations. Thus, for example, CA certificates will be associated with each of the RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs/ISPs. A CA certificate also is required to enable a resource holder to issue ROAs, because it must issue the corresponding end-entity certificate used to validate each ROA. Thus some subscribers also will need to have CA certificates for their allocations, e.g., subscribers with portable allocations, to enable them to issue ROAs. (A subscriber who is not multi-homed, whose allocation comes from an LIR/ISP, and who has not moved to a different LIR/ISP, need not be represented in the PKI. Moreover, a multi-homed subscriber with an allocation from an LIR/ISP may or may not need to be explicitly represented, as discussed in [Section 6.2.2](#))

Unlike in most PKIs, the distinguished name of the subject in a CA certificate is chosen by the certificate issuer. If the subject of a certificate is an RIR, then the distinguished name of the subject will be chosen to convey the identity of the registry and should consist of (a subset of) the following attributes: country, organization, organizational unit, and common name. For example, an appropriate subject name for the APNIC RIR might be:

. Country: AU

- . Organization: Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
- . Common Name: APNIC Resource Certification Authority

If the subject of a certificate is not an RIR, (e.g., the subject is a NIR, or LIR/ISP) the distinguished name **MUST** consist only of the common name attribute and must not attempt to convey the identity of the subject in a descriptive fashion. Additionally, the subject's distinguished name must be unique among all certificates issued by a given authority. In this PKI, the certificate issuer, being an internet registry or LIR/ISP, is not in the business of verifying the legal right of the subject to assert a particular identity. Therefore, selecting a distinguished name that does not convey the identity of the subject in a descriptive fashion minimizes the opportunity for the subject to misuse the certificate to assert an identity, and thus minimizes the legal liability of the issuer. Since all CA certificates are issued to subjects with whom the issuer has an existing relationship, it is recommended that the issuer select a subject name that enables the issuer to easily link the certificate to existing database records associated with the subject. For example, an authority may use internal database keys or subscriber IDs as the subject common name in issued certificates.

Each Resource Certificate attests to an allocation of resources to its holder, so entities that have allocations from multiple sources will have multiple CA certificates. A CA also may issue distinct certificates for each distinct allocation to the same entity, if the CA and the resource holder agree that such an arrangement will facilitate management and use of the certificates. For example, an LIR/ISP may have several certificates issued to it by one registry, each describing a distinct set of address blocks, because the LIR/ISP desires to treat the allocations as separate.

[2.3.](#) End-Entity (EE) Certificates

The private key corresponding to public key contained in an EE certificate is not used to sign other certificates in a PKI. The primary function of end-entity certificates in this PKI is the verification of signed objects that relate to the usage of the resources described in the certificate, e.g., ROAs and manifests. For ROAs and manifests there will be a one-to-one correspondence

between end-entity certificates and signed objects, i.e., the private key corresponding to each end-entity certificate is used to sign exactly one object, and each object is signed with only one key. This property allows the PKI to be used to revoke these signed objects, rather than creating a new revocation mechanism. When the end-entity certificate used to sign an object has been revoked, the signature on that object (and any corresponding assertions) will be considered invalid, so a signed object can be effectively revoked by revoking the end-entity certificate used to sign it.

A secondary advantage to this one-to-one correspondence is that the private key corresponding to the public key in a certificate is used exactly once in its lifetime, and thus can be destroyed after it has been used to sign its one object. This fact should simplify key management, since there is no requirement to protect these private keys for an extended period of time.

Although this document defines only two uses for end-entity certificates, additional uses will likely be defined in the future. For example, end-entity certificates could be used as a more general authorization for their subjects to act on behalf of the holder of the specified resources. This could facilitate authentication of inter-ISP interactions, or authentication of interactions with the repository system. These additional uses for end-entity certificates may require retention of the corresponding private keys, even though this is not required for the private keys associated with end-entity certificates keys used for verification of ROAs and manifests, as described above.

[2.4.](#) Trust Anchors

In any PKI, each relying party (RP) is free to choose its own set of trust anchors. This general property of PKIs applies here as well. There is an extant IP address space and AS number allocation hierarchy. IANA is the obvious candidate to be the TA, but operational considerations may argue for a multi-TA PKI, e.g., one in which both IANA and the RIRs form a default set of trust anchors. Nonetheless, every relying party is free to choose a different set of trust anchors to use for certificate validation operations.

For example, an RP (e.g., an LIR/ISP) could create a self-signed certificate to which all address space and/or all AS numbers are

assigned, and for which the RP knows the corresponding private key. The RP could then issue certificates under this trust anchor to whatever entities in the PKI it wishes, with the result that the certificate paths terminating at this locally-installed trust anchor will satisfy the [RFC 3779](#) validation requirements.

An RP who elects to create and manage its own set of trust anchors may fail to detect allocation errors that arise under such circumstances, but the resulting vulnerability is local to the RP.

[2.5.](#) Default Trust Anchor Considerations

IANA forms the root of the extant IP address space and AS number allocation hierarchy. Therefore, it is natural to consider a model in which most relying parties have as their single trust anchor a self-signed IANA certificate whose [RFC 3779](#) extensions specify the entirety of the AS number and IP address spaces.

As an example of such model, consider the use of private IP address space (i.e., 10/8, 172.16/12, and 192.168/16 in IPv4 and FC00::/7 in IPv6). IANA could issue a CA certificate for these blocks of private address space and then destroy the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. In this way, any relying party who configured IANA as their sole trust anchor would automatically reject any ROA containing private addresses, appropriate behavior with regard to routing in the public Internet. On the other hand, such an approach would not interfere with an organization that wishes to use private address space in conjunction with BGP and this PKI technology. Such an organization could configure its relying parties with an additional, local trust anchor that issues certificates for private addresses used within the organization. In this manner, BGP advertisements for these private addresses would be accepted within the organization but would be rejected if mistakenly sent outside the private address space context in question.

In the DNSSEC context, IANA (as the root of the DNS) is already experimenting with the operational procedures needed to digitally sign the root zone. This is very much analogous to the role it would play if it were to act as the default trust anchor for the RPKI, even though DNSSEC does not make use of X.509 certificates. Nonetheless, it is appropriate consider alternative default trust anchor models, if IANA does not act in this capacity. This motivates the consideration of alternative default trust anchor options for RPKI

relying parties.

Essentially all allocated IP address and AS number resources are sub-allocated by IANA to one of the five RIRs. Therefore, one could consider a model in which the default trust anchors are a set of five self-signed certificates, one for each RIR. There are two difficulties that such an approach must overcome.

The first difficulty is that IANA retains authority for 44 /8 prefixes in IPv4 and a /26 prefix in IPv6. Therefore, any approach that recommends the RIRs as default trust anchors will also require as a default trust anchor an IANA certificate who's [RFC 3779](#) extensions correspond to this address space. Additionally, there are about 49 /8 prefixes containing legacy allocations that are not each allocated to a single RIR. Currently, for the purpose of administering reverse DNS zones, each of these prefixes is administered by a single RIR who delegates authority for allocations within the prefix as appropriate. This existing arrangement could be used as the template for the assignment of administrative responsibility for the certification of these address blocks in the RPKI. Such an arrangement would in no way alter the administrative arrangements and the associated policies that apply to the individual legacy allocations that have been made from these address blocks.

The second difficulty is that the resource allocations of the RIRs may change several times a year. Typically in a PKI, trust anchors are quite long-lived and distributed to relying parties via some out-of-band mechanism. However, such out-of-band distribution of new trust anchors is not feasible if the allocations change every few months. Therefore, any approach that recommends the RIRs as default trust anchors must provide an in-band mechanism for managing the changes that will occur in the RIR allocations (as expressed via [RFC 3779](#) extensions).

[2.6.](#) Representing Early-Registration Transfers (ERX)

Currently, IANA allocates IPv4 address space to the RIRs at the level of /8 prefixes. However, there exist allocations that cross these RIR boundaries. For example, A LACNIC customer may have an allocation

that falls within a /8 prefix administered by ARIN. Therefore, the resource PKI must be able to represent such transfers from one RIR to another in a manner that permits the validation of certificates with

[RFC 3779](#) extensions.




FIGURE 1: Representing EXR

To represent such transfers, RIRs will need to manage multiple CA certificates, each with distinct public (and corresponding private) keys. Each RIR will have a single "root" certificate (e.g., a self-signed certificate or a certificate signed by IANA, see [Section 2.5](#)), plus one additional CA certificate for each RIR from which it receives a transfer. Each of these additional CA certificates will be issued under the "root" certificate of the RIR from which the transfer is received. This means that although the certificate is bound to the RIR that receives the transfer, for the purposes of certificate path construction and validation, it does not appear under that RIR's "root" certificate (see Figure 1).

[3.](#) Route Origination Authorizations

The information on IP address allocation provided by the PKI is not, in itself, sufficient to guide routing decisions. In particular, BGP is based on the assumption that the AS that originates routes for a particular prefix is authorized to do so by the holder of that prefix (or an address block encompassing the prefix); the PKI contains no information about these authorizations. A Route Origination Authorization (ROA) makes such authorization explicit, allowing a

holder of address space to create an object that explicitly and verifiably asserts that an AS is authorized originate routes to prefixes.

[3.1.](#) Role in the overall architecture

A ROA is an attestation that the holder of a set of prefixes has authorized an autonomous system to originate routes for those prefixes. A ROA is structured according to the format described in [\[7\]](#). The validity of this authorization depends on the signer of the ROA being the holder of the prefix(es) in the ROA; this fact is asserted by an end-entity certificate from the PKI, whose corresponding private key is used to sign the ROA.

ROAs may be used by relying parties to verify that the AS that originates a route for a given IP address prefix is authorized by the holder of that prefix to originate such a route. For example, an ISP might use ROAs as inputs to route filter construction for use by its BGP routers. These filters would prevent importation of any route in which the origin AS of the AS-PATH attribute is not an AS that is authorized (via a valid ROA) to originate the route. (See [Section 6.3](#) for more details.)

Initially, the repository system will be the primary mechanism for disseminating ROAs, since these repositories will hold the certificates and CRLs needed to verify ROAs. In addition, ROAs also could be distributed in BGP UPDATE messages or via other communication paths, if needed to meet timeliness requirements.

[3.2.](#) Syntax and semantics

A ROA constitutes an explicit authorization for a single AS to originate routes to one or more prefixes, and is signed by the holder of those prefixes. Syntactically, a ROA is a CMS signed-data object whose content is defined as follows:

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```
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {  
    version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,  
    asID ASID,  
    exactMatch BOOLEAN,  
    ipAddrBlocks ROAIPAddrBlocks }
```

```
ASID ::= INTEGER
```

```
ROAIPAddrBlocks ::= SEQUENCE of ROAIPAddressFamily
```

```
ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {  
    addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)),  
    addresses SEQUENCE OF IPAddress }  
-- Only two address families are allowed: IPv4 and IPv6
```

```
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING
```

That is, the signed data within the ROA consists of a version number, the AS number that is being authorized, and a list of IP prefixes to which the AS is authorized to originate routes. If the exactMatch flag is set to TRUE, then the AS is authorized to originate routes only for the specific prefix(es) listed in the ROA. If the exactMatch flag is set to FALSE, the AS is authorized to originate routes to the prefix(es) in the ROA as well as any longer (more specific) prefixes.

Note that a ROA contains only a single AS number. Thus, if an ISP has multiple AS numbers that will be authorized to originate routes to the prefix(es) in the ROA, an address space holder will need to issue multiple ROAs to authorize the ISP to originate routes from any of these ASes.

A ROA is signed using the private key corresponding to the public key in an end-entity certificate in the PKI. In order for a ROA to be valid, its corresponding end-entity (EE) certificate must be valid and the IP address prefixes of the ROA must exactly match the IP address prefix(es) specified in the EE certificate's [RFC 3779](#) extension. Therefore, the validity interval of the ROA is implicitly the validity interval of its corresponding certificate. A ROA is revoked by revoking the corresponding EE certificate. There is no independent method of invoking a ROA. One might worry that this revocation model could lead to long CRLs for the CA certification that is signing the EE certificates. However, routing announcements on the public internet are generally quite long lived. Therefore, as

long as the EE certificates used to verify a ROA are given a validity interval of several months, the likelihood that many ROAs would need to be revoked within time that is quite low.




FIGURE 2: This figure illustrates an ISP with allocations from two sources (and RIR and an NIR). It needs two CA certificates due to [RFC 3779](#) rules.

Because each ROA is associated with a single end-entity certificate, the set of IP prefixes contained in a ROA must be drawn from an allocation by a single source, i.e., a ROA cannot combine allocations from multiple sources. Address space holders who have allocations from multiple sources, and who wish to authorize an AS to originate routes for these allocations, must issue multiple ROAs to the AS.

4. Repositories

Initially, an LIR/ISP will make use of the resource PKI by acquiring and validating every ROA, to create a table of the prefixes for which each AS is authorized to originate routes. To validate all ROAs, an LIR/ISP needs to acquire all the certificates and CRLs. The primary function of the distributed repository system described here is to store these signed objects and to make them available for download by LIRs/ISPs. The digital signatures on all objects in the repository ensure that unauthorized modification of valid objects is detectable by relying parties. Additionally, the repository system uses

manifests (see [Section 5](#)) to ensure that relying parties can detect the deletion of valid objects and the insertion of out of date, valid signed objects.

The repository system is also a point of enforcement for access controls for the signed objects stored in it, e.g., ensuring that records related to an allocation of resources can be manipulated only by authorized parties. The use access controls prevents denial of service attacks based on deletion of or tampering to repository objects. Indeed, although relying parties can detect tampering with objects in the repository, it is preferable that the repository system prevent such unauthorized modifications to the greatest extent possible.

[4.1.](#) Role in the overall architecture

The repository system is the central clearing-house for all signed objects that must be globally accessible to relying parties. When certificates and CRLs are created, they are uploaded to this repository, and then downloaded for use by relying parties (primarily LIRs/ISPs). ROAs and manifests are additional examples of such objects, but other types of signed objects may be added to this architecture in the future. This document briefly describes the way signed objects (certificates, CRLs, ROAs and manifests) are managed in the repository system. As other types of signed objects are added to the repository system it will be necessary to modify the description, but it is anticipated that most of the design principles will still apply. The repository system is described in detail in [??].

[4.2.](#) Contents and structure

Although there is a single repository system that is accessed by

relying parties, it is comprised of multiple databases. These databases will be distributed among registries (RIRs, NIRs, LIRs/ISPs). At a minimum, the database operated by each registry will contain all CA and EE certificates, CRLs, and manifests signed by the CA(s) associated with that registry. Repositories operated by LIRs/ISPs also will contain ROAs. Registries are encouraged maintain copies of repository data from their customers, and their customer's customers (etc.), to facilitate retrieval of the whole repository contents by relying parties. Ideally, each RIR will hold PKI data from all entities within its geopolitical scope.

For every certificate in the PKI, there will be a corresponding file system directory in the repository that is the authoritative publication point for all objects (certificates, CRLs, ROAs and

manifests) verifiable via this certificate. A certificate's Subject Information Authority (SIA) extension provides a URI that references this directory. Additionally, a certificate's Authority Information Authority (AIA) extension contains a URI that references the authoritative location for the CA certificate under which the given certificate was issued. That is, if certificate A is used to verify certificate B, then the AIA extension of certificate B points to certificate A, and the SIA extension of certificate A points to a directory containing certificate B (see Figure 2).




FIGURE 3: In this example, certificates B and C are issued under certificate A. Therefore, the AIA extensions of certificates B and C point to A, and the SIA extension of certificate A points to the directory containing certificates B and C.

If a CA certificate is reissued with the same public key, it should not be necessary to reissue (with an updated AIA URI) all certificates signed by the certificate being reissued. Therefore, a certification authority SHOULD use a persistent URI naming scheme for issued certificates. That is, reissued certificates should use the same publication point as previously issued certificates having the same subject and public key, and should overwrite such certificates.

[4.3.](#) Access protocols

Repository operators will choose one or more access protocols that relying parties can use to access the repository system. These protocols will be used by numerous participants in the infrastructure (e.g., all registries, ISPs, and multi-homed subscribers) to maintain their respective portions of it. In order to support these activities, certain basic functionality is required of the suite of access protocols, as described below. No single access protocol need implement all of these functions (although this may be the case), but each function must be implemented by at least one access protocol.

Download: Access protocols MUST support the bulk download of repository contents and subsequent download of changes to the downloaded contents, since this will be the most common way in which relying parties interact with the repository system. Other types of download interactions (e.g., download of a single object) MAY also be supported.

Upload/change/delete: Access protocols MUST also support mechanisms for the issuers of certificates, CRLs, and other signed objects to add them to the repository, and to remove them. Mechanisms for modifying objects in the repository MAY also be provided. All access

protocols that allow modification to the repository (through addition, deletion, or modification of its contents) MUST support verification of the authorization of the entity performing the modification, so that appropriate access controls can be applied (see [Section 4.4](#)).

Current efforts to implement a repository system use RSYNC [10] as the single access protocol. RSYNC, as used in this implementation, provides all of the above functionality. A document specifying the conventions for use of RSYNC in the PKI will be prepared.

[4.4](#). Access control

In order to maintain the integrity of information in the repository, controls must be put in place to prevent addition, deletion, or modification of objects in the repository by unauthorized parties. The identities of parties attempting to make such changes can be authenticated through the relevant access protocols. Although specific access control policies are subject to the local control of repository operators, it is recommended that repositories allow only the issuers of signed objects to add, delete, or modify them. Alternatively, it may be advantageous in the future to define a formal delegation mechanism to allow resource holders to authorize

other parties to act on their behalf, as suggested in [Section 2.3](#) above.

[5](#). Manifests

A manifest is a signed object listing of all of the signed objects issued by an authority responsible for a publication in the repository system. For each certificate, CRL, or ROA issued by the authority, the manifest contains both the name of the file containing the object, and a hash of the file content.

As with ROAs, a manifest is signed by a private key, for which the corresponding public key appears in an end-entity certificate. This EE certificate, in turn, is signed by the CA in question. The EE certificate private key may be used to sign one or more manifests. If the private key is used to sign only a single manifest, then the manifest can be revoked by revoking the EE certificate. In such a case, to avoid needless CRL growth, the EE certificate used to

validate a manifest SHOULD expire at the same time that the manifest expires, i.e., the notAfter value in the EE certificate should be the same as the nextUpdate value in the manifest. If a private key corresponding to a the public key in an EE certificate is used to sign multiple (sequential) manifests for the CA in question, then there is no revocation mechanism for these manifests. In such a case a relying party will treat a manifest as valid until either (a) he obtains a new manifest for the same CA having a higher manifestNumber; or (b) the nextUpdate time is reached.

This EE certificate has an SIA extension access description field with an accessMethod OID value of id-ad-signedobjectrepository where the associated accessLocation references the publication point of the manifest as an object URL.

[5.1](#). Manifest Syntax

Syntactically, a manifest is a CMS signed-data object. As it is intended that the manifest will be used in the context of assembling a local copy of the entire RPKI repository, then the necessary information to validate the certificate path for the manifest's signature will be at hand for the relying party, thus duplication of superior certificates and of CRLs in the CMS SignedData of the manifest is not required. Only the EE certificate needed to directly verify the signature on the manifest MUST be included in the CMS SignedData; other certificates MUST NOT be included and CRLs MUST NOT be included.

The CMS timestamp field MUST be included in the CMS SignedData.

The content of the CMS signed-data object is defined as follows:

```
Manifest ::= SEQUENCE {
    version          [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
    manifestNumber   INTEGER,
    thisUpdate       GeneralizedTime,
    nextUpdate       GeneralizedTime,
    fileHashAlg      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    fileList         SEQUENCE OF (SIZE 0..MAX) FileAndHash
}

FileAndHash ::= SEQUENCE {
    file             IA5String
```

```
    hash      BIT STRING
}
```

The manifestNumber field is a sequence number that is incremented each time a manifest is issued by a authority. The thisUpdate field contains the time when the manifest was created and the nextUpdate field contains the time at which the next scheduled manifest will be issued. If the authority alters any of its items in the repository, then it MUST issue a new manifest before nextUpdate. A manifest is valid until the time specified in nextUpdate or until a manifest is issued with a greater manifest number, whichever comes first. (Note that when an EE certificate is used to sign only a single manifest, whenever the authority issues the new manifest, the CA MUST also issue a new CRL which includes the EE certificate corresponding to the old manifest. The revoked EE certificate for the old manifest will be removed from the CRL when it expires, thus this procedure ought not result in significant CRLs growth.)

The fileHashAlg field contains the OID of the hash algorithm used to hash the files that the authority has placed into the repository. The mandatory to implement hash algorithm is SHA-256 and its OID is 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1. [[12](#)]

The fileList field contains a sequence of FileAndHash pairs, one for each currently valid certificate, CRL and ROA that has been issued by the authority. Each of the FileAndHash pairs contains the name of the file in the repository that contains the object in question, and a hash of the file's contents.

[5.2](#). Certificate Requests

A request for a CA certificate MUST include in the SIA of the request an accessMethod OID of id-ad-manifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to the subject's published manifest object as

an object URL. The manifest refers to the list of all products of this CA certificate (except of course the manifest itself) that are published at the publication point referred to by the SIA repository pointer. This implies that the name of the manifest object is known in advance, requiring the manifest object name to be a PURL, i.e., a URL that is unchanged across manifest generation cycles.

Certificate requests for EE certificates MUST include in the SIA of

the request an access method OID of id-ad-manifest, where the associated access location refers to the publication point of the object verified using this EE certificate.

This implies that all certificate issuance requests where there is an SIA extension present should include the id-ad-manifest access method and the associated access location in the request, and the issuer should honour these values in the issued certificate.

[5.3.](#) Publication Repositories

The RPKI publication directory model requires that every publication point be associated with a CA, and be non-empty. Upon creation of the publication repository, the CA MUST create a manifest. The manifest will contain at least one entry, the CRL issued by the CA.

For a CA-issuer who is digitally signing documents and publishing these signed objects, the EE certificate used to verify the signing of an object would use the id-ad-manifest SIA access method to refer to the signed object itself. If the signing format is CMS and the EE certificate is attached to the signed document, then there is no requirement to publish the EE cert in the publication repository of the CA. On the other hand, if the CA wants to ensure that relying parties can assure themselves that they have the complete collection of signed objects then publishing the EE cert in the CA's publication repository would be sufficient.

[5.4.](#) Relying Party processing of a Manifest

In this section, we describe the recommended behavior of a relying party when processing a manifest. We begin by describing the scenario where the relying party is able to successfully validate a manifest the corresponds to the contents of the repository. We then describe the recommended behavior in the various cases where the relying party is unable to validate such a manifest.

[5.4.1.](#) The nominal good case:

A manifest is present in the repository, is current (i.e., the

current time is bounded by the manifest validity interval), and its signature can be verified. All files listed in the manifest are found in the repository and the hashes match. Any files in the repository that are NOT listed in the manifest but that validate anyway SHOULD be ignored (since they could be older instances of objects covered by the manifest).

5.4.2. The bad cases:

1. No manifest is found in the repository at the publication point. In this case, the relying party cannot use the manifest in question.

a. If the relying party has a prior manifest for this publication point, he should use most recent, verified manifest for the publication point in question and generate warning A.

b. If no prior manifest for this publication point is available, there is no basis for detecting missing files, so just process certificate, CRL, and ROA files and generate warning B.

2. The Signature on manifest fetched from the repository cannot be verified (or the format is bad). In this case, the relying party cannot use the manifest in question.

a. If the relying party has a prior manifest for this publication point, he should use most recent, verified manifest for the publication point in question and generate warning A.

b. If no prior manifest for this publication point is available, there is no basis for detecting missing files, so he should just process certificate, CRL, and ROA files and generate warning B.

3. The manifest is present and current and its signature can be verified using a matching EE certificate

a. If the EE certificate is valid (current and not revoked) and all files listed in the manifest are found in the repository and the hashes match, then the relying party should use the manifest as in [Section 5](#).

b. If the EE certificate is valid and one or more files listed in the manifest have hashes that do not match the files in the repository with the indicates names, then the corresponding files are

likely to be old and intended to be replaced, and thus SHOULD NOT be used. The relying party should generate Warning C.

c. If the EE certificate is valid and one or more files listed in the manifest are missing, the relying party should Generate Warning D.

d. If the EE certificate is expired. (this says the issuer of the manifest screwed up!), the relying party should generate warning E, but proceed with processing.

e. If the EE certificate is revoked but not expired, then the manifest SHOULD be ignored. The relying party should generate warning F and proceed with processing as if no manifest is available (since the CA explicitly revoked the certificate for the manifest.)

4. The manifest is present but expired. If the signature cannot be verified, treat as case 1/2. If the manifest signature can be verified using a matching EE certificate:

a. If the EE certificate is valid (current and not revoked), then generate warning A and proceed.

b. If the EE certificate is expired. (this says the issuer of the manifest screwed up!), then generate warning G and proceed.

c. If EE certificate is revoked but not expired, the manifest SHOULD be ignored. Generate warning F and proceed with processing as if no manifest is available (since the CA explicitly revoked the certificate for the manifest.)

5.4.3. Warning List

Warning A: A current manifest is not available for <pub point name>. A older manifest for this publication point will be used, but there may be undetected deletions from the publication point.

Warning B: No manifest is available for <pub point name>, and thus there may have been undetected deletions from the publication point.

Warning C: The following files at <pub point name> appear to be SUPERCEDED and are NOT being processed.

Warning D: The following files that should have been present in the repository at <pub point name>, are missing <file list>. This indicates an attack against this publication point, or the repository, or an error by the publisher.

Warning E: EE certificate for manifest verification for <pub point name> is expired. This indicates an error by the publisher, but processing for this publication point will proceed using the current manifest.

Warning F: The EE certificate for <pub point name> has been revoked. The manifest will be ignored and all files found at this publication point will be processed.

Warning G: EE certificate for manifest verification for <pub point name> is expired. This indicates an error by the publisher, but processing for this publication point will proceed using the most recent (but expired) manifest.

[6.](#) Local Cache Maintenance

In order to utilize signed objects issued under this PKI (e.g. for route filter construction, see [Section 6.3](#)), a relying party must first obtain a local copy of the valid EE certificates for the PKI. To do so, the relying party performs the following steps:

1. Query the registry system to obtain a copy of all certificates, manifests and CRLs issued under the PKI.
2. For each CA certificate in the PKI, verify the signature on the corresponding manifest. Additionally, verify that the current time is earlier than the time indicated in the nextUpdate field of the manifest.
3. For each manifest, verify that certificates and CRLs issued under the corresponding CA certificate match the hash values contained in the manifest. If the hash values do not match, use an out-of-band mechanism to notify the appropriate repository administrator that the repository data has been corrupted.
4. Validate each EE certificate by constructing and verifying a certification path for the certificate (including checking relevant CRLs) to the locally configured set of TAs. (See [\[6\]](#) for more details.)

Note that when a relying party performs these operations regularly, it is more efficient for the relying party to request from the

repository system only those objects that have changed since the relying party last updated its local cache. Note also that by checking all issued objects against the appropriate manifest, the

relying party can be certain that it is not missing an updated version of any object.

[7.](#) Common Operations

Creating and maintaining the infrastructure described above will entail additional operations as "side effects" of normal resource allocation and routing authorization procedures. For example, a subscriber with "portable" address space who enters a relationship with an ISP will need to issue one or more ROAs identifying that ISP, in addition to conducting any other necessary technical or business procedures. The current primary use of this infrastructure is for route filter construction; using ROAs, route filters can be constructed in an automated fashion with high assurance that the holder of the advertised prefix has authorized the first-hop AS to originate an advertised route.

[7.1.](#) Certificate issuance

There are several operational scenarios that require certificates to be issued. Any allocation that may be sub-allocated requires a CA certificate, e.g., so that certificates can be issued as necessary for the sub-allocations. Holders of "portable" address allocations also must have certificates, so that a ROA can be issued to each ISP that is authorized to originate a route to the allocation (since the allocation does not come from any ISP). Additionally, multi-homed subscribers may require certificates for their allocations if they intend to issue the ROAs for their allocations (see [Section 6.2.2](#)). Other holders of resources need not be issued CA certificates within the PKI.

In the long run, a resource holder will not request resource certificates, but rather receive a certificate as a side effect of the allocation process for the resource. However, initial deployment of the RPKI will entail issuance of certificates to existing resource holders as an explicit event. Note that in all cases, the authority issuing a CA certificate will be the entity who allocates resources to the subject. This differs from most PKIs in which a subject can

request a certificate from any certification authority.

If a resource holder receives multiple allocations over time, it may accrue a collection of resource certificates to attest to them. If a resource holder receives multiple allocations from the same source, the set of resource certificates may be combined into a single resource certificate, if both the issuer and the resource holder agree. This is effected by consolidating the IP Address Delegation and AS Identifier Delegation Extensions into a single extension (of

each type) in a new certificate. However, if the certificates for these allocations contain different validity intervals, creating a certificate that combines them might create problems, and thus is NOT RECOMMENDED.

If a resource holder's allocations come from different sources, they will be signed by different CAs, and cannot be combined. When a set of resources is no longer allocated to a resource holder, any certificates attesting to such an allocation MUST be revoked. A resource holder SHOULD NOT to use the same public key in multiple CA certificates that are issued by the same or differing authorities, as reuse of a key pair complicates path construction. Note that since the subject's distinguished name is chosen by the issuer, a subject who receives allocations from two sources generally will receive certificates with different subject names.

[7.2.](#) ROA management

Whenever a holder of IP address space wants to authorize an AS to originate routes for a prefix within his holdings, he MUST issue an end-entity certificate containing that prefix in an IP Address Delegation extension. He then uses the corresponding private key to sign a ROA containing the designated prefix and the AS number for the AS. The resource holder MAY include more than one prefix in the EE certificate and corresponding ROA if desired. As a prerequisite, then, any address holder that issues ROAs for a prefix must have a resource certificate for an allocation containing that prefix. The standard procedure for issuing a ROA is as follows:

1. Create an end-entity certificate containing the prefix(es) to be authorized in the ROA.
2. Construct the payload of the ROA, including the prefixes in the

end-entity certificate and the AS number to be authorized.

3. Sign the ROA using the private key corresponding to the end-entity certificate (the ROA is comprised of the payload encapsulated in a CMS signed message [7]).
4. Upload the end-entity certificate and the ROA to the repository system.

The standard procedure for revoking a ROA is to revoke the corresponding end-entity certificate by creating an appropriate CRL and uploading it to the repository system. The revoked ROA and end-entity certificate SHOULD BE removed from the repository system.

[7.2.1.](#) Single-homed subscribers (without portable allocations)

In BGP, a single-homed subscriber with a non-portable allocation does not need to explicitly authorize routes to be originated for the prefix(es) it is using, since its ISP will already advertise a more general prefix and route traffic for the subscriber's prefix as an internal function. Since no routes are originated specifically for prefixes held by these subscribers, no ROAs need to be issued under their allocations; rather, the subscriber's ISP will issue any necessary ROAs for its more general prefixes under resource certificates its own allocation. Thus, a single-homed subscriber with a non-portable allocation is not included in the RPKI, i.e., it does not receive a CA certificate, nor issue EE certificates or ROAs.

[7.2.2.](#) Multi-homed subscribers

In order for multiple ASes to originate routes for prefixes held by a multi-homed subscriber, each AS must have a ROA that explicitly authorizes such route origination. There are two ways that this can be accomplished.

One option is for the multi-homed subscriber to obtain a CA certificate from the ISP who allocated the prefixes to the subscriber. The multi-homed subscriber can then create a ROA (and associated end-entity certificate) that authorizes a second ISP to originate routes to the subscriber prefix(es). The ROA for the second ISP generally SHOULD be set to require an exact match, if the intent is to enable backup paths for the prefix. Note that the first ISP,

who allocated the prefixes, will want to advertise the more specific prefix for this subscriber (vs. the encompassing prefix). Either the subscriber or the first ISP will need to issue an EE certificate and ROA for the (more specific) prefix, authorizing this ISP to advertise this more specific prefix.

A second option is that the multi-homed subscriber can request that the ISP that allocated the prefixes create a ROA that authorizes the second ISP to originate routes to the subscriber's prefixes. (The ISP also creates an EE certificate and ROA for its own advertisement of the subscriber prefix, as above.) This option does not require that the subscriber be issued a certificate or participate in ROA management. Therefore, this option is simpler for the subscriber, and is preferred if the option is supported by the ISP performing the allocation.

[7.2.3.](#) Portable allocations

A resource holder is said to have a portable (provider independent) allocation if the resource holder received its allocation from a regional or national registry. Because the prefixes represented in such allocations are not taken from an allocation held by an ISP, there is no ISP that holds and advertises a more general prefix. A holder of a portable allocation MUST authorize one or more ASes to originate routes to these prefixes. Thus the resource holder MUST generate one or more EE certificates and associated ROAs to enable the AS(es) to originate routes for the prefix(es) in question. This ROA is required because none of the ISP's existing ROAs authorize it to originate routes to that portable allocation.

[7.3.](#) Route filter construction

The goal of this architecture is to support improved routing security. One way to do this is to use ROAs to construct route filters that reject routes that conflict with the origination authorizations asserted by current ROAs, which can be accomplished with the following procedure:

1. Obtain a local copy of all currently valid EE certificates, as

specified in [Section 5](#).

2. Query the repository system to obtain a local copy of all ROAs issued under the PKI.
3. Verify that the each ROA matches the hash value contained in the manifest of the CA certificate used to verify the EE certificate that issued the ROA and that no ROAs are missing. (ROAs are contained in files with a ".roa" suffix, so missing ROAs are readily detected.)
4. Validate each ROA by verifying that it's signature is verifiable by a valid end-entity certificate that matches the address allocation in the ROA. (See [\[7\]](#) for more details.)
5. Based on the validated ROAs, construct a table of prefixes and corresponding authorized origin ASes (or vice versa).

A BGP speaker that applies such a filter is thus guaranteed that for a given IP address prefix, all routes that the BGP speaker accepts for that prefix were originated by an AS that is authorized by the owner of the prefix to authorize routes to that prefix.

The first three steps in the above procedure might incur a substantial overhead if all objects in the repository system were downloaded and validated every time a route filter was constructed. Instead, it will be more efficient for users of the infrastructure to initially download all of the signed objects and perform the validation algorithm described above. Subsequently, a relying party need only perform incremental downloads and validations on a regular basis. A typical ISP using the infrastructure might have a daily schedule to download updates from the repository, upload any modifications it has made, and construct route filters.

It should be noted that the transition to 4-byte AS numbers (see [RFC 4893](#) [\[11\]](#)) weakens the security guarantees achieved by BGP speakers who do not support 4-byte AS numbers (referred to as OLD BGP speakers). [RFC 4893](#) specifies that all 4-byte AS numbers (except those whose first two bytes are entirely zero) be mapped to the reserved value 23456 before being sent to a BGP speaker who does not understand 4-byte AS numbers. Therefore, when an ISP creates a route

filter for use by an OLD BGP speaker, it must allow any 4-byte AS number to advertise routes for an IP address prefix if there exists a ROA that authorizes any 4-byte AS number to advertise routes to that prefix. This means that if an OLD BGP speaker accepts a route that was originated by an AS with a 4-byte AS number, there is no guarantee that it was originated by an authorized 4-byte AS number (unless the route was propagated by an intermediate NEW BGP speaker who performed route filtering as described above).

[8.](#) Security Considerations

The focus of this document is security; hence security considerations permeate this specification.

The security mechanisms provided by and enabled by this architecture depend on the integrity and availability of the infrastructure it describes. The integrity of objects within the infrastructure is ensured by appropriate controls on the repository system, as described in [Section 4.4](#). Likewise, because the repository system is structured as a distributed database, it should be inherently resistant to denial of service attacks; nonetheless, appropriate precautions should also be taken, both through replication and backup of the constituent databases and through the physical security of database servers

[9.](#) IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA.

Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an RFC

[10.](#) Acknowledgments

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