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A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)

Abstract

This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC 6482.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

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Table of Contents

- [1. Introduction](#)
 - [1.1. Changes from RFC6482](#)
- [2. Related Work](#)
- [3. The ROA ContentType](#)
- [4. The ROA eContent](#)
 - [4.1. version](#)
 - [4.2. asID](#)
 - [4.3. ipAddrBlocks](#)
- [5. ROA Validation](#)
- [6. Security Considerations](#)
- [7. IANA Considerations](#)
 - [7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type \(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1\)](#)
 - [7.2. RPKI Signed Objects sub-registry](#)
 - [7.3. File Extension](#)
 - [7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier \(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0\)](#)
 - [7.5. Media Type](#)
- [8. References](#)
 - [8.1. Normative References](#)
 - [8.2. Informative References](#)
- [Appendix A. Acknowledgements](#)
- [Appendix B. Example ROA eContent Payload](#)
- [Authors' Addresses](#)

1. Introduction

The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security. (See [[RFC6480](#)] for more information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow entities to verify that an AS has been given permission by an IP

address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes within that block. A ROA provides this function.

The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] wrapper for the ROA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document defines:

- *The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA. (This OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object).
- *The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the payload that specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.) The ROA eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690].
- *Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).

1.1. Changes from RFC6482

This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6482] and the profile described in this document.

- *Clarifications on the requirements for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers X.509 certificate extension.
- *Strengthening of ASN.1 formal notation.
- *Incorporate errata.
- *Add an example ROA payload and ROA as appendix.

2. Related Work

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].

Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object profile [RFC6488]; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed. Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates

adhering to the RPKI Resource Certificate Profile [[RFC6487](#)]; thus, familiarity with that profile is also assumed.

3. The ROA ContentType

The content-type for a ROA is defined as routeOriginAuthz and has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.

This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see [[RFC6488](#)]).

4. The ROA eContent

The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS number. A ROA is formally defined as:

```

RPKI-ROA-2022 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
  pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiROA-2022(TBD) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
  CONTENT-TYPE
  FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
      pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;

ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
  { TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
    IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }

id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
    pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }

RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
  version [0]          INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
  asID                 ASID,
  ipAddrBlocks         SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }

ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)

ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
  -- Note: addressFamily can only be '0001'H (IPv4) or '0002'H (IPv6) --
  addressFamily        OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)),
  addresses             SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress
}

ROAIPAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
  address              IPAddress,
  -- Note: maxLength must be equal or larger than size of IPAddress, --
  -- and equal or smaller to what the AFI context permits --
  maxLength            INTEGER (0..128) OPTIONAL
}

-- Note: if the ROAIPAddressFamily's addressFamily is IPv4, the --
-- IPAddress' size cannot exceed 32; conversely if addressFamily --
-- is IPv6, size can't exceed 128. --
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING (SIZE(0..128))

END

```

4.1. version

The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation MUST be 0.

4.2. asID

The asID field contains the AS number that is authorized to originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.

4.3. ipAddrBlocks

The ipAddrBlocks field encodes the set of IP address prefixes to which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax here is more restrictive than that used in the IP Address Delegation extension defined in RFC 3779. That extension can represent arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only prefixes.

Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, addressFamily contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family. This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6. Therefore, addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002. There MUST be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI. The ROAIPAddressFamily structure MUST NOT appear more than twice.

Within a ROAIPAddress structure, the addresses field represents prefixes as a sequence of type IPAddress. (See [RFC3779] for more details). If present, the maxLength MUST be an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying prefix, and less than or equal to the length (in bits) of an IP address in the address family (32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6). When present, the maxLength specifies the maximum length of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise. (For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113/24 and the maxLength is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more specific prefix with a maximum length of 26. In this example, the AS would be authorized to advertise 203.0.113/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or 203.0.113.0/25, but not 203.0.113.0/27.) When the maxLength is not present, the AS is only authorized to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROA.

Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA may contain the prefix 203.0.113/24 with maxLength 26, as well as the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28. (Such a ROA would authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28.) Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the IP address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this is NOT RECOMMENDED as, in

such a case, the ROAIPAddress with the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA.

5. ROA Validation

Before a relying party can use a ROA to validate a routing announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ROA. To validate a ROA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in [[RFC6488](#)] as well as the following additional ROA-specific validation steps.

- *The IP Address Delegation extension [[RFC3779](#)] is present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every IP address prefix(es) in the ROA payload is contained within the set of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP Address Delegation extension.

- *The EE certificate MUST NOT use "inherit" elements as described in [[RFC3779](#)].

- *The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension described in [[RFC3779](#)] is not used in Route Origin Authorizations and MUST NOT be present.

6. Security Considerations

There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication. Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.

The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to originate a route to the prefix(es) in the ROA. Thus, the integrity of a ROA MUST be established. The ROA specification makes use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations in [[RFC6488](#)] also apply to ROAs. Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations associated with that data structure.

The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the prefix(es) is established through use of the address space and AS number PKI described in [[RFC6480](#)]. Specifically, one MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the ROA are

contained within those in the certificate's IP Address Delegation Extension.

7. IANA Considerations

7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)

The IANA has allocated for this document in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry:

Decimal	Description	References

24	id-ct-routeOriginAuthz	[RFC6482][RFC-to-be]

Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to reference the RFC publication instead of this draft.

7.2. RPKI Signed Objects sub-registry

The IANA has registered the OID for the RPKI Signed Checklist in the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by [[RFC6488](#)] as follows:

Name	OID	Specification

ROA	1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24	[RFC6482][RFC-TBD]

7.3. File Extension

The IANA has added an item for the ROA file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by [[RFC6481](#)] as follows:

Filename Extension	RPKI Object	Reference

.roa	Route Origination Authorization	[RFC6481][RFC-to-be]

Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to make this addition permanent and to reference the RFC publication instead of this draft.

7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)

The IANA is requested to allocate for this document in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:

Decimal	Description	References
TBD	id-mod-rpkiROA-2022	[RFC-to-be]

7.5. Media Type

The IANA is requested to update the media type application/rpki-roa in the "Media Type" registry as follows:

Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-roa
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ROA [RFC-to-be].
 This media type contains no active content. See
 Section 6 of [RFC-to-be] for further information.
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: [RFC-to-be]
Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
Additional information:
 Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
 in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
 prefixes and an AS identifier as defined in [RFC-to-be].
 Magic number(s): None
 File extension(s): .roa
 Macintosh file type code(s):
Person & email address to contact for further information:
 Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Change controller: IETF

8. References

8.1. Normative References

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- [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>>.
- [X.690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015.

8.2. Informative References

- [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>>.
- [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation

List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>>.

[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, February 2012, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>>.

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

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Appendix B. Example ROA eContent Payload

Below an example of a DER encoded ROA eContent is provided with annotation following the '#' character.

```
$ echo 302402023CCA301E301C04020002301630090307002001067C208C30090307002
| xxd -r -ps \
| openssl asn1parse -i -dump -inform DER
  0:d=0  hl=2 l= 36 cons: SEQUENCE                # RouteOriginAtt
  2:d=1  hl=2 l=  2 prim: INTEGER                  :3CCA      # asID 15562
  6:d=1  hl=2 l= 30 cons: SEQUENCE                # ipAddrBlocks
  8:d=2  hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE                # ROAIPAddressF
10:d=3  hl=2 l=  2 prim: OCTET STRING             # addressFam1
    0000 - 00 02                                ..        # IPv6
14:d=3  hl=2 l= 22 cons: SEQUENCE                # addresses
16:d=4  hl=2 l=  9 cons: SEQUENCE                # ROAIPAddress
18:d=5  hl=2 l=  7 prim: BIT STRING              # address
    0000 - 00 20 01 06 7c 20 8c                . ..| .   # 2001:67c:
27:d=4  hl=2 l=  9 cons: SEQUENCE                # ROAIPAddress
29:d=5  hl=2 l=  7 prim: BIT STRING              # address
    0000 - 00 2a 0e b2 40                        .*..@     # 2a0e:b240
    0007 - <SPACES/NULS>
```

Below is a complete [Base64](#) [RFC4648] encoded RPKI ROA Signed Object.

MIIHCwYJKoZIHvcNAQcCoIIG/DCCBvgCAQMxD TALBg1ghkgBZQMEAgEwNwYlKoZIHvcNAQkQ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