

Network Working Group
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: September 12, 2012

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March 11, 2012

Security Requirements for BGP Path Validation
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs-03

Abstract

This document describes requirements for a future BGP security protocol design to provide cryptographic assurance that the origin AS had the right to announce the prefix and to provide assurance of the AS Path of the announcement.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

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1. Introduction

RPKI-based Origin Validation ([[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate](#)]) provides a measure of resilience to accidental mis-origination of prefixes. But it provides neither cryptographic assurance (announcements are not signed), nor assurance of the AS Path of the announcement.

This document describes requirements to be placed on a BGP security protocol, herein termed BGPsec, intended to rectify these gaps.

The threat model assumed here is documented in [[RFC4593](#)] and [[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats](#)].

As noted in the threat model, [[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats](#)], this work is limited to threats to the BGP protocol. Issues of business relationship conformance, of which routing 'leaks' are a subset, while important are outside the scope of the working group and therefore this document. It is hoped that these issues will be better understood in the future.

2. Recommended Reading

This document assumes knowledge of the RPKI see [[RFC6480](#)], the RPKI Repository Structure, see [[RFC6481](#)].

This document assumes ongoing incremental deployment of ROAs, see [[RFC6482](#)], the RPKI to Router Protocol, see [[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr](#)], and RPKI-based Prefix Validation, see [[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate](#)].

And, of course, a knowledge of BGP [[RFC4271](#)] is required.

3. General Requirements

The following are general requirements for a BGPsec protocol:

- 3.1 A BGPsec design must allow the receiver of a BGP announcement to determine, to a strong level of certainty, that the received PATH attribute accurately represents the sequence of eBGP exchanges that propagated the prefix from the origin AS to the receiver.
- 3.2 A BGPsec design must allow the receiver of an announcement to detect if an AS has added or deleted any AS number other than its own in the path attribute. This includes modification to the number of AS prepends.

- 3.3 A BGPsec design MUST be amenable to incremental deployment. Any incompatible protocol capabilities MUST be negotiated.
- 3.4 A BGPsec design MUST provide analysis of the operational considerations for deployment and particularly of incremental deployment, e.g, contiguous islands, non-contiguous islands, universal deployment, etc..
- 3.5 As cryptographic payloads and memory requirements on routers are likely to increase, a BGPsec design MAY require use of new hardware. I.e. compatibility with current hardware abilities is not a requirement that this document imposes on a solution. As BGPsec will likely not be rolled out for some years, this should not be a major problem.
- 3.6 A BGPsec design need not prevent attacks on data plane traffic. It need not provide assurance that the data plane even follows the control plane.
- 3.7 A BGPsec design MUST resist attacks by an enemy who has access to the inter-router link layer, per [Section 3.1.1.2 of \[RFC4593\]](#). In particular, such a design must provide mechanisms for authentication of all data, including protecting against message insertion, deletion, modification, or replay. Mechanisms that suffice include TCP sessions authenticated with TCP-AO [[RFC5925](#)], IPsec [[RFC4301](#)], or TLS [[RFC5246](#)].
- 3.8 It is assumed that a BGPsec design will require information about holdings of address space and ASNs, and assertions about binding of address space to ASNs. A BGPsec design MAY make use of a security infrastructure (e.g., a PKI) to distribute such authenticated data.
- 3.9 [this point should probably be removed. it remains to keep numbering for the moment] If message signing increases message size, the 4096 byte limit on BGP PDU size MAY be removed, see [[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages](#)].
- 3.10 It is entirely OPTIONAL to secure AS SETs and prefix aggregation. The long range solution to this is the deprecation of AS-SETs, see [[I-D.ietf-idr-deprecate-as-sets](#)].
- 3.11 If a BGPsec design uses signed prefixes, given the difficulty of splitting a signed message while preserving the signature, it need NOT handle multiple prefixes in a single UPDATE PDU.

- 3.12 A BGPsec design MUST enable each BGPsec speaker to configure use of the security mechanism on a per-peer basis.
- 3.13 A BGPsec design MUST provide backward compatibility in the message formatting, transmission, and processing of routing information carried through a mixed security environment. Message formatting in a fully secured environment MAY be handled in a non-backward compatible manner.
- 3.14 While the trust level of an NLRI should be determined by the BGPsec protocol, local routing preference and policy MUST then be applied to best path and other decisions. Such mechanisms MUST conform with [[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt](#)].
- 3.15 A BGPsec design MUST support 'transparent' route servers, meaning that the AS of the route server is not counted in downstream BGP AS-path-length tie-breaking decisions.
- 3.16 If a BGPsec design makes use of a security infrastructure, that infrastructure SHOULD enable each network operator to select the entities it will trust when authenticating data in the security infrastructure. See, for example, [[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt](#)].
- 3.17 A BGPsec design MUST NOT require operators to reveal more than is currently revealed in the operational inter-domain routing environment, other than the inclusion of necessary security credentials to allow others to ascertain for themselves the necessary degree of assurance regarding the validity of NLRI received via BGPsec. This includes peering, customer, and provider relationships, an ISP's internal infrastructure, etc. It is understood that some data are revealed to the savvy seeker by BGP, traceroute, etc. today.
- 3.18 A BGPsec design SHOULD flag security exceptions which are significant enough to be logged. The specific data to be logged are an implementation matter.
- 3.19 Any routing information database MUST be re-authenticated periodically or in an event-driven manner, especially in response to events such as, for example, PKI updates.
- 3.20 Any inter-AS use of cryptographic hashes or signatures, MUST provide mechanisms for algorithm agility.

- 3.21 A BGPsec design SHOULD NOT presume to know the intent of the originator of a NLRI, nor that of any AS on the AS Path.
- 3.22 A BGP listener SHOULD NOT trust non-BGPsec markings, such as communities, across trust boundaries.

4. BGP UPDATE Security Requirements

The following requirements MUST be met in the processing of BGP UPDATE messages:

- 4.1 A BGPsec design MUST enable each recipient of an UPDATE to formally validate that the origin AS in the message is authorized to originate a route to the prefix(es) in the message.
- 4.2 A BGPsec design MUST enable the recipient of an UPDATE to formally determine that the NLRI has traversed the AS path indicated in the UPDATE. Note that this is more stringent than showing that the path is merely not impossible.
- 4.3 Replay of BGP UPDATE messages need not be completely prevented, but a BGPsec design MUST provide a mechanism to control the window of exposure to replay attacks.
- 4.4 A BGPsec design SHOULD provide some level of assurance that the origin of a prefix is still 'alive', i.e. that a monkey in the middle has not withheld a WITHDRAW message or the effects thereof.
- 4.5 NLRI of the UPDATE message SHOULD be able to be authenticated as the message is processed.
- 4.6 Normal sanity checks of received announcements MUST be done, e.g. verification that the first element of the AS_PATH list corresponds to the locally configured AS of the peer from which the UPDATE was received.
- 4.7 The output of a router applying BGPsec to a received signed UPDATE MUST be either unequivocal and conform to a fully specified state in the design.

5. IANA Considerations

This document asks nothing of the IANA.

6. Security Considerations

The data plane may not follow the control plane.

Security for subscriber traffic is outside the scope of this document, and of BGP security in general. IETF standards for payload data security should be employed. While adoption of BGP security measures may ameliorate some classes of attacks on traffic, these measures are not a substitute for use of subscriber-based security.

7. Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank the authors of [[I-D.ietf-rpsec-bgpsec](#)] from whom we liberally stole, Russ Housley, Geoff Huston, Steve Kent, Sandy Murphy, John Scudder, Sam Weiler, and a number of others.

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