

SIDR Working Group
Internet-Draft
Intended status: BCP
Expires: August 27, 2013

S. Turner
IECA, Inc.
K. Patel
Cisco Systems
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
February 23, 2013

Router Keying for BGPsec
draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-01

Abstract

BGPsec-speaking routers must be provisioned with private keys and the corresponding public key must be published in the global RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure). This document describes two ways of provisioning public/private keys, router-driven and operator-driven.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of [BCP 78](#) and [BCP 79](#).

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on August 27, 2013.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to [BCP 78](#) and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must

Internet-Draft

Router Keying for BGPsec

February 23, 2013

include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

1. Introduction

BGPsec-speaking routers must be provisioned with private keys and the corresponding public key must be published in the global RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure). The public key is published in the RPKI in the form of a certificate [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]. This document describes two methods for generating the necessary public/private key-pair: router-driven and operator-driven.

The difference between the two models is where the keys are generated. Keys are generated on the router in the router-drive method but elsewhere by the operator in the operator-drive model. The router-driven model is most familiar to PKI subscribers because its design supports CPs (Certification Policies), often times for human subscribers, that require the private key only ever be controlled by the subscriber to ensure that no one can impersonate the subscriber. For non-humans, this model does not always work in particular when an operator wants to support hot-swappable routers the same private key needs to be installed in the soon-to-be online router that was installed in the soon-to-be offline router.

The remainder of this document describes how operators can use the two methods to provision new and existing routers.

Note that in both models, the key pair is for algorithms defined in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The first version specifies ECDSA on the P-256 curve.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [RFC2119].

It is assumed that the reader understands BGPsec [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol], the RPKI [RFC6480], and [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles].

3. Provisioning a New Router

When commissioning a new router, operators may use either the router-driven or operator-drive methods. Regardless of the method chosen, the operator first needs to establish a secure communication channel

Turner, et al.

Expires August 27, 2013

[Page 2]

Internet-Draft

Router Keying for BGPsec

February 23, 2013

with the router. Today, this is done via a proprietary management box directly connected to the router on the serial/craft port {spt: is serial/craft port the correct terminology?}. After the management box has been physically connected to the router, the operator authenticates to the management box, via a proprietary mechanism {spt: is this really proprietary or it is leap-of-faith?}, and uses the CLI (command line interface) to generate the router's SSH (Secure Shell) key [[RFC4253](#)], retrieve the router's SSH public key, install the operator's SSH key(s), configures the Ethernet port [[IEEE-802.3](#)], BGPSEC-router number {spt: assume this is where the BGPSEC-router # will get "installed" for the router-driven case to know what to put in the PKCS#10}, etc. {spt: did I miss anything?}.

{spt: i added CA certificate in the above for the router to verify that the CA actually signed the certificate. overkill?}

{spt: this could go here or in the security considerations. i am ambivalent about where it ends up, but i think we should have this data in here somewhere. i'd like to think if we're provisioning these routers with ECDSA keys that we're going to be using algorithms at least as good!? the one that gives me heartburn is hmac-sha2-256 seems like there ought to be a 128-bit truncated version to match with the others.}

The SSH encryption, integrity, authentication, and key exchange mechanisms used by the router and operator SHOULD be of comparable strength to BGPSEC key, which is 128-bit strength, e.g., for encryption: aes128-cbc [[RFC4253](#)] and AEAD_AES_128_GCM [[RFC5647](#)], for integrity: hmac-sha2-256 [[RFC6668](#)] and AESAD_AES_128_GCM [[RFC5647](#)], for authentication: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 [[RFC5656](#)], and for key exchange: ecdh-sha2-nistp256 [[RFC5656](#)].

{spt: i'm unsure whether the following is being done, but it could be done so i think it's worth mentioning it.}

Note that if the router supports public key certificates at this

point, which would have had to have been provided by the operator at this point, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 [[RFC6187](#)] could be used instead for authentication. The SSH certificate, profiled in [[RFC6187](#)], would be different than the BGPSEC certificate.

{spt: do the commands to generate/deposit a key need to come over the ethernet port or if they can come over the management port?}

Once generated, the operator establishes an SSH connection with the router and the management box is no longer needed. At this point, the choice of router-driven or operator-driven is vendor specific.

[3.1.](#) Router-Generated Keys

In the router-driven method, once an SSH connection is established between the operator and the router the operator issues a command, or commands, to generate the public/private key pair on the router, to generate the PKCS#10 that includes the router number and public key, and sign the PKCS#10 with the private key. [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] specifies the format for the PKCS #10 and the algorithm used to generate the signature is specified in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs].

{spt: Not sure if the distinction I made here between direct and indirect makes any sense.}

The PKCS#10 request can be directly transferred to the RPKI CA over the Ethernet port if the router supports protocols such as FTP and HTTP [[RFC2585](#)] using the application/pkcs10 media type [[RFC5967](#)] or EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport) [[I-D.ietf-pkix-est](#)]. The CA returns a successful request as a PKCS#7 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles], which includes the certificate, and uploads the certificate to the global RPKI. The response can be returned using the application/pkcs7-mime media type [[RFC5751](#)] if the router supports protocols such as FTP and HTTP.

The PKCS#10 request can also be indirectly transferred to the RPKI CA through the operator. The operator off-loads the PKCS#10 and uploads the request to their RPKI software management tools. The tools create and publish the certificate for the public key, and return the PKCS#7 to the router.

{spt: the bit about checking the returned certificate is new, but i think a good idea. but, does the CA's certificate get returned in the PKCS#7 - I couldn't find that in the cert profile?}

The router SHOULD extract the certificate from the PCKCS#7 and verify that the private key corresponds to the returned public key. The router SHOULD inform the operator that it has successfully received its certificate; this mechanism is out of scope. When the keys do not correspond, the router SHOULD inform the operator; this mechanism is out of scope. The router SHOULD also verify the returned certificate back to a trust anchor, but to perform this verification either the CA's certificate needs to be installed on the router via the CLI or the CA's certificate needs to be returned along with the router's certificate in the PKCS#7. The router SHOULD inform the operator if the signature does not validate to a trust anchor; this notification mechanism is out of scope. After performing these checks, the router need not retain the certificate.

Note that even if the operator can not get the private key off the router this still provides a linkage between a private key and a router.

[3.2.](#) Operator-Generated Keys

In the operator-driven method, the operator generates the private key and it is installed over the SSH connection established between the operator and the router. The operator uses their RPKI management tools to generate the keys, the PKCS#10 certification request, the certificate, and the PKCS#7 certification response as well as publish the certificate for the public key in the global RPKI. The private key MUST support the algorithm specified in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs], which for ECDSA is specified in [[RFC5915](#)]. The PKCS#10 and PKCS#7 are as specified in [[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles](#)].

{spt: i figured maybe we could sign the PKCS#8, but that would have to be done with a key other than the CA's key. It would have to be the operator's EE key.}

Along with the PKCS#7, the operator returns the private key. The private key is encapsulated in a PKCS #8 [[RFC5958](#)], the PKCS#8 is

further encapsulated in a CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) SignedData [[RFC5652](#)], and signed by the operator's EE certificate.

The router SHOULD verify the signature on the encapsulated PKCS#8 to ensure the returned private key in fact came from the operator, but this requires that the operator also provision via the CLI or include in the SignedData the RPKI CA certificates and operator's EE certificates. The router SHOULD inform the operator if the signature does not validate to a trust anchor; this notification mechanism is out of scope.

The router SHOULD extract the certificate for the PKCS#7 and verify that the private key corresponds to the returned public key. The router SHOULD inform the operator that it has successfully received its certificate; this mechanism is out of scope. When the keys do not correspond, the router SHOULD inform the operator; this mechanism is out of scope. The router SHOULD also verify the returned certificate back to a trust anchor, but to perform this verification either the CA's certificate needs to be installed on the router via the CLI or the CA's certificate needs to be returned along with the router's certificate in the PKCS#7. The router SHOULD inform the operator if the signature does not validate to a trust anchor; this notification mechanism is out of scope. After performing these checks, the router need not retain the certificate.

[5.](#) Other Use Cases

Current router code generates private keys for uses such as SSH, but the private keys may not be seen or off-loaded via CLI or any other means. While this is good security, it creates difficulties when a routing engine or whole router must be replaced in the field and all software which accesses the router must be updated with the new keys. Also, the initial contact with a new routing engine requires trust in the public key presented on first contact.

To allow operators to quickly replace routers without requiring update and distribution of the corresponding public keys in the RPKI, routers SHOULD allow the private BGPsec key to be off-loaded via the CLI, NetConf (see [[RFC6470](#)]), SNMP, etc. This lets the operator upload the old private key via the mechanism used for operator-generated keys, see [Section 3.2](#).

6. Security Considerations

Operator-generated keys could be intercepted in transport and the recipient router would have no way of knowing a substitution had been made or that the key had been disclosed by a monkey in the middle. Hence transport security is strongly RECOMMENDED. As noted in [Section 3](#), the level of security provided by the transport security SHOULD be commensurate with the BGPsec key. Additionally, operators SHOULD ensure the transport security implementation is up to date and addresses all known implementation bugs.

All generated key pairs MUST be generated from a good source of non-deterministic random input [[RFC4086](#)] and the private key MUST be protected in a secure fashion. Disclosure of the private key leads to masquerade [[RFC4949](#)]. The local storage format for the private key is a local matter.

Though the CA's certificate is installed on the router and used to verify the returned certificate is in fact signed by the CA, the revocation status of the CA's certificate is not checked. The operator MUST ensure that installed CA certificate is valid.

Operators need to manage their SSH keys to ensure only those authorized to access the router can. As employees no longer need access to the router, their keys SHOULD be removed from the router.

7. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA Considerations.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

Turner, et al. Expires August 27, 2013 [Page 6]

Internet-Draft Router Keying for BGPsec February 23, 2013

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), March 1997.

[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", [BCP 106](#), [RFC 4086](#), June 2005.

[RFC4253] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)

- Transport Layer Protocol", [RFC 4253](#), January 2006.
- [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, [RFC 5652](#), September 2009.
- [RFC5915] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure", [RFC 5915](#), June 2010.
- [RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", [RFC 5958](#), August 2010.
- [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Formats", [draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs](#) (work in progress), September 2012.
- [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests", [draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles](#) (work in progress), October 2012.

[8.2](#). Informative References

- [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC", [draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview](#) (work in progress), December 2012.
- [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", [draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol](#) (work in progress), October 2012.
- [I-D.ietf-pkix-est]
Pritikin, M., Yee, P., and D. Harkins "Enrollment over Secure Transport", [draft-ietf-pkix-est](#) (work in progress), February 2013.

Turner, et al.	Expires August 27, 2013	[Page 7]
----------------	-------------------------	----------

Internet-Draft	Router Keying for BGPsec	February 23, 2013
----------------	--------------------------	-------------------

ISO/IEC 8802-3 Information technology -
Telecommunications and information exchange between
systems - Local and metropolitan area networks -
Common specifications - Part 3: Carrier Sense
Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD)
Access Method and Physical Layer Specifications, 2008.

- [RFC2585] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP", [RFC 2585](#), May 1999.
- [RFC4253] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol", [RFC 4253](#), January 2006.
- [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI 36, [RFC 4949](#), August 2007.
- [RFC5647] Igoe, K. and J. Solinas, "AES Galois Counter Mode for the Secure Shell Transport Layer Protocol", [RFC 5647](#), August 2009.
- [RFC5656] Stebila, D. and J. Green, "Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer", [RFC 5656](#), December 2009.
- [RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification", [RFC 5751](#), January 2010.
- [RFC5967] Turner, S., "The application/pkcs10 Media Type", [RFC 5967](#), August 2010.
- [RFC6187] Igoe, K. and D. Stebila, "X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell Authentication", [RFC 6187](#), March 2011.
- [RFC6470] Bierman, A., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Base Notifications", [RFC 6470](#), February 2012.
- [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", [RFC 6480](#), February 2012.
- [RFC6668] Bider, D. and M. Baushke, "SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol", [RFC 6668](#), July 2012.

Authors' Addresses

Sean Turner
IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, Virginia 22031
US

Email: turners@ieca.com

Keyur Patel
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
US

Email: keyupate@cisco.com

Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US

Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
Email: randy@psg.com

