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RPKI Router Implementation Report
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-impl-01

Abstract

This document provides an implementation report for RPKI Router protocol as defined in [[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr](#)]. The editor did not verify the accuracy of the information provided by respondents or by any alternative means. The respondents are experts with the implementations they reported on, and their responses are considered authoritative for the implementations for which their responses represent. Respondents were asked to only use the YES answer if the feature had at least been tested in the lab.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)] only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English words, without any normative meaning.

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[1. Introduction](#)

In order to formally validate the origin ASs of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to receive RPKI [I-D

.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr] prefix origin data from a trusted cache. The RPKI Router protocol defined in [[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr](#)] provides a mechanism to deliver validated prefix origin data to routers.

This document provides an implementation report for the RPKI Router protocol as defined in [[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr](#)].

The editor did not verify the accuracy of the information provided by respondents or by any alternative means. The respondents are experts with the implementations they reported on, and their responses are considered authoritative for the implementations for which their responses represent. Respondents were asked to only use the YES answer if the feature had at least been tested in the lab.

2. Implementation Forms

Contact and implementation information for person filling out this form:

IOS Name: Keyur Patel, Email: keyupate@cisco.com, Vendor: Cisco Systems, Inc. Release: IOS

XR Name: Forhad Ahmed, Email: foahmed@cisco.com, Vendor: Cisco Systems, Inc. Release: IOS-XR

JUNOS Name: Hannes Gredler, Email: hannes@juniper.net, Vendor: Juniper Networks, Inc., Release: JUNOS

rpki.net Name: Rob Austein, Email: sra@hactrn.net, Vendor: rpki.net project, Release: <http://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/trunk/>

NCC Name: Tim Bruijnzeels, Email: tim@ripe.net, Vendor: RIPE NCC Release: RIPE NCC validator-app 2.0.0 <https://certification.ripe.net/content/public-repo/releases/net/ripe/rpki-validator/rpki-validator-app/2.0.0/rpki-validator-app-2.0.0-bin.zip>

RTRlib Name: Fabian Holler, Matthias Waehlich, Email: waehlich@ieee.org, Vendor: HAW Hamburg, FU Berlin, RTRlib project, Release: RTRlib 0.2 <http://rpki.realmv6.org/>

BBN Name: David Mandelberg, Andrew Chi Email: dmandelb@bbn.com, achi@bbn.com, Vendor: Raytheon/BBN Technologies, Release: RPSTIR 0.2 <http://sourceforge.net/projects/rpstir/>

3. Protocol Data Units

Does the implementation support Protocol Data Units (PDUs) as described in Section 5 of [[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr](#)]?

| | IOS | XR | JUNOS | rpki .net | NCC | RTR- lib | BBN |
|--------------------|-----|-----|-------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| Rcv. Serial Notify | YES | YES | YES | YES | UNIT TEST | YES | SYS TEST |
| Snd. Serial Notify | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | NO | YES |
| Rcv. Serial Query | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | NO | YES |
| Snd. Serial Query | YES | YES | YES | YES | UNIT TEST | YES | SYS TEST |
| Rcv. Reset Query | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | NO | YES |
| Snd. Reset Query | YES | YES | YES | YES | UNIT TEST | YES | SYS TEST |
| Rcv. Cache Resp. | YES | YES | YES | YES | UNIT TEST | YES | SYS TEST |
| Snd. Cache Resp. | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | NO | YES |
| Rcv. IPv4 Prefix | YES | YES | YES | YES | UNIT TEST | YES | SYS TEST |
| Snd. IPv4 Prefix | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | NO | YES |
| Rcv. IPv6 Prefix | YES | YES | YES | YES | UNIT TEST | YES | SYS TEST |
| Snd. IPv6 Prefix | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | NO | YES |
| Rcv. End of Data | YES | YES | YES | YES | UNIT TEST | YES | SYS TEST |
| Snd. End of Data | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | NO | YES |
| Rcv. Cache Reset | YES | YES | YES | YES | UNIT TEST | YES | SYS TEST |
| Snd. Cache Reset | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | NO | YES |
| Rcv. Error Report | YES | YES | NO~1 | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Snd. Error Report | YES | NO | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |

1) No, Error PDU gets silently ignored

4. Protocol Sequence

Does RPKI Router protocol implementation follow the four protocol sequences as outlined in Section 6 of [[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr](#)]?

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S1: Start or Restart

S2: Typical Exchange

S3: Generation of Incremental Updates Sequence

S4: Receipt of Incremental Updates Sequence

S5: Generation of Cache has No data Sequence

| | IOS | XR | JUNOS | rpki.net | NCC | RTRlib | BBN |
|----|-----|-----|-------|----------|------|--------|-----|
| S1 | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| S2 | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO~1 | YES | YES |
| S3 | NO | NO | NO | YES | NO | YES | YES |
| S4 | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | YES | NO |
| S5 | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |

1) NO, we always respond as described in 6.3 of [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr]

5. Protocol Transport

Does RPKI Router protocol implementation support different protocol transport mechanism outlined in [Section 7](#) of [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr]?

| | IOS | XR | JUNOS | rpki.net | NCC | RTRlib | BBN |
|---------|-----|-----|-------|----------|-----|--------|-------|
| SSH | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | YES~1 |
| TLS | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| TCP | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| TCP-MD5 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| TCP-AO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |

1) Yes, using netcat as the ssh subsystem to connect to the RTR server on localhost via TCP. This is currently untested.

6. Error Codes

Does RPKI Router protocol implementation support different protocol error codes outlined in Section 10 of [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr]?

| | IOS | XR | JUNOS | rpki.net | NCC | RTRlib | BBN |
|-------|-----|-----|-------|----------|-------|--------|----------|
| Rcv.0 | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Snd.0 | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Rcv.1 | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Snd.1 | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Rcv.2 | YES | YES | NO | YES | N/A | YES | YES |
| Snd.2 | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES | N/A | YES |
| Rcv.3 | YES | YES | NO | YES | N/A | YES | YES |
| Snd.3 | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | NO | YES |
| Rcv.4 | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Snd.4 | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Rcv.5 | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Snd.5 | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Rcv.6 | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES~1 | N/A | YES |
| Snd.6 | YES | YES | NO | NO | N/A | YES | SYS TEST |
| Rcv.7 | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES~1 | N/A | YES |
| Snd.7 | YES | YES | NO | NO | N/A | YES | SYS TEST |

1) YES, but... fatal, so connection is dropped, but cache does not conclude it's inconsistent

7. Incremental Updates Support

RPKI Router protocol does support Incremental Updates defined in Section 4 of [\[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr\]](#).

| IOS | XR | JUNOS | rpki.net | NCC | RTRlib | BBN |
|-----|----|-------|----------|-----|--------|-----|
| NO | NO | YES~1 | YES | NO | YES | YES |

1) YES, receive side support

8. Session ID Support

Session ID is used to indicate that the cache server may have restarted and that the incremental restart may not be possible.

Does RPKI Router protocol implementation support Session ID procedures outlined in Section 5.10 of [\[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr\]](#)?

| IOS | XR | JUNOS | rpki.net | NCC | RTRlib | BBN |
|-----|-----|-------|----------|------|--------|-----|
| YES | YES | YES | YES | NO~1 | YES | YES |

+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

1) NO, using random, but will FIX

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9. Incremental Session Startup Support

RPKI Router protocol does support Incremental session startups with Serial Number and Session ID defined in the protocol. Does RPKI Router protocol implementation support Incremental Session Startup Support as defined in section 5.4 of [[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr](#)].

| IOS | XR | JUNOS | rpki.net | NCC | RTRlib | BBN |
|-----|-----|-------|----------|-----|--------|-----|
| YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES |

10. Interoperable Implementations

List other implementations that you have tested interoperability of RPKI Router Implementation.

10.1. Cisco Implementation

Cisco: The Cisco IOS and IOS-XR implementation should be interoperable with other vendor RPKI Router Protocol implementations. In particular we have tested our interoperability with rpki.net's RPKI Router implementation.

10.2. Juniper Implementation

Juniper: The Juniper Networks, Inc. JUNOS implementation should be interoperable with other vendor RPKI Router Protocol implementations. In particular we have tested our interoperability with rpki.net's and NCCs RPKI Router Cache implementation.

10.3. rpki.net Implementation

rpki.net: The rpki.net implementation should operate with other rpki-rtr implementations. In particular, we have tested our interoperability with Cisco IOS, Cisco IOS-XR, and Juniper.

10.4. RIPE NCC Implementation

RIPE NCC: The RIPE NCC validator has been tested by us with other rpki-rtr implementations. In particular we have tested with RTRlib and CISCO IOS. We received positive feedback from close contacts testing our validator with JUNOS and Quagga.

10.5. RTRlib Implementation

RTRlib: The RTRlib has been tested by us with other rpki-rtr implementations. In particular, we have tested with rtr-origin from

rpki.net and RIPE NCC Validator.

10.6. BBN RPSTIR Implementation

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BBN RPSTIR: We have not yet tested with any other implementations.

11. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA.

Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an RFC.

12. Security considerations

No new security issues are introduced to the RPKI Router protocol defined in [[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr](#)].

13. Acknowledgements

TBD....

14. References

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