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RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)
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Abstract

In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Certificate Authorities publish certificates, including end entity certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL), and RPKI signed objects to repositories. Relying Parties retrieve the published information from those repositories. This document specifies a new RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) for this purpose. RRDP was specifically designed for scaling. It relies on a notification file which lists the current snapshot and delta files that can be retrieved using HTTP over TLS (HTTPS), and enables to use of CDNs or other caching infrastructure for the retrieval of these files.

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[1. Requirements notation](#)

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

2. Introduction

In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Certificate Authorities publish certificates [[RFC6487](#)], RPKI signed objects [[RFC6488](#)], manifests [[RFC6486](#)], and CRLs to repositories. CAs may have an embedded mechanism to publish to these repositories, or they may use a separate Repository Server and publication protocol. RPKI repositories are currently accessible using the [[rsync](#)] protocol, allowing Relying Parties to synchronise a local copy of the RPKI repository used for validation with the remote repositories [[RFC6481](#)].

[rsync] has proven valuable in the early deployment of RPKI, because it allowed operators to gain experience without the need to invent a custom protocol. However, operational experience has brought concerns to light that we wish to address here:

- o [[rsync](#)] is designed to limit the amount of data that needs to be transferred between client and server. However the server needs to spend significant resources in terms of CPU and memory for every connection. This is a problem in an envisioned RPKI deployment where thousands of Relying Parties query a small number of central repositories, and it makes these repositories weak to denial of service attacks.
- o A secondary concern is the lack of supported rsync server and client libraries. In practice all implementations have to make system calls to an rsync binary. This is inefficient, introduces fragility with regards to updates of this binary, makes it difficult to catch and report problems to operators, and it complicates software development and testing.

This document specifies an alternative repository access protocol based on notification, snapshot and delta files that a Relying Party can retrieve over the HTTPS protocol. This allows Relying Parties to perform either a full (re-)synchronisation of their local copy of the repository using snapshot files, or use delta files to keep their local repository updated after initial synchronisation. We call this the RPKI Repository Delta Protocol, or RRDP in short.

RRDP was designed to support scaling in RPKI's asymmetric deployment. It is consistent (in terms of data structures) with the publication protocol [[I-D.ietf-sidr-publication](#)] and treats publication events of one or more repository objects as discrete events that can be communicated to Relying Parties. This approach helps to minimize the amount of data that traverses the network and thus helps minimize the amount of time until repository convergence occurs. RRDP also provides a standards based way to obtain consistent, point in time

views of a single repository, eliminating a number of consistency related issues. Finally, this approach allows these discrete events to be communicated as immutable files. This enables Repository Servers to pre-calculate these files only once for all clients - thus limiting the CPU and memory investments required, and enables the use of caching infrastructure to reduce the load on a repository server when a large number of Relying Parties are querying it.

This document allows the use of RRDP as an additional repository distribution mechanism for RPKI. In time RRDP may replace [[rsync](#)] as the only mandatory to implement repository distribution mechanism. However this transition is outside of the scope of this document.

3. RPKI Repository Delta Protocol Implementation

3.1. Informal Overview

Certification Authorities in the RPKI use a repository server to publish their RPKI products, such as manifests, CRLs, signed certificates and RPKI signed objects. This repository server may be remote, or embedded in the Certificate Authority engine itself. Certificates in the RPKI that use a repository server that supports RRDP include a special Subject Information Access (SIA) pointer referring to a notification file.

The notification file includes a globally unique session_id in the form of a version 4 UUID ([[RFC4122](#)]), and serial number that can be used by the Relying Party to determine if it and the repository are synchronised. Furthermore it includes a link to the most recent complete snapshot of current objects that are published by the repository server, and a list of links to delta files, for each revision starting at a point determined by the repository server, up to the current revision of the repository.

A Relying Party that learns about a notification file location for the first time can download it, and then proceed to download the latest snapshot file, and thus create a local copy of the repository that is in sync with the repository server. The Relying Party records the location of this notification file, the session_id and current serial number.

Relying Parties are encouraged to re-fetch this notification file at regular intervals, but not more often than once per minute. After re-fetching the notification file, the Relying Party may find that there are one or more delta files available that allow it to synchronise its local repository with the current state of the repository server. If no contiguous chain of deltas from the Relying Party's serial to the latest repository serial is available, or if

the session_id has changed, the Relying Party performs a full resynchronisation instead.

As soon as the Relying Party fetches new content in this way it could start a validation process. An example of a reason why a Relying Party may not choose to do this immediately is because it has learned of more than one notification location and it prefers to complete all its updates before validating.

The repository server could use caching infrastructure to reduce its load, particularly because snapshots and deltas for any given session_id and serial number contain an immutable record of the state of the repository server at a certain point in time. For this reason these files can be cached indefinitely. Notification files are polled by Relying Parties to discover if updates exist, and for this reason notification files may not be cached for longer than one minute.

3.2. Certificate Authority Use

Certificate Authorities that use RRDP MUST include an instance of an SIA AccessDescription extension in resource certificates they produce, in addition to the ones defined in [\[RFC6487\]](#),

```
AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE {  
    accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,  
    accessLocation GeneralName }
```

This extension MUST use an accessMethod of id-ad-rpkiNotify, see [Section 6](#):

```
id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)  
    dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }
```

```
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
```

```
id-ad-rpkiNotify OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 13 }
```

The accessLocation MUST be an HTTPS URI as defined in [\[RFC7230\]](#), that will point to the update notification file for the repository server that publishes the products of this Certificate Authority certificate.

3.3. Repository Server Use

3.3.1. Initialisation

When the repository server initialises it performs the following actions:

- o The server MUST generate a new random version 4 UUID (see [section 4.1.3 of \[RFC4122\]](#)) to be used as the session_id
- o The server MUST then generate a snapshot file for serial number ONE for this new session that includes all currently known published objects that the repository server is responsible for. Note that this snapshot file may contain zero publish elements at this point if no objects have been submitted for publication yet.
- o This snapshot file MUST be made available at a URL that is unique to this session_id and serial number, so that it can be cached indefinitely. The format and caching concerns for snapshot files are explained in more detail in [Section 3.5.2](#).
- o After the snapshot file has been published the repository server MUST publish a new notification file that contains the new session_id, has serial number ONE, has one reference to the snapshot file that was just published, and that contains no delta references. The format and caching concerns for update notification files are explained in more detail in [Section 3.5.1](#).

3.3.2. Publishing Updates

Whenever the repository server receives updates from a Certificate Authority it MUST generate new snapshot and delta files within one minute. If a Repository Server services a large number of Certificate Authorities it MAY choose to combine updates from multiple CAs. If a Repository Server combines updates in this way, it MUST ensure that publication never postponed for longer than one minute for any of the CAs involved.

Updates are processed as follows:

- o The new repository serial number MUST be one greater than the current repository serial number.
- o A new delta file MUST be generated for this new serial. This delta file MUST include all new, replaced and withdrawn objects for multiple CAs if applicable, as a single change set.
- o This delta file MUST be made available at a URL that is unique to the current session_id and serial number, so that it can be cached indefinitely.

- o The format and caching concerns for delta files are explained in more detail in [Section 3.5.3](#).
- o The repository server MUST also generate a new snapshot file for this new serial. This file MUST contain all "publish" elements for all current objects.
- o The snapshot file MUST be made available at a URL that is unique to this session and new serial, so that it can be cached indefinitely.
- o The format and caching concerns for snapshot files are explained in more detail in [Section 3.5.2](#).
- o Any older delta files that, when combined with all more recent delta files, will result in total size of deltas exceeding the size of the snapshot, MUST be excluded to avoid that Relying Parties download more data than necessary.
- o A new notification file MUST now be created by the repository server. This new notification file MUST include a reference to the new snapshot file, and all delta files selected in the previous steps.
- o The format and caching concerns for update notification files are explained in more detail in [Section 3.5.1](#).

If the repository server is not capable of performing the above for some reason, then it MUST perform a full re-initialisation, as explained above in [Section 3.3.1](#).

[3.4.](#) Relying Party Use

[3.4.1.](#) Processing the Update Notification File

When a Relying Party performs RPKI validation and learns about a valid certificate with an SIA entry for the RRDP protocol, it SHOULD use this protocol as follows.

The Relying Party MUST download the update notification file, unless an update notification file was already downloaded and processed from the same location in this validation run, or because a polling strategy was used (see [Section 3.4.4](#)).

It is RECOMMENDED that Relying Party uses a "User-Agent" header explained in [section 5.5.3. of \[RFC7231\]](#) to identify the name and version of the Relying Party software used. It is useful to track

capabilities of Relying Parties in the event of changes to the RPKI standards.

When the Relying Party downloads an update notification file it MUST verify the file format and validation steps described in [Section 3.5.1.3](#). If this verification fails, the file MUST be rejected and RRDP cannot be used. See [Section 3.4.5](#) for considerations.

The Relying Party MUST verify whether the session_id matches the last known session_id for this update notification file location. Note that even though the session_id is a random UUID value, it alone MUST NOT be used by a Relying Party as a unique identifier of a session, but always together with the location of the notification file. The reason for this is that a malicious server can use an existing session_id from another Repository Server.

If the session_id matches the last known session_id, then a Relying Party MAY download and process missing delta files as described in [Section 3.4.2](#), provided that all delta files for serial numbers between the last processed serial number and the current serial number in the notification file can be processed this way.

If the session_id matches the last known session_id, but delta files were not used, then the Relying Party MUST download and process the snapshot file on the update notification file as described in [Section 3.4.3](#).

If the session_id does not match the last known session_id, the Relying Party MUST update its last known session_id to the value specified in the downloaded notification file. The Relying Party MUST then download and process the snapshot file specified in the downloaded update notification file as described in [Section 3.4.3](#).

[3.4.2](#). Processing Delta Files

If an update notification file contains a contiguous chain of links to delta files from the last processed serial number to the current serial number, then Relying Parties MUST attempt to download and process all delta files in order of serial number as follows.

When the Relying Party downloads a delta file it MUST verify the file format and perform validation steps described in [Section 3.5.3.3](#). If this verification fails, the file MUST be rejected.

Furthermore the Relying Party MUST verify that the hash of the contents of this file matches the hash on the update notification

file that referenced it. In case of a mismatch of this hash, the file MUST be rejected.

If a Relying Party retrieved a delta file that is valid according to the above criteria, it performs the following actions:

- o The Relying Party MUST verify that the session_id matches the session_id of the notification file. If the session_id values do not match the file MUST be rejected.
- o The Relying Party MUST verify that the serial number of this delta file is exactly one greater than the last processed serial number for this session_id, and if not this file MUST be rejected.
- o The Relying Party SHOULD add all publish elements to a local storage and update its last processed serial number to the serial number of this delta file.
- o When a Relying Party encounters a "withdraw" element, or a "publish" element where an object is replaced, in a delta that it retrieves from a Repository Server, it MUST verify that the object to be withdrawn or replaced was retrieved from this same Repository Server, before applying the appropriate action. Failing to do so will leave the Relying Party vulnerable to malicious Repository Servers instructing it to delete or change arbitrary objects.

If any delta file is rejected Relying Parties MUST process the current Snapshot File instead, as described in [Section 3.4.3](#).

[3.4.3](#). Processing a Snapshot File

Snapshot Files MUST only be used if Delta Files are unavailable, or were rejected. As is ensured, if the process described in [Section 3.4.1](#) is followed.

When the Relying Party downloads a snapshot file it MUST verify the file format and validation steps described in [Section 3.5.2.3](#). If this verification fails, the file MUST be rejected.

Furthermore the Relying Party MUST verify that the hash of the contents of this file matches the hash on the update notification file that referenced it. In case of a mismatch of this hash, the file MUST be rejected.

If a Relying Party retrieved a snapshot file that is valid according to the above criteria, it performs the following actions:

- o The Relying Party MUST verify that the session_id matches the session_id of the notification file. If the session_id values do not match the file MUST be rejected.
- o The Relying Party MUST verify that the serial number of this snapshot file is greater than the last processed serial number for this session_id. If this fails the file MUST be rejected.
- o The Relying Party SHOULD then add all publish elements to a local storage and update its last processed serial number to the serial number of this snapshot file.

If a Snapshot File is rejected that means that RRDP cannot be used. See [Section 3.4.5](#) for considerations.

3.4.4. Polling the Update Notification File

Once a Relying Party has learned about the location, session_id and last processed serial number of repository that uses the RRDP protocol, the Relying Party MAY start polling the repository server for updates. However the Relying Party MUST NOT poll for updates more often than once every 1 minute, and in order to reduce data usage Relying Parties MUST use the "If-Modified-Since" header explained in [section 3.3 of \[RFC7232\]](#) in requests.

If a Relying Party finds that updates are available it SHOULD download and process the file as described in [Section 3.4.1](#), and initiate a new RPKI object validation process. However, a detailed description of the RPKI object validation process itself is out of scope of this document.

3.4.5. Considerations Regarding Operational Failures in RRDP

If a Relying Party experiences any issues with retrieving or processing any of the files used in this protocol, it will be unable to retrieve new RPKI data from the affected Repository Server.

Relying Parties could attempt to use alternative repository access mechanisms, if they are available, according to the accessMethod element value(s) specified in the SIA of the associated certificate (see [Section 4.8.8 of \[RFC6487\]](#)).

Furthermore Relying Parties may wish to employ re-try strategies while fetching RRDP files. Relying Parties are also advised to keep old objects in their local cache so that validation can be done using old objects.

It is also recommendable that re-validation and retrieval is performed pro-actively before manifests or CRLs go stale, or certificates expire, to ensure that problems on the side of the Relying Party can be identified and resolved before they cause major concerns.

3.5. File Definitions

3.5.1. Update Notification File

3.5.1.1. Purpose

The update notification file is used by Relying Parties to discover whether any changes exist between the state of the repository and the Relying Party's cache. It describes the location of the files containing the snapshot and incremental deltas which can be used by the Relying Party to synchronise with the repository.

3.5.1.2. Cache Concerns

A repository server MAY use caching infrastructure to cache the notification file and reduce the load of HTTPS requests. However, since this file is used by Relying Parties to determine whether any updates are available the repository server SHOULD ensure that this file is not cached for longer than 1 minute. An exception to this rule is that it is better to serve a stale notification file, than no notification file.

How this is achieved exactly depends on the caching infrastructure used. In general a repository server may find certain HTTP headers to be useful, such as: "Cache-Control: max-age=60" (see [Section 5.2 of \[RFC7234\]](#)). Another approach can be to have the repository server push out new versions of the notification file to the caching infrastructure when appropriate.

In case of a high load on a repository server or its distribution network, the Cache-Control HTTP header, or a similar mechanism, MAY be used to suggest an optimal (for the repository server) poll interval for Relying Parties. However, setting it to an interval longer than 1 hour is NOT RECOMMENDED. Relying parties SHOULD align the suggested interval with their operational practices and the expected update frequency of RPKI repository data, and MAY discard suggested value.

3.5.1.3. File Format and Validation

Example notification file:

```
<notification xmlns="http://www.ripe.net/rpki/rrdp"
  version="1"
  session_id="9df4b597-af9e-4dca-bdda-719cce2c4e28"
  serial="3">
  <snapshot uri="https://host/9d-8/3/snapshot.xml" hash="AB"/>
  <delta serial="3" uri="https://host/9d-8/3/delta.xml" hash="CD"/>
  <delta serial="2" uri="https://host/9d-8/2/delta.xml" hash="EF"/>
</notification>
```

Note: URIs and hash values in this example are shortened because of formatting.

The following validation rules MUST be observed when creating or parsing notification files:

- o A Relying Party MUST reject any update notification file that is not well-formed, or which does not conform to the RELAX NG schema outlined in [Section 3.5.4](#) of this document.
- o The XML namespace MUST be <http://www.ripe.net/rpki/rrdp>
- o The encoding MUST be US-ASCII
- o The version attribute in the notification root element MUST be 1
- o The session_id attribute MUST be a random version 4 UUID ([[RFC4122](#)]), unique to this session
- o The serial attribute MUST be an unbounded, unsigned positive integer in decimal format indicating the current version of the repository.
- o The notification file MUST contain exactly one 'snapshot' element for the current repository version.
- o If delta elements are included they MUST form a contiguous sequence of serial numbers starting at a revision determined by the repository server, up to the serial number mentioned in the notification element. Note that the elements may not be ordered.
- o The hash attribute in snapshot and delta elements MUST be the hexadecimal encoding of the SHA-256 [[SHS](#)] hash of the referenced file. The Relying Party MUST verify this hash when the file is retrieved and reject the file if the hash does not match.

3.5.2. Snapshot File

3.5.2.1. Purpose

A snapshot is intended to reflect the complete and current contents of the repository for a specific session and version. Therefore it **MUST** contain all objects from the repository current as of the time of the publication.

3.5.2.2. Cache Concerns

A snapshot reflects the content of the repository at a specific point in time, and for that reason can be considered immutable data. Snapshot files **MUST** be published at a URL that is unique to the specific session and serial.

Because these files never change, they **MAY** be cached indefinitely. However, in order to prevent that these files use a lot of space in caching infrastructure it is **RECOMMENDED** that a limited interval is used in the order of hours or days.

To avoid race conditions where a Relying Party downloads a notification file moments before it's updated, Repository Servers **SHOULD** retain old snapshot files for at least 5 minutes after a new notification file is published.

3.5.2.3. File Format and Validation

Example snapshot file:

```
<snapshot xmlns="http://www.ripe.net/rpki/rrdp"
  version="1"
  session_id="9df4b597-af9e-4dca-bdda-719cce2c4e28"
  serial="2">
  <publish uri="rsync://rpki.ripe.net/Alice/Bob.cer">
    ZXhhbXBsZTE=
  </publish>
  <publish uri="rsync://rpki.ripe.net/Alice/Alice.mft">
    ZXhhbXBsZTI=
  </publish>
  <publish uri="rsync://rpki.ripe.net/Alice/Alice.crl">
    ZXhhbXBsZTM=
  </publish>
</snapshot>
```

The following rules **MUST** be observed when creating or parsing snapshot files:

- o A Relying Party MUST reject any snapshot file that is not well-formed, or which does not conform to the RELAX NG schema outlined in [Section 3.5.4](#) of this document.
- o The XML namespace MUST be <http://www.ripe.net/rpki/rrdp>.
- o The encoding MUST be US-ASCII.
- o The version attribute in the notification root element MUST be 1
- o The session_id attribute MUST match the expected session_id in the reference in the notification file.
- o The serial attribute MUST match the expected serial in the reference in the notification file.
- o Note that the publish element is similar to the publish element defined in the publication protocol [[I-D.ietf-sidr-publication](#)]. However, the "tag" attribute is not used here because it is not relevant to Relying Parties. The "hash" attribute is not used here because this file represents a complete current state of the repository, and therefore it is not relevant to know which existing RPKI object (if any) is updated.

[3.5.3](#). Delta File

[3.5.3.1](#). Purpose

An incremental delta file contains all changes for exactly one serial increment of the repository server. In other words a single delta will typically include all the new objects, updated objects and withdrawn objects that a Certification Authority sent to the repository server. In its simplest form the update could concern only a single object, but it is RECOMMENDED that CAs send all changes for one of their key pairs (updated objects as well as a new manifest and CRL) as one atomic update message.

[3.5.3.2](#). Cache Concerns

Deltas reflect the difference between two consecutive versions of a repository for a given session. For that reason deltas can be considered immutable data. Delta files MUST be published at a URL that is unique to the specific session and serial.

Because these files never change, they MAY be cached indefinitely. However, in order to prevent these files from using a lot of space in caching infrastructure it is RECOMMENDED that a limited interval is used in the order of hours or days.

To avoid race conditions where a Relying Party downloads a notification file moments before it's updated, Repository Servers SHOULD retain old delta files for at least 5 minutes after they are no longer included in the latest notification file.

3.5.3.3. File Format and Validation

Example delta file:

```
<delta xmlns="http://www.ripe.net/rpki/rrdp"
  version="1"
  session_id="9df4b597-af9e-4dca-bdda-719cce2c4e28"
  serial="3">
  <publish uri="rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repo/Alice/Alice.mft"
    hash="50d8...545c">
    ZXhhbXBsZTQ=
  </publish>
  <publish uri="rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repo/Alice/Alice.crl"
    hash="5fb1...6a56">
    ZXhhbXBsZTU=
  </publish>
  <withdraw uri="rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repo/Alice/Bob.cer"
    hash="caeb...15c1"/>
</delta>
```

Note that a formal RELAX NG specification of this file format is included later in this document. A Relying Party MUST NOT process any delta file that is incomplete or not well-formed.

The following validation rules MUST be observed when creating or parsing delta files:

- o A Relying Party MUST reject any delta file that is not well-formed, or which does not conform to the RELAX NG schema outlined in [Section 3.5.4](#) of this document.
- o The XML namespace MUST be <http://www.ripe.net/rpki/rrdp>.
- o The encoding MUST be US-ASCII.
- o The version attribute in the delta root element MUST be 1
- o The session_id attribute MUST be a random version 4 UUID unique to this session
- o The session_id attribute MUST match the expected session_id in the reference in the notification file.

- o The serial attribute MUST match the expected serial in the reference in the notification file.
- o Note that the publish element is similar to the publish element defined in the publication protocol [[I-D.ietf-sidr-publication](#)]. However, the "tag" attribute is not used here because it is not relevant to Relying Parties.

[3.5.4.](#) XML Schema

The following is a RELAX NG compact form schema describing version 1 of this protocol.

```
#
# RelaxNG schema for RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP).
#

default namespace = "http://www.ripe.net/rpki/rrdp"

version = xsd:positiveInteger    { maxInclusive="1" }
serial  = xsd:positiveInteger
uri     = xsd:anyURI
uuid    = xsd:string             { pattern = "[\0-9a-fA-F]+" }
hash    = xsd:string             { pattern = "[0-9a-fA-F]+" }
base64  = xsd:base64Binary

# Notification file: lists current snapshots and deltas

start |= element notification {
  attribute version    { version },
  attribute session_id { uuid },
  attribute serial     { serial },
  element snapshot {
    attribute uri { uri },
    attribute hash { hash }
  },
  element delta {
    attribute serial { serial },
    attribute uri    { uri },
    attribute hash   { hash }
  }*
}

# Snapshot segment: think DNS AXFR.

start |= element snapshot {
  attribute version    { version },
  attribute session_id { uuid },
```



```
    attribute serial      { serial },
    element publish      {
        attribute uri { uri },
        base64
    }*
}

# Delta segment: think DNS IXFR.

start |= element delta {
    attribute version      { version },
    attribute session_id { uuid },
    attribute serial      { serial },
    delta_element+
}

delta_element |= element publish {
    attribute uri { uri },
    attribute hash { hash }?,
    base64
}

delta_element |= element withdraw {
    attribute uri { uri },
    attribute hash { hash }
}

# Local Variables:
# indent-tabs-mode: nil
# comment-start: "# "
# comment-start-skip: "#[ \t]*"
# End:
```

4. Operational Considerations

4.1. Compatibility with previous standards

This protocol has been designed to replace rsync as a distribution mechanism of an RPKI repository. However, it is also designed to co-exist with existing implementations based on rsync, to enable smooth transition from one distribution mechanism to another.

For every repository object listed in the snapshot and delta files both the hash of the object's content and the rsync URI [[RFC5781](#)] of its location in the repository are listed. This makes it possible to distribute the same RPKI repository, represented by a set of files on a filesystem, using both rsync and RRDP. It also enables Relying

Parties tools to query, combine, and consequently validate objects from repositories of different types.

[4.2.](#) Distribution considerations

One of the design goals of RRDP was to minimise load on a repository server while serving clients. To achieve this, neither the content, nor the URLs of the snapshot and delta files are modified after they have been published in the notification file. This allows their effective distribution, either by a single HTTP server, or using a Content Distribution Network (CDN).

The RECOMMENDED way for Relying Parties to keep up with the repository updates is to poll the Update Notification File for changes. The content of that file is updated with every new serial version of a repository (while its URL remains stable). To effectively implement distribution of the notification file, an "If-Modified-Since" HTTP request header is required to be present in all requests for notification file (see [Section 3.4.4.](#)) Therefore it is RECOMMENDED that Relying Party tools implement a mechanism to keep track of a previous successful fetch of a notification file.

Implementations of RRDP should also take care of not producing new versions of the repository (and subsequently, new Notification, Snapshot and Delta files) too often. Usually the maintenance of the RPKI repository includes regular updates of manifest and CRL objects, performed on a schedule. This often results in bursts of repository updates during a short period of time. Since the Relying Parties are required to poll for the Update Notification File not more often than once per minute ([Section 3.4.4.](#)), it is not practical to generate new serial versions of the repository much more often than 1 per minute. It is allowed to combine multiple updates, possibly from different CAs, into a new serial repository version ([Section 3.3.2.](#)). This will significantly shorten the size of the Update Notification File and total amount of data distributed to all Relying Parties.

[4.3.](#) HTTPS considerations

Note that a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) cannot produce validly signed RPKI data, but can perform withhold or replay attacks targeting a Relying Party, and keep the Relying Party from learning about changes in the RPKI. Because of this Relying Parties SHOULD do TLS certificate and host name validation when they fetch from an RRDP Repository Server.

Relying Party tools SHOULD log any TLS certificate or host name validation issues found, so that an operator can investigate the cause. However, such validation issues are often due to

configuration errors, or a lack of a common TLS trust anchor. In these cases it is better if the Relying Party retrieves the signed RPKI data regardless, and performs validation on it. Therefore Relying Party MUST continue to retrieve the data in case of errors. The Relying Party MAY choose to log encountered issues only when fetching the notification update file, but not when it subsequently fetches snapshot or delta files from the same host. Furthermore the Relying Party MAY provide a way for operators to accept untrusted connections for a given host, after the cause has been identified.

It is RECOMMENDED that Relying Parties and Repository Servers follow the Best Current Practices outlined in [\[RFC7525\]](#) on the use of HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) [\[RFC7230\]](#). Relying Parties SHOULD do TLS certificate and host name validation using subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [\[RFC6125\]](#). The rules and guidelines defined in [\[RFC6125\]](#) apply here, with the following considerations:

- o Relying Parties and Repository Servers SHOULD support the DNS-ID identifier type. The DNS-ID identifier type SHOULD be present in Repository Server certificates.
- o DNS names in Repository Server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the wildcard character "*".
- o A CN field may be present in Repository Server certificates's subject name, but SHOULD NOT be used for authentication within the rules described in [\[RFC6125\]](#).
- o This protocol does not require the use of SRV-IDs.
- o This protocol does not require the use of URI-IDs.

Note however that this validation is done on a best effort basis, and serves to highlight potential issues, but RPKI object security does not depend on this. Therefore Relying Parties MAY deviate from the validation steps listed above.

5. Security Considerations

RRDP deals exclusively with transfer of RPKI objects from a repository server to a Relying Party. The trust relation between a Certificate Authority and its repository server is out of scope for this document. However, it should be noted that from a Relying Party point of view all RPKI objects (certificates, CRLs, and CMS-wrapped objects) are already covered by object security mechanisms including signed manifests. This allows validation of these objects even though the repository server itself is not trusted. This document makes no change to RPKI validation procedures per se.

The original RPKI transport protocol is rsync, which offers no channel security mechanism. RRDP replaces the use of rsync by HTTPS; while the channel security mechanism underlying RRDP (HTTPS) is not a cure-all, it does make some forms of denial of service attack more difficult for the attacker. HTTPS issues are discussed in more detail in [Section 4.3](#).

Supporting both RRDP and rsync necessarily increases the number of opportunities for a malicious RPKI Certificate Authority to perform denial of service attacks on Relying Parties, by expanding the number of URIs which the Relying Party may need to contact in order to complete a validation run. However, other than the relative cost of HTTPS versus rsync, adding RRDP to the mix does not change this picture significantly: with either RRDP or rsync a malicious Certificate Authority can supply an effectively infinite series of URIs for the Relying Party to follow. The only real solution to this is for the Relying Party to apply some kind of bound to the amount of work it is willing to do. Note also that the attacker in this scenario must be an RPKI Certificate Authority, since otherwise the normal RPKI object security checks would reject the malicious URIs.

Processing costs for objects retrieved using RRDP may be somewhat different from the same objects retrieved using rsync: because RRDP treats an entire set of changes as a unit (one "delta"), it may not be practical to start processing any of the objects in the delta until the entire delta has been received. With rsync, by contrast, incremental processing may be easy, but the overall cost of transfer may be higher, as may be the number of corner cases in which the Relying Party retrieves some but not all of the updated objects. Overall, RRDP's behavior is closer to a proper transactional system, which (probably) leads to an overall reliability increase.

RRDP is designed to scale much better than rsync. In particular, RRDP is designed to allow use of HTTPS caching infrastructure to reduce load on primary Repository Servers and increase resilience against denial of service attacks on the RPKI publication service.

6. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to update the reference for id-ad-rpkiNotify to this document in the PKIX Access Descriptor registry [[IANA-AD-NUMBERS](#)].

7. Acknowledgements

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