Network Working Group P. Mohapatra Internet-Draft K. Patel Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Systems Expires: May 29, 2011 J. Scudder D. Ward Juniper Networks R. Bush Internet Initiative Japan, Inc. November 29, 2010 BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-00 Abstract As part of the origination AS validation process, it can be desirable to automatically consider the validation state of routes in the BGP decision process. The purpose of this document is to provide a specification for doing so. The document also defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry the validation state inside an autonomous system to influence the decision process of the IBGP speakers. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of <u>BCP 78</u> and <u>BCP 79</u>. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on May 29, 2011. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Mohapatra, et al. Expires May 29, 2011 [Page 1]

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Internet-Draft
1. Introduction
  As part of the origination AS validation process, it can be desirable
  to automatically consider the validation state of routes in the BGP
  decision process. The purpose of this document is to provide a
  specification for doing so. The document defines a new BGP opaque
  extended community to carry the validation state inside an autonomous
  system to influence the decision process of the IBGP speakers.
1.1. Requirements Language
  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
  document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Origin Validation State Extended Community
  The origin validation state extended community is an opaque extended
  community [<u>RFC4360</u>] with the following encoding:
    0
                                                      3
                     1
                                     2
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    0x43 | TBD |
                                 Reserved
    Reserved
                                           lvalidationstate
    The value of the high-order octet of the extended Type Field is 0x43,
  which indicates it is non-transitive. The value of the low-order
  octet of the extended type field for this community is TBD. The last
  octet of the extended community encodes the route's validation
  state([I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. It can assume the following
  values:
              +----+
              | Value | Meaning
              +----+
              0 | Lookup result = "valid"
              1 | Lookup result = "not found" |
                 2 | Lookup result = "invalid" |
              +----+
  If the router is configured to support the extensions defined in this
  draft, it SHOULD attach the origin validation state extended
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BGP Origin Validation Extcomm Internet-Draft November 2010 community to BGP UPDATE messages sent to IBGP peers by mapping the computed validation state in the last octet of the extended community. Similarly on the receiving IBGP speakers, the validation state of an IBGP route SHOULD be derived directly from the last octet of the extended community, if present. Note that routers do not perform prefix origin validation (compute the validation state as defined in [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]) for IBGP learnt routes.

3. Changes to the BGP Decision Process

If a BGP router supports prefix origin validation and is configured for the extensions defined in this document, the validation step MUST be performed prior to any of the steps defined in the decision process of [RFC4271]. The validation step is stated as follows: When comparing a pair of routes for a BGP destination, the route with the lowest "validation state" value is preferred.

In all other respects, the decision process remains unchanged.

3.1. Policy Control

It MUST be possible to enable or disable the validation step as defined in <u>Section 3</u> through configuration. The default SHOULD be for the validation step to be disabled.

4. Deployment Considerations

In deployment scenarios where not all the speakers in an autonomous system are upgraded to support the extensions defined in this document, it is necessary to define policies that match on the origin validation extended community and set another BGP attribute [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] that influences the best path selection the same way as what would have been enabled by an implementation of this extension.

5. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable review and suggestions from Wesley George and Roque Gagliano on this document. **<u>6</u>**. IANA Considerations

IANA shall assign a new value from the "BGP Opaque Extended

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BGP Origin Validation Extcomm November 2010 Internet-Draft Community" type registry from the non-transitive range, to be called "BGP Origin Validation State Extended Community". 7. Security Considerations This document introduces no new security concerns beyond what is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. 8. References 8.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", <u>BCP 14</u>, <u>RFC 2119</u>, March 1997. [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", <u>RFC 4271</u>, January 2006. [RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, February 2006. 8.2. Informative References [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-00 (work in progress), July 2010. Authors' Addresses Pradosh Mohapatra Cisco Systems 170 W. Tasman Drive San Jose, CA 95134 USA Email: pmohapat@cisco.com

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