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**BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Formats  
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Abstract

This document specifies the algorithms, algorithms' parameters, asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key size and signature format used in BGPSEC (Border Gateway Protocol Security). This document updates the Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure ([RFC 6485](#)).

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## **1. Introduction**

This document specifies:

- o the digital signature algorithm and parameters;
- o the hash algorithm and parameters;
- o the public and private key formats; and,
- o the signature format

used by Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authorities (CA), and BGPSEC (Border Gateway Protocol Security) speakers (i.e., routers). CAs use these algorithms when issuing BGPSEC Router Certificates [[ID.bgpsec-pki-profiles](#)] and CRLs [[RFC6487](#)]. BGPSEC routers use these when requesting BGPSEC certificates [[ID.bgpsec-pki-profiles](#)], generating BGPSEC Update messages [[ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol](#)], and verifying BGPSEC Update messages [[ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol](#)].

This document is referenced by the BGPSEC specification [[ID.bgpsec-protocol](#)] and the profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates and Certification Requests [[ID.bgpsec-pki-profiles](#)]. Familiarity with these documents is assumed. Implementers are reminded, however, that, as noted in Section 2 of [[ID.bgpsec-pki-profiles](#)], the algorithms used to sign CA Certificates, BGPSEC Router Certificates, and CRLs are found in [[RFC6485](#)].

This document updates [[RFC6485](#)] to add support for a) a different algorithm for BGPSEC certificate requests, which are only issued by BGPSEC speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info format for BGPSEC certificates, which is needed for the specified BGPSEC signature algorithm; and, c) a different signature format for BGPSEC signatures, which is needed for the specified BGPSEC signature algorithm. The BGPSEC certificate are differentiated from other RPKI certificates by the use of the BGPSEC Extended Key Usage defined in [[ID.bgpsec-pki-profiles](#)].

### **1.1. Terminology**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

## **2. Algorithms**

Four cryptographic algorithms are used to support BGPSEC:

- o The signature algorithm used when issuing BGPSEC certificates and CRLs, which would revoke BGPSEC certificates, MUST be as specified in [[RFC6485](#)].

- o The signature algorithm used in certification requests and BGPSEC Update messages MUST be Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [[RFC6090](#)].
- o The hashing algorithm used when issuing certificates and CRLs MUST be as specified in [[RFC6485](#)].
- o The hashing algorithm use when generating certification requests and BGPSEC Update messages MUST be SHA-256 [[SHS](#)]. Hash algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates, or BGPSEC Update messages instead they are combined with the digital signature algorithm (see below).

NOTE: The exception to the above hashing algorithm is the use of SHA-1 [[SHS](#)] when CAs generate authority and subject key identifiers [[ID.bgpsec-pki-profiles](#)].

To support BGPSEC, the algorithms are identified as follows:

- o In certificates and CRLs, an Object Identifier (OID) is used. The value and locations are as specified in [section 2 of RFC6485](#).
- o In certification request, an OID is used. The ecdsa-with-SHA256 OID [[RFC5480](#)] MUST appear in the PKCS #10 signatureAlgorithm field [[RFC4211](#)] or in Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) POPOSigningKey signature field [[RFC2986](#)].
- o In BGPSEC Update messages, the ECDSA with SHA-256 Algorithm Suite Identifier from [Section 7](#) is included in the Signature-Block List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field.

### **3. Asymmetric Key Format**

The RSA key pairs used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPSEC Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in [section 3 of RFC6485](#). The remainder of this section addresses key formats found in the BGPSEC router certificate requests and in BGPSEC Router Certificates.

The ECDSA key pairs used to compute signatures for certificate requests and BGPSEC Update messages MUST come from the P-256 curve [[RFC5480](#)]. The public key pair MUST use the uncompressed form.

#### **3.1. Public Key Format**

The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo [[RFC5280](#)]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey.

The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow:

- o algorithm (which is an AlgorithmIdentifier type): The id-ecPublicKey OID MUST be used in the algorithm field, as specified in 2.1.1 of [RFC5480]. The value for the associated parameters MUST be secp256r1, as specified in 2.1.1.1 of [RFC5480].
- o subjectPublicKey: ECPublicKey MUST be used to encode the certificate's subjectPublicKey field, as specified in [Section 2.2 of \[RFC5480\]](#).

### **3.2. Private Key Format**

Local Policy determines private key format.

## **4. Signature Format**

The structure for the certificate's and CRL's signature field MUST be as specified in [Section 4 of \[RFC6485\]](#). The structure for the certification request's and BGPSEC Update message's signature field MUST be as specified in [Section 2.2.3 of \[RFC3279\]](#).

## **5. Additional Requirements**

It is anticipated that BGPSEC will require the adoption of updated key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic security to protect the integrity of BGPSEC. This profile should be updated to specify such future requirements, when appropriate.

CAs and RPs SHOULD be capable of supporting a transition to allow for the phased introduction of additional encryption algorithms and key specifications, and also accommodate the orderly deprecation of previously specified algorithms and keys. Accordingly, CAs and RPs SHOULD be capable of supporting multiple RPKI algorithm and key profiles simultaneously within the scope of such anticipated transitions. The recommended procedures to implement such a transition of key sizes and algorithms is not specified in this document.

## **6. Security Considerations**

The Security Considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC5480], [RFC6090], [RFC6485], and [ID.bgpsec-pki-profiles] apply to certificates. The security considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090], [RFC6485], [ID.bgpsec-pki-profiles] apply to certification requests. The security considerations of [RFC3279], [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], and [RFC6090] apply to BGPSEC Update messages. No new security are

introduced as a result of this specification.

**7. IANA Considerations**

The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is requested to define the "BGPSEC Algorithm Suite Registry" described below.

An algorithm suite consists of a digest algorithm and a signature algorithm. This specification creates an IANA registry of one-octet BGPSEC algorithm suite identifiers. Additionally, this document registers a single algorithm suite which uses the digest algorithm SHA-256 and the signature algorithm ECDSA on the P-256 curve [[RFC5480](#)].

BGPSEC Algorithm Suites Registry

Digest Algorithm	Signature Algorithm	Algorithm Suite Identifier	Specification Pointer
SHA-256	ECDSA P-256	TBD	<a href="#">RFC 5480</a>

Future assignments are to be made using either the Standards Action process defined in [[RFC5226](#)], or the Early IANA Allocation process defined in [[RFC4020](#)]. Assignments consist of a digest algorithm name, signature algorithm name, and the algorithm suite identifier value.

**10. Acknowledgements**

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**11.1. Informative References**

None.

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