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RPKI Local Trust Anchor Use Cases
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Abstract

There are a number of critical circumstances where a localized routing domain needs to augment or modify its view of the Global RPKI. This document attempts to outline a few of them.

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[1.](#) Introduction

Today RPKI-based Origin Validation, [[RFC6811](#)], relies on widespread deployment of the Global Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), [[RFC6480](#)]. In the future, RPKI-based Path Validation, [[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview](#)], will be even more reliant on the Global RPKI.

But there are critical circumstances in which a local, well-scoped, administrative and/or routing domain will need to augment and/or modify their internal view of the Global RPKI.

This document attempts to lay out a few of those use cases. It is not intended to be authoritative, complete, or to become a standard. It merely tries to lay out a few critical examples to help scope the issues.

[2.](#) Suggested Reading

It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, see [[RFC6480](#)], the RPKI Repository Structure, see [[RFC6481](#)], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), see [[RFC6482](#)], and GhostBusters Records, see [[RFC6493](#)].

[3.](#) What is 'Local'

The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, manifests, ROAs, and GhostBusters Records as described in [[RFC6481](#)]. Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and maintenance are discussed elsewhere.

Like the DNS, the Global RPKI presents a single global view, although only a loosely consistent view, depending on timing, updating,

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fetching, etc. There is no 'fix' for this, it is not broken, it is the nature of distributed data with distributed caches.

There are critical uses of the RPKI where a local administrative and/or routing domain, e.g. an end-user site, a particular ISP or content provider, an organization, a geo-political region, ... may wish to have a specialized view of the RPKI.

For the purposes of this exploration, we refer to this localized view as a 'Local Trust Anchor', mostly for historical reasons, but also because implementation would likely be the local distribution of one or more specialized trust anchors, [[RFC6481](#)].

4. Example Uses

Carol, a RIPE resource holder (LIR, PI holder, ...), statistically likely not to actually be in the Netherlands, is a victim of the "Dutch Court Attack," i.e. someone convinces a Dutch court to force the RIPE/NCC to remove or modify some or all of Carol's certificates, ROAs, etc. or the resources they represent, and the operational community wants to retain the ability to route to Carol's network(s). There is need for some channel through which operators can exchange local trust, command, and data collections necessary to propagate patches local to all their caches.

Bob has a multi-AS network under his administration and some of those ASs use private ([RFC1918](#)) or 'borrowed' address space which is otherwise unrouted in the global Internet (US military space is popular), and he wishes to certify them for use in his internal routing.

Alice runs the root trust for a large organization, commercial or geo-political, where upper management requests routing engineering to redirect their competitors' prefixes to socially acceptable data, and Alice is responsible for making the CA hierarchy have validated certificates for those redirected resources as well as the rest of the Internet.

5. Notes

In these examples, it is ultimately the ROAs, not the certificates, which one wants to modify. But one can't just hack new ROAs as one does not have the private keys needed to sign them. Hence one has to first hack the 3779 certificates.

But we should not lose sight of the goal that it is the ROAs and GhostBuster Records which need re-issuing under the new 3779 certificates.

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Further, since we're not the NSA, GCHQ, ..., we can not assume that we can reissue down from the root trust anchor at the IANA or from the RIRs' certificates. So we have to create a new trust anchor which, for ease of use, will contain the new/hacked certificates and ROAs as well as the unmodified remainder of the Global RPKI.

And, because Alice, Bob, and Carol want to be able to archive, reproduce, and send to friends the data necessary to recreate their hacks, there will need to be a formally defined set of data which is input to a well-defined process to take an existing Global RPKI tree and produce the desired modified re-anchored tree.

6. Security Considerations

These use cases are all about violating global security, albeit within a constrained local context.

7. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA Considerations.

8. Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Kent, and Karen Seo.

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